Single-Family Rental Securitizations Here To Stay?

photo by David McBee

Kroll Bond Rating Agency has released Single-Borrower SFR: Comprehensive Surveillance Report. It has lots of interesting tidbits about this new real estate finance sector (it has only been four years since its first securitization):

  • Six single-family rental operators own nearly 180,000 homes. (3)
  • Of the 33 SFR securitizations issued to date ($19.2 billion), nine deals ($4.6 billion) have been repaid in full without any interest shortfalls or principal losses. (4)
  • the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which regulates Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, announced that it had authorized Freddie Mac to enter the single-family rental sector on a limited basis to provide up to $1.0 billion of financing or loan guarantees. Freddie Mac reportedly is expected to focus on small-scale and midsize landlords that invest in SFR properties that the GSE considers to be affordable rental housing, not institutional issuers such as Invitation Homes, which owns and manages nearly 50,000 SFR properties. (5)
  • The largest five exposures account for 39.4% of the properties and include Atlanta (11,822 homes; 13.0%), which represents the CBSA with the greatest number of properties, followed by Tampa (6,374; 7.0%), Dallas (6,199; 6.8%), Phoenix (5,780; 6.3%), and Charlotte (5,733; 6.3%). (6)
  • The highest home price appreciation since issuance was observed in CAH 2014-1, at 30.7%. On average, collateral homes included in the outstanding transactions issued during 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 have appreciated in value by 25.0%, 18.0%, 8.7% and 3.2%, respectively. It is worth noting that the rate of the home price appreciation on a national basis and in the regions where the underlying homes are located has slowed in recent years. (7)
  • Since issuance, the underlying collateral has generally exhibited positive operating performance with the exception of expenses. Contractual rental rates have continued to increase, vacancy and tenant retention rates have remained relatively stable, and delinquency rates have remained low. Servicer reported operating expenses, however, continue to be higher than the issuer underwritten figures at securitization. (7)

Analysts did not believe that single-family rentals could be done at scale before the financial crisis. But investors were able to sweep up tens of thousands of homes on the cheap during the foreclosure crisis and the finances made a lot of sense. It will be interesting to see how this industry matures with home prices appreciating and expenses rising. I am not making any predictions, but I wonder when it will stop making sense for SFR operators to keep buying new homes.

The Single-Family Rental Revolution Continues

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The Kroll Bond Rating Agency has released its Single-Borrower SFR: Comprehensive Surveillance Report:

Kroll Bond Rating Agency (KBRA) recently completed a comprehensive surveillance review of its rated universe of 23 single-borrower, single-family rental (SFR) securitizations. In connection with these transactions, 132 ratings are outstanding, all of which have been affirmed. The transactions have an aggregate outstanding principal balance of $13.0 billion, of which $12.6 billion is rated. These transactions have been issued by six sponsors, which own approximately 159,700 properties, 90,649 of which are included in the securitizations that are covered in this report. (3)

This business model took off during the depths of the Great Recession when capital-rich companies were able to buy up single-family homes on the cheap and in bulk. While the Kroll report is geared toward the interests of investors, it contains much of interest for those interested in housing policy more generally. I found two highlights to be particularly interesting:

  • The 90,649 properties underlying the subject transactions have, on average, appreciated in value by 10.2% since the issuance dates of the respective transactions . . . (4)
  • The underlying collateral has exhibited positive operating performance with the exception of expenses. Contractual rental rates have continued to increase, vacancy rates declined (but remain above issuance levels), tenant retention rates have remained relatively stable, and delinquency rates have remained low. (Id.)

KBRA’s overall sector outlook for deal performance is

positive given current rental rates, which have risen since institutional investors entered the SFR space, although the rate of increase has slowed. Future demand for single-family rental housing will be driven by the affordability of rents relative to home ownership costs as well as the availability of mortgage financing. In addition, homeownership rates are expected to continue to decline due to changing demographics. Recent data released by the Urban Institute shows the percentage of renters as a share of all households growing from 35% as of the 2010 US Decennial Census to 37% in 2020 and increasing to 39% by 2030. Furthermore, 59% of new household formations are expected to be renters. Against this backdrop, KBRA believes single-borrower SFR securitizations have limited term default risk. However, there has been limited seasoning across the sector, and no refinancing has occurred to date. As such, these transactions remain more exposed to refinance risk. (9)

Kroll concludes that things look good for players in this sector. It does seem that large companies have figured out how to make money notwithstanding the higher operating costs for single-family rentals compared to geographically concentrated multifamily units.

I am not sure what this all means for households themselves. Given long-term homeownership trends, it may very well be good for households to have another rental option out there, one that makes new housing stock available to them. Or it might mean that households will face more competition when shopping for a home. Both things are probably true, although not necessarily both for any particular household.

The Rental Crisis and Household Formation

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The Mortgage Bankers Association has posted a Special Report: Diverted Homeowners, the Rental Crisis and Foregone Household Formation. The report’s bottom line is that people who should have been homeowners have displaced people who should have been renters. Those displaced people have been left in their original households, typically those headed by their parents.

The Report’s Executive Summary states that among the long term impacts of the Great Recession

have been the emergence of a rental housing shortage and an intensified affordability crisis in the rental market. In this report, we analyze various supply and demand factors that have led to this crisis.

In so doing, we provide detailed analysis of the shifts in homeowner and rental demand. As we note, these shifts cannot be analyzed without understanding the shifts in household formation that have occurred. We utilize data from the U.S. Census and focus the analysis on 3 distinct time periods (2000, 2006, 2012) to highlight housing epochs that are relatively normal, at the peak, and near the bottom of the market. Special attention is also placed on those younger than age 45 because they represent the households most commonly making first time decisions to form a household and to own a house.

Our primary findings:

• A sharp downturn in homeowner growth since 2006 suggests that 6.0 million would-be homeowners (the expected number compared to actual) have been shifted to renting or have left the housing market.

• These diverted homeowners triggered a cascade of adjustments throughout the rental housing sector that are measurable in different ways.

• A sizable portion (roughly a third) of the diverted homeowners likely have been absorbed into single-family rentals, especially among households aged 25 to 54.

• Although larger than expected, growth in the rental sector was too small to account for both the expected rental growth and also the large number of diverted homeowners. Before disruptions to the owner-occupied market, the rental sector had been expected to grow by 4.4 million occupied units after 2006, due to the arrival of the large Millennial generation. While diverted homeowners resulted in demand for nearly 6 million additional rental units, rental housing only grew by 5.2 million.

• New construction was crippled during the financial crisis and aftermath, slowing its response to the swelling rental demand, although multifamily construction volume nearly doubled in 2012 compared to 2010, and increased another third in 2014 compared to 2012.

• The clear inference is that slightly more than 5 million otherwise-expected renters left or never entered the housing market, their growth displaced by the diverted homeowners, and diminishing overall household growth far below expectations. (1)

• A further consequence of the resulting increase in demand and shortfall in supply in the rental market was an increase in rents, with rental affordability problems surging to record heights in 2010 and 2012. This dynamic created an increased incidence of high rental cost burdens that was remarkable for its relative uniformity across the nation.

There has been a fair amount written recently about household formation (here and here, for instance), but this Report is notable for its description of the cascading effect that the financial crisis has had on today’s housing market. We are around the fifty-year low for the homeownership rate.  If that rate has hit bottom, perhaps the trends identified in the MBA report are about to reverse course.