FinTech Disrupting The Mortgage Industry

photo by www.cafecredit.com

photo by www.cafecredit.com

Researchers at the NY Fed have posted The Role of Technology in Mortgage Lending. There is no doubt that tech can disrupt the mortgage lending business much as it has done with others. The abstract reads,

Technology-based (“FinTech”) lenders increased their market share of U.S. mortgage lending from 2 percent to 8 percent from 2010 to 2016. Using market-wide, loan-level data on U.S. mortgage applications and originations, we show that FinTech lenders process mortgage applications about 20 percent faster than other lenders, even when controlling for detailed loan, borrower, and geographic observables. Faster processing does not come at the cost of higher defaults. FinTech lenders adjust supply more elastically than other lenders in response to exogenous mortgage demand shocks, thereby alleviating capacity constraints associated with traditional mortgage lending. In areas with more FinTech lending, borrowers refinance more, especially when it is in their interest to do so. We find no evidence that FinTech lenders target marginal borrowers. Our results suggest that technological innovation has improved the efficiency of financial intermediation in the U.S. mortgage market.

The report documents the significant extent to which FinTech firms have already disrupted the primary mortgage market. They also predict a whole lot more disruption coming down the pike:

Going forward, we expect that other lenders will seek to replicate the “FinTech model” characterized by electronic application processes with centralized, semi-automated underwriting operations. However, it is unclear whether traditional lenders or small institutions will all be able to adopt these practices as these innovations require significant reorganization and sizable investments. The end result could be a more concentrated mortgage market dominated by those firms that can afford to innovate. From a consumer perspective, we believe our results shed light on how mortgage credit supply is likely to evolve in the future. Specifically, technology will allow the origination process to be faster and to more easily accommodate changes in interest rates, leading to greater transmission of monetary policy to households via the mortgage market. Our findings also imply that technological diffusion may reduce inefficiencies in refinancing decisions, with significant benefits to U.S. households.

Our results have to be considered in the prevailing institutional context of the U.S. mortgage market. Specifically, at the time of our study FinTech lenders are non-banks that securitize their mortgages and do not take deposits. It remains to be seen whether we find the same benefits of FinTech lending as the model spreads to deposit-taking banks and their borrowers. Changes in banking regulation or the housing finance system may affect FinTech lenders going forward. Also, the benefits we document stem from innovations that rely on hard information; as these innovations spread, they may affect access to credit for those borrowers with applications that require soft information or borrowers that require direct communication with a loan officer. (37-38)

I think that the author’s predictions are right on target.

 

De Facto Housing Finance Reform

photo by The Tire Zoo

David Finkelstein, Andreas Strzodka and James Vickery of the NY Fed have posted Credit Risk Transfer and De Facto GSE Reform. It opens,

Nearly a decade into the conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, no legislation has yet been passed to reform the housing finance system and resolve the long-term future of these two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). The GSEs have, however, implemented significant changes to their operations and practices over this period, even in the absence of legislation. The goal of this paper is to summarize and evaluate one of the most important of these initiatives – the use of credit risk transfer (CRT) instruments to shift mortgage credit risk from the GSEs to the private sector.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have significant mortgage credit risk exposure, largely because they provide a credit guarantee to investors on the agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) they issue. Since the CRT programs began in 2013, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have transferred to the private sector a portion of the credit risk on approximately $1.8 trillion in single-family mortgages (as of December 2017; source: Fannie Mae, 2017, Freddie Mac, 2017). The GSEs have experimented with a range of different risk transfer instruments, including reinsurance, senior-subordinate securitizations, and transactions involving explicit lender risk sharing. The bulk of CRT, however, has occurred via the issuance of structured debt securities whose principal payments are tied to the credit performance of a reference pool of securitized mortgages. A period of elevated mortgage defaults and losses will  trigger automatic principal write-downs on these CRT bonds, partially offsetting credit losses experienced by the GSEs.

Our thesis is that the CRT initiative has improved the stability of the  housing finance system and advanced a number of important objectives of GSE reform. In particular the CRT programs have meaningfully reduced the exposure of the Federal government to mortgage credit risk without disrupting the liquidity or stability of secondary mortgage markets. In the process, the CRT programs have created a new financial market for pricing and trading mortgage credit risk, which has grown in size and liquidity over time. Given diminished private-label securitization activity in recent years, these CRT securities are one of the primary ways for private-sector capital market investors to gain exposure to residential mortgage credit risk.

An important reason for this success is that the credit risk transfer programs do not disrupt the operation of the agency MBS market or affect the risks facing agency MBS investors. Because agency MBS carry a GSE credit guarantee, agency MBS investors assume that they are exposed to interest rate risk and prepayment risk, but not credit risk. This reduces the set of parameters on which pass-through MBS pools differ from one another, improving the standardization of the securities underlying the liquid to-be-announced (TBA) market where agency MBS mainly trade. Even though the GSEs now use CRT structures to transfer credit risk to a variety of private sector investors, these arrangements do not affect agency MBS investors, since the agency MBS credit guarantee is still being provided only by the GSE. In other words, the GSE stands in between the agency MBS investors and private-sector CRT investors, acting in a role akin to a central counterparty.

Ensuring that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s credit risk sharing efforts occur independently of the agency MBS market is important for both market functioning and financial stability. The agency MBS market, which remains one of the most liquid fixed income markets in the world, proved to be quite resilient during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, helping to support the supply of mortgage credit during that period. The agency market financed $2.89 trillion of mortgage originations during 2008 and 2009, experiencing little drop in secondary market trading volume during that period. In contrast, the non-agency MBS market, where MBS investors are exposed directly to credit risk, proved to be much less stable; Issuance in this market essentially froze in the second half of 2007, and has remained at low levels since that time.4 (1-2, citations and footnotes omitted)

One open question, of course, is whether the risk transfer has been properly priced. We won’t be able to fully answer that question until the next crisis tests these CRT securities. But in the meantime, we can contemplate the authors’ conclusion:

the CRT program represents a valuable step forward towards GSE
reform, as well as a basis for future reform. Many proposals have been put forward for long-term reform of mortgage market since the GSE conservatorships began in 2008. Although the details of these proposals vary, they generally share in common the goals of

(1) ensuring that mortgage credit risk is borne by the private sector (probably with some form of government backstop and/or tail insurance to insure catastrophic risk and stabilize the market during periods of stress), while

(2) maintaining the current securitization infrastructure as well as the standardization and liquidity of agency MBS markets.

The credit risk transfer program, now into its fifth year, represents an effective mechanism for achieving these twin goals. (21, footnote omitted)

Sustainable Housing for FHA Borrowers

photo by Michael Daddino

Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Donghoon Lee and Joseph Tracy of the NY Fed have posted a staff report, Long-Term Outcomes of FHA First-Time Homebuyers. It opens,

The Commissioner of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), David Stevens, in remarks delivered on December 12, 2009, defined the purpose of the FHA as follows. “As a mission-driven organization, FHA’s goal is to provide sustainable homeownership options for qualified borrowers.” These remarks followed a remarkable increase in the scope of the FHA mortgage insurance program in response to the financial crisis and housing bust. This comment by Commissioner Stevens is important in that it clarifies a goal of the FHA program. However, this clarity was not followed up by the FHA with a definition of “sustainable homeownership.” Nor was there any documented attempt by the FHA to develop metrics to track their progress toward this objective, or a commitment by the FHA to make this information available to the public in the future.

Program evaluation is an integral part of any effective program—government or private. We illustrate in this paper that advances in data availability offer the opportunity for the FHA to both define what it means by sustainable homeownership and to measure its progress against this definition. We believe that it would be beneficial for the FHA to be transparent in this effort and to report on not only its definition and metrics, but also on its progress on an annual basis. Improved tracking of long-term outcomes of FHA borrowers will better help inform the FHA on program design. This should lead to improved outcomes over time and enhanced public support.

We focus our analysis on first-time homebuyers who are an important market segment for the FHA. The mission of sustainable homeownership is particularly relevant for these new homeowners. The benefits of a government mortgage insurance program that helps to facilitate the transition from renting to owning rests importantly on the success of these new borrowers in remaining homeowners in the future. However, to date, the FHA has not systematically tracked the progress of its first-time homebuyers after they pay off their credit risk to the FHA. We use the New York Fed’s Consumer Credit Panel (CCP) data to do this analysis starting with the 2002 cohort of FHA first-time homebuyers. (1, footnotes omitted)

This is inarguably right. The FHA should set forth performance metrics and provide annual progress reports for them. For too long, the FHA has cherry-picked metrics without providing a holistic perspective on its performance. The authors conclude,

A stated mission of the FHA mortgage insurance program is to support sustainable homeownership. An examination of the history of the FHA program illustrates a strong initial focus on sustainability, but legislated changes in the 1950s and early 1960s shifted the focus to affordability. If sustainability remains an important goal for the FHA, then it would be desirable for the FHA to define what they mean by sustainability and to track their performance over time. Only by being transparent and holding themselves accountable can the FHA improve on this objective over time. (14)

Amen to that.

Understanding Homeownership

 

The Housing Finance Policy Center at the Urban Institute released its House Finance at a Glance Chartbook for December. It states that financial education “can help reduce barriers to homeownership.” As I argue below, I do not think that financial education is the right thing to emphasize when trying to get people to enter the housing market.

The Introduction makes the case for financial education:

While mortgage debt has been stable to marginally increasing, other types of debt, particularly auto and student loan debt have increased far more rapidly. Our calculations, based on The Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Quarterly Report on Household Debt and Credit, show that over the past 5 years (Q3 2012 to Q3 2017), mortgage debt outstanding has grown at an annualized rate of 1.3 percent, while non-mortgage debt (which includes credit card debt, student loan debt, auto debt, and other debt) has grown by 6.8 percent annualized rate. Student loan debt has grown by 7.3 percent per year while auto debt has been growing by 9.6 percent per year. In Q3 2012, the number of accounts for mortgage loans and auto loans are very close (84 million vs 82 million). By Q3 2017, the number of accounts for mortgages had fallen to 80 million consistent with declining homeownership rate, while the number of accounts for auto loans had increased to 110 million.

Another metric where auto loans have diverged from mortgages is delinquency rates. Over the past 5 years, mortgage delinquencies have plummeted (pages 22 and 29) while the percent of auto loans that is more than 90 days late is roughly flat despite an improving economy. However, the percent of auto loans transitioning into serious delinquency has risen from 1.52 percent in Q3 2012 to 2.36 percent in Q3 2017. While these numbers remain small, the growth bears monitoring.

When we looked at the distribution of credit scores for new auto origination and new mortgage origination, we found no major change in either loan category; while mortgage credit scores are skewed higher, the distribution of mortgage credit scores (page 17) and the distribution of auto credit scores have been roughly consistent over the period. Our calculations based off NY Fed data shows the percent of auto loan origination balances with FICOs under 660 was 35.9% in Q3, 2012, it is now 31.7%; similarly the percent of auto origination with balances under 620 has contracted from 22.7 percent to 19.6 percent. There have been absolutely more auto loans with low FICOs originated, but this is because of the increased overall volume.

So what might explain the differences in trends in the delinquency rate and loan growth between these two asset classes? A good part of the story (in addition to tight mortgage credit) is that many potential low- and moderate-income borrowers do not believe they can get a mortgage. As a result, many don’t even bother to apply. We showed in our recently released report on Barriers to Accessing Homeownership that survey after survey shows that borrowers think they need far bigger down payments than they actually do. And there are many down payment assistance programs available. Moreover, it is still less expensive at the national level to own than to rent. This suggests that many LMI borrowers who are shying away from applying for a mortgage could benefit from financial education; with a better grasp of down payment facts and assistance opportunities, many of these families could be motivated to apply for mortgages and have the opportunity to build wealth. (5)

I am not sure if financial education is the whole answer here. Employment instability as well as generalized financial insecurity may be playing a bigger role in home purchases than in car purchases. The longer time horizon as well as the more serious consequences of a default with homeownership may be keeping people from stepping into the housing market. This is particularly true if renters have visions in their heads of family members or friends suffering during the long and lingering foreclosure crisis.

Wall Street Naughty List

Damian Gadal

Law360 quoted me in Checks Needed For Naughty List To Improve Wall Street’s Rep. It reads, in part, 

Wall Street banks may back a push to create a central registry of employees who misbehave in a bid to improve internal culture at the country’s biggest banks, but worries about the accuracy of any potential list and other due process concerns have given some observers pause.

Federal Reserve Bank of New York President William F. Dudley has been advocating for the creation of such a central registry that can be used by banks when recruiting new talent as a way to make sure that serial rulebreakers are kept out of the biggest banks. And a readout of a meeting on bank culture with Wall Street bigwigs in November appear to show that the banks are getting behind the idea.

While creating such a central registry could go a long way toward preventing bad actors from engaging in future frauds and improving the internal workings of banks, there are risks that people could be wrongly included on the list and shut out from jobs, or that individuals could be made scapegoats for larger, institutional failures at the big banks.

In order to prevent that from happening, any formal registry of wrongdoers set up by the banks must have strict rules for when a person is added and how they can appeal their placement on the list, said Ellen Zimiles, a managing director at Navigant Consulting.

*     *     *

Still, despite her concerns, Zimiles said that having a registry of bad actors could increase the amount of individual accountability for Wall Street’s misdeeds, something that has been lacking.

But some say it does not go far enough.

The Dodd-Frank Act mandated new compensation rules, and more than five years after the law’s passage, they have still not been completed. Without compensation reforms, including clawbacks for violations, a central registry will not be enough to truly reform Wall Street’s internal culture, said David Reiss, a Brooklyn Law School professor.

“Together, perhaps the registry and clawbacks could have a positive effect on firm behavior if they are implemented thoughtfully and are designed to work together,” he said.

And even with the addition of compensation reforms to the central registry forming a “belt and suspenders” approach to reform bank culture, the fiercest of Wall Street critics say that changes will not come unless bankers are brought before courts for alleged violations and sent to jail if found guilty.

“And, of course, along with the belt and suspenders, there should be prison bars as well,” Bart Naylor of Public Citizen said.

That’s something that critics say was missing after the financial crisis.

The registry, however, could be a start to bringing about much-needed accountability, they said.

Low Down Payment or Low Interest Rate?

dollars.0

MainStreet.com quoted me in Consumers Should Not Assume a Lower Down Payment Is a Better Option. It reads, in part

First-time homeowners are often caught in a conundrum when they are faced with tantalizing offers of either lower mortgage rates or a smaller down payment.

The decision is much harder to make than it appears because of many variables such as the stability of your profession, the likelihood of buying another home within a few years and the long-term costs of higher payments.

While at first glance paying a smaller down payment sounds like the obvious choice for many Millennials and Gen X-ers who want to own a home, but are also saddled with student loans and credit card debt, the decision has other ramifications. A higher mortgage rate means paying thousands of extra dollars in interest alone over time.

A recent study conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York found that when a lower down payment is required, it affects the demand on housing more as additional consumers are eager or able financially to purchase a house. Changes in the mortgage rate have a “modest” effect, wrote Andreas Fuster and Basit Zafar, both senior economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s research and statistics group. The study asked 1,000 households what would affect their willingness to buy a home if they were to move to a similar city and a comparable home.

When the households were offered either a 20% down payment compared to a 5% down payment, the number of people willing to pay for a house rose by 15% when the lower amount was an option.

    *     *     *

Advantages of Lower Interest Rates

While a lower down payment might be more appealing for a first time homebuyer, it can often result in paying more money just on the interest alone, said David Reiss, a law professor at Brooklyn Law School in N.Y. Lenders offer mortgage rates largely based on the credit score of the homeowner, so a cheaper interest rate may not always be available.

Let’s say the homebuyer is considering a $100,000 property that is paid for with a $90,000 interest-only mortgage with a 4% interest rate and a $10,000 down payment or with a $95,000 interest-only mortgage with a 5% interest rate and a $5,000 down payment.

The first mortgage means the consumer would pay $3,600 a year in interest. However, the second mortgage results in the consumer paying $4,750 a year in interest.

“That is not an apples-to-apples comparison, because the second mortgage interest payment reflects the higher loan to value ratio and the higher interest rate and it also does not take into account the tax treatment of interest payments,” he said.

Homeowners need to decide if paying additional money in interest is “worth it,” since a consumer would pay about $1,000 a year more in interest for the “privilege of paying the lower down payment,” Reiss said.

“I think that it is smart to figure out how to pay as low of an interest rate as possible, given the other financial constraints you face,” he said.

Many consumers believe there is not much of a difference between a 3.5% or 4% mortgage rate, but it can result in another few hundred dollars each month in mortgage payments, which can add up easily in 30 years.

Refinancing a mortgage in the current market conditions means your rate is not likely to decline much, so receiving a lower rate now will have a larger impact over the next 30 years, he said. After paying closing costs, many homeowners do not see the impact of the lower rates until the fourth year after the refinancing occurred.

“Since refinancing requires a large upfront cost of thousands of dollars, you need to live there long enough for it to make sense if you are only saving less than 1% on your mortgage rate,” he said.

Thursday’s Advocacy & Think Tank Round-Up

  • The Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Staff Report, Determinants of Mortgage Default and Consumer Credit Use: The Effects of Foreclosure Laws and Foreclosure Delays, examines the interconnectedness of debt repayment decisions – specifically finding that mortgage default is negatively correlated with credit card and car loan defaults, unless foreclosure is delayed, in which case default rates increase across the board.
  • Harvard’s Joint Center for Housing Studies’ Remodeling Futures Program recently released its Leading Indicator of Remodeling Activity (LIRA) index which predicts annual spending growth for home improvements will accelerate to 4.0% by the first quarter of 2016.
  • According to the National Association of Realtor’s recently released June Existing Home Sales data, sales are now at their highest pace since February 2007 (5.79 million), have increased year-over-year for nine consecutive months and are 9.6 percent above a year ago (5.01 million).
  • The National Low Income Housing Coalition has compiled a helpful overview of the new Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (AFFH) Rule, which was released by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development on July 8th.  This document compares the old AFFH rule to the new AFFH rule and finds it makes modest yet positive steps toward encouraging more integrated communities.
  • The Urban Institute’s Are You Rent Burdened?  Is an interactive calculator the allows one to imput address, income and rental amount to determine whether one is rent burdened.