Wells Fargo Smackdown

Circuit Judge Elliott of Missouri Circuit Court issued a Judgment in Holm v. Wells Fargo et al. (No. 08CN-CV00944 Jan. 26, 2015) that awarded nearly three million dollars in punitive damages. This is just one of a number of searing judicial opinions that I’ve discussed on the blog. The Court found that

Wells Fargo and its agents expended immeasurable, if not incomprehensible, time and effort to avert reinstatement. The result of Wells Fargo’s egregious conduct was to impose approximately six and one-half years of uncertainty, lost optimism, emotional distress, and paralysis of Plaintiffs’ family.

The evidence established that Wells Fargo’s intentional choice to foreclose arose from its own financial incentives. Dr. Kurt Krueger testified that Wells Fargo had financial incentives to seek reimbursement of its fees at a foreclosure sale. This economic motivation collided with the well-being of David and Crystal Holm, and was clearly contrary to the interests of Freddie Mac. In other words, in this case, a powerful financial company exerted its will over a financially distressed family in Clinton County, Missouri. The result is predictable. Plaintiffs were severely damaged; Wells Fargo took its money and moved on, with complete disregard to the human damage left in its wake.

Defendant Wells Fargo is an experienced servicer of home loans. Wells Fargo knew that its decision to foreclose after reinstatement was accepted would inflict a devastating injury on the Holm family. Wells Fargo’s actions were knowing, intentional, and injurious. (7)

It is not certain that this judgment will be held up on appeal. If it is, it is still worth asking whether the occasional verdict of this magnitude is sufficient to change the behavior of servicers. There have been many efforts to change the incentives that servicers have, but cases such as these make one wonder if there is some deeper problem that has not yet been identified and addressed. One cannot imagine how Wells Fargo employees could have let this go on for so long in this case. But they did.

Tenants in Foreclosure

Judge Demarest issued a Decision and Order in 650 Brooklyn LLC v. Hunte et al. (No. 504623/2013 Feb. 5, 2015). The defendants moved for dismissal because the foreclosing plaintiff failed to comply with a relatively new NY statute that requires that the “foreclosing party in a mortgage foreclosure action, involving residential real property shall provide notice to: (a) any mortgagor if the action relates to an owner-occupied one-to-four family dwelling; and (b) any tenant of a dwelling unit in accordance with the provisions of this section . . ..” (12, citing NY RPAPL section 1303(1))

The Court dismissed defendants’ motion, relying on the plain language of the statute. The Court also noted that the purpose of the RPAPL notice provision, according to the 2009 Sponsor’s Memorandum, was to “establish protections for tenants residing in foreclosed properties” and noting that

20% of all foreclosure filings across the country were in non-owner occupied properties . . . Often, renters have been unaware that their landlords are in default until utilities are shut off or an eviction notice appears on their door . . . This [notice] provision will allow tenants to be fully aware of the status of the property and allow them to make informed decisions about whether they should remain in such property. (15)

Given the straightforward language of the statute, this seems like the right result as a matter of law. It also seems like the right result as a matter of policy. Certain dense jurisdictions, like NYC, have a lot of of tenants living in 2-4 family buildings. Many of these buildings are in areas that have been hard hit by the foreclosure epidemic. Indeed, according to the State of New York City’s Housing and Neighborhoods in 2013, “most of the foreclosure filings in 2013 and other recent years have been on 2–4 family properties.” (3) Many foreclosures have unnecessary collateral damage and improving notice to affected parties like tenants seems like a small and reasonable step for any jurisdiction to take.

Mortgage Assignment Mayhem

Judge Drain issued a biting Memorandum of Decision on Debtor’s Objection to Claim of Wells Fargo Bank, NA in the case In re Carrsow-Franklin (No. 10-20010, Jan. 29, 2015). The Court granted the debtor’s claim objection “on the basis that Wells Fargo is not the holder or owner of the note and beneficiary of the deed of trust upon which the claim is based and therefore lacks standing to assert the claim.” (1)

This blog, and many other venues, have documented the Alice in Wonderland world of mortgage assignments in which something is true because the the foreclosing party, like the Red Queen herself, says it is.

Judge Drain adds to the evidence with ALLCAPS, a touch I can’t remember seeing in another judicial opinion that I have blogged about:

Because Wells Fargo does not rely on the Assignment of Mortgage to prove its claim, the foregoing evidence is helpful to the Debtor only indirectly, insofar as it goes to show that the blank indorsement, upon which Wells Fargo is relying, was forged. Nevertheless it does show a general willingness and practice on Wells Fargo’s part to create documentary evidence, after‐the‐fact, when enforcing its claims, WHICH IS EXTRAORDINARY. (17-18, emphasis in the original, footnote omitted)

In retrospect, legal historians will be shocked by the lending industry’s practices which seemed to ignore the law in favor of convenience. MERS, and the practices which arose from it, was an attempt to circumvent clunky laws in favor of efficiency. For many years, many judges went along with this regime. Since the foreclosure crisis began, however, more and more judges are engaging in a more rigorous analysis of the documents in a particular case and the applicable law governing mortgage notes and foreclosures. When these judges find that a transaction does not comply with the relevant law, it is incumbent upon them to deny the relief sought by the foreclosing party as Judge Drain did here.

Monday’s Adjudication Roundup

Wednesday’s Academic Roundup

Assignments Not Standing up

The District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida (4th Dist.) ruled in Murray v. HSBC Bank USA et al., (No. 4D13-4316, Jan. 21, 2015) that HSBC did not have standing to foreclose. This case highlights the difficulties that so many judges have in applying the UCC appropriately in foreclosures. The Court quotes the trial court as stating,

     To me, that’s the only issue in the case; can this Court enter a judgment on what you say is that possession is enough without the [i]ndorsement.

      In every other respect they have it. They got the mortgage. They got the records. They got the servicing. They got the whole thing. They just don’t have the [i]ndorsement, and is that fatal?

       In other words do you have to go and get, and then start over again? That’s the question. I don’t know the answer. (2, n.1)

It is well documented that many, many courts have trouble applying the relevant provisions of the UCC in harmony with the relevant provisions of the state foreclosure procedure statute.

The District Court of Appeal goes to great efforts to get it right here, given that the trial court apparently punted on the analysis. I found the the Appendix to the opinion to be of particular of interest. It carefully walks through the chain of transfers to identify the “missing piece” that results in the HSBC’s lack of standing. It also distinguishes these transfers from those between servicers, which some courts conflate with transfers between those with the right to enforce a mortgage.

From a law reform perspective, I wonder what should be done to get courts to apply the law as it is written, instead of just trying to get the gist of it right. Given that the Permanent Editorial  Board of the UCC has issued guidance in this area, I don’t think the issue is lack of clarity. Rather, I think it is just straightforward complexity — judges have a hard time going through all of the steps of the analysis. Can this area of law be simplified so that courts can achieve more just and equitable results? I wonder if Dale Whitman has any ideas . . ..

Are Billions Enough?

Jenner & Block has issued the Citi Monitorship First Report. By way of background,

The Settlement Agreement resolved potential federal and state legal claims for violations of law in connection with the packaging, marketing, sale, structuring, arrangement, and issuance of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) between 2006 and 2007. As explained below, in the Settlement Agreement, Citi agreed to pay $4.5 billion to the settling governmental entities, acknowledged a statement of facts attached as Annex 1, and agreed to provide consumer relief that would be valued at $2.5 billion under the valuation principles set forth in Annex 2.2 As part of the Settlement Agreement, [Jenner partner] Thomas J. Perrelli was appointed as independent monitor (Monitor) to determine Citi’s compliance with the consumer relief and corresponding requirements of the Settlement Agreement. This is the first report assessing Citi’s progress toward completion of those obligations. (3, footnote omitted)

Because this is the first report, much of it sets the stage for what is to come. I was, however, struck by the section titled “Impact of Relief Provided:”

To evaluate fully the impact of the relief that is the subject of this report and authorized under the Settlement Agreement would require a variety of activities not contemplated by the settlement and not easily achievable (e.g., interviews with individual homeowners). Isolating the effect of this settlement, the National Mortgage Settlement, and other RMBS settlements from the broader housing market is also difficult.

One question frequently asked is whether the relief provided to borrowers and for which Citi has received credit would have been provided in any event (e.g., is this really additional?) On this question, the answer is mixed. Given ordinary accounting practices, loans for which foreclosure does not make economic sense are frequently written-off by financial institutions. In that circumstance, however, the banks may not release liens as a matter of routine, leaving borrowers with an ongoing burden and impeding potential efforts to redevelop the property. To get credit under the Settlement Agreement, Citi was required to release the lien, thus giving an additional benefit to the homeowner to allow him or her to make a fresh start and to remove any legal obstacles from the transfer of the property. (17, footnote omitted)

As I have noted before, it is hard to truly assess the restorative and retributive impacts of the ten and eleven digit settlements of litigation arising from the financial crisis. Are individuals appropriately helped? Are wrongdoers appropriately punished? Are current actors appropriately deterred?  I find it bizarre that it is so hard to tell even when settlements are measured in the billions of dollars.