Reiss on Anatomy of a Mortgage

MainStreet quoted me in The Anatomy of a Mortgage – Determining Which Fees You Need to Pay. It reads in part,

All mortgages are not created equal, so reading the fine print before you agree to a long-term commitment is crucial.

Mortgage lenders now have become “very risk averse” since the financial crisis and are doing everything “pretty much by the book,” said Greg McBride, the chief financial analyst for Bankrate.com, a New York-based personal finance content company. “The rules on the ability of a homeowner to be able to repay are stricter than ten years ago,” he said. “Niche products have gone back to niche borrowers.”

While lenders are offering fewer risky products such as interest only mortgages to run-of-the-mill consumers, there are still hidden fees and other deceptive practices to be wary of, said Jason van den Brand, CEO of Lenda, the San Francisco-based online mortgage company.

In 2013, the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau issued guidelines to protect consumers from the types of mortgages that contributed to the financial crash. In the past, lenders were approving mortgages that allowed consumers to borrow large sums of money without any documentation such as pay stubs and offered extremely low interest rates to lure people into buying homes.

 “It also doesn’t mean that the potential to get bad mortgage advice has been eliminated,” van den Brand said. “There aren’t bad mortgage products, just bad advice and decisions.”

Here are the top seven things consumers should consider carefully.

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Avoid choosing an adjustable rate mortgage or ARM when it makes more sense to select a fixed rate mortgage. Those low initial rates offered by ARMs are enticing, but they only make sense for homeowners who know that in less than ten years, they plan to upgrade to a large home, move to another neighborhood or relocate for work. Many ARMs are called a 5/1 or 7/1, which means that they are fixed at the introductory interest rate for five or seven years and then readjust every year after that, which increases your monthly mortgage payment said David Reiss, a law professor at Brooklyn Law School.

While many homeowners gravitate toward a 30-year mortgage, younger owners “should seriously consider getting an ARM if they think that they might move sooner rather than later,” he said. If you are single and buying a one-bedroom condo, it is likely you could sell that condo and buy a house in the future. “That person might not want to pay for the long-term safety of a 30-year fixed rate mortgage and instead save money with a 7/1 ARM,” Reiss said.

FHFA Wins on “Actual Knowledge”

Judge Cote issued an Opinion and Order in Federal Housing Finance Agency v. HSBC North America Holdings Inc., et al. (11-cv-06189 July 25, 2014). The opinion and order granted the FHFA’s motion for partial summary judgment concerning whether Fannie and Freddie knew of the falsity of various representations contained in offering documents for residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by the remaining defendants in the case.

I found there to be three notable aspects of this lengthy opinion. First, it provides a detailed exposition of the process by which Fannie and Freddie purchased mortgages from the defendants (who included most of the major Wall Street firms, although many of them have settled out of the case by now). it goes into great length about how loans were underwritten and how originators and aggregators reviewed them as they were evaluated  as potential collateral for RMBS issuances.

Second, it goes into great detail about the discovery battle in a high, high-stakes dispute with very well funded parties. While not of primary interest to readers of this blog, it is amazing to see just how much of a slog discovery can be in a complex matter like this.

Finally, it demonstrates the importance of litigating with common sense in mind. Judge Cote was clearly put off by the inconsistent arguments of the defendants. She writes, with clear frustration,

It bears emphasis that at this late stage — long after the close of fact discovery and as the parties prepare their Pretrial Orders for three of these four cases — Defendants continue to argue both that their representations were true and that underwriting defects, inflated appraisals and borrower fraud were so endemic as to render their representations obviously false to the GSEs. Using the example just given, Goldman Sachs argues both that Fannie Mae knew that the percentage of loans with an LTV ratio below 80% was not 67%, but also that the true figure was, in fact, 67%. (65)