Tag Archives: Chase

Conservative Underwriting or Regulatory Uncertainty?

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Jordan Rappaport (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City) and Paul Willen (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston) have posted a Current Policy Perspectives,Tight Credit Conditions Continue to Constrain The Housing Recovery. They write,

Rather than cutting off access to mortgage credit for a subset of households, ongoing credit tightness more likely takes the form of strict underwriting procedures applied to all households. Lenders require conservative appraisals, meticulous documentation, and the curing of even the slightest questions of title. To the extent that these standards constitute sound lending practices, adhering to them is a positive development. But the level of vigilance suggests that regulatory uncertainty may also be playing a role.

Since the housing crisis, the FHA, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and other government and private organizations have been continually developing a new regulatory framework. Lenders fear that departures from the evolving standards will result in considerable costs, including the forced buyback of loans sold to Fannie and Freddie and the rescinding of FHA mortgage guarantees. The associated uncertainty has caused lenders to act as if strict interpretations of possible restrictive future standards will apply. (2-3)

The authors raise an important question: has the federal government distorted the mortgage market in its pursuit of past wrongdoing and its regulation of behavior going forward? Anecdotal reports such as those about Chase’s withdrawal from the FHA market seem to suggest that the answer is yes. But it appears to me that Rappaport and Willen may be jumping the gun based on the limited data that they analyze in their paper.

Markets cycle from greed to fear, from boom to bust. The mortgage market is still in the fear part of the cycle and government interventions are undoubtedly fierce (just ask BoA). But the government should not chart its course based on short-term market conditions. Rather, it should identify fundamentals and stick to them. Its enforcement approach should reflect clear expectations about compliance with the law. And its regulatory approach should reflect an attempt to align incentives of market actors with government policies regarding appropriate underwriting and sustainable access to credit. The market will adapt to these constraints. These constraints should then help the market remain vibrant throughout the entire business cycle.

Borrowers Have “Been Through Hell”

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The Maine Supreme Judicial Court issued an opinion, U.S. Bank, N.A. v. David Sawyer et al., 2014 ME 81 (June 24, 2014), that makes you question the sanity of the servicing industry and the efficacy of the rule of law. If you are a reader of this blog, you know this story.

This particular version of the story is taken from the unrebutted testimony of the homeowners, David and Debra Sawyer. They received a loan modification, which was later raised to a level above the predelinquency level; the servicers (which changed from time to time) then demanded various documents which were provided numerous times over the course of four court-ordered mediations; the servicers made numerous promises about modifications that they did not keep; the dysfunction goes on and on.

The trial court ultimately dismissed the foreclosure proceeding with prejudice. Like other jurisdictions, Maine requires that parties to a foreclosure “make a good faith effort to mediate all issues.” (6, quoting 14 M.R.S. section 6321-A(12) (2013); M.R. Civ. P. 93(j)).  Given this factual record, the Supreme Judicial Court found that the trial court “did not abuse its discretion in imposing” that sanction. (6-7) The sanction is obviously severe and creates a windfall for the borrowers. But the Supreme Judicial Court noted that U.S. Bank’s “repeated failures to cooperate and participate meaningfully in the mediation process” meant that the borrowers accrued “significant additional fees, interest, costs, and a reduction in the net value of the borrower’s [sic] equity in the property.” (8)

The Supreme Judicial Court concludes that if “banks and servicers intend to do business in Maine and use our courts to foreclose on delinquent borrowers, they must respect and follow our rules and procedures . . .” (9) So, a state supreme court metes out justice in an individual case and sends a warning that failure to abide by the law exposes “a litigant to significant sanctions, including the prospect of dismissal with prejudice.” (9)

But I am left with a bad taste in my mouth — can the rule of law exist where such behavior by private parties is so prevalent? How can servicers with names like J.P. Morgan Chase and U.S. Bank be this incompetent? What are the incentives within those firms that result in such behavior? Have the recent settlements and regulatory enforcement actions done enough to make such cases anomalies instead of all-too-frequent occurrences? U.S. Bank conceded in court that these borrowers have “been through hell.” (9, n. 5) The question is, have we reached the other side?

 

HT April Charney

Mortgage Servicer Accountability

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Joseph A. Smith, Jr, the Monitor of the National Mortgage Settlement, issued his third set of compliance reports (I blogged about the second here). For those needing a recap,

As required by the National Mortgage Settlement (Settlement or NMS), I have filed compliance reports with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (the Court) for each servicer that is a party to the Settlement. The servicers include four of the original parties – Bank of America, Chase, Citi and Wells Fargo. Essentially all of the servicing assets of the fifth original servicer party, ResCap, were sold to and divided between Ocwen and Green Tree pursuant to a February 5, 2013, bankruptcy court order. Accordingly, Ocwen and Green Tree are now subject to the NMS for the portions of their portfolios they acquired from ResCap.1 These reports provide the results of my testing regarding compliance with the NMS servicing standards during the third and fourth calendar quarters of 2013, or test periods five and six. They are the third set of reports for the original four bank servicers, the second report for Ocwen and the first report assessing Green Tree. (3)

The Monitor concludes that Bank of America, Citi, Chase, Ocwen and Wells Fargo “did not fail any metrics during the most recent testing periods.” (2) The Monitor also reports on “fourth-quarter compliance testing results for the loans Green Tree acquired from the ResCap Parties. Green Tree implemented the Settlement’s servicing standards after such acquisition. Green Tree failed a total of eight metrics during this time period.” (2) The metrics that Green Tree failed include a number of practices that have made the lives of borrowers miserable during the foreclosure crisis. They are,

  • whether the servicer accurately stated amounts due from borrowers in proofs of claims filed in bankruptcy proceedings
  • whether the servicer accurately stated amounts due from borrowers in affidavits filed in support for relief from stay in bankruptcy proceedings
  • whether loans were delinquent at the time foreclosure was initiated and whether the servicer provided borrower with accurate information in a pre-foreclosure letter
  • whether the servicer provided borrower with required notifications no later than 14 days prior to referral to foreclosure and whether required notification statements were accurate
  • whether the servicer waived post-petition fees, charges or expenses when required by the Settlement
  • whether the servicer has documented policies and procedures in place to oversee third party vendors
  • whether the servicer responded to government submitted complaints and inquiries from borrowers within 10 business days and provided an update within 30 days
  • whether the servicer notified the borrower of any missing documents in a loan modification application within five days of receipt (9, emphasis added)

These metrics seem pretty reasonable — one might even say they are a low bar for sophisticated financial institutions to exceed. Until the servicing industry can do such things as a matter of course, close government regulation seems appropriate. The monitor notes that “work still remains to ensure that the servicers treat their customers fairly.” (2) Amen to that, Monitor.

REMIC Armageddon on the Horizon?

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Brad Borden and I have warned that an unanticipated tax consequence of the sloppy mortgage origination practices that characterized the boom is that MBS pools may fail to qualify as REMICs.  This would have massively negative tax consequences for MBS investors and should trigger lawsuits against the professionals who structured these transactions. Courts deciding upstream and downstream cases have not focused on this issue because it is typically not relevant to the dispute between the parties.

Seems that is changing. Bankruptcy Judge Isgur (S.D. Tex.) issued an opinion in In re: Saldivar, Case No. 11-1-0689 (June 5, 2013)) which found, for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, that “under New York law, assignment of the Saldivars’ Note after the start up day [of the REMIC] is void ab initio.  As such, none of the Saldivars’ claims” challenging the validity of the assignment of their mortgage to the REMIC trust  “will be dismissed for lack of standing.” (8)

If this case holds up on appeal, it will have a massive impact on many purported REMICs which had sloppy practices for transferring mortgages to the trusts. That is a big “if,” as the case relies upon Erobobo for its take on the relevant NY law. Erobobo, a NY trial court opinion, itself reached a controversial result and is hardly the last word on NY trust law. The Court also acknowledges that additional evidence may be proffered relating to a subsequent ratification of the conveyance of the mortgage, but for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the homeowners have met their burden.

For those few REMIC geeks out there, it is worth quoting from the opinion at length (everyone else can stop reading now):

The Notice of Default indicates that the original creditor is Deutsche Bank, as Trustee for Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-6. The Trust is a New York common law trust created through a Pooling and Servicing Agreement (the “PSA”). Under the PSA, loans were purportedly pooled into a trust and converted into mortgage-backed securities. The PSA provides a closing date for the Trust of October 25, 2004. As set forth below, this was the  date on which all assets were required to be deposited into the Trust. The PSA provides that New York law governs the acquisition of mortgage assets for the Trust.

The Trust was formed as a REMIC trust. Under the REMIC provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) the closing date of the Trust is also the startup day for the Trust. The closing date/startup day is significant because all assets of the Trust were to be transferred to the Trust on or before the closing date to ensure that the Trust received its REMIC status. The IRC provides in pertinent part that:

“Except as provided in section 860G(d)(2), ‘if any  amount is contributed to a REMIC after the startup day, there is hereby imposed a tax for the taxable year of the REMIC in which the contribution is received equal to 100 percent of the amount of such contribution.”

26 U.S.C. § 860G(d)(1).

A trust’s ability to transact is restricted to the  actions authorized by its trust documents. The Saldivars allege that here, the Trust documents permit only one specific method of transfer to the Trust, set forth in § 2.01 of the PSA. Section 2.01 requires the Depositor to provide the Trustee with the original Mortgage Note, endorsed in blank or endorsed with the following: “Pay to the order of Deutsche Bank, as Trustee under the applicable agreement, without recourse.” All prior and intervening endorsements must show a complete chain of endorsement from the originator to the Trustee.

Under New York Estates Powers and Trusts Law § 7-2.1(c), property must be registered in the name of the trustee for a particular trust in order for transfer to the trustee to be effective. Trust property cannot be held with incomplete endorsements and assignments that do not indicate that the property is held in trust  by a trustee for a specific beneficiary trust.

The Saldivars allege that the Note was not transferred to the Trust until 2011, resulting in an invalid assignment of the Note to the Trust. The Saldivars allege that this defect means that Deutsche Bank and Chase are not valid Note Holders.

(2-4, footnotes and citations omitted) The Court agreed, at least while “accepting all well-pleaded facts as true.” (5)

(HT April Charney)