Gorsuch and the CFPB

photo provided byUnited States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Judge Gorsuch

Bankrate.com quoted me in Supreme Court Pick Could Spell Trouble for the CFPB. It opens,

President Donald Trump’s first Supreme Court pick has been identified as the “most natural successor” to the late Justice Antonin Scalia, whom he would replace.

Neil Gorsuch, 49, a judge on the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Denver, is said to share many of Scalia’s beliefs and his judicial philosophy. That could tip the high court back toward the 5-4 conservative split it held during controversial cases prior to Scalia’s death, although Justice Anthony Kennedy will remain a liberal swing vote on certain social issues before the court.

Gorsuch’s big judicial decisions have favored religious freedom over government regulation and state’s rights over the power of the federal government.

But how might that impact consumers or their wallets directly?

“I think with a judge like Gorsuch, you can see there probably will be a tendency in that direction to dissuade innovation,” says David Reiss, a law professor at Brooklyn Law School and the academic program director for the Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship.

That could mean the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, whose unique management structure a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit last fall called unconstitutional, could face an obstacle on the bench should the legal fight over its construction ever reach the Supreme Court.

Judge Brett Kavanaugh, who wrote the majority opinion for the D.C. circuit panel, said because this independent agency is headed by a director whom the president cannot fire at will – and not, say, a set of commissioners like other agencies within the government – it is a threat to individual liberty.

“In short, when measured in terms of unilateral power, the director of the CFPB is the single most powerful official in the entire U.S. government, other than the president,” Kavanaugh wrote. “In essence, the director is the president of consumer finance.”

How Gorsuch May Rule

Supporters of the bureau are trying to get a hearing before the full U.S. Court of Appeals, but the issue could well wind up in front of the U.S. Supreme Court – that is if Congress doesn’t take action first.

Legal scholars say should Gorsuch win Senate confirmation he is unlikely to look favorably on the bureau’s structure.

Indeed, Gorsuch is likely to “echo the views of Judge Kavanaugh,” Melissa Malpass, senior legal editor for consumer regulatory finance at Thompson Reuters Practical Law, said in an email.

“Judge Gorsuch, through recent decisions, has expressed his disfavor with permitting government agencies to not only determine what the law is, but also to interpret and re-interpret the law as they see fit, often based on the political climate,” Malpass says.

If the Supreme Court were to uphold the Kavanaugh ruling, it “may, in effect, destroy the CFPB as we know it, and that will have an effect on consumers,” Reiss says.

Not everyone, though, thinks restructuring the CFPB as a commission-led agency like the Federal Communications Commission, for example, would be bad for consumers.

Gorsuch’s Path to the High Court

Democrats, still stung over the Senate’s refusal to consider Merrick Garland, then-President Barack Obama’s pick to succeed Scalia, could try to block Gorsuch’s nomination. Under current Senate rules, at least eight Democrats will need to cross the aisle to prevent a filibuster of the appointment.

Gorsuch, who was confirmed for his current post in 2006 by Senate voice vote, has won widespread acclaim in Republican circles. He also received a vote of confidence from a former Obama administration official.

“I think the Democrats are going to ask questions to determine if the nominee is outside what they call the political mainstream,” Reiss says. “We know this battle will be a brutal one, almost definitely because of the treatment of Merrick Garland’s nomination under the Obama administration.”

Hockett on Postliberal Finance

Bob Hockett has posted Preliberal Autonomy and Postliberal Finance to SSRN. The abstract reads,

Even American Founders whose views diverged as dramatically as those of Jefferson and Hamilton shared a view of finance and of enterprise that one might call “productive republican.” Pursuant to this vision, financial and other forms of market activity are instrumentally rather than intrinsically good — and for that very reason are of interest to the public qua public rather than to the public qua aggregate of “private” individuals. Citizens are best left free to engage in financial and other market activities, per this understanding, only insofar as these are consistent with sustainable collective republic-making. And the republic — the res publica or “thing of the public” — for its part devotes many of its energies to the task of fostering and maintaining a materially independent republican citizenry. State and citizen are thus mutually constituting and mutually supporting, per this vision, and finance is important primarily in its capacity to nurture that symbiosis.

The productive republican view of finance can be illuminatingly contrasted with another view of more recent vintage, which one might call “liberal.” The liberal view takes market activity to be an intrinsic good, if not indeed a matter of inherent political-cum-moral right. Markets on this view are as it were natural social outgrowths of and aggregated counterparts to inherently “free” individual choices — choices that all of us, in both our individual and our collective capacities, are ethically bound to respect insofar as they don’t impose illegitimate costs upon others. So-called “public” interventions in “private” markets are accordingly fit subjects of suspicion and scrutiny per the liberal view. They are presumptively problematic unless and until proven otherwise, while “proof otherwise” for its part typically takes the form of proof that the intervention protects putatively pre-political freedom itself.

I claim in this article, a solicited symposium contribution, that American financial law, and economic law more generally, were once highly productive-republican in character, and that many financial, economic and, in consequence, political dysfunctions with which we have become familiar in recent decades stem from those laws’ having become steadily more liberal in character over time. I also argue that a number of essays, articles, and monographs published over the last twenty years or so under the rubrics of “banking the poor,” “alternative banking,” or “democratized finance” are, in effect if not self-conscious intention, attempts at partial recovery of the productive republican tradition — at least in the realm of finance. They are in this sense what might be called “post-liberal” in sensibility, if not quite in self-conscious aim. Their project can accordingly be aided, I aim to show, by affording them a form of reflective project-consciousness. That consciousness, however, once attained, will not be satisfied with post-liberal finance alone. It will demand a post-liberal economics.

This symposium piece is particularly compelling because it includes a personal story about Bob’s involvement with a “homeless kibbutz.” No spoilers, so you’ll have to read it yourself.