Tag Archives: subprime crisis

Reiss on $17 Billion BoA Settlement

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Law360 quoted me in BofA Deal Shows Pragmatism At Work On Both Sides (behind a paywall). It reads in part,

Bank of America Corp.’s $16.65 billion global settlement over its alleged faulty lending practices in the run-up to the financial crisis may have made bigger waves than recent payouts by JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup Inc., but attorneys say the deal still represents the best possible outcome for the bank and for federal prosecutors, who can now put their resources elsewhere.

The settlement, inked with the U.S. Department of Justice, Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., the Federal Housing Administration and the states of California, Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland and New York, released most of the significant claims related to subprime mortgage practices at Countrywide Financial Corp. and investment bank Merrill Lynch, both of which Bank of America picked up during the crisis.

Although the hefty price tag, which includes $7 billion in consumer relief payments and a record $5 billion in civil penalties, is nothing to balk at, the settlement will help Bank of America avoid a series of piecemeal deals that could stretch out over a much longer period without the prospect of closure, according to Ben Diehl of Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP.

“They want to start being looked at and considered by the market, their customers and regulators based on what they are doing today, in 2014, and not have everything continue to be looked at through the perspective of alleged accountability for conduct related to the financial crisis,” said Diehl, who formerly oversaw civil prosecutions brought by the California attorney general’s mortgage fraud strike force.

And the bank isn’t the only one looking for closure, according to Diehl.

“It’s in a regulator’s interest as well to be able to look at what is currently being offered to consumers and have a dialogue with companies about that, as opposed to talking about practices that allegedly happened six or more years prior,” he said.

The government also saw great value in getting a big dollar number out to a public that has expressed frustration over a perceived lack of accountability of financial institutions for their role in the financial crisis.

“The executive branch get a big news story, particularly with the eye-poppingly large settlements that have been agreed to recently,” said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School, who added that the federal government also has an interest in global settlements that keep the markets running more predictably.

Is Banks’ $200 Billion Payout from RMBS Lawsuits Enough?

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S&P issued a brief, The Largest U.S. Banks Should Be Able To Withstand The Ramifications Of Legal Issues, that quantifies the exposure that big banks have from litigation arising from the Subprime Crisis:

Since 2009, the largest U.S. banks (Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, and Wells Fargo) together have paid or set aside more than $45 billion for mortgage representation and warranty (rep and warranty) issues and have incurred roughly $50 billion in combined legal expenses .  . . This does not include another roughly $30 billion of expenses and mortgage payment relief to consumers to settle mortgage servicing issues. We estimate that the largest banks may need to pay out an additional $55 billion to $105 billion to settle mortgage-related issues, some of which is already accounted for in these reserves. (2)

S&P believes “that the largest banks have, in aggregate, about a $155 billion buffer, which includes a capital cushion, representation and warranty reserves, and our estimate of legal reserves, to absorb losses from a range of additional mortgage-related and other legal exposures.” (2) As far as their ratings go, S&P has already incorporated “heightened legal issues into our ratings, and we currently don’t expect legal settlements to result in negative rating actions for U.S. banks.” (2) But it warns, “an immediate and unexpected significant legal expense could result in the weakening of a bank’s business model through the loss of key clients and employees, as well as the weakening of its capital position.” (2) S&P also acknowledges that there are some not yet quantifiable risks out there, such as DoJ’s FIRREA suits.

As the endgame of the financial crisis begins to take shape and financial institutions are held accountable for their actions, one is left wondering about a group who is left relatively unscathed: financial institution employees who received mega bonuses for involving these banks in these bad deals. As we think about the inevitable next crisis, we should ask if there is a way to hold those individuals accountable too.

S&P on Rating Mortgage-Backed Securities Before The Crisis

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S&P has posted The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in The Financial System, remarks by its president at the United Nations. The remarks reflect S&P’s narrative of the events leading up to the Subprime Crisis. This narrative is, unsurprisingly, self-serving but revealing nonetheless.

  • We, like others, did not anticipate the U.S. housing downturn, which led to the financial crisis. But with the exception of our ratings on U.S. mortgage-related securities, our ratings have performed as expected. (3) 

Seems like a perfect example of the exception swallowing the rule . . ..

  • In September of 2008, we were all in the depths of the financial crisis. During that time the vast majority of the securities S&P rated performed as we anticipated, including many structured finance ratings. But the performance of our ratings of certain U.S. residential mortgage-related securities was a major disappointment. Like nearly every other market participant, analyst and interested government entity, we did not anticipate the U.S. housing collapse and its effect on the economy as a whole. (4)

As I have said before, this is self-serving revisionism, when S&P’s own analysts predicted the collapse of many of the mortgage-backed securities that they rated before the Bust.

  • We have taken significant actions to further strengthen our independence from issuer influence. We have long had policies to manage potential conflicts of interest such as a separation of analytic and commercial activities, a ban on analysts from participating in fee negotiations, and de-linking analyst compensation from the volume of securities they rate or the type of ratings they assign. After the crisis, we decided to strengthen analytical independence by rotating the analysts assigned to a particular issuer and enhancing analyst training. (4)

No mention here of the fact that their longstanding policies appeared to have not been up to the task of controlling for conflicts as far as anyone was concerned . . ..

  • For mortgage-related securities, for example, we significantly increased the credit enhancement required to achieve a ‘AAA’ rating and made it more difficult for securities to achieve high ratings. (4)

Thank goodness for that! Time will tell if these new assumptions adequately reflect the risk of default for complex MBS.

Borden & Reiss on REMIC Failure, in a Big Way

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Brad and I posted REMIC Tax Enforcement as Financial-Market Regulator to SSRN (as well as to BePress). The article is forthcoming in the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Law and Business and it provides our extended analysis of how the organizers of purported Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (REMICs) failed to abide by the requirements necessary to obtain the favorable REMIC tax status. We had addressed this topic in shorter articles here, here, and here, but this is our most comprehensive take on the subject. We look forward to hearing reactions to it.

The abstract reads:

Lawmakers, prosecutors, homeowners, policymakers, investors, news media, scholars and other commentators have examined, litigated, and reported on numerous aspects of the 2008 Financial Crisis and the role that residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) played in that crisis. Big banks create RMBS by pooling mortgage notes into trusts and selling interests in those trusts as RMBS. Absent from prior work related to RMBS securitization is the tax treatment of RMBS mortgage-note pools and the critical role tax enforcement should play in ensuring the integrity of mortgage-note securitization.

This Article is the first to examine federal tax aspects of RMBS mortgage-note pools formed in the years leading up to the Financial Crisis. Tax law provides favorable tax treatment to real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs), a type of RMBS pool. To qualify for the favorable REMIC tax treatment, an RMBS pool must meet several requirements relating to the ownership and quality of mortgage notes. The practices of loan originators and RMBS organizers in the years leading up to the Financial Crisis jeopardize the tax classification of a significant portion of the RMBS pools. Nonetheless, the IRS appears to believe that there is no legal or policy basis for challenging REMIC classification of even the worst RMBS pools. This Article takes issue with the IRS’s inaction and presents both the legal and policy grounds for enforcing tax law by challenging the REMIC classification of at least the worst types of RMBS pools. The Article urges the IRS to take action, recognizing that its failure to police these arrangements prior to the Financial Crisis is partly to blame for the economic meltdown in 2008. The IRS’s continued failure to police RMBS arrangements provides latitude to industry participants, which facilitates future economic catastrophes. Even without the IRS taking action, private parties can rely upon the blueprint set forth in the Article to bring qui tam or whistleblower claims to accomplish the purposes of the REMIC rules and obtain the beneficial results that would occur if the IRS enforced the REMIC rules.