Reiss in Bloomberg Industries Q&A on Frannie Litigation

Bloomberg Industries Litigation Analyst Emily Hamburger interviewed me about The Government as Defendant: Breaking Down Fannie-Freddie Lawsuits (link to audio of the call). The blurb for the interview is as follows:

As investors engage in jurisdictional discovery and the government pleads for dismissals in several federal cases over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stock, Professor David Reiss of Brooklyn Law School will provide his insights on the dynamics of the lawsuits and possible outcomes for Wall Street, the U.S. government and GSEs. Reiss is the author of a recent article, An Overview of the Fannie and Freddie Conservatorship Litigation.

Emily questioned me for the first half of the one hour call and some of the 200+ participants asked questions in the second half.

Emily’s questions included the following (paraphrased below)

  • You’re tracking several cases that deal with the government’s role in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and I’d like to go through about 3 of the major assertions made by investors – investors that own junior preferred and common stock in the GSEs – against the government and hear your thoughts:
    • The first is the accusation that the Treasury and FHFA’s Conduct in the execution of the Third Amendment was arbitrary and capricious. What do you think of this?
    •  Another claim made by the plaintiffs is that the government’s actions constitute a taking of property without just compensation, which would be seen as a violation of the 5th Amendment – do you think this is a stronger or weaker claim?
    • And finally – what about plaintiffs asserting breach of contract against the government? Plaintiffs have said that the Net Worth Sweep in the Third Amendment to the Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement nullified Fannie and Freddie’s ability to pay dividends, and that the two companies can’t unilaterally change terms of preferred stock, and that the FHFA is guilty of causing this breach.
  • Is the government correct when they say that the section 4617 of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act barred plaintiff’s right to sue over the conservator’s decisions?
  • Former Solicitor General Theodore Olson, an attorney for Perry Capital, has said that the government’s powers with respect to the interventions in Fannie and Freddie “expired” – is he correct?
  • Can you explain what exactly jurisdictional discovery is and why it’s important?
  • Do we know anything about what might happen if one judge rules for the plaintiffs and another judge rules for the government?
  • Is there an estimate that you can provide as to timing?
  • Are there any precedents that you know of from prior crises? Prior interventions by the government that private plaintiffs brought suit against?
  • How do you foresee Congress and policymakers changing outcomes?
  • What do we need to be looking out for now in the litigation?
  • How does this end?

You have to listen to the audiotape to hear my answers, but my bottom line is this — these are factually and legally complex cases and don’t trust anyone who thinks that this is a slam dunk for any of the parties.

 

Fannie and Freddie Boards: Caveat Fairholme

Fairholme Capital Management has sent stern letters to the the boards of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the letters are essentially the same). Fairholme’s funds have millions of common and preferred shares in the two companies and Fairholme has taken a multi-pronged to trying to wring some value out of those shares. It has sued the federal government. It has offered to buy the two companies’ mortgage guaranty operations. Now, it is threatening the board of the two enterprises with personal liability for their actions and inaction.

In regard to the cash dividends that the two companies have paid to the Treasury as a result of their Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (as amended), Fairholme writes,

It is common sense that no Board should approve cash distributions without independent financial advice as to the effect of such payments on the Company’s safety, soundness, and  liquidity. Moreover, corporate laws generally prohibit the payment of dividends in many circumstances, imposing personal liability on Directors for illegal dividends – a liability that, pursuant to the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, is not assumed by the Conservator. (Fannie Letter, 3) (emphasis added)

This is a straightforward threat that will likely get the attention of the directors of the two companies and get them to check in with their D&O insurer before taking any further actions. But it is genuinely unclear what they should be doing at this point.

As I note in a forthcoming article, An Overview of the Fannie and Freddie Conservatorship Litigation (NYU J. Law & Bus.), the Fannie/Freddie shareholder litigation raises all sorts of complex and novel legal issues, and I am not willing to predict their outcomes. But I will go as far to say that Fairholme presents the way out of this mess as far clearer than it is — “Various solutions are simple, equitable, and need not be contentious.” (5) The ones that Fairholme has in mind likely involve large payouts for shareholders, one way or the other.

At the same time that Fairholme presents the solution as simple, it does acknowledge (as it really must) that the problem itself is not:  “we are aware of no circumstance in which the controlling shareholder and its affiliates simultaneously act as director, regulator, conservator, supervisor, contingent capital provider, and preferred stock investor.” (3-4) Yup, this is one big mess with no real precedent. I am confident, however, that the federal government has no interest in reaching a settlement with shareholders that shareholders would find acceptable. So, no end in sight to this aspect of the Fannie/Freddie situation, a far as I can tell.