Compass Point Research & Trading, LLC has a nice graph, The Mortgage Market Overview, that helps to make sense of the massive U.S. residential mortgage market. It breaks down the $20 trillion dollar U.S. residential housing market into debt and equity and then further breaks down debt into the various available types, by market share: GSE; portfolio; private-label MBS; etc. A picture can be worth twenty trillion words . . ..
Tag Archives: freddie
Tough Row to Hoe for Frannie Shareholders
Inside Mortgage Finance quoted me in a story, GSE Jr. Preferred Shareholders Have a Tough ‘Row to Hoe’ in Winning Their Lawsuits (behind a paywall). It reads,
Expect a long and winding legal road to resolution of investor lawsuits challenging the Treasury Department’s “net worth sweep” of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac earnings, warn legal experts.
More than a dozen lawsuits filed against the government – including hedge funds Perry Capital and Fairholme Capital Management – are pending in federal district court in Washington, DC, and in the Court of Federal Claims. The private equity plaintiffs allege that the Treasury’s change in the dividend structure of its preferred stock leaves the government-sponsored enterprises with no funds to pay anything to junior shareholders.
The complaints raise complex constitutional and securities law issues, according to Emily Hamburger, a litigation analyst for Bloomberg Industries. “It may be a year before the crucial questions can be answered by the courts because the parties are still in the early stages of gathering evidence,” explained Hamburger during a recent webinar.
Brooklyn Law School Professor David Reiss agrees. “The plaintiffs, in the main, argue that the federal government has breached its duties to preferred shareholders, common shareholders, and potential beneficiaries of a housing trust fund authorized by the same statute that authorized their conservatorships. At this early stage, it appears that the plaintiffs have a tough row to hoe,” notes Reiss in a draft paper examining the GSE shareholder lawsuits.
Government attorneys argue that Treasury has authority to purchase Fannie and Freddie stock when it’s determined such actions are necessary to provide stability to the financial markets, prevent disruptions in the availability of mortgage finance and protect the taxpayer. The government also argues that the plaintiffs do not have a legal property interest for purposes of a Fifth Amendment “takings” claim due to the GSEs’ status in conservatorship.
Hamburger predicted that the judges in the various suits won’t be able to ignore the “obvious equitable tensions” involved. “The government is changing the terms years after their bailout, but on the other hand, the timing and motivation of investors is going to be challenged too,” she noted.
While Reiss agrees that the junior shareholders “look like they are receiving a raw deal from the federal government,” it’s a tall order to sue the federal government even under the most favorable of circumstances. The plaintiffs will have to overcome the government’s sovereign immunity, unless it is waived, and the government has additional defenses, including immunity from Administrative Procedures Act claims, under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008.
Reiss explained that HERA states that except “at the request of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of [FHFA] as conservator or receiver.” It remains to be seen how this language might apply to Treasury’s change in the preferred stock agreement, but Reiss said it could be read to give the government broad authority to address the financial situation of the two companies.
“The litigation surrounding GSE conservatorship raises all sorts of issues about the federal government’s involvement in housing finance,” said Reiss. “These issues are worth setting forth as the proper role of these two companies in the housing finance system is still very much up in the air.”
The full paper, An Overview of the Fannie and Freddie Conservatorship Litigation (SSRN link), can also be found on BePress.
Fannie and Freddie’s Debt to Treasury
Larry Wall of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta has posted one of his Notes from the Vault, Have the Government-Sponsored Enterprises Fully Repaid the Treasury? It opens,
Have U.S. taxpayers been fully compensated for their bailout of the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac? The Treasury is reported to have argued that “the value of Treasury’s commitment to the GSEs was “incalculably large,'” with the implication that it could never be repaid. Richard Epstein, the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution [and who discloses that he consults “with several hedge funds with positions in Fannie and Freddie”], responded that “the level of the Treasury commitment was not ‘incalculably large’: it was $188 billion, all of which will shortly be repaid.” The significance of Epstein’s argument is that if Treasury has been fully compensated for its bailout of Fannie and Freddie, a case can be made that the future profits of the two GSEs should go to their private shareholders.
As an accounting matter, one could argue that Epstein is correct; the dividends equal the amount of Treasury funds provided to the GSEs. And as a legal matter, the issue may ultimately be resolved by the federal courts. However, as an economic matter, the value of the government’s contribution clearly exceeds $188 billion once the risk borne by taxpayers is taken into account.
In this Notes from the Vault I examine the value of the taxpayers’ contribution to Fannie and Freddie from an economic perspective. My analysis of these contributions is divided into three parts: (1) the GSEs’ profitability prior to the 2008 conservatorship agreement (bailout), (2) the value of the taxpayer promise at the time of the bailout, and (3) support of new investments since they were placed in conservatorship. (1)
The article goes on to explain each of these three parts of the taxpayers’ contribution and concludes,
The claim that the taxpayers and Treasury have been fully repaid for their support of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is based on an accounting calculation that does not withstand economic analysis. The claim that Treasury’s commitment has been fully repaid attributes no dividend payments to Treasury starting in 2012, attributes no value to the government guarantee to absorb whatever losses arose in the pre-conservatorship book of business, and arguably reflects Treasury setting too low of a dividend rate on its senior preferred stock. Moreover, the profits that are being used to pay the dividends did not arise from the contributions of private shareholders but rather entirely reflect risks borne by the Treasury and taxpayers. Thus, the Treasury claim that the value of the aid was “incalculable” is an exaggeration; the value surely can be fixed within reasonable bounds. However, the implication of this claim, that the GSEs cannot repay the economic value on behalf of their common shareholders, is nevertheless accurate. (2)
This article offers a useful corrective to the story one hears from those representing Fannie and Freddie’s shareholders. They have constructed a simple narrative of the bailout of the two companies that ignores the way that the two companies’ fortunes have been intrinsically tied to the federal government’s support of them. That simple narrative just nets out the monies that Treasury fronted Fannie and Freddie with the payments that the two companies made back to Treasury. After netting the two, they say, “Case closed!” Wall has demonstrated that there are a lot more factors at play than just those two.
I would also highlight something that Wall did not: the federal government actually determines the level of profits that Fannie and Freddie can make by setting the fees the two companies charge for guaranteeing mortgages. So, the federal government could wipe away future profits by lowering the guaranty fees. And wiping away those profits would make those outstanding shares worthless.
So the question remains: what is the endgame for the investors who have brought these lawsuits?
Reiss on Frannie Reform
Law360.com quoted me in Capital Rules To Spread Beyond Banks Under Housing Bill (behind a paywall). The story reads in part,
Mortgage servicers, aggregators and other actors in the U.S. housing finance market would for the first time be subject to the same capital requirements that apply to banks under a new bipartisan bill aimed at replacing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, potentially eliminating an advantage nonbank firms currently enjoy.
The elimination of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is the centerpiece of S. 1217, the Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014, introduced by Senate Banking Committee Chairman Tim Johnson, D-S.D., and the committee’s ranking Republican, Sen. Mike Crapo, R-Wyo. The government-sponsored entities would be replaced by a proposed Federal Mortgage Insurance Corp. that would backstop the housing finance market in a manner similar to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.’s backing of the banking system.
Among the details in the 442-page bill released Sunday are provisions that would allow the FMIC to impose capital standards and other “safety and soundness” rules to mortgage servicers, firms that package mortgages into securities and guarantors that provide the private capital backing to mortgage-backed securities. Compliance with these standards would be required for access to a government guarantee.
Previously those types of institutions have not been subject to safety and soundness rules, unless they were part of a bank. If the Johnson-Crapo bill moves forward as currently written, those firms could be in for a big change, said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.
“Historically, nonbanks have had a lot less regulation than banks. So, by giving them a safety and soundness regulator you are taking away a regulatory advantage – that is, less regulation – that they have had as financial institutions,” he said.
* * *
“What it effectively does is create safety and soundness standards for guarantors, aggregators and servicers, as if they were banks. There’s been this long debate about what you do about the nondepository institutions, and this would empower FMIC to supervise private-party participants like banks,” said Laurence Platt, a partner with K&L Gates LLP.
Specifically, the potential rules would apply to aggregators, which serve to collect mortgages and pack them into securities, and guarantors, or firms that provide the private capital to back those securities. Mortgage servicers that process payments and provide other services to mortgages inside those securities would also be included under the FMIC’s regulatory umbrella, according to the bill.
The FMIC would also have the power to force the largest guarantors and aggregators to maintain higher capital standards than their smaller competitors as a way to mitigate the risk of any such market player becoming too big to fail, and will be able to limit such firms’ market share if they get too big, according to the bill.
Underwriting standards for mortgages that would be backed by the FMIC would match, as much as possible, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s qualified mortgage standards, which went into effect in January, according to the legislation.
Moreover, the FMIC would be able to write regulations for force-placed insurance that is applied to mortgages where borrowers do not purchase their own private mortgage insurance under the legislation. The CFPB and other regulators have tackled perceived problems in the force-placed insurance market in recent months.
Extending those capital and other safety and soundness requirements to nonbank firms would be akin to extending supervision authority of nonbank mortgage servicers and other firms to the CFPB, a power granted by the Dodd-Frank Act, Reiss said.
“It can be described as part of the effort since the passage of Dodd-Frank to regulate the breadth of the financial services industry instead of one part of it, the banking sector,” he said.
Reiss on Fannie/Freddie Suits
Bloomberg BNA quoted me in No Basis for Discovery by GSE Investors, Treasury Department, FHFA Memos Say. It reads
[Reproduced with permission from BNA’s Banking Report, 102 BBR 417, 3/11/14. Copyright 2014 by The Bureau
of National Affairs, Inc. (800-372-1033) https://www.bna.com]
The Treasury Department and the Federal Housing Finance Agency March 4 said a federal judge should deny a motion for discovery in lawsuits by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac investors, citing an agreed-upon schedule and saying the motion would do nothing to address legal questions at the core of the case (Fairholme Funds v. Federal Housing Finance Agency, D.D.C., No. 13-cv-01053, 3/4/14).
In its memo filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Treasury said Fairholme’s Feb. 12 motion for discovery (31 DER EE-6, 2/14/14) would be “improper” under a November scheduling order, and urged the court to dismiss the Fairholme suit and related cases.
“These cases should proceed on the agreed briefing schedule, which already provided ample time to the plaintiffs to file their substantive briefs, and the Court, upon review of a completed set of briefing with respect to the defendants’ dispositive motions, should dismiss these cases,” Treasury said March 4.
In its March 4 filing, the FHFA memo said “no discovery is necessary to assess the purely legal arguments” before the court, adding the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) bars second-guessing of the FHFA’s actions as conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Litigation Ongoing
The suit is one of several in at least two district courts and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims that challenge Treasury and FHFA action in August 2012 that restructured contracts governing preferred stock issued by the two government-sponsored enterprises.
Fairholme and other investors say the August 2012 amendment amounted to an expropriation of their assets and have variously sought damages and compensation in response.
The government has sought to dismiss the Fairholme case and others, but in its Feb. 12 motion, Fairholme said the government’s motion to dismiss was too expansive and raised questions that require access to government documents, e-mails and other materials.
Arrowood Indemnity Co., the plaintiff in a related case in the district court and a separate case in the Claims Court, Feb. 20 sought to link its own bid for discovery to Fairholme’s (36 DER EE-8, 2/24/14).
Fairholme has already prevailed on its discovery motion in the Claims Court. In a Feb. 26 order, Judge Margaret M. Sweeney granted Fairholme’s motion for a continuance to pursue discovery in that case.
March Reply Scheduled
In the district court, Fairholme is scheduled to respond to the government’s March 4 memos by mid-March.
“We are reviewing the opposition briefs filed by the defendants just yesterday, and we will respond to them in our reply brief, due on March 14,” a spokesman for Fairholme told Bloomberg BNA March 5.
High Stakes Seen
Professor David Reiss of Brooklyn Law School in New York March 5 said discovery usually occurs after motions to dismiss have been decided.
In this case, he said, “the stakes are so high and the quality of lawyering so high that there is litigation over the scheduling order itself.”
“This is a hard-fought battle and the issues are incredibly complex,” Reiss told Bloomberg BNA. “Each side characterizes their arguments as relatively straightforward, but I think the judge will have a hard time parsing out the issues, because there are different statutory regimes, policy issues and the like that must be rationalized with each other. I think this is just the beginning of a long slog,” he said.
Fannie and Freddie Boards: Caveat Fairholme
Fairholme Capital Management has sent stern letters to the the boards of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the letters are essentially the same). Fairholme’s funds have millions of common and preferred shares in the two companies and Fairholme has taken a multi-pronged to trying to wring some value out of those shares. It has sued the federal government. It has offered to buy the two companies’ mortgage guaranty operations. Now, it is threatening the board of the two enterprises with personal liability for their actions and inaction.
In regard to the cash dividends that the two companies have paid to the Treasury as a result of their Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (as amended), Fairholme writes,
It is common sense that no Board should approve cash distributions without independent financial advice as to the effect of such payments on the Company’s safety, soundness, and liquidity. Moreover, corporate laws generally prohibit the payment of dividends in many circumstances, imposing personal liability on Directors for illegal dividends – a liability that, pursuant to the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, is not assumed by the Conservator. (Fannie Letter, 3) (emphasis added)
This is a straightforward threat that will likely get the attention of the directors of the two companies and get them to check in with their D&O insurer before taking any further actions. But it is genuinely unclear what they should be doing at this point.
As I note in a forthcoming article, An Overview of the Fannie and Freddie Conservatorship Litigation (NYU J. Law & Bus.), the Fannie/Freddie shareholder litigation raises all sorts of complex and novel legal issues, and I am not willing to predict their outcomes. But I will go as far to say that Fairholme presents the way out of this mess as far clearer than it is — “Various solutions are simple, equitable, and need not be contentious.” (5) The ones that Fairholme has in mind likely involve large payouts for shareholders, one way or the other.
At the same time that Fairholme presents the solution as simple, it does acknowledge (as it really must) that the problem itself is not: “we are aware of no circumstance in which the controlling shareholder and its affiliates simultaneously act as director, regulator, conservator, supervisor, contingent capital provider, and preferred stock investor.” (3-4) Yup, this is one big mess with no real precedent. I am confident, however, that the federal government has no interest in reaching a settlement with shareholders that shareholders would find acceptable. So, no end in sight to this aspect of the Fannie/Freddie situation, a far as I can tell.
Foreclosure Prevention: The Real McCoy
Patricia McCoy has posted Barriers to Foreclosure Prevention During the Financial Crisis (also on SSRN). In the early 2000s, Pat was one of the first legal scholars to identify predatory behaviors in the secondary mortgage market. These behaviors resulted in homeowners being saddled with expensive loans that they had trouble paying off. As many unaffordable mortgages work themselves through the system, Pat has now turned her attention to the other end of the life cycle of many an abusive mortgage — foreclosure.
The article opens,
Since housing prices fell nationwide in 2007, triggering the financial crisis, the U.S. housing market has struggled to dispose of the huge ensuing inventory of foreclosed homes. In January 2013, 1.47 million homes were listed for sale. Another 2.3 million homes that were not yet on the market—the so-called “shadow inventory”—were in foreclosure, held as real estate owned or encumbered by seriously delinquent loans. Discouragingly, the size of the shadow inventory has not changed significantly since January 2009.
Reducing the shadow inventory is key to stabilizing home prices. One way to trim it is to accelerate the sale of foreclosed homes, thereby increasing the outflow on the back-end. Another way is to prevent homes from entering the shadow inventory to begin with, through loss mitigation methods designed to keep struggling borrowers in their homes. Not all distressed borrowers can avoid losing their homes, but in appropriate cases—where modifications can increase investors’ return compared to foreclosure and the borrowers can afford the new payments—loan modifications can be a winning proposition for all. (725)
The article then evaluates the various theories that are meant to explain the barriers to the loan modification and determines “that servicer compensation together with the high cost of loan workouts, accounting standards, and junior liens are the biggest impediments to efficient levels of loan modifications.” (726) It identifies “three pressing reasons to care about what the real barriers to foreclosure prevention are. First, foreclosures that could have been avoided inflict enormous, needless losses on borrowers, investors, and society at large. Second, overcoming artificial barriers to foreclosure prevention will result in loan modifications with higher rates of success. Finally, knowing what to fix is necessary to identify the right policy solution.” (726)
It seems to me that the federal government dealt with foreclosures much more effectively in the Great Depression, with the creation of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation. In our crisis, we have muddled through and have failed to systematically deal with the foreclosure crisis. McCoy’s article does a real service in identifying what we have done wrong this time around. No doubt, we will have another foreclosure crisis at some point in our future. It is worth our while to identify the impediments to effective foreclosure prevention strategies so we can act more effectively when the time comes.
