Weigh in on Mortgage Closing “Pain Points”

The Consumer Finance Protection Bureau has issued a Request for Information Regarding the Mortgage Closing Process. The CFPB wants

information from the public about mortgage closing. Specifically, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) seeks information on key consumer “pain points” associated with mortgage closing and how those pain points might be addressed by market innovations and technology.

The CFPB seeks to encourage the development of a more streamlined, efficient, and educational closing process as the mortgage industry increases its usage of technology, electronic signatures, and paperless processes. The next phase of CFPB’s Know Before You Owe initiative aims to identify ways to improve the mortgage closing process for consumers. This project will encourage interventions that increase consumer knowledge, understanding, and confidence at closing.

This notice seeks information from market participants, consumers, and other stakeholders who work closely with consumers. The information will inform the CFPB’s understanding of what consumers find most problematic about the current closing process and inform the CFPB’s vision for an improved closing experience. (79 F.R. 386)

The CFPB is particularly interested in responses to the following questions:

1. What are common problems or issues consumers face at closing? What parts of the closing process do consumers find confusing or overwhelming?Show citation box

2. Are there specific parts of the closing process that borrowers find particularly helpful?

3. What do consumers remember about closing as related to the overall mortgage/home-buying process? What do consumers remember about closing?

4. How long does the closing process usually take? Do borrowers feel that the time at the closing table was an appropriate amount of time? Is it too long? Too short? Just right?

5. How empowered do consumers seem to feel at closing? Did they come to closing with questions? Did they review the forms beforehand? Did they know that they can request their documents in advance? Did they negotiate?

6. What, if anything, have you found helps consumers understand the terms of the loan? (79 F.R. 387)

It is rare that a federal agency requests information and comments from the Average Joe, Joe Sixpack and Joe the Plumber. So this is a chance for educated consumers of mortgages to be heard at the highest levels about the flaws in the home loan closing process. I encourage readers of REFinblog.com to make their voices heard!

CFPB’s Regulatory Agenda — Collect More Data!

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has published its Semiannual Regulatory Agenda in the Federal Register.  Of note are amendments to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act’s Regulation C. These amendments are in the prerule stage.  The Agenda states that HMDA

requires certain financial institutions to collect and report information in connection with housing-related loans and applications they receive for such loans. The amendments made by the Dodd-Frank Act expand the scope of information relating to mortgage applications and loans that must be compiled, maintained, and reported under HMDA, including the ages of loan applicants and mortgagors, information relating to the points and fees payable at origination, the difference between the annual percentage rate associated with the loan and benchmark rates for all loans, the term of any prepayment penalty, the value of real property to be pledged as collateral, the term of the loan and of any introductory interest rate for the loan, the presence of contract terms allowing non-amortizing payments, the origination channel, and the credit scores of applicants and mortgagors. The Dodd-Frank Act also provides authority for the CFPB to require other information, including identifiers for loans, parcels, and loan originators. The CFPB expects to begin developing proposed regulations concerning the data to be collected and appropriate format, procedures, information safeguards, and privacy protections for information compiled and reported under HMDA. The CFPB may consider additional revisions to its regulations to accomplish the purposes of HMDA. (1243)

While esoteric for most, this is an important development. The lending industry collects lots of loan-level data. But that data is very expensive to access for academic and policy researchers. Improved loan-level data will better allow government agencies and researchers to study the mortgage market in a timely way. This will allow them (hopefull!) to identify unsustainable and predatory developments more quickly.

In another effort relevant to the mortgage market, the CFPB also noted that it “is continuing rulemaking activities that will further establish the Bureau’s nonbank supervisory authority by defining larger participants of certain markets for consumer financial products and services. Larger participants of such markets, as the Bureau defines by rule, are subject to the Bureau’s supervisory authority.” (1242)

Preserving NYC’s Affordable Housing Stock

The housing folks in the De Blasio Administration may want to take a look at a recent article in the Journal of Affordable Housing by Sullivan and Power.  Coming Affordable Housing Challenges for Municipalities After the Great Recession (also on SSRN) provides an overview of some modest ways to protect the existing affordable housing stock. Policies such as these can inform the Mayor’s overall affordable housing strategy which will have to emphasize preservation as much as new construction.

The authors note that for “low-income individuals who are to find employment, the disparity between wages and housing affordability is stark.” (298) They also note that while “housing prices have fallen approximately 30 percent since 2006, adjustments in value have done little to ease the financial burden of rental housing.” (2) The article then looks at various opportunities that local governments have to stem the loss of rental units to conversion, demolition and abandonment.

The authors identify three cost-effective and ways that states and local governments may be able to  “curtail the ongoing loss and conversion of affordable housing units . . ..” (308) They can adopt “no net loss” policies that could, for instance require that downzonings of residential communities be matched by upzonings . They can implement “rights of first refusal” that grant governmental and not-for-profit housing agencies “the right to notice of an owner’s intent to sell within a certain time frame and an opportunity to purchase expiring or opting-out affordable housing units.” (310) And local and state governments can amend their building codes to make it easier and cheaper for providers of affordable housing to maintain their properties.

NYC already does some of these things, but it is worth it for the new Mayor to take a fresh look at the City’s approach to preservation to ensure that there are no missed opportunities.

A New History of Mortgage Banking — Part Two!

I know, I know, you can’t get enough of this stuff. Yesterday, I noted a couple of highlights from Mortgage Banking in the United States 1870-1940. The last part of the report carefully documents how various players in the urban mortgage market saw their market and their market shares change dramatically as a result, in large part, of the new federal housing finance regime introduced in the 1930s:

All that was required for a historic surge in homebuilding and homeownership was a housing finance system. Local institutional portfolio lenders, now buttressed by deposit insurance and, in the case of S&Ls, the FHLB’s lending facilities, took up most of the business. But the inter-regional flow of credit that arbitraged imbalances across local markets was dominated by life insurance companies and their mortgage banking correspondents. Through 1952, most of these loans were insured under the FHA program, and for good reason — that program had worked well for these intermediaries in the late 1930s. The federally insured and guaranteed home mortgage loan business for life insurance companies and, later in the decade, mutual savings banks preoccupied mortgage bankers until the unusual conditions that fostered the expansion finally ran out in the 1960s. (2)

All of this historical detail brings home a key point for us today. The technical choices we make in structuring the federal housing finance system will alter the incentives of all of the current players. As we watch to see how the Qualified Mortgage, Qualified Residential Mortgage and Ability-to-Repay rules play out when they go into effect next year, we should know that they are likely to shape the mortgage market for decades to come. We already know that some mortgage products will be common and some rare because of these rules. But we should also be aware that some types of originators will be winners and some will be losers because of these rules, although it is too early (at least for me) to tell which will be which. And such an impact may shape the nature mortgage market as much as the types of products that eventually win out when the rules are fully understood by the industry.

A New History of Mortgage Banking

Yes, I know, a dry subject for most. But for some nerds, there are lots of insights in Mortgage Banking in the United States 1870-1940. The author, Kenneth Snowden, highlights this finding, which gives more credit to the Federal Farm Loan Bank system for the development of the modern mortgage market than do many other histories of the industry:

The Federal Farm Loan Bank system and the FHA mortgage insurance programs that restructured both the farm and urban mortgage banking sectors shared three common features:

+     They each encouraged the widespread adoption of long-term, amortized mortgage loans.

+     They each created mechanisms to stimulate the inter-regional transfer of mortgage credit and the convergence of mortgage rates and lending terms across regions.

+     They each established federal chartering systems for privately financed European-style mortgage banks to create active secondary markets for long-term, amortized loans. (2)

This history provides a lot more detail than one finds in standard histories of the American mortgage market, including much about the early history of securitization. Writers in this area (myself included) tend to think that securitization was birthed in the 1970s, but Snowden documents some proto-securitizations in the early 20th Century. I will come back to this report in a later blog post, but I highly recommend it to serious students of the mortgage markets.

Reiss on Cases To Watch In 2014

Law360 quoted me in Real Estate Cases To Watch In 2014. The story reads in part,

The real estate market’s recovery from the financial crisis of the past few years has created a host of new issues — from contract disputes to eminent domain litigation — for government lenders, developers and investors to litigate in 2014.

Real estate finance attorneys are paying close attention to an expected rise in judicial scrutiny of banks’ ownership of loans, while also closely watching the multitude of cases that have been brought against the U.S. government and its handling of profits made by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

At the same time, development attorneys are tuned in to how an increase in construction in gateway cities might soon lead to more litigation over land use and eminent domain.

Here are some of the most important cases and trends real estate attorneys are watching closely:

Challenges to Allocation of Fannie and Freddie Profits

A collection of cases making their way through the Washington, D.C., federal court and the Court of Federal Claims challenge the government’s taking of all of the profits from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and directing them toward the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

Two of the most-watched cases were brought by hedge funds Perry Capital LLC and Fairholme Capital Management LLC, the latter of which has since offered to purchase the government-sponsored entities’ insurance businesses.

Perry Capital accused the Treasury in July of illegally speeding up the GSEs’ liquidation, entitling the government to all of their mounting profits and essentially “extinguishing” privately held securities, according to the complaint filed in Washington federal court.

Fairholme made a similar claim in the Court of Federal Claims two days later, alleging that the government had acted unconstitutionally when it altered its bailout deal for the GSEs to keep the companies’ profits for itself.

“The universe of cases impacting the current operation of Fannie and Freddie is very important from a policy perspective, and it’s also an interesting battle between hedge funds and the government,” said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.

There will likely be a flurry of motions to dismiss and requests for summary judgment on all sides in these cases 2014, but from the perspective of a real estate attorney, the policy implications will be more interesting than the precedential value of any decisions, he said.

A hearing on defendants’ dispositive motions and plaintiffs’ cross motions has been set for June 23 in the Washington cases.

Perry Capital is represented by Theodore B. Olson, Janet Weiss, Douglas Cox, Matthew McGill, Nikesh Jindal and Derek Lyons of Gibson Dunn. The case is Perry Capital LLC v. Lew et al., case number 1:13-cv-01025, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

Fairholme is represented by Charles J. Cooper, Vincent J. Colatriano, David H. Thompson and Peter A. Patterson of Cooper & Kirk PLLC. That case is Fairholme Funds Inc. v. U.S., case number 1:13-cv-00465, in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.

Reiss in Reuters on Mortgage Investing

Reuters quoted me in Mortgage Bonds Reward Yield-Sensitive Investors, which addresses the future of Fannie and Freddie. It reads in part,

Investors who buy mortgage-backed securities from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and hold those bonds until they mature will get their full investment back; there is no “principal risk.”

*     *     *

Washington has spent years debating what to do with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the future, and quick change is unlikely.

Even if Fannie and Freddie are privatized, older bonds would be safe, suggests David Reiss, a law professor of real estate finance at Brooklyn Law School.

“The government would not change the rules of the game for securities purchased with the guarantee. Pre-privatization (securities) would retain the guarantees, and future securities would have a different type of guarantee,” he said.