Jefferson on Governing

photo by Aaron Vowels

President Jefferson on Mount Rushmore

In commemoration of Independence Day, I quote from Thomas Jefferson’s First Inaugural Address as President of the United States in 1801:

About to enter, fellow-citizens, on the exercise of duties which comprehend everything dear and valuable to you, it is proper you should understand what I deem the essential principles of our Government, and consequently those which ought to shape its Administration. I will compress them within the narrowest compass they will bear, stating the general principle, but not all its limitations. Equal and exact justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, religious or political; peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none; the support of the State governments in all their rights, as the most competent administrations for our domestic concerns and the surest bulwarks against anti-republican tendencies; the preservation of the General Government in its whole constitutional vigor, as the sheet anchor of our peace at home and safety abroad; a jealous care of the right of election by the people — a mild and safe corrective of abuses which are lopped by the sword of revolution where peaceable remedies are unprovided; absolute acquiescence in the decisions of the majority, the vital principle of republics, from which is no appeal but to force, the vital principle and immediate parent of despotism; a well-disciplined militia, our best reliance in peace and for the first moments of war till regulars may relieve them; the supremacy of the civil over the military authority; economy in the public expense, that labor may be lightly burthened; the honest payment of our debts and sacred preservation of the public faith; encouragement of agriculture, and of commerce as its handmaid; the diffusion of information and arraignment of all abuses at the bar of the public reason; freedom of religion; freedom of the press, and freedom of person under the protection of the habeas corpus, and trial by juries impartially selected. These principles form the bright constellation which has gone before us and guided our steps through an age of revolution and reformation. The wisdom of our sages and blood of our heroes have been devoted to their attainment. They should be the creed of our political faith, the text of civic instruction, the touchstone by which to try the services of those we trust; and should we wander from them in moments of error or of alarm, let us hasten to retrace our steps and to regain the road which alone leads to peace, liberty, and safety.

Let us hope that our current leaders, and we the people, rededicate ourselves to the 21st century version of these principles on this our Independence Day.

Are Billions Enough?

Jenner & Block has issued the Citi Monitorship First Report. By way of background,

The Settlement Agreement resolved potential federal and state legal claims for violations of law in connection with the packaging, marketing, sale, structuring, arrangement, and issuance of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) between 2006 and 2007. As explained below, in the Settlement Agreement, Citi agreed to pay $4.5 billion to the settling governmental entities, acknowledged a statement of facts attached as Annex 1, and agreed to provide consumer relief that would be valued at $2.5 billion under the valuation principles set forth in Annex 2.2 As part of the Settlement Agreement, [Jenner partner] Thomas J. Perrelli was appointed as independent monitor (Monitor) to determine Citi’s compliance with the consumer relief and corresponding requirements of the Settlement Agreement. This is the first report assessing Citi’s progress toward completion of those obligations. (3, footnote omitted)

Because this is the first report, much of it sets the stage for what is to come. I was, however, struck by the section titled “Impact of Relief Provided:”

To evaluate fully the impact of the relief that is the subject of this report and authorized under the Settlement Agreement would require a variety of activities not contemplated by the settlement and not easily achievable (e.g., interviews with individual homeowners). Isolating the effect of this settlement, the National Mortgage Settlement, and other RMBS settlements from the broader housing market is also difficult.

One question frequently asked is whether the relief provided to borrowers and for which Citi has received credit would have been provided in any event (e.g., is this really additional?) On this question, the answer is mixed. Given ordinary accounting practices, loans for which foreclosure does not make economic sense are frequently written-off by financial institutions. In that circumstance, however, the banks may not release liens as a matter of routine, leaving borrowers with an ongoing burden and impeding potential efforts to redevelop the property. To get credit under the Settlement Agreement, Citi was required to release the lien, thus giving an additional benefit to the homeowner to allow him or her to make a fresh start and to remove any legal obstacles from the transfer of the property. (17, footnote omitted)

As I have noted before, it is hard to truly assess the restorative and retributive impacts of the ten and eleven digit settlements of litigation arising from the financial crisis. Are individuals appropriately helped? Are wrongdoers appropriately punished? Are current actors appropriately deterred?  I find it bizarre that it is so hard to tell even when settlements are measured in the billions of dollars.

Reiss on Dimming of FIRREA

Inside MBS & ABS quoted me in Judge Recommends Dismissal of DOJ’s Fraud Case Against BofA, But It May Not End FIRREA Claims (behind paywall). It reads,

A North Carolina federal magistrate has recommended that a Justice Department fraud case against Bank of America be dismissed, but he also said a separate Securities and Exchange Commission lawsuit against the bank based on a different federal law should proceed.

The DOJ last August filed suit against BofA under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, accusing the bank of defrauding investors in the sale of $855 million of nonagency MBS. Last week, U.S. Magistrate David Cayer of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina found that the government failed to prove the bank made “material” false statements to the former Federal Housing Finance Board.

The DOJ claimed that BofA “willfully” misled investors, including the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco and Wachovia Corp. – now owned by Wells Fargo – about the risks in the 2008 offering by failing to fully disclose the risk of 1,191 jumbo adjustable-rate mortgages backing the deal.

FIRREA allows the government to seek civil penalties equal to losses suffered by federally insured financial institutions, with a maximum of $1.1 million per violation. The 1989 law was a little used relic of the savings and loan aftermath until government lawyers began recently to invoke it widely in addition to other charges.

The law gives agency lawyers the ability to tap grand jury material and to subpoena documents. FIRREA also has a 10-year statute of limitations, longer than the typical five years for fraud cases, allowing government lawyers more time to pursue cases related to the 2007-2008 financial crisis.

The magistrate rejected the government’s claim that BofA’s statements were in violation of FIRREA because the FHLBank of San Francisco was within the jurisdiction of the FHFB. Cayer found that policing such statements did not fall within the agency’s purview and there was no indication that either the FHFB or the FHLBank ever complained about the MBS.

The magistrate recommended the DOJ’s case be dismissed without prejudice, although District Judge Max Cogburn will have the final word. Cayer allowed a parallel complaint filed by the SEC to move forward.

David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School, noted that U.S. district judges often give deference to reports from magistrate judges. But even if Cogburn opts to dismiss the DOJ’s case, it’s less an indictment against the use of FIRREA and more an indication that the government filed its case incorrectly, he said.

“Is it a harbinger that all other judges are going to change their minds about the broad reading of FIRREA? I don’t see that at all,” Reiss told Inside MBS & ABS. “I see judges in New York and in other jurisdictions continuing to allow the government to broadly interpret FIRREA based on its plain language. They are reading the text of the statute and saying the government can act.”

Doing Justice with the $13B JPMorgan Settlement

I have posted a couple of items on this massive settlement (here and here).  This should be my last one. Perhaps I am ungrateful, but the Statement of Facts agreed upon by the Department of Justice and JPMorgan Chase left me with an empty feeling. Recovering $13 billion for homeowners, investors and the government is certainly a key aspect of the justice done in this case. But the law can and should have an expressive function — it should make a statement about the difference between right and wrong behavior. Unfortunately, the Statement of Facts almost completely fails as an expressive document.

It only makes it clear at one point that JPMorgan, Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual did something very wrong:

employees of JPMorgan, Bear Stearns, and WaMu received information that, in certain instances, loans that did not comply with underwriting guidelines were included in the RMBS sold and marketed to investors; however, JPMorgan, Bear Stearns, and WaMu did not disclose this to securitization investors. (1)

The Statement of Facts provided a couple of facts that made clear what JPMorgan did wrong (see page 2), but I could not even parse the sections of Bear Stearns and WaMu to tell you what they did wrong. This is about as strong as it gets:

in 2008, internal WaMu reviews indicated specific instances of weaknesses in WaMu’s loan origination and underwriting practices, including, at times, non-compliance with underwriting standards; the reviews also revealed instances of borrower fraud and misrepresentations by others involved in the loan origination process with respect to the information provided for loan qualification purposes. (10)

You can’t tell from such language whether WaMu was acting intentionally, recklessly or negligently.  You can’t really tell whether this behavior was endemic, frequent, occasional or rare. You can’t tell whether it was the fault of some low-level employees or of upper management. Just about the only thing you can tell from the WaMu section (and the Bear Stearns section, for that matter) is that it was not JPMorgan’s fault:

The actions and omissions described above with respect to WaMu occurred prior to OTS’s closure of WaMu and JPMorgan’s acquisition of the identified WaMu assets and liabilities. (11)

No doubt, JPMorgan tried to control the PR and legal liability to third parties that this Statement of Facts could engender. But Justice could have held the line on the expressive aspect of the settlement just as it did with the monetary aspect. In the long run, that could turn out to be just as important.