What $4 Billion Does for Homeowners

Enterprise released a Policy Focus on What the JPMorgan Chase Settlement Means for Consumers: An Analysis of the $4 Billion in Consumer Relief Obligations. It opens,

On November 19, 2013, JPMorgan Chase reached a record-setting settlement deal with the federal government’s Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) Working Group for $13 billion, which included $4 billion in consumer relief for struggling homeowners and hard-hit communities.

This brief examines how the $4 billion obligation will likely flow to consumers over the next four years. According to the settlement terms, eligible activities for which JPMorgan Chase will receive credit broadly include: loan modifications; rate reduction and refinancing; low- to moderate-income/disaster area lending; and anti-blight work. (1)

Enterprise projects that JPMorgan’s $4 Billion obligation will

translate into $4.65 billion in relief for existing homeowners, with an additional $15 million going to homebuyers, and as much as $380 million in cash and REO properties allocated to reducing foreclosure-related blight. Our analysis projects that over 26,500 borrowers will receive a total of $2.6 billion in principal forgiveness, which translates into $1.5 billion in credit toward the bank’s obligation. Forbearance will be extended on 17,000 loans, and slightly more than 7,000 second liens will be fully or partially forgiven. In addition to forgiveness or forbearance, we anticipate the interest rates on approximately 26,500 loans will be reduced, resulting in a real borrower savings of $1.4 billion. (1)

We’re talking about some pretty big numbers here, so it might be useful to break them down on a per borrower basis.

  • 26,500 loans will receive interest rate reductions resulting in $1.4 billion in consumer benefit, or $52,830 per loan.
  • 26,500 borrowers will receive $2.6 billion in principal forgiveness, or $98,113 per homeowner.

The report, unfortunately, does not parse these big numbers out so well. For instance, do they reflect savings over the expected life of the loans or over the remaining term? We also do not know whether these changes, large as they are, will leave sustainable loans in their place. So, this is a report provides a useful starting point, but some very big questions about the settlement still remain to be answered.

Reiss in Bloomberg on CS Lawsuit

Bloomberg quoted me in Credit Suisse Waits for $11 Billion Answer in N.Y. Fraud Suit.  It reads in part,

As Credit Suisse Group AG (CSGN) sees it, time has run out on New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman’s pursuit of Wall Street banks for mortgage fraud that helped trigger the financial crisis.

Schneiderman sued Credit Suisse in 2012 as part of a wide-ranging probe into mortgage bonds. He claimed Switzerland’s second-largest bank misrepresented the risks associated with $93.8 billion in mortgage-backed securities issued in 2006 and 2007.

Credit Suisse asked a Manhattan judge in December to dismiss Schneiderman’s case, as well as his demand for as much as $11.2 billion in damages. The bank argued that New York, by waiting so long to file the lawsuit, missed a three-year legal deadline for suing. The state countered that it had six years to file its complaint.

If the bank wins, Schneiderman will face a new roadblock as he considers similar multibillion-dollar claims against a dozen other Wall Street firms. The judge in New York State Supreme Court could rule at any time.

“It would obviously tilt everything in the favor of Credit Suisse and similarly situated financial institutions,” said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School, hindering New York’s remaining efforts to hold banks accountable for mistakes that spurred a recession.

*     *     *

Since the latest bonds cited in Schneiderman’s suit originated in 2006 and 2007, if the judge chooses the bank’s argument, the lawsuit may be dismissed. If the judge takes Schneiderman’s more expansive view, most or all of the suspect bonds may still be covered by the litigation.

“The entire case is time-barred,” Richard Clary, a lawyer for the bank, told Friedman at the December hearing. Lawyers for the state argued that such limits weren’t intended to apply to the attorney general.

“We’ve successfully resolved cases filed within six years,” Deputy Attorney General Virginia Chavez Romano said, citing last year’s JPMorgan accord. “It has been our decades-long practice.”

So far, New York’s courts have broadly interpreted the statute in finding a six-year period, Brooklyn Law School’s Reiss said. That may be changing as legal scholars and financial industry lawyers question its propriety.

“Having these incredibly long and ambiguous statutes of limitations is not particularly fair,” he said.

*     *     *

Friedman’s ruling in the Credit Suisse case may be crucial to Schneiderman’s probe of close to a dozen other banks, and whether he can sue them successfully.

New York agreed with the firms in October 2012 that any legal deadline for bringing fraud claims against them would be suspended while he continues his investigation, a person familiar with the matter said.

Such tolling agreements stopped the clock on any statute of limitations and ensured Schneiderman can bring fraud claims against banks for conduct going as far back as 2006, said the person.

Brooklyn Law School’s Reiss said the banks may have agreed to the delay to avoid forcing Schneiderman to file a “kitchen sink complaint with every possible allegation in it” just to beat the clock. Doing so also builds good will with regulators and may also facilitate a favorable settlement.

The agreements don’t necessarily mean that suits will be filed, the person said. If Schneiderman sues any of the banks, they may then assert the statute of limitations is three years, and not six, just as Credit Suisse has done.

*     *     *

This may be a more potent argument if Friedman rules for the Swiss bank in the pending case.

A three-year statute-of-limitations would mean they can’t be held responsible for transactions before 2009, while a six-year deadline would allow Schneiderman to reach back to 2006.

There’s “great uncertainty” about whether Schneiderman can move forward with the Credit Suisse case in light of the statute of limitations arguments, said James Cox, a corporate law professor at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina.

Reiss said that any ruling would probably be challenged all the way to the Court of Appeals in Albany, the state’s highest court.

National Mortgage Settlement Update

Joseph A. Smith, Jr., the Monitor of the National Mortgage Settlement (NMS), has issued his Second Compliance Report (I blogged about an earlier report here) which has been filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia. According to the Monitor, Ally Financial and Wells Fargo were not in violation of the settlement at all during 2013 and BoA’s and Chase’s deficiencies were not widespread. Citi had a widespread deficiency.

The Monitor’s conclusion echoes his earlier report although his tone is more optimistic than last time:

It is clear to me that the servicers have additional work to do both in their efforts to fully comply with the NMS and to regain their customers’ trust. The Monitor Reports that I have just filed with the Court show, however, that the Settlement is addressing shortcomings in the treatment of distressed borrowers.

CAPs [corrective action plans], including remediation efforts when required, have been implemented or are in process. If the CAPs are not successful, the Monitoring Committee and I will take additional action, as dictated by the Settlement. In addition, we have applied what we have learned to enhance our oversight of the servicers by creating four new metrics to address persistent issues in the marketplace. (16)

The big five banks appear to be improving their compliance with the settlement, which is obviously a good thing. But there is still work to be done to improve loan servicing. The monitor notes the top ten complaints about servicers that were submitted by elected officials on behalf of their constituents:

1 Single point of contact was not provided, was difficult to deal with or was difficult to reach.

2 Single point of contact was non-responsive.

3 Servicer did not take appropriate action to remediate inaccuracies in borrower’s account.

4 Servicer failed to update the borrower’s contact information and/or account balance.

5 Servicer failed to correct errors in the borrower’s account information.

6 The borrower was “dual-tracked.” In other words, the borrower submitted an application for loss mitigation, and although it was in process or pending, the borrower was foreclosed upon.

7 Servicer did not accept payments or incorrectly applied them.

8 Servicer did not follow appropriate loss mitigation procedures.

9 The borrower received requests for financial statements they already provided.

10 The completed first lien modification request was not responded to within 30 days.

Total Executive Office complaints for all servicers: 44,570 (n.p.)

Obviously not every complaint is valid, but these numbers suggest that the settlement is not being fully complied with.

Is Banks’ $200 Billion Payout from RMBS Lawsuits Enough?

S&P issued a brief, The Largest U.S. Banks Should Be Able To Withstand The Ramifications Of Legal Issues, that quantifies the exposure that big banks have from litigation arising from the Subprime Crisis:

Since 2009, the largest U.S. banks (Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, and Wells Fargo) together have paid or set aside more than $45 billion for mortgage representation and warranty (rep and warranty) issues and have incurred roughly $50 billion in combined legal expenses .  . . This does not include another roughly $30 billion of expenses and mortgage payment relief to consumers to settle mortgage servicing issues. We estimate that the largest banks may need to pay out an additional $55 billion to $105 billion to settle mortgage-related issues, some of which is already accounted for in these reserves. (2)

S&P believes “that the largest banks have, in aggregate, about a $155 billion buffer, which includes a capital cushion, representation and warranty reserves, and our estimate of legal reserves, to absorb losses from a range of additional mortgage-related and other legal exposures.” (2) As far as their ratings go, S&P has already incorporated “heightened legal issues into our ratings, and we currently don’t expect legal settlements to result in negative rating actions for U.S. banks.” (2) But it warns, “an immediate and unexpected significant legal expense could result in the weakening of a bank’s business model through the loss of key clients and employees, as well as the weakening of its capital position.” (2) S&P also acknowledges that there are some not yet quantifiable risks out there, such as DoJ’s FIRREA suits.

As the endgame of the financial crisis begins to take shape and financial institutions are held accountable for their actions, one is left wondering about a group who is left relatively unscathed: financial institution employees who received mega bonuses for involving these banks in these bad deals. As we think about the inevitable next crisis, we should ask if there is a way to hold those individuals accountable too.

Doing Justice with the $13B JPMorgan Settlement

I have posted a couple of items on this massive settlement (here and here).  This should be my last one. Perhaps I am ungrateful, but the Statement of Facts agreed upon by the Department of Justice and JPMorgan Chase left me with an empty feeling. Recovering $13 billion for homeowners, investors and the government is certainly a key aspect of the justice done in this case. But the law can and should have an expressive function — it should make a statement about the difference between right and wrong behavior. Unfortunately, the Statement of Facts almost completely fails as an expressive document.

It only makes it clear at one point that JPMorgan, Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual did something very wrong:

employees of JPMorgan, Bear Stearns, and WaMu received information that, in certain instances, loans that did not comply with underwriting guidelines were included in the RMBS sold and marketed to investors; however, JPMorgan, Bear Stearns, and WaMu did not disclose this to securitization investors. (1)

The Statement of Facts provided a couple of facts that made clear what JPMorgan did wrong (see page 2), but I could not even parse the sections of Bear Stearns and WaMu to tell you what they did wrong. This is about as strong as it gets:

in 2008, internal WaMu reviews indicated specific instances of weaknesses in WaMu’s loan origination and underwriting practices, including, at times, non-compliance with underwriting standards; the reviews also revealed instances of borrower fraud and misrepresentations by others involved in the loan origination process with respect to the information provided for loan qualification purposes. (10)

You can’t tell from such language whether WaMu was acting intentionally, recklessly or negligently.  You can’t really tell whether this behavior was endemic, frequent, occasional or rare. You can’t tell whether it was the fault of some low-level employees or of upper management. Just about the only thing you can tell from the WaMu section (and the Bear Stearns section, for that matter) is that it was not JPMorgan’s fault:

The actions and omissions described above with respect to WaMu occurred prior to OTS’s closure of WaMu and JPMorgan’s acquisition of the identified WaMu assets and liabilities. (11)

No doubt, JPMorgan tried to control the PR and legal liability to third parties that this Statement of Facts could engender. But Justice could have held the line on the expressive aspect of the settlement just as it did with the monetary aspect. In the long run, that could turn out to be just as important.

And How About the Just?

Some believe that there are 36 righteous people whose existence justifies the whole of humanity.  Each bears the world’s pain and the world would come to an end without these Just ones. Oddly enough, I was thinking about this story when reading about the the JPMorgan Chase settlement with the Department of Justice.

I was glad to see that the company was being held accountable for its behavior (the Statement of Facts outlines the basis for the settlement).  I was also glad to see that Justice is not giving a free pass to the individuals who may be individually guilty of wrongdoing. The settlement does not bar future prosecutions and Justice seems energized to hold individuals accountable for their intentional and wrongful acts that contributed to the financial crisis. These actions by Justice will hopefully deter some potential wrongdoers going forward.

But what is missing from all of this allocating of responsibility is an acknowledgment that some people in these financial institutions tried to do the right thing. They tried to underwrite mortgages properly; they tried to rate securities properly; they tried to follow established due diligence procedures. These people were overrun by their superiors who were chasing short term profits for their employers and bigger annual bonuses for themselves. Some of these Financial Industry Just were fired, some retired, some moved on.

How might the FI Just view their actions so many years later? Their supervisors likely received large bonuses and promotions and very few of them will be held responsible for their bad acts. The FI Just, on other other hand, got harsh words, poor treatment and relatively poor compensation for their troubles.

Just as we want to disincentivize bad behavior, we should also seek to incentivize good behavior. This does not necessarily require financial compensation. For many people, an acknowledgement of their good judgment might be enough. Is there a role for government in such an initiative? Can their be a medal for financial rectitude; an honor roll for underwriting: a listing of the Just by Justice?

 

National Mortgage Settlement: Not Too Compliant

The Summary of Compliance: A Report from the Monitor of the National Mortgage Settlement
documents just how hard it is for the big five mortgage servicers (ResCap parties (formerly Ally/GMAC), Bank of America, Citi, JPMorgan Chase and Wells Fargo) to comply with a settlement that they themselves had agreed to.
The report tracks, among other things, complaints by professionals who work for borrowers.  The top ten are
  1. Bank failed to offer loan modification/loss mitigation opportunity.
  2. Bank failed to provide single point of contact.
  3. Bank failed to make a determination on the borrower’s loan modification no later than 30 days after receiving the complete application.
  4. Bank foreclosed while a loan modification/loss mitigation was pending.
  5. Single point of contact failed to carry out responsibilities of working with borrower on loan modification/loss mitigation activities.
  6. Bank failed to notify borrower of any known deficiency in initial submission of information no later than 5 days of receipt.
  7. Bank failed to communicate with borrower’s authorized representatives.
  8. Bank failed to keep the same single point of contact assigned until all the borrower’s needs were met.
  9. Bank failed to provide one or more direct means of communication with the single point of contact.
  10. Bank failed to acknowledge receipt of first lien loan modification application within 3 business days. (8)

I assume that the servicers are not willfully flouting the settlement because of the negative publicity they would receive for doing so as well as the millions of dollars of fines that they could thereby accrue. So these complaints must reflect some kind of systemic incompetence.  Servicers must either continue to be dramatically under-resourced to handle their work or they are bloated bureaucracies that cannot consistently disseminate key information internally or externally. Taking just the most extreme example, it is shocking (if true) that in 2013 banks are still foreclosing while loan modifications are pending with homeowners.

The Monitor, Joseph A. Smith, Jr., concludes, “It is clear to me that the servicers have additional work to do both in their efforts to fully comply with the NMS and to regain their customers’ trust. There continue to be issues with the loan modification process, single point of contact, and customer records.” (9) Amen to that.