Bullying the Fed

Fed Chair Jerome Powell

Central Banking quoted me in Economists Denounce Trump’s ‘Bullying’ of Fed Chair (sign up required). It opens,

Economists have attacked what they regard as US president Donald Trump’s bullying of Federal Reserve chair Jerome Powell, describing it as dangerous for the central bank’s continued independence.

On June 30, Trump posted on his social media platform a copy of a handwritten letter to Powell showing interest rates around the world. In the letter, Trump had written: “Jerome, you are as usual, too late. You have cost the USA a fortune, and continue to do so. You should lower the rate by a lot. Hundreds of billions of dollars being lost. No inflation.”

Along with the note, Trump posted that “Jerome ‘Too Late’ Powell, and his entire Board, should be ashamed of themselves for allowing this to happen to the United States. They have one of the easiest, yet most prestigious, jobs in America, and they have FAILED — And continue to do so”.

He added: “If they were doing their job properly, our Country would be saving Trillions of Dollars in Interest Cost. The Board just sits there and watches, so they are equally to blame. We should be paying 1% Interest, or better!”

On July 1, Powell said the Fed would probably have lowered rates already had it not been for the tariffs and trade policies introduced by the Trump administration.

Ralf Fendel, professor of economics at WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management in Germany, says Trump’s note bears all the hallmarks of political interference.

“Handwritten personal correspondence is traditionally reserved for heartfelt gratitude or strategic diplomacy, but not for exerting pressure on an independent central bank,” he tells Central Banking. “In resisting such pressure, Mr Powell is upholding the Fed’s institutional credibility and responding appropriately to a macroeconomic environment clouded by trade policy uncertainty and various economic risks.”

Fendel adds that Fed decisions must be guided by economic data and not the demands of the White House.

William English – professor of economics at Yale University, and a former director of the Fed’s monetary affairs division and secretary to the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) – says that having a president who is so publicly critical makes the Fed’s job more complicated. “But they have their mandate and will do their best to achieve that,” he says. “We’ll see how it goes!”

Francesco Bianchi, professor of economics and department chair at Johns Hopkins University, says the most recent remarks by Trump represent a turn for the worse.

“Such a confrontational stance cannot be good for central bank independence,” he says. “Powell probably feels that he needs to push back against the pressure and that he has a bit more freedom given that his second term is coming to an end.”

Fed historian Robert Hetzel adds that Trump appears to want to return to a time when the central bank was subservient to the US Treasury.

David Reiss, professor of law at Cornell University, says there is an extensive history of presidents “jawboning” the Fed chair to lower rates. However, he says central banks work better when “insulated from the political exigencies of political leaders”.

“Paradoxically, bullying the central bank can lead to interest rates increasing, as markets demand a higher risk premium as trust in the central bank’s decision-making decreases,” he says. He also concurs with Powell’s assessment that tariffs are inflationary through many channels.

Fannie, Freddie and Trump

Profile picture for William J. Pulte

FHFA Director Bill Pulte

Central Banking quoted me in Fannie, Freddie . . . and Donald. It reads, in part,

IIn a client note on May 13, investment management firm Pimco said any privatisation of Fannie and Freddie would be a solution in search of a problem.

“If the GSEs are released but the government remains accountable to come to their rescue, wouldn’t taxpayers ultimately be the biggest loser, once again, by seeing GSE gains privatised but losses socialised?” it said, adding: “Don’t fix what’s not broken.”

David Reiss, professor at Cornell Law School, says Pimco’s view reflects the fact that the mortgage market has been functioning “pretty smoothly” since Fannie and Freddie were nationalised. According to this viewpoint, there is “no need to release them from conservatorship”.

However, Reiss says he does not like to see so much power and influence concentrated in the GSEs, and he believes the private sector would do a better job of evaluating credit risk.

“Some people – mostly investors in Fannie and Freddie securities – think [privatisation] is the right thing to do because the conservatorships were supposed to be temporary and the companies should be returned to private control and investors should be able to get some kind of return on their investments,” he says.

Reiss adds that some members of the Trump administration think privatisation would generate hundreds of billions of dollars in revenue that could be used to help pay down the national debt, offset tax cuts and seed a sovereign wealth fund.

Joe Tracy, senior fellow with think-tank the American Enterprise Institute and a former official with the Federal Reserve banks of New York and Dallas, agrees with Reiss. “The problem is that they are in conservatorship limbo, so the government has effectively nationalised a large segment of mortgage finance,” he says. “This should be carried out by the private sector.”

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Lawrence White, professor at New York University and co-author of Guaranteed to Fail: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Debacle of Mortgage Finance, says the GSEs are unlikely to become boring unless they are broken down. He believes that if Fannie and Freddie are privatised in their current form, each enterprise will be likely to pose a systemic risk from a financial stability perspective.

“The implication is that their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency [FHFAI, will need to have strong powers of examination and supervision and will need to impose substantial, risk-adjusted capital requirements,” he says.

“It is unclear whether there will be implications for the Fed as lender of last resort, since the Fed’s lending function is currently limited to banks.”

Reiss agrees that the two lenders are systemically important. If they “had to significantly scale back their lending, it would likely cause a crisis in the financial markets”, he says. “If that crisis were not quickly addressed it would cause a crisis in the real economy as well, freezing up credit for new construction and resales.”

Given that the two GSEs issue more than 70% of the outstanding $9 trillion of mortgage-backed securities in the US and, if privatised, would be two of the country’s largest publicly traded companies, the financial stability risks are clear, he says.

Reiss adds that if the privatisations were poorly planned, and if this were priced in by the markets, it would lead to “higher mortgage rates, with all of the knock-on effects that would have”. This, he says, would “increase the magnitude of a financial crisis if the two companies were to report poor financial results down the line”

Reiss’s interpretation of the Fed’s role is different to that of White, and he believes history may end up repeating itself. He says that although the FHFA is Fannie and Freddie’s primary regulator, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 requires the Fed to be consulted about any federal government processes related to the companies.

“The Fed may also co-ordinate with other parts of the federal government in responding to a financial crisis, such as purchasing Fannie and Freddie securities, as they did during the financial crisis of 2007-08,” he says. “One could well imagine the Fed playing a similar role in future crises involving Fannie and Freddie.