Author Archives: David Reiss

Dirty REMICs: A Debate

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Brad, Joshua Stein and I have posted Dirt Lawyers and Dirty REMICs: A Debate to SSRN (also on BePress). Brad and I had posted our side of the debate at various points, but the entire back and forth is contained in this one handy download. The abstract reads:

In mid-2013, Professors Bradley T. Borden and David J. Reiss published an article in the American Bar Association’s PROBATE & PROPERTY journal (May/June 2013, at 13), about the disconnect between the securitization process and the mechanics of mortgage assignments. The Borden/Reiss article discussed potential legal and tax issues caused by sloppiness in mortgage assignments.

Joshua Stein responded to the Borden/Reiss article, arguing that the technicalities of mortgage assignments serve no real purpose and should be eliminated. That article appeared in the November/December 2013 issue of the same publication, at 6.

Stein’s response was accompanied by a commentary from Professors Borden and Reiss, which also appeared in the November/December 2013 issue, at 8.

Reducing The Cost of Affordable Housing Development: Lessons for NYC?

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Enterprise and the Urban Land Institute have issued a report, Bending the Cost Curve on Affordable Rental Development: Understanding the Drivers of Cost, that identifies affordable housing development’s “most commonly cited cost drivers, provides a brief overview of their impact and applicability, and includes high-level recommendations to promote a more efficient delivery system.” (4). As the report notes,

Affordable housing delivery is shaped by a number of procedures, regulations, and policies instituted at all levels of the system—each with associated costs. Development costs may be dictated by site constraints, design elements, local land use and zoning restrictions, building codes, delays in the development process, efforts to reduce long-term operating costs, and the affordable housing finance system. Most affordable developments rely on multiple funding streams, both equity and debt, each of which carries its own set of requirements and compliance costs. While there may be some alignment of affordable housing land use regulations, financing tools, or programs, far too often developers must seek a complex series of approvals or obtain waivers to bring a project to fruition. This process alone can introduce costs through delays to the development timeline as well as introduce additional uncertainty and risk, which, in addition to regulatory barriers, can also increase costs. (3)

While the report offers no shocking insights into affordable housing’s cost drivers, it does provide a good overview. It also brings to mind research that NYU’s Furman Center did some years ago about the drivers of the high cost of housing construction in New York City.

Given that Mayor-Elect de Blasio has put affordable housing at the center of his campaign, his team should focus on reducing these costs as part of his overall affordable housing strategy. Mayors Bloomberg and Giuliani were not able to make any significant progress on this issue, even though doing so would be quite consistent with their approach to governance. Perhaps that makes it even more of a compelling goal for the de Blasio Administration.

Reiss on Government’s Role in Housing Finance

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The Urban Land Institute New York Blog posted Housing Finance Leaders Gather to Discuss the Future of Freddie and Fannie about a recent panel on the housing finance market. It begins,

Housing finance industry leaders came together last week to debate the future role of government-sponsored lending giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Both entities were placed under the conservatorship of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) during the financial crisis from which they have yet to emerge.

Panelists included David Brickman, Head of Multifamily for Freddie Mac, Robert Bostrom, Co-Chair of the Financial Compliance and Regulatory Practice at Greenberg Traurig, Mike McRoberts, Managing Director at Prudential Mortgage Capital Company, David Reiss, Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School, and Alan H. Weiner, Group Head at Wells Fargo Multifamily Capital.

The debate centered around the proper role for the mortgage giants and to what extent government-backed entities should intervene in capital markets.

A market failure or liquidity crisis is the only reasonable basis for government intervention in the housing market, according to Reiss. “However, it is not possible for the government to create liquidity only in moments of crisis, so there is a need to have a permanent platform that is capable of originating liquidity at all times,” said Brickman. Fannie Mae, which was created during the Great Depression and Freddie Mac, which was created during the Savings and Loan crisis, were both responses to past market failures.

Doing Justice with the $13B JPMorgan Settlement

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I have posted a couple of items on this massive settlement (here and here).  This should be my last one. Perhaps I am ungrateful, but the Statement of Facts agreed upon by the Department of Justice and JPMorgan Chase left me with an empty feeling. Recovering $13 billion for homeowners, investors and the government is certainly a key aspect of the justice done in this case. But the law can and should have an expressive function — it should make a statement about the difference between right and wrong behavior. Unfortunately, the Statement of Facts almost completely fails as an expressive document.

It only makes it clear at one point that JPMorgan, Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual did something very wrong:

employees of JPMorgan, Bear Stearns, and WaMu received information that, in certain instances, loans that did not comply with underwriting guidelines were included in the RMBS sold and marketed to investors; however, JPMorgan, Bear Stearns, and WaMu did not disclose this to securitization investors. (1)

The Statement of Facts provided a couple of facts that made clear what JPMorgan did wrong (see page 2), but I could not even parse the sections of Bear Stearns and WaMu to tell you what they did wrong. This is about as strong as it gets:

in 2008, internal WaMu reviews indicated specific instances of weaknesses in WaMu’s loan origination and underwriting practices, including, at times, non-compliance with underwriting standards; the reviews also revealed instances of borrower fraud and misrepresentations by others involved in the loan origination process with respect to the information provided for loan qualification purposes. (10)

You can’t tell from such language whether WaMu was acting intentionally, recklessly or negligently.  You can’t really tell whether this behavior was endemic, frequent, occasional or rare. You can’t tell whether it was the fault of some low-level employees or of upper management. Just about the only thing you can tell from the WaMu section (and the Bear Stearns section, for that matter) is that it was not JPMorgan’s fault:

The actions and omissions described above with respect to WaMu occurred prior to OTS’s closure of WaMu and JPMorgan’s acquisition of the identified WaMu assets and liabilities. (11)

No doubt, JPMorgan tried to control the PR and legal liability to third parties that this Statement of Facts could engender. But Justice could have held the line on the expressive aspect of the settlement just as it did with the monetary aspect. In the long run, that could turn out to be just as important.

Reiss on Urban Planning Legacy of the Bloomberg Administration

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The BLS Real Estate Society is sponsoring The Zoning and Urban Planning Legacy of the Bloomberg Administration on Monday, November 25th from 6:30 p.m. – 9:00 p.m. in the Student Lounge on the first floor of Brooklyn Law School, 250 Joralemon Street. The press release reads:

Come hear two real estate experts discuss and debate zoning and urban planning issues and the legacy of the outgoing Bloomberg Administration.

Panelists

Mitchell Korbey ’03, Chair of Zoning and Land Use Group, Herrick Feinstein

David Reiss, BLS Real Estate Professor (previously Paul Weiss, and Morrison & Foerster)

No RSVP is required for this event. Contact Rafe Serouya at rafe.serouya@brooklaw.edu for more information.

Mitch’s bio reads in part,

Prior to joining Herrick, Mitch served for six years as commissioner of the New York City Board of Standards and Appeals under Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, and as director of the New York City Department of City Planning’s Brooklyn office, where he guided Brooklyn’s first mixed use zoning districts through the public review process and spearheaded plans for the rezoning and revitalization of a number of neighborhoods, including Williamsburg and Greenpoint.  Prior to running the Brooklyn office, Mitch was deputy director of the Staten Island office and served in the City Planning Department’s Housing and Economic Development Division.

*   *   *

Mitch is an Adjunct Professor in Hunter College Graduate School’s Urban Affairs and Planning Department where he teaches Land Use Law and leads a seminar entitled “Lawyers and Planners in the Development Process.”  His insights on real estate development and the intricacies of local zoning laws have appeared in major real estate and business publications, including Crain’s, The New York Times and The Real Deal.

He is also a co-author of Herrick’s land use and zoning blog, ZONE, which keeps readers up-to-date on the latest issues in land use and environmental law.

And How About the Just?

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Some believe that there are 36 righteous people whose existence justifies the whole of humanity.  Each bears the world’s pain and the world would come to an end without these Just ones. Oddly enough, I was thinking about this story when reading about the the JPMorgan Chase settlement with the Department of Justice.

I was glad to see that the company was being held accountable for its behavior (the Statement of Facts outlines the basis for the settlement).  I was also glad to see that Justice is not giving a free pass to the individuals who may be individually guilty of wrongdoing. The settlement does not bar future prosecutions and Justice seems energized to hold individuals accountable for their intentional and wrongful acts that contributed to the financial crisis. These actions by Justice will hopefully deter some potential wrongdoers going forward.

But what is missing from all of this allocating of responsibility is an acknowledgment that some people in these financial institutions tried to do the right thing. They tried to underwrite mortgages properly; they tried to rate securities properly; they tried to follow established due diligence procedures. These people were overrun by their superiors who were chasing short term profits for their employers and bigger annual bonuses for themselves. Some of these Financial Industry Just were fired, some retired, some moved on.

How might the FI Just view their actions so many years later? Their supervisors likely received large bonuses and promotions and very few of them will be held responsible for their bad acts. The FI Just, on other other hand, got harsh words, poor treatment and relatively poor compensation for their troubles.

Just as we want to disincentivize bad behavior, we should also seek to incentivize good behavior. This does not necessarily require financial compensation. For many people, an acknowledgement of their good judgment might be enough. Is there a role for government in such an initiative? Can their be a medal for financial rectitude; an honor roll for underwriting: a listing of the Just by Justice?

 

Reiss on $13B JPMorgan Settlement in CSM

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The Christian Science Monitor quoted me in JPMorgan Chase settles. Is $13 billion for role in mortgage crisis fair? The story reads in part,

The settlement does not, however, release any individuals within JPMorgan from further criminal or civil charges. The bank has agreed to cooperate fully in any investigations related to the fraud covered in the agreement.

“I think that the Department of Justice has heard the public in terms of saying, if people were criminally responsible, they should be held liable,” says David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School, who has written extensively on the mortgage crisis. “Just a handful of people have faced any serious personal liability as a result of the events of the financial crisis of the 2000s.”

But some feel that the unprecedented scope and size of the penalty is unfair for the bank behemoth, which was seen as something of a financial savior when it took on the imploding assets of Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual after the financial collapse. Some estimate that employees at these banks conducted up to 80 percent of the fraud found by the Justice Department. JPMorgan assumed these firms’ legal jeopardy when it took on their troubled assets.

“There’s a moral narrative about this, that it’s unfair to go after JPMorgan because they stepped in to help,” says Mr. Reiss.