GSE Shareholders Floored, Again

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit issued an opinion in Saxton v. FHFA (No. 17-1727, Aug. 23, 2018). The Eighth Circuit joins the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and D.C. Circuits in rejecting the arguments of Fannie and Freddie shareholders that the Federal Housing Finance Agency exceeded its authority as conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The Court provides the following overview:

     The financial crisis of 2008 prompted Congress to take several actions to fend off economic disaster. One of those measures propped up Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Fannie and Freddie, which were founded by Congress back in 1938 and 1970, buy home mortgages from lenders, thereby freeing lenders to make more loans. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 4501. Although established by Congress, Fannie and Freddie operate like private companies: they have shareholders, boards of directors, and executives appointed by those boards. But Fannie and Freddie also have something most private businesses do not: the backing of the United States Treasury. 

     In 2008, with the mortgage meltdown at full tilt, Congress enacted the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA or the Act). HERA created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), and gave it the power to appoint itself either conservator or receiver of Fannie or Freddie should either company become critically undercapitalized. 12 U.S.C. § 4617(a)(2), (4). The Act includes a provision limiting judicial review: “Except as  provided in this section or at the request of the Director, no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the [FHFA] as a conservator or a receiver.” Id. § 4617(f). 

     Shortly after the Act’s passage, FHFA determined that both Fannie and Freddie were critically undercapitalized and appointed itself conservator. FHFA then entered an agreement with the U.S. Department of the Treasury whereby Treasury would acquire specially-created preferred stock and, in exchange, would make hundreds of billions of dollars in capital available to Fannie and Freddie. The idea was that Fannie and Freddie would exit conservatorship when they reimbursed the Treasury.

     But Fannie and Freddie remain under FHFA’s conservatorship today. Since the conservatorship began, FHFA and Treasury have amended their agreement several times. In the most recent amendment, FHFA agreed that, each quarter, Fannie and Freddie would pay to Treasury their entire net worth, minus a small buffer. This so-called “net worth sweep” is the basis of this litigation. 

     Three owners of Fannie and Freddie common stock sued FHFA and Treasury, claiming they had exceeded their powers under HERA and acted arbitrarily and capriciously by agreeing to the net worth sweep. The shareholders sought only an injunction setting aside the net worth sweep; they dismissed a claim seeking money damages. Relying on the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Perry Capital LLC v. Mnuchin, 864 F.3d 591 (D.C. Cir. 2017), the district court dismissed the suit.

What amazes me as a longtime watcher of the GSE litigation is how supposedly dispassionate investors lose their heads when it comes to the GSE lawsuits. They cannot seem to fathom that judges will come to a different conclusion regarding HERA’s limitation on judicial review.

While I do not rule out that the Supreme Court could find otherwise, particularly if Judge Kavanaugh is confirmed, it seems like this unbroken string of losses should provide some sort of wake up call for GSE shareholders. But somehow, I doubt that it will.

Does Housing Finance Reform Still Matter?

Ed DeMarco and Michael Bright

Ed DeMarco and Michael Bright

The Milken Institute’s Michael Bright and Ed DeMarco have posted a white paper, Why Housing Reform Still Matters. Bright was the principal author of the Corker-Warner Fannie/Freddie reform bill and DeMarco is the former Acting Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency. In short, they know housing finance. They write,

The 2008 financial crisis left a lot of challenges in its wake. The events of that year led to years of stagnant growth, a painful process of global deleveraging, and the emergence of new banking regulatory regimes across the globe.

But at the epicenter of the crisis was the American housing market. And while America’s housing finance system was fundamental to the financial crisis and the Great Recession, reform efforts have not altered America’s mortgage market structure or housing access paradigms in a material way.

This work must get done. Eventually, legislators will have to resolve their differences to chart a modernized course for housing in our country. Reflecting upon the progress made and the failures endured in this effort since 2008, we have set ourselves to the task of outlining a framework meant to advance the public debate and help lawmakers create an achievable plan. Through a series of upcoming papers, our goal will be to not just foster debate but to push that debate toward resolution.

Before setting forth solutions, however, it is important to frame the issues and state why we should do this in the first place. In light of the growing chorus urging surrender and going back to the failed model of the past, our objective in this paper is to remind policymakers why housing finance reform is needed and help distinguish aspects of the current system that are worth preserving from those that should be scrapped. (1)

I agree with a lot of what they have to say.  First, we should not go back to “the failed model of the past,” and it amazes me that that idea has any traction at all. I guess political memories are as short as people say they are.

Second, “until Congress acts, the FHFA is stuck in its role of regulator and conservator.” (3) They argue that it is wrong to allow one individual, the FHFA Director, to dramatically reform the housing finance system on his own. This is true, even if he is doing a pretty good job, as current Director Watt is.

Third, I agree that any reform plan must ensure that the mortgage-backed securities market remain liquid; credit remains available in all submarkets markets; competition is beneficial in the secondary mortgage market.

Finally, I agree with many of the goals of their reform agenda: reducing the likelihood of taxpayer bailouts of private actors; finding a consensus on access to credit; increasing the role of private capital in the mortgage market; increasing transparency in order to decrease rent-seeking behavior by market actors; and aligning incentives throughout the mortgage markets.

So where is my criticism? I think it is just that the paper is at such a high level of generality that it is hard to find much to disagree about.  Who wouldn’t want a consensus on housing affordability and access to credit? But isn’t it more likely that Democrats and Republicans will be very far apart on this issue no matter how long they discuss it?

The authors promise that a detailed proposal is forthcoming, so my criticism may soon be moot. But I fear that Congress is no closer to finding common ground on housing finance reform than they have been for the better part of the last decade. The authors’ optimism that consensus can be reached is not yet warranted, I think. Housing reform may not matter because the FHFA may just implement a new regime before Congress gets it act together.

Wednesday’s Academic Roundup

Reiss in CSM on Rental Policy

The Christian Science Monitor quoted me in Census Outlines ‘Poverty Areas’: Which States Hit Hardest? It reads in part,

The number of US residents living in “poverty areas” has jumped significantly since 2000, according to a Census Bureau report released Monday.

According the 2000 Census, less than 1 in 5 people lived in poverty areas. But more recently, 1 in 4 residents have lived in these areas, according to census data collected from 2008 to 2012.

The Census Bureau defines a poverty area as any census tract with a poverty rate of 20 percent of more.

Sociologists and other analysts point to the Great Recession, in particular housing and job challenges, as well as slow and uneven growth since the recession.

“With the advent of the financial crisis and the bursting of the housing bubble, many people lost their homes and thus needed to rent or move in with relatives,” says Cheryl Carleton, an economics professor at Villanova University near Philadelphia. “[I]ndividuals need to move where they can afford to live … which is going to be in areas where public housing is available or housing prices and rental rates are low, which is more likely to be in a ‘poverty area.’ ” Professor Carleton made her comments via e-mail.

*     *     *

Law professor David Reiss suggests that changes to homeownership policies could help.
“Federal and state housing programs could do more to support a market for well-maintained rental units for low-income households,” e-mails Professor Reiss, who teaches at Brooklyn Law School. “Many low-income households have difficulty maintaining homeownership because of irregular incomes and low wealth.”

A HELOC of a Securitization

S&P posted A Look At U.S. Second-Lien And HELOC Transactions Post-Crisis.  In 2008, they announced that “would halt rating new U.S. RMBS closed-end second-lien transactions because loan performance had deteriorated significantly.  [They] haven’t rated any U.S. RMBS second-lien (both second-lien HCLTV [high-combined loan-to-value] and closed-end second-lien) or HELOC [home equity line of credit] transactions since 2007.” (1) They also note that notwithstanding the fact that such securitizations had ended, “HELOC loans continue to be originated, with banks generally keeping these types of loans on their books.” (1)

The report provides a some interesting data on those securitizations.  Let me share one highlight, a table of lifetime loss projections of RMBS with different collateral types. For the 2007/2008 vintage, they performed as follows.

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Second-lien  HCLTV:  45%

Closed-end second lien:  58%

HELOC:  42%

Subprime:  49%

Alt-A:  29.25%

Negative Amortization:  43.25%

Prime:  10%

With a bit of understatement, they conclude that “[c]losed-end second-lien transactions may be limited going forward because of limited investor and issuer appetite, given past performance and uneven home price appreciation.” (5) They note that HELOCs are not included in the definition of Qualified Mortgages or Qualified Residential Mortgages [QRM] “so the issuer would most likely have to retain a stake in the deal, increasing issuance costs.” (6)

This seems like a good a good result, if you ask me. Here is a product that performed miserably (with losses of greater than 40%!!!) as a securitization. If the new QRM rules reduce these securitization but banks continue to originate them for their own portfolio, perhaps Dodd-Frank is doing its job in the mortgage markets. Of course, we want to ensure that there is sufficient sustainable credit for HELOCs, but it is good to see that portfolio lenders are stepping in where they see a market that RMBS issuers has exited.