Author Archives: David Reiss

Wrongful Foreclosure Claim Survives Motion to Dismiss

Posted on by

Judge Conti (N.D. Cal.) issued an order granting in part and denying in part a motion to dismiss in Subramani v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. et al., No. 13-1605 (Oct. 30, 2013).

Plaintiff Subramani received a mortgage loan from Defendant Wells Fargo secured by a deed of trust (DOT).  Subramani alleges (and these allegations are taken to be true for the purposes of a motion to dismiss)  that Wells Fargo sold the loan in 2006 to an affiliate and that it was ultimately bundled with other mortgages into a mortgage-backed security.  Subramani later defaulted on the loan and the home was sold at foreclosure.

Subramani contends that documents relating to the foreclosure were void because Wells Fargo “was no longer the valid lender in the DOT, or even an agent of a successor beneficiary after it sold the Loan in 2006 . . .. Plaintiff therefore states that after Defendant sold the Loan, neither Defendant nor anyone else had any right to or interest in the Loan, so all legal notices associated with the note and DOT — including the SOTs [substitutions of trustee] , NODs [notice of defaults], and the foreclosure sale itself — are illegal and void.” (4, citations omitted)

The Court found that at the motion to dismiss stage, Subramani “has sufficiently stated a claim for wrongful foreclosure based on his allegations that Defendant’s 2006 sale of Plaintiff’s DOT precluded Defendant from retaining a beneficial interest in the DOT. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Defendant directed the wrong party to issue Notices of Default, that Defendant is not the true beneficiary, and that Defendant failed to abide by the rules regarding transference of the Loan.” (8, citations omitted)

 

[HT April Charney]

Reiss on Risk Management

Posted on by

Law360.com interviewed me in Banks Caught In Middle Of Regulators’ Fair-Lending Pursuits (behind a paywall).  The article reads in part,

Federal and state regulators are increasingly enlisting banks in their pursuit of fair-lending and other violations at payday and auto lenders and other financial services providers with which they do business, a tactic that has also increased banks’ risk of penalties for conduct by third parties.

In late October, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency was the latest to put out new guidance for banks’ responsibility to monitor the activities of third-party vendors that perform operations on behalf of the bank. Other federal and state regulators have been calling on banks with growing frequency and force in recent years in order to ensure their vendors and clients comply with fair lending and other laws.

*     *     *

The increased use of pressure on banks to indirectly go after firms that may not be subject to federal or state laws or regulations comes after banks outsourced a great deal of their mortgage-lending operations and other services during the financial crisis, according to David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.

While many of those vendors met high standards, others, particularly in the subprime loan context, did not. And banks didn’t monitor those failings, Reiss said.

“The crazy thing about that is you’d think banks would do this on their own,” Reiss said. “Why do they need their regulators to say, ‘Check on these things’?”

Affordable Housing in the De Blasio Era

Posted on by

Mayoral candidate de Blasio’s position on affordable housing policy can be found here. The key points include:

  • Require developers to build some affordable housing when they build in neighborhoods that have been upzoned (mandatory inclusionary zoning)

  • Direct $1 billion in city pension funds to affordable housing construction

  • Apply the same tax rate to big, vacant lots as applies to commercial properties and earmark the increased revenues for affordable housing

  • Ensure that affordable housing subsidies meet the needs of lower-income families and are distributed equitably throughout the City

As I had mentioned previously, NYU’s Furman Center (and its Moelis Institute for Affordable Housing Policy) ran a great series of ten conversations on the big housing issues facing New York City’s mayor. Since then, the Furman Center has posted ten policy briefs about those issues.The ten issues are

  1. Should the next mayor commit to build or rehabilitate more units of affordable housing than the Bloomberg Administration has financed?

  2. Should the next mayor require developers to permanently maintain the affordability of units developed with public subsidies?

  3. Should the next mayor adopt a mandatory inclusionary zoning program that requires developers to build or preserve affordable housing whenever they build market-rate housing?

  4. Should the next mayor seek to expand the use of city pension funds to develop affordable housing?

  5. Should the next mayor provide a rental subsidy for moderate- and middle-income households?

  6. Should the next mayor permit more distant transfers of unused development rights to support the development of affordable housing?

  7. Should the next mayor support the New York City Housing Authority’s plan to lease its undeveloped land for the construction of market-rate rental housing?

  8. Should the next mayor allow homeless families to move to the top of the waiting list for housing vouchers or public housing?

  9. Should the next mayor offer to cap the property tax levy on 421-a rental properties in order to preserve the affordable units within those buildings?

  10. How should the next mayor prioritize the preservation of existing affordable housing units?

Mayor-Elect de Blasio and his team will have to struggle with all of these issues. There are few easy answers in New York City when it comes to housing policy.

Reiss on Mayor De Blasio’s Plans for Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning

Posted on by

Law360.com interviewed me about Mayor-Elect de Blasio’s plans for mandatory inclusionary zoning in NYC Real Estate Faces Less Friendly Market Under De Blasio (behind a paywall). It reads in part:

One of the biggest and most controversial pieces of de Blasio’s affordable housing platform is a plan to mandate inclusionary zoning — requiring developers to build affordable housing as part of their market-rate multifamily projects — when developments are being constructed in areas rezoned by the city.

Mandatory inclusionary zoning is meant to be a “hard-and-fast rule” to replace the incentives de Blasio plans to end for big developers, and he predicted on his campaign website that the strategy would create up to 50,000 new affordable housing units during the next 10 years.

But “mandatory” anything is considered an added cost when developers are weighing their options in deciding where to build, and requiring that residential developments include affordable housing could push some developers elsewhere, experts say.

“The devil is in the details,” said Brooklyn Law School professor David Reiss, noting that the way the de Blasio administration writes and implements the rule will make a big difference, either encouraging more development of affordable housing or shutting down the market to new developers.

And while de Blasio has emphasized that inclusionary zoning would only be mandatory for projects taking place in areas specifically rezoned for new development, Learner points out that the Bloomberg administration rezoned more than 30 percent of the city, so the new rule could likely affect many developers.

“When the program is designed, a lot of thought needs to go into what impact mandatory inclusionary zoning will have on the bottom line of developers,” Reiss said. “If it’s too significant of an impact, a less than optimal amount of housing will be built.”

FHA’s Net Cost of $15 Billion

Posted on by

The Congressional Budget Office posted FHA’s Single-Family Mortgage Guarantee Program: Budgetary Cost or Savings? In response to the question, “Has FHA’s Guarantee Program for Single-Family Mortgages Produced Net Savings to Taxpayers,” the CBO responds,

No. Collectively, the single-family mortgage guarantees made by FHA between 1992 and 2012 have had a net federal budgetary cost of about $15 billion, according to the most recent estimates by FHA. In contrast, FHA’s initial estimates of the budgetary impact of those guarantees sum to savings of $45 billion . . .. That swing of $60 billion from savings to cost primarily reflects higher-than-expected defaults by borrowers and lower-than-expected recoveries when the houses of defaulted borrowers have been sold—especially for loans made over the 2004-2009 period. (1)

The document contains a chart of estimates of the budgetary impact of the FHA’s single-family mortgage guarantees by year. It shows that the 2008 vintage was particularly bad, accounting for over $15 billion in losses by itself (the other years’ savings and costs would thus net out).

There are some disturbing aspects of this finding and some that are not. First, the disturbing ones. The FHA has not been transparent about its potential for losses and bailouts (see here for instance). Second, its own financial projections have been overly optimistic.

That being said, the mere fact that the FHA is expected to have losses is not in itself an indictment of the government’s strategy of using the FHA to provide liquidity to the mortgage markets during the financial crisis. If only this were done forthrightly . . . but perhaps that is too much to ask in the midst of the crisis itself.

Balancing Consumer Protection and Access to Credit

Posted on by

S&P posted U.S. RMBS Roundtable: Originators, Aggregators, and Counsel Discuss New Qualified Mortgage Rules. In summarizing the roundtable, S&P notes that

The ability-to-repay rule, ostensibly to prevent defaults and another housing crisis, is still very much open to interpretation. To that end, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services recently held a private roundtable with several market participants. The confidential discussion offered the attendees an opportunity to share their views and interpretations of these rules, offer opinions on how to operate efficiently within the scope of the rules, and highlight perceived conflicts the rules still present.

In our view, the discussion identified some common themes, notably:

    • Most originators will focus on QM-Safe Harbor loans to avoid liability and achieve the best execution.
    • Many originators will also find attractive opportunities to originate non-QM loans.
    • Non-agency originations of QM or non-QM loans will continue to focus on super-prime borrowers as lenders find that the best defense is to limit the potential for default.
    • The documentation standards used by originators will be the key to compliance with the rule. (2)

There are a lot of interesting tidbits in this document, including speculation about the role of technology in the brave new world of mortgage lending.  The summary ended on a guardedly optimistic note:

While the rule leaves significant room for interpretation, originators generally felt that the final rule to be implemented in January 2014 is better than expected. They expressed hope that regulators will be vigilant in pursuing violations that are reasonable. Originators still see challenges for originations of non-QM loans, but they don’t believe they are insurmountable, and many expect that non-QM loans will be represented in origination volume throughout 2014. The challenges that remain are the market’s pricing of QM safe harbor, rebuttable presumption, and non-QM loans; required credit enhancement levels; the effects of risk retention rules, which have yet to be finalized; and the ultimate costs associated with the assignee liability provisions in the rule. (7)

If these industry participants are right, it will look like regulators did a pretty good job of balancing consumer protection and access to credit. Let’s hope!

Measuring Progress at the CFPB

Posted on by

The Bipartisan Policy Center issued a white paper, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Measuring the Progress of a New Agency:

This paper measures the agency’s actions against its mandate.  It analyzes the start-up and operational challenges the Bureau has faced and the critical choices it has made. Throughout this process, the Task Force met with leading consumer advocates, federal and state bank regulators and their staffs, and regulated industry participants in the bank and nonbank space. (5)

I was particularly intrigued by the external metrics that the Bipartisan Policy Center recommends for the CFPB:

  • Are there quality, safe products available in both the bank and nonbank space?
  •  Is the CFPB identifying and responding promptly to problems in both the bank and nonbank space?
  • Does the Bureau engage consumers in a meaningful way? For example, specific metrics should track its regulatory and outreach efforts to growing minority populations.
  • Is the CFPB collaborating effectively with other regulators in both the bank and nonbank space, to ensure a high level of consumer protection?
  • Is there a healthy amount of quality product innovation in the financial services marketplace the Bureau regulates? (10)

These are all reasonable metrics, but most importantly, the white paper “recommends that the CFPB measure success as it relates to consumer behavior by finding demonstrable evidence of improved consumer decision-making with regard to consumer products.” (10) I think that this is perhaps the most important of the metrics and one that the CFPB has made the least progress in measuring. It will be interesting to see how the CFPB makes progress in this regard.

The rest of their findings are organized as follows:

  • Guidance vs. Rule-Making
  • Supervisory and Examination Process
  • Data Requests and Collection
  • Consumer Complaint Portal
  • Civil Penalty Fund
  • CFPB Consultation with Other Agencies
  • CFPB’s Authority to Cover Lending Activities of Auto-Dealers
  • CFPB Funding and Accountability
  • Performance Metrics
  • [External Metrics]
  • Internal Metrics