Tag Archives: foreclosure

Borrowers Have “Been Through Hell”

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The Maine Supreme Judicial Court issued an opinion, U.S. Bank, N.A. v. David Sawyer et al., 2014 ME 81 (June 24, 2014), that makes you question the sanity of the servicing industry and the efficacy of the rule of law. If you are a reader of this blog, you know this story.

This particular version of the story is taken from the unrebutted testimony of the homeowners, David and Debra Sawyer. They received a loan modification, which was later raised to a level above the predelinquency level; the servicers (which changed from time to time) then demanded various documents which were provided numerous times over the course of four court-ordered mediations; the servicers made numerous promises about modifications that they did not keep; the dysfunction goes on and on.

The trial court ultimately dismissed the foreclosure proceeding with prejudice. Like other jurisdictions, Maine requires that parties to a foreclosure “make a good faith effort to mediate all issues.” (6, quoting 14 M.R.S. section 6321-A(12) (2013); M.R. Civ. P. 93(j)).  Given this factual record, the Supreme Judicial Court found that the trial court “did not abuse its discretion in imposing” that sanction. (6-7) The sanction is obviously severe and creates a windfall for the borrowers. But the Supreme Judicial Court noted that U.S. Bank’s “repeated failures to cooperate and participate meaningfully in the mediation process” meant that the borrowers accrued “significant additional fees, interest, costs, and a reduction in the net value of the borrower’s [sic] equity in the property.” (8)

The Supreme Judicial Court concludes that if “banks and servicers intend to do business in Maine and use our courts to foreclose on delinquent borrowers, they must respect and follow our rules and procedures . . .” (9) So, a state supreme court metes out justice in an individual case and sends a warning that failure to abide by the law exposes “a litigant to significant sanctions, including the prospect of dismissal with prejudice.” (9)

But I am left with a bad taste in my mouth — can the rule of law exist where such behavior by private parties is so prevalent? How can servicers with names like J.P. Morgan Chase and U.S. Bank be this incompetent? What are the incentives within those firms that result in such behavior? Have the recent settlements and regulatory enforcement actions done enough to make such cases anomalies instead of all-too-frequent occurrences? U.S. Bank conceded in court that these borrowers have “been through hell.” (9, n. 5) The question is, have we reached the other side?

 

HT April Charney

Hawaii Court Holds that Debtor had Standing to Enforce Note and Mortgage Under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 490:3-301(ii) Even Though it was a Non-Holder

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The court in deciding 1250 Oceanside Partners v. Katcher, 2013 Bankr. (D. Haw. 2013) recommended that the district court enter a decree of foreclosure in favor of the debtor.

The debtor in possession of 1250 Oceanside Partners sought to enforce a promissory note and foreclose a mortgage made by defendants, the Katchers. Oceanside sought summary judgment, the Katchers argued that the court lacked jurisdiction, that Oceanside was not entitled to foreclose, and that if it was entitled to foreclose, it was not entitled to a deficiency judgment.

The court found that there was no dispute as to any material fact and that Oceanside was entitled to foreclose on the property, but it was not entitled to a deficiency judgment against the Katchers at this stage in the litigation.

The court held that the debtor had standing to enforce the note and mortgage under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 490:3-301(ii) even though it was a non-holder, as it was in possession of the note and had the rights of a holder. The court also found that the mortgagors’ defenses to foreclosure were based entirely on debtor’s failure to develop a project as the purchase contract required, but the terms of the purchase contract provided that the mortgagors’ claims against debtor would be decided separately from debtor’s foreclosure claims. Moreover, the debtor’s claim for a deficiency judgment related to monetary damages or costs and thus, was subject to arbitration under the agreement.

Ohio Appeals Court Reverses Summary Judgment in Favor of Bank as Genuine Issue of Fact Existed as to Whether the Bank held the Note

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The court in deciding U.S. Bank N.A. v. Kamal, 2013-Ohio-5380 (Ohio Ct. App., Mahoning County, 2013) reversed and remanded the lower court’s ruling. The court decided that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether U.S. Bank was the holder of the note or mortgage when the complaint was filed and as to whether U.S. Bank complied with the default provisions in the note and mortgage. Therefore, the grant of summary judgment in U.S. Bank’s favor was reversed and the matter was remanded for further summary judgment proceedings.

Defendants-appellants appealed the decision of the lower court, which granted summary judgment and issued a decree of foreclosure for U.S. Bank National Association. Three issues were raised; the first was whether there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether U.S. Bank complied with the notice of default provisions in the note and mortgage. The second issue was whether U.S. Bank was a real party in interest when the foreclosure complaint was filed. The third issue was whether the trial court should have struck certain evidence that U.S. Bank used to support its request for summary judgment.

This court ultimately held that a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether the bank was the holder of the note when the complaint was filed, as the record was devoid of any evidence proving the date on which the bank became the holder. There was also a genuine issue of fact as to when the mortgage was assigned, as the assignment contained information not known on the date the mortgage was executed and the only other logical date was the date the assignment was recorded, which occurred after the complaint was filed. Additionally a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether the bank complied with the notice of default and acceleration provision, as there was no evidence as to how the bank notified the debtor as the acceleration.

Ultimately, the lower court’s grant of summary judgment was reversed and the matter was remanded for further summary judgment proceedings.

Ohio Court Finds that Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Foreclosure Complaint did not Deprive it of Jurisdiction Over Defendants and Their TILA Claims

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The court in deciding Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Wick, 2013-Ohio-5422 (Ohio Ct. App., Cuyahoga County, 2013) found that the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s foreclosure complaint did not deprive it of jurisdiction over defendants and their TILA claims, as these claims were separate and independent of the foreclosure complaint.

The Wicks claimed that the trial court erred in dismissing all of their counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims when it dismissed Wells Fargo’s foreclosure complaint for failure to invoke the court’s jurisdiction. In ruling on the Wicks’ motion for reconsideration, however, this court determined that, with the exception of the TILA claims, the trial court’s dismissal of the Wicks’ claims was without prejudice and, therefore, as it related to those non-TILA claims, the trial court’s dismissal was not a final, appealable order.

On appeal, this court determined in considering the merits of the case, that a proper and validly asserted counterclaim is not extinguished by a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of its claims when the court has jurisdiction to proceed on the counterclaim. This court found, therefore, that where the court has jurisdiction over the parties and over the controversy, the borrowers’ counterclaim that does not arise from the note or mortgage can remain pending for independent adjudication.

Similarly, this court found that the trial court’s conclusion in this case that it lacked jurisdiction over the foreclosure claim because the bank lacked standing did not extinguished the Wicks’ proper and validly asserted claims.

Georgia Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s RESPA, TILA and HOEPA Claims

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The court in deciding Mitchell v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Ga., 2013) found no plain error in the lower court’s conclusion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims.

Plaintiffs Reginald and Jamela Mitchell filed a complaint against Deutsche Bank and MERS, the complaint alleged federal violations of the Truth-in-Lending Act (“TILA”), the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act (“RESPA”), and the Homeownership Equity Protection Act (“HOEPA”).

The Complaint also asserted the following state law claims: (1) fraud; (2) wrongful foreclosure; (3) quiet title; (4) slander of title; (5) infliction of emotional distress and (6) unfair business practices.

The crux of the plaintiffs’ claims under the federal statutes was that the defendants failed to provide them with the required disclosures, thereby allowing plaintiffs to rescind their mortgage transaction and seek damages. The lower court concluded that the Plaintiffs’ claims arising under TILA, HOEPA and RESPA were barred by the statute of limitations. The lower court recommended that the plaintiffs’ complaint be dismissed as the plaintiffs failed to state any federal or state law claim upon which relief could be granted. The plaintiff then appealed.

Upon review of the lower court’s decision, this court found no plain error in the lower court’s findings and recommendation that the defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims be granted.

Georgia Court Dismisses TILA and RESPA Claims Brought by Plaintiff

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The court in deciding Mitchell v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2013) granted the motion to dismiss proffered by the defendant.

The first enumerated cause of action in Plaintiffs’ complaint was a claim for fraud. Plaintiffs argued that their original mortgage lender, Accredited, engaged in a practice of filing false prospectus supplements with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Plaintiffs’ complaint also included a claim for wrongful foreclosure.

Next, the plaintiffs asserted that Deutsche Bank and MERS had “unclean hands” as they failed to make certain disclosures required by TILA. Plaintiffs also asserted that the defendants or their predecessors in interest violated RESPA in a number of ways. Plaintiffs’ complaint also included a claim for fraud in the inducement. Moreover, the plaintiffs’ complaint raised a claim for quiet title under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-40 and O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60 et seq. Lastly, the plaintiffs’ complaint raised a claim for fraudulent assignment.

Ultimately the court concluded that the plaintiffs’ complaint failed to state a viable claim for relief. Accordingly, this court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint.

Connecticut Court Rejects Invalid Assignment and Standing Claims

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The court in deciding Bank of Am., N.A. v. Samaha, 2013 Conn. Super.  (Conn. Super. Ct., 2013) granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

Plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage executed by Joseph Samaha and Denise Samaha in favor of the Webster Bank in the principal amount of $162,000.00.

The defendant raised several special defenses to this foreclosure action. First, the defendant asserted that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring this litigation. Second, the defendant claimed that as a result of the death of one of the makers of the note, Joseph Samaha, that his estate had an indivisible interest in the subject property and was subject to probate court jurisdiction. Third, the defendant challenged the authority of MERS to assign this mortgage to the plaintiff. Four, that the defendant had tendered payment with regard to the note and she alleged accord and satisfaction. Fifth, the defendant challenged whether or not the note in question was a negotiable instrument.

Regarding the first special defense, the court decided that the plaintiff had standing.
The court found there was simply no authority for the defendant’s second assertion. Further, the court found there were no facts alleged in the special defense and there is no affidavit from the defendant providing any factual foundation for the third assertion. Regarding the fourth special defense the court found that the mere assertion of this defense, without any evidence to support it, and thereby contest or create a material issue of fact for a motion of summary judgment is insufficient. Lastly, the fifth special defense was deemed to be an assertion of a legal conclusion.

The court in deciding this case granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.