Tag Archives: securitization

(Non-)Enforcement of Securitized Mortgage Loans

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Professors Neil Cohen and Dale Whitman, two important scholars who know their way around the UCC and mortgage law, will take on a highly contested topic in an upcoming ABA Professors’ Corner webinar: “Ownership, Transfer, and Enforcement of Securitized Mortgage Loans.” I blogged a bit about this topic a couple of days ago, in relation to Adam Levitin’s new article. There is a lot of misinformation floating around the blogosphere relating to this topic, so I encourage readers to register.

The full information on this program is as follows:

Professors’ Corner is a FREE monthly webinar, sponsored by the ABA Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Section’s Legal Education and Uniform Law Group.  On the second Wednesday of each month, a panel of law professors discusses recent cases or issues of interest to real estate practitioners and scholars.

December 2013 Professors’ Corner
“Ownership, Transfer, and Enforcement of Securitized Mortgage Loans”
Profs. Neil Cohen and Dale Whitman
Wednesday, December 11, 2013
12:30pm Eastern/11:30am Cental/9:30am Pacific
Register for this FREE program at https://ambar.org/ProfessorsCorner

Our nation’s courts have been swamped with litigation involving the foreclosure of securitized mortgage loans.  Much of this litigation involves the appropriate interaction of the Uniform Commercial Code and state foreclosure law. Because few foreclosure lawyers and judges are UCC experts, the outcomes of the reported cases have reflected a significant degree of uncertainty or confusion.

In addition, much litigation has been triggered by poor practices in the securitization of mortgage loans, such as robo-signing and the failure to transfer loans into a securitized trust within the time period required by the IRS REMIC rules.  This litigation has likewise produced conflicting case outcomes.  In particular, recent decisions have reflected some disagreement regarding whether a mortgagor — who is not a party to the Pooling and Servicing Agreement that governs the securitized trust that holds the mortgage — can successfully defend a foreclosure by challenging the validity of the assignment of the mortgage to a securitized trust.

Our speakers for the December program will bring some much-needed clarity to these issues.  Our speakers are Prof. Neil B. Cohen, the Jeffrey D. Forchelli Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School, and Prof. Dale A. Whitman, the James E Campbell Missouri Endowed Professor Emeritus of Law at the University of Missouri School of Law.  Prof. Cohen is the Research Director of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, and a principal contributor to the November 2011 PEB Report, “Application of the Uniform Commercial Code to Selected Issues Relating to Mortgage Notes.” Prof. Whitman is the co-Reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Property — Mortgages, and the co-author of the pre-eminent treatise on Real Estate Finance Law.

Please join us for this program.  You may register at https://ambar.org/ProfessorsCorner.

Levitin on the Uncertainty of Mortgage Title

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Adam Levitin has posted The Paper Chase: Securitization, Foreclosure, and the Uncertainty of Mortgage Title to SSRN.  This paper adds to a small (here and here, for instance), but important body of literature that seeks to harmonize the application of foreclosure laws with the Uniform Commercial Code. Levitin’s abstract reads

The mortgage foreclosure crisis raises legal questions as important as its economic impact. Questions that were straightforward and uncontroversial a generation ago today threaten the stability of a $13 trillion mortgage market: Who has standing to foreclose? If a foreclosure was done improperly, what is the effect? And what is the proper legal method for transferring mortgages? These questions implicate the clarity of title for property nationwide and pose a too- big-to-fail problem for the courts.

The legal confusion stems from the existence of competing systems for establishing title to mortgages and transferring those rights. Historically, mortgage title was established and transferred through the “public demonstration” regimes of UCC Article 3 and land recordation systems. This arrangement worked satisfactorily when mortgages were rarely transferred. Mortgage finance, however, shifted to securitization, which involves repeated bulk transfers of mortgages.

To facilitate securitization, deal architects developed alternative “contracting” regimes for mortgage title: UCC Article 9 and MERS, a private mortgage registry. These new regimes reduced the cost of securitization by dispensing with demonstrative formalities, but at the expense of reduced clarity of title, which raised the costs of mortgage enforcement. This trade-off benefitted the securitization industry at the expense of securitization investors because it became apparent only subsequently with the rise in mortgage foreclosures. The harm, however, has not been limited to securitization investors. Clouded mortgage title has significant negative externalities on the economy as a whole.

This Article proposes reconciling the competing title systems through an integrated system of note registration and mortgage recordation, with compliance as a prerequisite to foreclosure. Such a system would resolve questions about standing, remove the potential cloud to real-estate title, and facilitate mortgage financing by clarifying property rights.

I had to agree with one of his conclusions:  “Reduction of transaction costs is ultimately a second-order move for commercial law. The first-order move, so elemental it is easy to forget, is clarification of the property being transferred.” (723-24) The others are pretty compelling too.

Is Banks’ $200 Billion Payout from RMBS Lawsuits Enough?

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S&P issued a brief, The Largest U.S. Banks Should Be Able To Withstand The Ramifications Of Legal Issues, that quantifies the exposure that big banks have from litigation arising from the Subprime Crisis:

Since 2009, the largest U.S. banks (Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, and Wells Fargo) together have paid or set aside more than $45 billion for mortgage representation and warranty (rep and warranty) issues and have incurred roughly $50 billion in combined legal expenses .  . . This does not include another roughly $30 billion of expenses and mortgage payment relief to consumers to settle mortgage servicing issues. We estimate that the largest banks may need to pay out an additional $55 billion to $105 billion to settle mortgage-related issues, some of which is already accounted for in these reserves. (2)

S&P believes “that the largest banks have, in aggregate, about a $155 billion buffer, which includes a capital cushion, representation and warranty reserves, and our estimate of legal reserves, to absorb losses from a range of additional mortgage-related and other legal exposures.” (2) As far as their ratings go, S&P has already incorporated “heightened legal issues into our ratings, and we currently don’t expect legal settlements to result in negative rating actions for U.S. banks.” (2) But it warns, “an immediate and unexpected significant legal expense could result in the weakening of a bank’s business model through the loss of key clients and employees, as well as the weakening of its capital position.” (2) S&P also acknowledges that there are some not yet quantifiable risks out there, such as DoJ’s FIRREA suits.

As the endgame of the financial crisis begins to take shape and financial institutions are held accountable for their actions, one is left wondering about a group who is left relatively unscathed: financial institution employees who received mega bonuses for involving these banks in these bad deals. As we think about the inevitable next crisis, we should ask if there is a way to hold those individuals accountable too.

Happy New Year for Mortgages?

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S&P has posted How Will Mortgage Loan Originators, Borrowers, And RMBS Securitization Trusts Fare Under The New Ability-To-Repay Rules?  This research report finds that

  • The ATR [Ability to Repay] and QM [Qualified Mortgages] standards under TILA [the Truth in Lending Act] will require loan originators to make a reasonable, good faith determination of a borrower’s ability to repay a loan using reliable, third-party written records.
  • If violated, originators and assignees can face liabilities and litigation brought on by borrowers during foreclosure proceedings and even outside of foreclosure proceedings. However, they can be protected from some of these liabilities if a loan meets the QM standards.
  • Depending on the loan’s status, increased loss expectations resulting from additional assignee liability, longer liquidation timelines resulting from borrower defenses in foreclosure proceedings, and additional loan modification experience can affect securitization trust performance.
  • Sensitivity testing using the damages outlined in the rule suggests that additional loss experience will generally be mild for prime jumbo backed securitizations even under conservative assumptions for litigation risks. Trusts backed by loans with higher credit risk, lower balances, and originated by unfamiliar or below-average originators will be at risk of higher losses than prior to the rule.
  • We expect that while the rule will prevent underwriting standards from loosening towards the more risky mortgages originated during the 2006 and 2007 financial crisis, it may also limit credit access to borrowers and make it more difficult to obtain a mortgage loan. (1)

I think that only the last two points are really newsworthy, particularly the last one. Whether the credit markets tighten too much from the new rules is the $64,000 question.

S&P appears to be arguing that the rules will constrain good credit too much. Time will tell if that is the case, as lenders fill the QM sector and the non-QM sector. The non-QM sector provides, for example, interest-only mortgages. There was a lot of bad lending involving interest-only mortgages, so it will be interesting to see what that market sector looks like as it matures over the next few years.

Doing Justice with the $13B JPMorgan Settlement

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I have posted a couple of items on this massive settlement (here and here).  This should be my last one. Perhaps I am ungrateful, but the Statement of Facts agreed upon by the Department of Justice and JPMorgan Chase left me with an empty feeling. Recovering $13 billion for homeowners, investors and the government is certainly a key aspect of the justice done in this case. But the law can and should have an expressive function — it should make a statement about the difference between right and wrong behavior. Unfortunately, the Statement of Facts almost completely fails as an expressive document.

It only makes it clear at one point that JPMorgan, Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual did something very wrong:

employees of JPMorgan, Bear Stearns, and WaMu received information that, in certain instances, loans that did not comply with underwriting guidelines were included in the RMBS sold and marketed to investors; however, JPMorgan, Bear Stearns, and WaMu did not disclose this to securitization investors. (1)

The Statement of Facts provided a couple of facts that made clear what JPMorgan did wrong (see page 2), but I could not even parse the sections of Bear Stearns and WaMu to tell you what they did wrong. This is about as strong as it gets:

in 2008, internal WaMu reviews indicated specific instances of weaknesses in WaMu’s loan origination and underwriting practices, including, at times, non-compliance with underwriting standards; the reviews also revealed instances of borrower fraud and misrepresentations by others involved in the loan origination process with respect to the information provided for loan qualification purposes. (10)

You can’t tell from such language whether WaMu was acting intentionally, recklessly or negligently.  You can’t really tell whether this behavior was endemic, frequent, occasional or rare. You can’t tell whether it was the fault of some low-level employees or of upper management. Just about the only thing you can tell from the WaMu section (and the Bear Stearns section, for that matter) is that it was not JPMorgan’s fault:

The actions and omissions described above with respect to WaMu occurred prior to OTS’s closure of WaMu and JPMorgan’s acquisition of the identified WaMu assets and liabilities. (11)

No doubt, JPMorgan tried to control the PR and legal liability to third parties that this Statement of Facts could engender. But Justice could have held the line on the expressive aspect of the settlement just as it did with the monetary aspect. In the long run, that could turn out to be just as important.

A HELOC of a Securitization

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S&P posted A Look At U.S. Second-Lien And HELOC Transactions Post-Crisis.  In 2008, they announced that “would halt rating new U.S. RMBS closed-end second-lien transactions because loan performance had deteriorated significantly.  [They] haven’t rated any U.S. RMBS second-lien (both second-lien HCLTV [high-combined loan-to-value] and closed-end second-lien) or HELOC [home equity line of credit] transactions since 2007.” (1) They also note that notwithstanding the fact that such securitizations had ended, “HELOC loans continue to be originated, with banks generally keeping these types of loans on their books.” (1)

The report provides a some interesting data on those securitizations.  Let me share one highlight, a table of lifetime loss projections of RMBS with different collateral types. For the 2007/2008 vintage, they performed as follows.

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Second-lien  HCLTV:  45%

Closed-end second lien:  58%

HELOC:  42%

Subprime:  49%

Alt-A:  29.25%

Negative Amortization:  43.25%

Prime:  10%

With a bit of understatement, they conclude that “[c]losed-end second-lien transactions may be limited going forward because of limited investor and issuer appetite, given past performance and uneven home price appreciation.” (5) They note that HELOCs are not included in the definition of Qualified Mortgages or Qualified Residential Mortgages [QRM] “so the issuer would most likely have to retain a stake in the deal, increasing issuance costs.” (6)

This seems like a good a good result, if you ask me. Here is a product that performed miserably (with losses of greater than 40%!!!) as a securitization. If the new QRM rules reduce these securitization but banks continue to originate them for their own portfolio, perhaps Dodd-Frank is doing its job in the mortgage markets. Of course, we want to ensure that there is sufficient sustainable credit for HELOCs, but it is good to see that portfolio lenders are stepping in where they see a market that RMBS issuers has exited.

Borden and Reiss on High-Stakes MBS Litigation

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Brad and I posted Goliath Versus Goliath in High-Stakes MBS Litigation on SSRN (and BePress).  The abstract reads,

The loan-origination and mortgage-securitization practices between 2000 and 2007 created the housing and mortgage-backed securities bubble that precipitated the 2008 economic crisis and ensuing recession. The mess that the loan-origination and mortgage-securitization practices caused is now playing out in courts around the world. MBS investors are suing banks, MBS sponsors and underwriters for misrepresenting the quality of loans purportedly held in MBS pools and failing to properly transfer loan documents and mortgages to the pools, as required by the MBS pooling and servicing agreements. State and federal prosecutors have also filed claims against banks, underwriters and sponsors for the roles they played in creating defective MBS and for misrepresenting the quality of the assets purportedly held in MBS pools. This commentary focuses on the state of this upstream litigation. It reviews claims of several complaints and discusses some decisions on motions for summary judgment in several of the cases. The commentary is not a comprehensive review of all the activity in this area, but it does provide an overview of the issues at stake in this litigation. The litigation in this area is still relatively new, but with hundreds of billions of dollars at stake, it will likely last for years to come and should reshape the MBS landscape.