- Cohousing: An Idea for the Modern Age, by Nancy J. White & Charly Loper, February 18, 2015.
- Failure to Launch: Housing, Debt Overhang, and the Inflation Option During the Great Recession, by Aaron Hedlund, February 23, 2015.
- Have Distressed Neighborhoods Recovered? Evidence from the Neighborhood Stabilization Program, by Jenny Schuetz, Jonathan S. Spader, & Alvaro Cortes, March 4, 2015.
- Incorporating NY Land Banks into the Delinquent Property Tax Enforcement Processes, by J. Justin Woods, New York Zoning Law and Practice Report, Spring 2015, Forthcoming.
- The Impact of Investors on Housing Values and Markets, by Sumit Agarwal, John P. Harding, & Vincent Yao, January 27, 2015.
- Urban Renewal Amidst National Divides: Can Housing Development (Partially) Correct Past Injustices?, by Neta Ziv, Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law Policy, Vol. XXII, No. 1, 2015.
Tag Archives: investors
A Framework For Housing Finance
The Government Accountability Office has released Housing Finance System: A Framework for Assessing Potential Changes. The GAO writes,
To help policymakers assess various proposals for changing the single-family housing finance system and consider ways in which the system could be made more effective and efficient, we prepared this report under the authority of the Comptroller General. Specifically, this report (1) describes market developments since 2000 that have led to changes in the federal government’s role in single-family housing finance; (2) analyzes whether and how these market developments have challenged the housing finance system; and (3) presents an evaluation framework for assessing potential changes to the housing finance system. (2)
It is useful to have a framework to figure out what kind of housing finance system we want for the 21st century. The GAO’s has 9 elements:
- Clearly defined and prioritized housing finance system goals
- Policies and mechanisms that are aligned with goals and other economic policies
- Adherence to an appropriate financial regulatory framework
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Government entities that have capacity to manage risks
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Mortgage borrowers are protected and barriers to mortgage market access are addressed
- Protection for mortgage securities investors
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Consideration of cyclical nature of housing finance and impact of housing finance on financial stability
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Recognition and control of fiscal exposure and mitigation of moral hazard
- Emphasis on implications of the transition (54-55)
This all sounds very Yoda-like, but the report itself goes into great detail as to what each of these 9 elements means. Given that Congress has left the housing finance system to its own devices, it is helpful that other branches of government like the GAO, Treasury and the FHFA are trying to move us beyond our current state of limbo. We need a housing finance system that is designed to last longer than the Band Aids and duct tape that were applied to it during the financial crisis.
Reiss on New Residential Real Estate Exchange
NationSwell quoted me in Can’t Afford a Down Payment? Let Investors Help You Buy Your Home. It reads in part,
Enter PRIMARQ, the world’s first residential real-estate equity exchange — a soon-to-launch venture of San Francisco entrepreneur Steve Cinelli. Can’t afford a down payment? Let investors put together the capital you can’t, without relinquishing all your clout as a homeowner. By letting “co-owners” buy shares in your home, you’re able to put down a bigger down payment, which means you end up carrying less debt and can get a loan free of mortgage insurance, which is commonly tacked on for down payments of less than 20 percent. “I think the market is overly dependent on mortgage-debt financing,” Cinelli says. “The application of debt has gone way too far.”
Investors can bet on housing without having to deal with the actual house. They’ll get their money back (plus profits if there are any), under one of several circumstances: when you sell your home, when you decide to buy back your shares, or when the investor sells his shares back to the PRIMARQ exchange itself, which offers a “liquidity guaranteed” 90 percent of their value. So, if an investor puts up $10,000, and then wants to cash out for any reason before you sell your home, they’ll walk away with no less than $9,000 (unless the home price drops) — and it doesn’t affect you either way.
Not all homebuyers and not all houses can qualify for PRIMARQ funding. If there’s a mortgage involved, the buyer has to meet strict credit-score criteria, and the home has to have a certain expected price appreciation — meaning it’s got to be a decent property in a good location. That doesn’t necessarily rule out homes in lower-income neighborhoods, but it does stand to reason that unless those neighborhoods are deemed “up-and-coming,” the homes there might not qualify for PRIMARQ.
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To be sure, the PRIMARQ model involves risks for both investors and homeowners — not the least of which is a gaming of the system by nefarious investors, says David Reiss, a professor of law at Brooklyn Law School in New York who researches and writes about the American housing-finance sector. While Reiss calls PRIMARQ a “supercool idea” for all the aforementioned reasons, he could imagine various ways for unsophisticated homeowners to get fleeced without proper consumer protection regulations (the program has not yet been reviewed by a government regulatory agency). Unscrupulous investors could demand fees or increased equity in exchange for agreeing to help fund a second mortgage, for example. By participating in PRIMARQ as a homeowner, “you are not the master of your own destiny,” Reiss says.
Ain’t Misrepresentin’
According to Wikipedia, the performers in the musical Ain’t Misbehavin’ “present an evening of rowdy, raunchy, and humorous songs that encapsulate the various moods of the era and reflect” a “view of life as a journey meant for pleasure and play.” In U.S. RMBS Roundtable: Arrangers And Investors Discuss The Role Of Representations And Warranties In U.S. RMBS Transactions, S&P does something similar with securitization. It presents the views of industry players as they try to predict and shape the future of the recently emerging private-label RMBS market, in the hopes of “achieving a healthy and sustainable RMBS market.” (2)
ACT I: Lookin’ Good but Feelin’ Bad
The piece contains a lot of important insights, including the following point made by investors: “standardizing R&Ws would be a step towards improving the transparency and their ease of understanding. Smaller investors noted that they can be particularly limited in distinguishing R&Ws given the complexities involved.” (3)
This point encapsulates in so many words the classic market for lemons problem, famously formalized by George Akerlof. The lemon problem leads us to ask how a buyer is to price a purchase where the buyer has less information about the product than the seller. Because of this information assymetry, the purchaser will assume the worst about the product and offer to buy it with that in mind.
R&Ws are an attempt to overcome that problem because the RMBS arranger or the mortgage originator promises to compensate the investor for lemons that are contained with a mortgage pool securing an RMBS. Consistent with that view, investors noted that “they expected to be compensated for losses caused by origination defects, rather than legitimate life events.” (2) In other words, origination defects are the lemons that should be borne by the arranger/originator with its superior information about the mortgages. And “legitimate life events” represent the credit risk that the investors have signed up for.
ACT II: That Ain’t Right
Arrangers and originators made the following points:
- [o]ne arranger indicated that the R&W process should be governed only by the contractual obligations negotiated for each deal. (2)
- [o]riginators have strict underwriting guidelines and said they take great care to follow those procedures before issuing a loan. Arrangers are also currently subjecting all or almost all loans to a third-party due-diligence review. (2)
- arrangers said that standardizing R&Ws will not be an easy task as differences between arrangers and product types will limit the degree to which R&Ws can be homogenized. (3)
These points clearly align with the interests of the seller in a market for lemons. To restate them a bit, 1. caveat emptor; 2. arrangers and originators don’t sell lemons (!); and (3) it is too hard to come up with provisions that consistently protect investors so don’t bother trying.
ENCORE: Find Out What They Like
S&P notes that there “was broad agreement that one of the keys to achieving a healthy and sustainable RMBS market is aligning the interests of arrangers and investors.” (2) From that broader perspective, S&P is right that the industry should work toward a state of affairs that “minimizes the cost of unknown risks and ultimately reduces losses and related litigation.” (2) Given the spate of lawsuits over reps and warranties, we had fallen shy of that mark in the past (here, for example). It remains to be seen if the industry can get it better next time and if the incentives are aligned enough to do so.
