Tag Archives: fannie

Reiss on Fannie/Freddie Suits

Posted on by

Bloomberg BNA quoted me in No Basis for Discovery by GSE Investors, Treasury Department, FHFA Memos Say. It reads

[Reproduced with permission from BNA’s Banking Report, 102 BBR 417, 3/11/14. Copyright  2014 by The Bureau
of National Affairs, Inc. (800-372-1033) https://www.bna.com]

The Treasury Department and the Federal Housing Finance Agency March 4 said a federal judge should deny a motion for discovery in lawsuits by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac investors, citing an agreed-upon schedule and saying the motion would do nothing to address legal questions at the core of the case (Fairholme Funds v. Federal Housing Finance Agency, D.D.C., No. 13-cv-01053, 3/4/14).

In its memo filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Treasury said Fairholme’s Feb. 12 motion for discovery (31 DER EE-6, 2/14/14) would be “improper” under a November scheduling order, and urged the court to dismiss the Fairholme suit and related cases.

“These cases should proceed on the agreed briefing schedule, which already provided ample time to the plaintiffs to file their substantive briefs, and the Court, upon review of a completed set of briefing with respect to the defendants’ dispositive motions, should dismiss these cases,” Treasury said March 4.

In its March 4 filing, the FHFA memo said “no discovery is necessary to assess the purely legal arguments” before the court, adding the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) bars second-guessing of the FHFA’s actions as conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

Litigation Ongoing

The suit is one of several in at least two district courts and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims that challenge Treasury and FHFA action in August 2012 that restructured contracts governing preferred stock issued by the two government-sponsored enterprises.

Fairholme and other investors say the August 2012 amendment amounted to an expropriation of their assets and have variously sought damages and compensation in response.

The government has sought to dismiss the Fairholme case and others, but in its Feb. 12 motion, Fairholme said the government’s motion to dismiss was too expansive and raised questions that require access to government documents, e-mails and other materials.

Arrowood Indemnity Co., the plaintiff in a related case in the district court and a separate case in the Claims Court, Feb. 20 sought to link its own bid for discovery to Fairholme’s (36 DER EE-8, 2/24/14).

Fairholme has already prevailed on its discovery motion in the Claims Court. In a Feb. 26 order, Judge Margaret M. Sweeney granted Fairholme’s motion for a continuance to pursue discovery in that case.

March Reply Scheduled

In the district court, Fairholme is scheduled to respond to the government’s March 4 memos by mid-March.

“We are reviewing the opposition briefs filed by the defendants just yesterday, and we will respond to them in our reply brief, due on March 14,” a spokesman for Fairholme told Bloomberg BNA March 5.

High Stakes Seen

Professor David Reiss of Brooklyn Law School in New York March 5 said discovery usually occurs after motions to dismiss have been decided.

In this case, he said, “the stakes are so high and the quality of lawyering so high that there is litigation over the scheduling order itself.”

“This is a hard-fought battle and the issues are incredibly complex,” Reiss told Bloomberg BNA. “Each side characterizes their arguments as relatively straightforward, but I think the judge will have a hard time parsing out the issues, because there are different statutory regimes, policy issues and the like that must be rationalized with each other. I think this is just the beginning of a long slog,” he said.

Fannie and Freddie Boards: Caveat Fairholme

Posted on by

Fairholme Capital Management has sent stern letters to the the boards of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the letters are essentially the same). Fairholme’s funds have millions of common and preferred shares in the two companies and Fairholme has taken a multi-pronged to trying to wring some value out of those shares. It has sued the federal government. It has offered to buy the two companies’ mortgage guaranty operations. Now, it is threatening the board of the two enterprises with personal liability for their actions and inaction.

In regard to the cash dividends that the two companies have paid to the Treasury as a result of their Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (as amended), Fairholme writes,

It is common sense that no Board should approve cash distributions without independent financial advice as to the effect of such payments on the Company’s safety, soundness, and  liquidity. Moreover, corporate laws generally prohibit the payment of dividends in many circumstances, imposing personal liability on Directors for illegal dividends – a liability that, pursuant to the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, is not assumed by the Conservator. (Fannie Letter, 3) (emphasis added)

This is a straightforward threat that will likely get the attention of the directors of the two companies and get them to check in with their D&O insurer before taking any further actions. But it is genuinely unclear what they should be doing at this point.

As I note in a forthcoming article, An Overview of the Fannie and Freddie Conservatorship Litigation (NYU J. Law & Bus.), the Fannie/Freddie shareholder litigation raises all sorts of complex and novel legal issues, and I am not willing to predict their outcomes. But I will go as far to say that Fairholme presents the way out of this mess as far clearer than it is — “Various solutions are simple, equitable, and need not be contentious.” (5) The ones that Fairholme has in mind likely involve large payouts for shareholders, one way or the other.

At the same time that Fairholme presents the solution as simple, it does acknowledge (as it really must) that the problem itself is not:  “we are aware of no circumstance in which the controlling shareholder and its affiliates simultaneously act as director, regulator, conservator, supervisor, contingent capital provider, and preferred stock investor.” (3-4) Yup, this is one big mess with no real precedent. I am confident, however, that the federal government has no interest in reaching a settlement with shareholders that shareholders would find acceptable. So, no end in sight to this aspect of the Fannie/Freddie situation, a far as I can tell.

Foreclosure Prevention: The Real McCoy

Posted on by

Patricia McCoy has posted Barriers to Foreclosure Prevention During the Financial Crisis (also on SSRN). In the early 2000s, Pat was one of the first legal scholars to identify predatory behaviors in the secondary mortgage market. These behaviors resulted in homeowners being saddled with expensive loans that they had trouble paying off. As many unaffordable mortgages work themselves through the system, Pat has now turned her attention to the other end of the life cycle of many an abusive mortgage — foreclosure.

The article opens,

Since housing prices fell nationwide in 2007, triggering the financial crisis, the U.S. housing market has struggled to dispose of the huge ensuing inventory of foreclosed homes. In January 2013, 1.47 million homes were listed for sale. Another 2.3 million homes that were not yet on the market—the so-called “shadow inventory”—were in foreclosure, held as real estate owned or encumbered by seriously delinquent loans. Discouragingly, the size of the shadow inventory has not changed significantly since January 2009.

Reducing the shadow inventory is key to stabilizing home prices. One way to trim it is to accelerate the sale of foreclosed homes, thereby increasing the outflow on the back-end. Another way is to prevent homes from entering the shadow inventory to begin with, through loss mitigation methods designed to keep struggling borrowers in their homes. Not all distressed borrowers can avoid losing their homes, but in appropriate cases—where modifications can increase investors’ return compared to foreclosure and the borrowers can afford the new payments—loan modifications can be a winning proposition for all. (725)

The article then evaluates the various theories that are meant to explain the barriers to the loan modification and determines “that servicer compensation together with the high cost of loan workouts, accounting standards, and junior liens are the biggest impediments to efficient levels of loan modifications.” (726) It identifies “three pressing reasons to care about what the real barriers to foreclosure prevention are. First, foreclosures that could have been avoided inflict enormous, needless losses on borrowers, investors, and society at large. Second, overcoming artificial barriers to foreclosure prevention will result in loan modifications with higher rates of success. Finally, knowing what to fix is necessary to identify the right policy solution.” (726)

It seems to me that the federal government dealt with foreclosures much more effectively in the Great Depression, with the creation of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation. In our crisis, we have muddled through and have failed to systematically deal with the foreclosure crisis. McCoy’s article does a real service in identifying what we have done wrong this time around. No doubt, we will have another foreclosure crisis at some point in our future. It is worth our while to identify the impediments to effective foreclosure prevention strategies so we can act more effectively when the time comes.

Reiss on Watt Confirmation

Posted on by

Law360 interviewed me about the Senate confirmation of Mel Watt as the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency in Fannie, Freddie’s Footprint Could Grow Under New FHFA Head. The article reads in part,

The U.S. mortgage industry is in for a sea change as Rep. Mel Watt, D-N.C., takes the helm of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, experts say, predicting Watt will seek to expand Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, veering sharply from his predecessor’s plans but lining up more closely with President Barack Obama’s.

The confirmation came Tuesday in a 57-41 vote after months of delay ended by Senate Democrats’ implementation of the so-called “nuclear option” eliminating the filibuster of presidential nominees. Senate Republicans had expressed concern about the choice of a politician like Watt — as opposed to an academic or economist — to head the agency.

Members of the real estate finance community are also divided about whether Watt’s confirmation will have a positive or negative impact on the industry, but most agree that a major change is ahead.

“I think Watt, as director, could end up having a very big impact both in terms of reversing some changes that have been implemented, and also taking the agency in a very different direction,” said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.

Since 2009, interim FHFA head Ed DeMarco has made an effort to shrink the footprint of the regulator and its government-sponsored enterprises, Fannie and Freddie, in the U.S. residential mortgage market.

DeMarco faced pushback in these efforts from industry groups and lawmakers, causing him to backpedal a bit in November when the FHFA announced that it would hold off on reducing the size of mortgages that Fannie and Freddie can guarantee for at least the first half of next year.

Obama also did not share DeMarco’s ideology, but experts believe Watt’s plans for the GSEs are much more in line with those of the president. He appears cautious about allowing Fannie and Freddie to back away from the market entirely and may in fact favor policies that will increase the GSEs’ role in the mortgage market.

“My guess is that Watt will further enmesh Fannie and Freddie in the operations of the mortgage markets, whereas DeMarco was actually shrinking their footprint,” Reiss said.

*     *     *

The difference between the short-term and long-term impacts of Watt’s expected actions will be significant, experts say.

DeMarco’s moves made short-term waves, but supporters believed the aim was long-term equilibrium and an eventual balance of public and private capital in the mortgage market. Watt may have more potential for positive short-term results, but there will still be a question as to whether this will translate into a stable market for the next generation, Reiss said.

“Often when people are talking about government intervention, they want help for problems now, but they’re also setting up the rules of the game for once the crisis has passed,” he said.

Private Capital and the Mortgage Markets

Posted on by

The American Securitization Forum recently wrote to the Federal Housing Finance Agency to argue for at least a small reduction in the size of the loans that Fannie and Freddie can guaranty. While this makes sense to me, it is pretty controversial.  The ASF argues that “incremental reductions are appropriate for the following reasons:”

(i) as a means to begin scaling back the outsized role the GSEs currently play in the U.S. housing finance system and encourage the return of private capital;

(ii) FHFA has the legal authority in its role as conservator to act according to its dual mandate; and

(iii) the timing of any Congressional action on wide-ranging housing finance reform remains uncertain. (1)

Various groups like the Realtors and some members of Congress argue that any restriction of credit is unwarranted while the housing recovery is so tentative. The ASF notes, however, that the federal government is insuring roughly 90% of new residential mortgages. Virtually no one supports such a level of government support for the mortgage market, so the only question is one of timing. Do we start cutting back now or do we wait for better market conditions?

Others argue that there is not enough private capital to replace the government guaranteed capital in the market. But scaling back the Fannie/Freddie loan limit is a great way to work private capital back into the market gradually. The long term health of the American mortgage market is best assured by having private capital assume as much of the credit risk as it can responsibly handle. This private capital should also be subject to consumer protection regulation to ensure that it is not put to predatory uses. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has rules in place to provide that consumer protection. The FHFA should complement that regulatory action with its own. It should reduce the Fannie and Freddie loan limits starting in 2014.

Mortgage Reform Schooling on 30 Year Term

Posted on by

S&P has posted U.S. Mortgage Finance Reform Efforts and the Potential Credit Implications to school us on the current state of affairs in Congress. It provides a useful lesson on three major mortgage reform bills introduced in Congress this year.  They are the Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2013 (Corker-Warner); Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners ACT of 2013 (PATH); and the FHA Solvency Act.

Given the current mood in D.C., S&P somewhat optimistically states that there “seems to be a bipartisan commitment to encourage private capital support for the U.S. housing market while winding down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that hold dominant positions in the mortgage market.” (1) S&P uses this report as an opportunity to “comment on the potential credit implications of these mortgage finance reform efforts on several market sectors.” (1)

In this post, I focus on, and criticize, S&P’s analysis of the appropriate role of the 30 year fixed-rate mortgage. S&P states that

The 30-year fixed-rate mortgage has contributed significantly to housing affordability in the U.S. And while some market players have looked at current rates on jumbo mortgages (those that exceed conforming-loan limits) and suggested that the private market could support mortgage interest rates below 5%, we think this view is distorted. Jumbo mortgage rates carrying the lowest interest rates, for the most part, are limited to a narrow set of borrowers who have FICO credit scores above 750 and equity of roughly 30% in their homes. We don’t believe that these same rates would be available to average prime borrowers, such as those with credit scores of 725 and 25% equity in a property. (3)

While I think that S&P is probably right about the limited usefulness of comparing current jumbo loans to a broad swath of conforming loans, I see no support in their analysis for the assertion that the “30-year fixed-rate mortgage has contributed significantly to housing affordability in the U.S.” First, a 30-year FRM typically carries a higher interest rate than an ARM of any length. Second, a typical American household only stays in a home for about seven years. Thus, a 30-year FRM provides an expensive insurance policy against increases in interest rates that most Americans do not end up needing.

While we may end up providing governmental support for the 30-year FRM because of its longstanding popularity, S&P’s mortgage reform school should be based on facts, not fancy.

Whither The Housing Trust Fund?

Posted on by

As part of my review of the litigation surrounding the newly-profitable Fannie And Freddie (here, here, here and here), I turn to the complaint filed by “extremely low income tenants in desperate need of affordable housing” and the National Low Income Housing Coalition and the Right to the City Alliance, Samuels et al. v. FHFA et al., No. 1:13-cv-22399 (Jul. 9, 2009).

As the complaint notes, Congress created the Housing Trust Fund as part of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA).  The Housing Trust Fund was to be funded by contributions by Fannie and Freddie that were based on their annual purchases.   Those contributions could amount to hundreds of millions of dollars a year.

But here was the rub:  the Director of the FHFA could suspend  those contributions if the Director finds that they

(1) are contributing, or would contribute, to the financial instability of [Fannie or Freddie];

(2) are causing, or would cause, the [Fannie or Freddie] to be classified as undercapitalized; or

(3) are preventing, or would prevent, [Fannie or Freddie] from successfully completing a capital restoration plan under section 4622 of this title. (14, quoting 12 U.S.C. section 4567(b))

And that is just what happened in 2008:  the FHFA put them into conservatorship because of fears of their impending insolvency and their mounting losses. With the housing recovery, Fannie and Freddie have returned to profitability — massive profitability. But the federal government has redirected those profits to the Treasury, which had provided many billions of dollars to the two companies during the early years of the crisis without funding the Housing Trust Fund.

The plaintiffs allege that despite “the record profits of the Enterprises and despite the statutory requirement that any suspension of payments be temporary,  the Federal Defendants have failed and refused to review these findings and/or discontinue their suspension of the statutorily required payments by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into the Housing Trust Fund.” (17) The plaintiffs allege that this is “arbitrary and capricious in light of the changed and current financial condition of the Enterprise. The required statutory contribution is a small percentage of the Enterprise’s profits and thus would not contribute to the financial instability” of the two companies or to the other two bases for suspending the contributions pursuant to section 4567(b). (18, citations omitted) In sum, “the level of capitalization is solely a function of the policy decisions of the conservator not the cost of contributions to the Housing Trust Fund.” (22)

The big challenge that the plaintiffs face, as far as I can tell, is how they can convince the Court that the two companies are financially stable when they are still so deeply in debt to the federal government, notwithstanding the billions of dollars of profits that they two companies have remitted so far to the Treasury.