Tag Archives: Federal Housing Finance Agency

Private Capital and the Mortgage Markets

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The American Securitization Forum recently wrote to the Federal Housing Finance Agency to argue for at least a small reduction in the size of the loans that Fannie and Freddie can guaranty. While this makes sense to me, it is pretty controversial.  The ASF argues that “incremental reductions are appropriate for the following reasons:”

(i) as a means to begin scaling back the outsized role the GSEs currently play in the U.S. housing finance system and encourage the return of private capital;

(ii) FHFA has the legal authority in its role as conservator to act according to its dual mandate; and

(iii) the timing of any Congressional action on wide-ranging housing finance reform remains uncertain. (1)

Various groups like the Realtors and some members of Congress argue that any restriction of credit is unwarranted while the housing recovery is so tentative. The ASF notes, however, that the federal government is insuring roughly 90% of new residential mortgages. Virtually no one supports such a level of government support for the mortgage market, so the only question is one of timing. Do we start cutting back now or do we wait for better market conditions?

Others argue that there is not enough private capital to replace the government guaranteed capital in the market. But scaling back the Fannie/Freddie loan limit is a great way to work private capital back into the market gradually. The long term health of the American mortgage market is best assured by having private capital assume as much of the credit risk as it can responsibly handle. This private capital should also be subject to consumer protection regulation to ensure that it is not put to predatory uses. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has rules in place to provide that consumer protection. The FHFA should complement that regulatory action with its own. It should reduce the Fannie and Freddie loan limits starting in 2014.

Mortgage Reform Schooling on 30 Year Term

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S&P has posted U.S. Mortgage Finance Reform Efforts and the Potential Credit Implications to school us on the current state of affairs in Congress. It provides a useful lesson on three major mortgage reform bills introduced in Congress this year.  They are the Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2013 (Corker-Warner); Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners ACT of 2013 (PATH); and the FHA Solvency Act.

Given the current mood in D.C., S&P somewhat optimistically states that there “seems to be a bipartisan commitment to encourage private capital support for the U.S. housing market while winding down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that hold dominant positions in the mortgage market.” (1) S&P uses this report as an opportunity to “comment on the potential credit implications of these mortgage finance reform efforts on several market sectors.” (1)

In this post, I focus on, and criticize, S&P’s analysis of the appropriate role of the 30 year fixed-rate mortgage. S&P states that

The 30-year fixed-rate mortgage has contributed significantly to housing affordability in the U.S. And while some market players have looked at current rates on jumbo mortgages (those that exceed conforming-loan limits) and suggested that the private market could support mortgage interest rates below 5%, we think this view is distorted. Jumbo mortgage rates carrying the lowest interest rates, for the most part, are limited to a narrow set of borrowers who have FICO credit scores above 750 and equity of roughly 30% in their homes. We don’t believe that these same rates would be available to average prime borrowers, such as those with credit scores of 725 and 25% equity in a property. (3)

While I think that S&P is probably right about the limited usefulness of comparing current jumbo loans to a broad swath of conforming loans, I see no support in their analysis for the assertion that the “30-year fixed-rate mortgage has contributed significantly to housing affordability in the U.S.” First, a 30-year FRM typically carries a higher interest rate than an ARM of any length. Second, a typical American household only stays in a home for about seven years. Thus, a 30-year FRM provides an expensive insurance policy against increases in interest rates that most Americans do not end up needing.

While we may end up providing governmental support for the 30-year FRM because of its longstanding popularity, S&P’s mortgage reform school should be based on facts, not fancy.

Reiss on Fannie/Freddie Loan Limits

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Law360 quoted me in Time May Not Be Right To Limit Fannie, Freddie Loans (behind a paywall).  It reads in part,

The Federal Housing Finance Agency has proposed lowering the maximum size of the loans Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can purchase as part of an effort to attract more private-sector lending, but some experts warn that other market factors including rising interest rates will keep private lenders from filling the gap.

The FHFA announced earlier this month that it planned to reduce the maximum size of home mortgage loans eligible for backing by the government-sponsored enterprises. The move is part of the agency’s strategic plan of slowly backing away from the mortgage market and encouraging private capital to take its place. But some real estate attorneys and practitioners say private lenders need more than customers to convince them to take the plunge.

Many other environmental factors affect private lenders’ decisions about whether to enter the residential mortgage market, said Bob Bostrom, a shareholder of Greenberg Traurig LLP and former counsel to Freddie Mac.

Reducing the number of loans eligible for Fannie and Freddie backing and raising guarantee fees — another recent tactic — sound good in theory, but they don’t change the fact that the interest rate for a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage rose a full percentage point over the past several months and the housing market dipped correspondingly, Bostrom said.

“The housing recovery is extraordinarily fragile right now,” he said.

The steps the FHFA is taking to reduce the GSEs’ size and scope will work only when there’s a private sector ready to step in, experts say. Until then, these measures can only push the housing market backward, they warn.

* * *

Not everyone is convinced of this dark forecast, however. David Reiss, a Brooklyn Law School professor and real estate finance scholar, told Law360 on Thursday that he’s not convinced the FHFA’s moves will have a negative effect.

Although the pullback should be gradual, it must be done, because the government can’t continue to hold up the mortgage market indefinitely, he said.

Reiss says current market factors actually favor weaning borrowers off Fannie and Freddie, noting that private capital in the sector has increased — particularly in the market for jumbo loans — and that the overall housing market has stabilized.

“We’re past the immediate crisis,” he said. “There’s nothing going on right now that makes me think a downward adjustment in conforming loan limits won’t be met by an increase in capital from private lenders,” Reiss said.

Reiss on the Future of Fannie and Freddie

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I will be speaking at NYU Law next week on

The Future of Fannie and Freddie

Friday, September 20, 2013
9:00 am – 5:00pm
Reception to follow

Greenberg Lounge, NYU School of Law
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012

Jointly sponsored by:
The Classical Liberal Institute & NYU Journal of Law & Business

 

This conference will bring together leaders in law, finance, and economics to explore the challenges to investment in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the future possibilities for these government-sponsored entities (GSEs).  Panels will focus on the reorganization of Fannie and Freddie, as well as the recent litigation surrounding the Treasury’s decision to “wind down” these GSEs.  Panelists will explore the legal issues at stake in the wind down, including the administrative law and Takings Clause arguments raised against the Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency.  Panelists will also look at economic policy and future prospects for Fannie and Freddie in light of legislation proposed in the House and the Senate.

Conference Panels:

  • The Reorganization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
  • Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Administrative Law
  • Conservatorship and the Takings Clause
  • The Future of Fannie and Freddie

Confirmed Participants:

  • Professor Barry Adler (NYU)
  • Professor Adam Badawi (Washington University)
  • Professor Anthony Casey (Chicago)
  • Charles Cooper (Cooper & Kirk PLLC)
  • Professor Richard Epstein (NYU)
  • Randall Guynn (Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP)
  • Professor Todd Henderson (Chicago)
  • Professor Troy Paredes (former SEC Commissioner)
  • Professor David Reiss (Brooklyn)
  • Professor Lawrence White (NYU Stern)

Fannie and Freddie’s Unreported Billions of Losses

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The Federal Housing Finance Agency’s Inspector General has warned FHFA Acting Director DeMarco that the FHFA has allowed Fannie and Freddie to defer acknowledgment of billions of dollars of losses relating to seriously delinquent singe-family residential mortgage loans for far too long.

The Office of the IG recommends that estimates of these losses be reported immediately, on an ongoing basis. There are all sorts of obvious good reasons to do this, including the fact that “[c]lassification of loans according to risk characteristics is a critical factor considered by financial regulators to evaluate a financial institution’s safety and soundness”  and that it accords with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. (1)

directly through interest

Fannie and Freddie’s recent reports of billions of dollars of profits have caused a scrum to form around the two companies, as investors in preferred shares seek to get a slice of those profits through a series of lawsuits (here, here, here and here for example), as low-income advocates seek to fund the Housing Trust Fund through a lawsuit (here) and as some politicians forget the risks that these two companies present to the American taxpayer and seek to reanimate the two companies.

In a perfect world, we would ask what kind of residential housing finance infrastructure we want to implement for the next fifty years or so and what should happen to Fannie and Freddie should have little to nothing to do with their current profits or losses. But the political reality is that it does. With that as a given, we should at least have an honest assessment of their balance sheets. But the FHFA is keeping us in the dark. It needs to turn the lights on so that we can understand the true magnitude of these unreported losses so that the debate about Fannie and Freddie can be held with as much accurate information as possible.

Fannie/Freddie Take Down 3: Washington Federal v. The U.S. of A.

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This should catch us up on the Fannie/Freddie preferred stock Takings litigation (see here and here for two other suits).  Washington Federal et al. v. United States was filed June 10, 2013 and is a class action complaint. The theories are pretty similar in the three cases. I had earlier written about the importance of narrative in these Takings cases. Having lived through this history myself and having read the “first draft” of history carefully in the pages of the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal and many trade periodicals, I am somewhat taken aback by this revisionist history. For instance, the complaint states that the companies were not “likely to incur losses that would deplete all or substantially all of” their capital. (38) News to me!

But what is most striking about the complaint is this notion that if the government had just taken this action (allowing the companies to buy more subprime mortgages) or not taken that action (strong arming the board to accept the conservatorship) or not deferring taking this other action (waiting to raise the guarantee fee), then everything would have worked out for the companies and their shareholders.  Maybe so, but it sure will be hard to categorize each of the government’s actions as either totally okay or completely inappropriate for the companies’ health in the context of the financial crisis. This leaves the plaintiffs with some tough work ahead. They are going to need to show a judge just how to categorize each of those facts and ensure that the categorization does not interfere with their theory of the case.

All of this raises a bigger, more interesting question. What role should these types of lawsuits play after a crisis has passed? Some would say that they are an outrage — second-guessing what are leaders did to avert financial ruin. Others might say that this is an efficient way to respond to crises: allow the government to do what it needs to do during the crisis, but use litigation to make an accounting to all of the stakeholders once the situation has stabilized. I don’t have a fully thought out view on this, but I am struck by the dangers of each approach. The first allows for various kinds of scapegoating (as Hank Greenberg argues in the AIG bailout litigation) while the second allows for the kind of revisionism that favors the wealthy and powerful (as with these Takings suits by powerful investors who bought Fannie and Freddie preferred shares on the cheap as a sort of long shot bet on what the two companies will look like going forward). Tough to choose between the two . . ..

The Taking of Fannie and Freddie 2

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Today, I look at one more complaint filed in response to the federal government’s amendment to its Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements with Fannie and Freddie (the PSPAs).  Cacciapelle et al. v. United States, filed July 10, 2013, is another takings clause case like the one filed by Fairholme the day before. The facts alleged in the complaint should be familiar to readers of REfinblog.com (here, here and here), although this is a class action complaint.

The plaintiffs state that the members of the class “paid valuable consideration to acquire these rights, and in doing so helped provide financial support for Fannie and Freddie, both before and after the conservatorship, by contributing to a viable market for Fannie’s and Freddie’s issued securities. Plaintiffs certainly had a reasonable, investment-backed expectation that the property they acquired could not be appropriated by the Government without payment of just compensation.” (4-5)

Now having read four complaints dealing with the same issue arising from the financial crisis, I am struck by the importance of narrative in litigation. Given that the federal government saved the Fannie and Freddie from certain financial ruin, we may label the Cacciapelle narrative the “Have Your Cake and Eat It Too” storyline.

One can well imagine the government’s version of events in its inevitable motion to dismiss.

Fannie and Freddie were at the brink of ruin.  We swept in, provided unlimited capital and rescued the companies, the housing market, the country and the world from the Second Great Depression.  To have the private preferred shareholders engage in Monday Morning Quarterbacking and focus on the details from the crisis response that harmed them, to have them ignore the competing concerns that were at stake for each of these critical decisions, adds insult to this injurious lawsuit.  Judge, do not succumb to this hindsight bias!

Let’s label this the Corialanus storyline.

These lawsuits have caught reporters’ eyes and will be well-covered in the press. I would look to see which narratives resonate and I wouldn’t be surprised if the dominant narrative finds its way into the judicial opinions that decide these cases.