Author Archives: David Reiss

Transferring Risk from Fannie & Freddie

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The Federal Housing Finance Agency has posted its FHFA Progress Report on the Implementation of FHFA’s Strategic Plan for the Conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. As its name suggests, it provides a progress report on a range of topics, but I was particularly interested in its section on credit risk transfers for single-family credit guarantees:

The 2014 Conservatorship Strategic Plan’s goal of reducing taxpayer risk builds on the Enterprises’ previous risk transfer efforts. Under the 2013 Conservatorship Scorecard, FHFA expressed the expectation that each Enterprise would conduct risk transfer transactions involving single-family loans with an unpaid principal balance (UPB) of at least $30 billion. The 2014 Conservatorship Scorecard tripled the required risk transfer amount, with the expectation that each Enterprise would transfer a substantial portion of the credit risk on $90 billion in UPB of new mortgage-backed securitizations. FHFA also expected each Enterprise to execute a minimum of two different types of credit risk transfer transactions. FHFA required the Enterprises to conduct all activities undertaken in fulfillment of these objectives in a manner consistent with safety and soundness. During 2014, the two Enterprises executed credit risk transfers on single-family mortgages with a UPB of over $340 billion, which is well above the required amounts. (14)

Risk transfer is an important tool to reduce the risks that taxpayers will be on the hook for future bailouts. The mechanism for these risk transfer deals are not well understood because they are pretty new. The Progress Report describes how they work in relatively clear terms:

The primary way that the Enterprises have executed single-family credit risk transfers to date has been through debt-issuance programs. Freddie Mac transactions are called Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR) notes, and Fannie Mae transactions are called Connecticut Avenue Securities (CAS). Following the release of historical credit performance data in 2012, each Enterprise has issued either STACR or CAS notes that transfer a portion of the credit risk from large reference pools of single-family mortgages to private investors. These reference pools are comprised of loans that the Enterprises had previously securitized to sell the interest rate risk of the loans to private investors. The STACR and CAS transactions take the next step of transferring a portion of the credit risk for these loans to investors as well. Each subsequent credit risk transfer transaction is intended to provide credit protection to the issuing Enterprise on the mortgages in the relevant reference pool. (14)

The Progress Report provides more detail for those who are interested. For the rest of us, we may just want to think through the policy implications. How much credit risk can Fannie and Freddie offload? Is it sufficient to make a real dent in the overall risk that the two companies pose to taxpayers? It would be helpful if the FHFA answered those questions in future reports.

Another Fannie/Freddie Bailout?

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The Federal Housing Finance Agency Office of the Inspector General has issued a White Paper Report, The Continued Profitability of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Is Not Assured. The Executive Summary opens,

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (collectively, the Enterprises) returned to profitability in 2012 after successive years of losses. Their improved financial performance is encouraging; however, their continued profitability is not assured. The mortgage industry is complex, cyclical, and sensitive to changes in economic conditions, mortgage rates, house prices, and other factors. The Enterprises have acknowledged in their public disclosures that adverse market and other changes could lead to additional losses and that their financial results are subject to significant variability from period to period.

Notwithstanding the Enterprises’ recent positive financial results, they face many challenges. For example:

  The Enterprises must reduce the size of their retained investment portfolios over the next few years pursuant to the terms of agreements with the U.S. Department of Treasury (Treasury) and additional limits from FHFA. Declines in the size of these portfolios will reduce portfolio earnings over the long term. These portfolios have been the Enterprises’ largest source of earnings in the past.

  Core earnings from the Enterprises’ business segments—single-family guarantee, multifamily, and investments—comprised only 40% of net income in 2013. Sixty percent of the Enterprises’ net income came from non-recurring tax-related items and large settlements of legal actions and business disputes, which are not sustainable sources of revenue. Core earnings comprised 55% of net income in 2014.

  The Enterprises are unable to accumulate a financial cushion to absorb future losses. Pursuant to the terms of agreements with Treasury, the Enterprises are required to pay Treasury each quarter a dividend equal to the excess of their net worth over an applicable capital reserve amount. The applicable capital reserve amount decreases to zero by January 1, 2018.

  Stress test results released by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) in April 2014 indicate that the Enterprises, under the worst scenario—a scenario generally akin to the recent financial crisis— would require additional Treasury draws of either $84.4 billion or $190 billion, depending on the treatment of deferred tax assets, through the end of the stress test period, which is the fourth quarter of 2015.

  Absent Congressional action, or a change in FHFA’s current strategy, the conservatorships will go on indefinitely. The Enterprises’ future status is beyond their control. At present, it appears that Congressional action will be needed to define what role, if any, the Enterprises play in the housing finance system. (1-2)

While I am overall sympathetic to the underlying message of this white paper — Reform Fannie and Freddie Now! — I think it is somewhat misleading. Fannie and Freddie have been sending billions of dollars to the Treasury that exceed the amount of support that they received during the financial crisis. Before we could talk about a second taxpayer bailout, I think we would have to credit them with those excess payments.

That being said, the Obama Administration and Congress have left Fannie and Freddie to linger for far too long in conservatorship limbo. I have no doubt that this state of affairs will contribute to some kind of crisis for the two companies, so we should support some kind of exit strategy that gets implemented sooner rather than later. Inaction is the greatest threat to Fannie and Freddie, and to the housing finance system itself.

Foreign Funding for Real Estate Projects

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Jeanne Calderon and Gary Friedland have posted A Roadmap to the Use of EB-5 Capital: An Alternative Financing Tool for Commercial Real Estate Projects. The paper provides a great overview of a relatively new source of funding for real estate deals. The introduction opens,

From an immigrant’s perspective, the EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program (“EB-5” or the “Program”) represents merely one of several paths to obtain a visa.  The EB-5 visa is based on the immigrant’s investment of capital in a business that creates new jobs. However, from a real estate developer’s perspective, the immigrant’s investment to qualify for the visa creates an alternative capital source for the developer’s project (“EB-5 capital” or “EB-5 financing”).

Despite the Program’s enactment by Congress in 1990, for many years EB-5 was not a common path followed by immigrants to seek a visa. However, when the traditional capital markets evaporated during the Great Recession, developers’ demand for alternate capital sources rejuvenated the Program. Since 2008, the number of EB-5 visas sought, and hence the use of EB-5 capital, has skyrocketed. EB-5 capital has become a capital source providing extraordinary flexibility and attractive terms, especially to finance commercial real estate projects. Consequently, many developers routinely consider EB-5 capital as a potential source to fill a major space in the capital stack. As the financing tool becomes more widely known and understood, this source of capital should become even more popular.

The EB-5 investor’s motivation for making the investment accounts for the relative flexibility and favorable terms afforded by EB-5 capital compared to conventional capital sources. Unlike that of the conventional capital providers (such as banks, private equity funds, REITs, life insurance companies and pension funds), the EB-5 investor’s reason for making the investment is to secure a visa. Thus, his primary objective at the time of making the investment is to satisfy the EB-5 visa requirements. Consequently, so long as the investor believes that the investment will qualify for the visa and result in the safe return of his capital, he is willing to accept a below market, if not minimal, return on the investment. Furthermore, the investor might not require some of the other protections that more sophisticated, conventional real estate investors typically seek.

*     *     *

Simply stated, the Program requires that the immigrant make a capital investment of $500,000 or $1,000,000 (depending on whether the project is located in a “Targeted Employment Area”) in a business located within the United States. The business must directly create 10 new, full-time jobs per investor. Thus, the number of jobs that a project will create is a key determinant of the amount of the potential EB-5 capital raise. (3-4)

This once exotic funding technique is now becoming quite mainstream. Of interest to some readers of this blog, the paper describes at various points how EB-5 funds have been used in residential projects. The paper is a useful introduction for those who want to know more about this program.

Tax Expenditure Wars: Wealthy Households v. Poor

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Henry Rose has posted How Federal Tax Expenditures That Support Housing Contribute to Economic Inequality to SSRN. This short article examines “how federal income tax laws benefit more affluent owner households but provide no benefits to economically-strapped renter households.” (1) Housing policy analysts (myself included) constantly bemoan the regressive nature of federal tax policy as it relates to housing, but it is always worth looking at the topic with updated numbers. And this article contains some tables with some interesting numbers.

One table provides an overview of the estimated tax savings (in billions) in FY 2014 for five federal tax expenditures for owners of housing that they occupy:

Mortgage Interest Deduction  (MID)                                                 $66.91

Property Tax Deduction (PTD)                                                        $31.59

Capital Gains Exclusion on Sales                                                   $35.54

Net Imputed Rental Income Exclusion                                            $75.24

Discharge of Mortgage Indebtedness Exclusion                            $3.1

Total                                                                                                 $212.38

The next table provides an estimated distribution of two of these tax expenditures (FY 2014, savings in millions):

Tax-Filer AGI                PTD Tax Savings         MID Tax Savings                

Below $50,000              $693                              $1,443

$50,000-75,000             $2,190                           $4,330

$75,000-100,000           $3,478                           $6,581

$100,000-200,000         $13,648                         $27,421

$200,000+                     $11,798                         $29,340

Total                              $31,806                         $69,115                               

The article concludes by noting that despite

the great disparity in economic positions between owners and renters, federal tax expenditures lavish tax savings on primarily affluent owners and provide none for renters. The federal tax expenditures for owners are so generous that interest can be deducted on mortgage balances up to $1,000,000 and can also be taken on second homes, even yachts, as well as primary residences. It is difficult to conceive of a federal public policy that more directly promotes economic inequality than the federal tax expenditures that support owners of housing but are not available to renters. (9-10, footnote omitted)

I don’t expect this disparity to be addressed any time in the near future, given the current political environment, but it is certainly one that should stay at the top of any list of reforms for those concerned with promoting equitable federal housing policies.

Reiss on Foreign Buyers in NYC

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MainStreet.com quoted me in Foreign Buyers Driving Up Rental Prices Impacts New York Residents. The story opens,

Emir Bahadir, a native of Turkey, purchased two apartments in Manhattan for the purpose of renting them out. The 24-year-old paid a total of $9 million for the apartments in the West Village and Chelsea and earns some $40,000 a month in rental income.

”Entry into the real estate market in Manhattan by the foreign buyer has become easier because of technology,” Bahadir told MainStreet.

As a result, foreign buyers are increasingly coming into the Manhattan market and buying properties worth $2 to $5 million for the benefit of rental income. That can push rental prices higher for those on Main Street.

“[Foreign buyers] are not keeping them empty but filling them with tenants,” said Tamir Shemesh, a Realtor at the Corcoran Group. “A $2 million apartment can be rented out for as much as $8,500 a month, while a $3 million apartment can go for $11,000 to $12,000 a month.”

The tenants who can afford to pay thousands a month in rent are largely foreign as well.

“The reason we invest in real estate in New York is because of the exorbitant amount of rent that people are willing to pay,” Bahadir said. “That doesn’t happen anywhere else except in the U.K., but because of complications in the Middle East, London is not so popular these days.”

The downside for Americans is that escalating prices impact the overall rental market.

“It lets landlords know what the ceiling is and may encourage them to reach for it,” said David Reiss, professor with Brooklyn Law School.

CFPB Mortgage Supervision Highlights

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The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau issued its Supervisory Highlights for Winter 2015. The highlights include a section on Mortgage Origination and “largely focuses on Supervision’s examination findings and observations from July 2014 to December 2014.” (9)

The headings of this section give a sense of the CFPB’s work in this area:

  • Loan originators cannot receive compensation based on a term of a transaction
  • Improper use of lender credit absent changed circumstances
  • Failing to provide the Good Faith Estimate in a timely manner
  • Improperly using advertisements with triggering terms without the required additional disclosures
  • Adverse action notice deficiencies and failure to provide the notice in a timely manner
  • Deficiencies in compliance management systems

For good or for ill, these are pretty modest examination findings. They certainly don’t reveal the fire-breathing regulator that some had prophesied. I was particularly interested in the last finding:

an effective compliance management system includes board and management oversight, a compliance program, a consumer complaint management program, and a compliance audit program. The board of directors and senior management should, among other things, adopt clear policy statements concerning consumer compliance, establish a compliance function to set policies and procedures, and assign resources to the compliance function commensurate with the size and complexity of the supervised entity’s practices and operations. A compliance program should include policies and procedures, training, and monitoring and corrective action processes. A compliance audit program should assist the board of directors or board committees in determining whether policies and standards adopted by the board are being implemented, and should also identify any significant gaps in board policies and standards. (13)

Compliance management systems are intended to create a culture of compliance within an organization, from top to bottom. The CFPB found that one or more financial institutions had weak compliance management systems that would allow for numerous violations of federal regulations governing mortgage lending. It is important for the CFPB to focus on these compliance issues now, before the mortgage market really froths up and carries mortgage professionals away from appropriate underwriting and servicing.

Arbitration and The Common Mortgage

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The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau posted its Arbitration Study. This is a report to Congress that was required by Dodd-Frank. By way of background, the study states that

Companies provide almost all consumer financial products and services subject to the terms of a written contract. Whenever a consumer obtains a consumer financial product such as a credit card, a checking account, or a payday loan, he or she typically receives the company’s standard form, written legal contract.

*     *     *

As a general rule, the parties to a dispute can agree, after the dispute arises, to submit the dispute for resolution to a forum other than a court — for example, to submit a particular dispute that has arisen to resolution by an arbitrator. (3)

Arbitration provisions typically do not directly apply to residential mortgages because Dodd-Frank “prohibited the use of ‘arbitration or any other nonjudicial procedure’ for resolving disputes arising from residential mortgage loans or extensions of credit under an open-end consumer credit plan secured by the principal dwelling of the consumer. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c.” (Arbitration Study § 5.4, n.34) But they can apply in mortgage-related contracts, such as those for title insurance, mortgage insurance and forced-place flood insurance. (§ 8.3, n.24 & Appendix S, § 8)

The Study thus holds some interest for those of us interested housing finance. The Executive Summary (§ 1.4) provides an overview of the CFPB’s research findings about arbitrations and other proceedings.

My overall impression after having reviewed the report is that consumers do not often raise claims against consumer finance companies in any forum, whether with an arbitrator or with a judge. The Study does not provide any information that would allow one to conclude what the socially optimal level of formalized disputes would be. It would be helpful for the CFPB to try to model that.