S&L Flexible Porfolio Lending

Bailey BrosDepositAccounts.com quoted me in Types of Institutions in the U.S. Banking System – Savings and Loan Associations. It opens,

When you think of a savings and loan, maybe you think of the Bailey Savings & Loan from the movie It’s a Wonderful Life or remember the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, when more than 1,000 savings and loans with over $500 billion in assets failed.

But there’s much more to the story. Savings and loan associations originally specialized in home-financing, be it a mortgage, home improvements or construction. According to Encyclopedia Britannica, Savings and loan associations originated with the building societies of Great Britain in the late 1700s. They consisted of groups of workmen who financed the building of their homes by paying fixed sums of money at regular intervals to the societies. When all members had homes, the societies disbanded. The societies began to borrow money from people who did not want to buy homes themselves and became permanent institutions. Building societies spread from Great Britain to other European countries and the United States. They are also found in parts of Central and South America. The Oxford Provident Building Association of Philadelphia, which began operating in 1831 with 40 members, was the first savings and loan association in the United States. By 1890 they had spread to all states and territories.

Today, explains, David Bakke, a financial columnist for MoneyCrashers.com, explains how S&Ls have evolved. “More recently, they have also expanded into areas such as car loans, commercial loans and even mutual fund investing. Currently, there isn’t much difference between them and other types of financial institutions.”

S&Ls are a type of thrift institution. Like all financial institutions they are bound to rules and regulations. They can have a state or federal charter. Those with a federal charter are regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) used to be the regulator before it was merged with the OCC in 2011.

Another big change that impacted S&Ls was the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA). It abolished the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, which had provided deposit insurance to savings and loans since 1934. It created two insurance funds, the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) and the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF), which were both administered by the FDIC. Those two funds were merged into the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) in 2006. In summary, your deposits at S&Ls today are insured by the FDIC.

If you’re wondering how S&Ls work, to put it simply, the money you deposit into your savings account, is used to fund the money the S&L doles out in loans.

Savings and loans have some advantages over other types of institutions. “Many S&Ls keep many of the loans that they originate in their own portfolio instead of selling them off for securitization.  This means that they often have more flexibility in their underwriting criteria than do those lenders that sell off their mortgages to Fannie, Freddie and Wall Street securitizers.  This means that borrowers with atypical profiles or borrowers interested in atypical properties might be more likely to find a lender open to a nontraditional deal in the S&L sector,” says David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School, that specializes in real estate.

Independent Foreclosure Review: Case Closed?

The Federal Reserve Board issued its Independent Foreclosure Review. By way of background,

Between April 2011 and April 2012, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Federal Reserve”), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) issued formal enforcement actions against 16 mortgage servicing companies to address a pattern of misconduct and negligence related to deficient practices in residential mortgage loan servicing and foreclosure processing identified by examiners during reviews conducted from November 2010 to January 2011. Beginning in January 2013, 15 of the mortgage servicing companies subject to enforcement actions for deficient practices in mortgage loan servicing and foreclosure processing reached agreements with the OCC and the Federal Reserve (collectively, the “regulators”) to provide approximately $3.9 billion in direct cash payments to borrowers and approximately $6.1 billion in other foreclosure prevention assistance, such as loan modifications and the forgiveness of deficiency judgments. For participating servicers, fulfillment of these agreements satisfies the foreclosure file review requirements of the enforcement actions issued by the OCC, the Federal Reserve, and the OTS in 2011 and 2012. (1)

The government’s actions regarding the Independent Foreclosure Review have been its controversial, with some believing that it was completed too hastily. I am less interested in that debate than in FRB’s sense of the the servicing sector going forward.

The report states that “the initial supervisory review of the servicer and holding company action plans has shown that the banking organizations under Consent Orders have implemented significant corrective actions with regard to their mortgage servicing and foreclosure processes, but that some additional actions need to be taken.” (24) Overall, the report reflects an optimism that endemic servicer problems are a thing of the past.

drumbeat of reports and cases seems to be at odds with that assessment, although there is obviously a significant lag between the occurrence of  problems and the report of them in official sources. As a close observer of the mortgage industry, however, I am not yet convinced that regulators have their hands around the problems in the servicer industry. Careful monitoring remains the order of the day.

Doing Justice with the $13B JPMorgan Settlement

I have posted a couple of items on this massive settlement (here and here).  This should be my last one. Perhaps I am ungrateful, but the Statement of Facts agreed upon by the Department of Justice and JPMorgan Chase left me with an empty feeling. Recovering $13 billion for homeowners, investors and the government is certainly a key aspect of the justice done in this case. But the law can and should have an expressive function — it should make a statement about the difference between right and wrong behavior. Unfortunately, the Statement of Facts almost completely fails as an expressive document.

It only makes it clear at one point that JPMorgan, Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual did something very wrong:

employees of JPMorgan, Bear Stearns, and WaMu received information that, in certain instances, loans that did not comply with underwriting guidelines were included in the RMBS sold and marketed to investors; however, JPMorgan, Bear Stearns, and WaMu did not disclose this to securitization investors. (1)

The Statement of Facts provided a couple of facts that made clear what JPMorgan did wrong (see page 2), but I could not even parse the sections of Bear Stearns and WaMu to tell you what they did wrong. This is about as strong as it gets:

in 2008, internal WaMu reviews indicated specific instances of weaknesses in WaMu’s loan origination and underwriting practices, including, at times, non-compliance with underwriting standards; the reviews also revealed instances of borrower fraud and misrepresentations by others involved in the loan origination process with respect to the information provided for loan qualification purposes. (10)

You can’t tell from such language whether WaMu was acting intentionally, recklessly or negligently.  You can’t really tell whether this behavior was endemic, frequent, occasional or rare. You can’t tell whether it was the fault of some low-level employees or of upper management. Just about the only thing you can tell from the WaMu section (and the Bear Stearns section, for that matter) is that it was not JPMorgan’s fault:

The actions and omissions described above with respect to WaMu occurred prior to OTS’s closure of WaMu and JPMorgan’s acquisition of the identified WaMu assets and liabilities. (11)

No doubt, JPMorgan tried to control the PR and legal liability to third parties that this Statement of Facts could engender. But Justice could have held the line on the expressive aspect of the settlement just as it did with the monetary aspect. In the long run, that could turn out to be just as important.