Tag Archives: freddie

Foreclosure Prevention: The Real McCoy

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Patricia McCoy has posted Barriers to Foreclosure Prevention During the Financial Crisis (also on SSRN). In the early 2000s, Pat was one of the first legal scholars to identify predatory behaviors in the secondary mortgage market. These behaviors resulted in homeowners being saddled with expensive loans that they had trouble paying off. As many unaffordable mortgages work themselves through the system, Pat has now turned her attention to the other end of the life cycle of many an abusive mortgage — foreclosure.

The article opens,

Since housing prices fell nationwide in 2007, triggering the financial crisis, the U.S. housing market has struggled to dispose of the huge ensuing inventory of foreclosed homes. In January 2013, 1.47 million homes were listed for sale. Another 2.3 million homes that were not yet on the market—the so-called “shadow inventory”—were in foreclosure, held as real estate owned or encumbered by seriously delinquent loans. Discouragingly, the size of the shadow inventory has not changed significantly since January 2009.

Reducing the shadow inventory is key to stabilizing home prices. One way to trim it is to accelerate the sale of foreclosed homes, thereby increasing the outflow on the back-end. Another way is to prevent homes from entering the shadow inventory to begin with, through loss mitigation methods designed to keep struggling borrowers in their homes. Not all distressed borrowers can avoid losing their homes, but in appropriate cases—where modifications can increase investors’ return compared to foreclosure and the borrowers can afford the new payments—loan modifications can be a winning proposition for all. (725)

The article then evaluates the various theories that are meant to explain the barriers to the loan modification and determines “that servicer compensation together with the high cost of loan workouts, accounting standards, and junior liens are the biggest impediments to efficient levels of loan modifications.” (726) It identifies “three pressing reasons to care about what the real barriers to foreclosure prevention are. First, foreclosures that could have been avoided inflict enormous, needless losses on borrowers, investors, and society at large. Second, overcoming artificial barriers to foreclosure prevention will result in loan modifications with higher rates of success. Finally, knowing what to fix is necessary to identify the right policy solution.” (726)

It seems to me that the federal government dealt with foreclosures much more effectively in the Great Depression, with the creation of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation. In our crisis, we have muddled through and have failed to systematically deal with the foreclosure crisis. McCoy’s article does a real service in identifying what we have done wrong this time around. No doubt, we will have another foreclosure crisis at some point in our future. It is worth our while to identify the impediments to effective foreclosure prevention strategies so we can act more effectively when the time comes.

Reiss on Watt Confirmation

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Law360 interviewed me about the Senate confirmation of Mel Watt as the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency in Fannie, Freddie’s Footprint Could Grow Under New FHFA Head. The article reads in part,

The U.S. mortgage industry is in for a sea change as Rep. Mel Watt, D-N.C., takes the helm of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, experts say, predicting Watt will seek to expand Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, veering sharply from his predecessor’s plans but lining up more closely with President Barack Obama’s.

The confirmation came Tuesday in a 57-41 vote after months of delay ended by Senate Democrats’ implementation of the so-called “nuclear option” eliminating the filibuster of presidential nominees. Senate Republicans had expressed concern about the choice of a politician like Watt — as opposed to an academic or economist — to head the agency.

Members of the real estate finance community are also divided about whether Watt’s confirmation will have a positive or negative impact on the industry, but most agree that a major change is ahead.

“I think Watt, as director, could end up having a very big impact both in terms of reversing some changes that have been implemented, and also taking the agency in a very different direction,” said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.

Since 2009, interim FHFA head Ed DeMarco has made an effort to shrink the footprint of the regulator and its government-sponsored enterprises, Fannie and Freddie, in the U.S. residential mortgage market.

DeMarco faced pushback in these efforts from industry groups and lawmakers, causing him to backpedal a bit in November when the FHFA announced that it would hold off on reducing the size of mortgages that Fannie and Freddie can guarantee for at least the first half of next year.

Obama also did not share DeMarco’s ideology, but experts believe Watt’s plans for the GSEs are much more in line with those of the president. He appears cautious about allowing Fannie and Freddie to back away from the market entirely and may in fact favor policies that will increase the GSEs’ role in the mortgage market.

“My guess is that Watt will further enmesh Fannie and Freddie in the operations of the mortgage markets, whereas DeMarco was actually shrinking their footprint,” Reiss said.

*     *     *

The difference between the short-term and long-term impacts of Watt’s expected actions will be significant, experts say.

DeMarco’s moves made short-term waves, but supporters believed the aim was long-term equilibrium and an eventual balance of public and private capital in the mortgage market. Watt may have more potential for positive short-term results, but there will still be a question as to whether this will translate into a stable market for the next generation, Reiss said.

“Often when people are talking about government intervention, they want help for problems now, but they’re also setting up the rules of the game for once the crisis has passed,” he said.

Private Capital and the Mortgage Markets

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The American Securitization Forum recently wrote to the Federal Housing Finance Agency to argue for at least a small reduction in the size of the loans that Fannie and Freddie can guaranty. While this makes sense to me, it is pretty controversial.  The ASF argues that “incremental reductions are appropriate for the following reasons:”

(i) as a means to begin scaling back the outsized role the GSEs currently play in the U.S. housing finance system and encourage the return of private capital;

(ii) FHFA has the legal authority in its role as conservator to act according to its dual mandate; and

(iii) the timing of any Congressional action on wide-ranging housing finance reform remains uncertain. (1)

Various groups like the Realtors and some members of Congress argue that any restriction of credit is unwarranted while the housing recovery is so tentative. The ASF notes, however, that the federal government is insuring roughly 90% of new residential mortgages. Virtually no one supports such a level of government support for the mortgage market, so the only question is one of timing. Do we start cutting back now or do we wait for better market conditions?

Others argue that there is not enough private capital to replace the government guaranteed capital in the market. But scaling back the Fannie/Freddie loan limit is a great way to work private capital back into the market gradually. The long term health of the American mortgage market is best assured by having private capital assume as much of the credit risk as it can responsibly handle. This private capital should also be subject to consumer protection regulation to ensure that it is not put to predatory uses. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has rules in place to provide that consumer protection. The FHFA should complement that regulatory action with its own. It should reduce the Fannie and Freddie loan limits starting in 2014.

Mortgage Reform Schooling on 30 Year Term

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S&P has posted U.S. Mortgage Finance Reform Efforts and the Potential Credit Implications to school us on the current state of affairs in Congress. It provides a useful lesson on three major mortgage reform bills introduced in Congress this year.  They are the Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2013 (Corker-Warner); Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners ACT of 2013 (PATH); and the FHA Solvency Act.

Given the current mood in D.C., S&P somewhat optimistically states that there “seems to be a bipartisan commitment to encourage private capital support for the U.S. housing market while winding down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that hold dominant positions in the mortgage market.” (1) S&P uses this report as an opportunity to “comment on the potential credit implications of these mortgage finance reform efforts on several market sectors.” (1)

In this post, I focus on, and criticize, S&P’s analysis of the appropriate role of the 30 year fixed-rate mortgage. S&P states that

The 30-year fixed-rate mortgage has contributed significantly to housing affordability in the U.S. And while some market players have looked at current rates on jumbo mortgages (those that exceed conforming-loan limits) and suggested that the private market could support mortgage interest rates below 5%, we think this view is distorted. Jumbo mortgage rates carrying the lowest interest rates, for the most part, are limited to a narrow set of borrowers who have FICO credit scores above 750 and equity of roughly 30% in their homes. We don’t believe that these same rates would be available to average prime borrowers, such as those with credit scores of 725 and 25% equity in a property. (3)

While I think that S&P is probably right about the limited usefulness of comparing current jumbo loans to a broad swath of conforming loans, I see no support in their analysis for the assertion that the “30-year fixed-rate mortgage has contributed significantly to housing affordability in the U.S.” First, a 30-year FRM typically carries a higher interest rate than an ARM of any length. Second, a typical American household only stays in a home for about seven years. Thus, a 30-year FRM provides an expensive insurance policy against increases in interest rates that most Americans do not end up needing.

While we may end up providing governmental support for the 30-year FRM because of its longstanding popularity, S&P’s mortgage reform school should be based on facts, not fancy.

Whither The Housing Trust Fund?

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As part of my review of the litigation surrounding the newly-profitable Fannie And Freddie (here, here, here and here), I turn to the complaint filed by “extremely low income tenants in desperate need of affordable housing” and the National Low Income Housing Coalition and the Right to the City Alliance, Samuels et al. v. FHFA et al., No. 1:13-cv-22399 (Jul. 9, 2009).

As the complaint notes, Congress created the Housing Trust Fund as part of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA).  The Housing Trust Fund was to be funded by contributions by Fannie and Freddie that were based on their annual purchases.   Those contributions could amount to hundreds of millions of dollars a year.

But here was the rub:  the Director of the FHFA could suspend  those contributions if the Director finds that they

(1) are contributing, or would contribute, to the financial instability of [Fannie or Freddie];

(2) are causing, or would cause, the [Fannie or Freddie] to be classified as undercapitalized; or

(3) are preventing, or would prevent, [Fannie or Freddie] from successfully completing a capital restoration plan under section 4622 of this title. (14, quoting 12 U.S.C. section 4567(b))

And that is just what happened in 2008:  the FHFA put them into conservatorship because of fears of their impending insolvency and their mounting losses. With the housing recovery, Fannie and Freddie have returned to profitability — massive profitability. But the federal government has redirected those profits to the Treasury, which had provided many billions of dollars to the two companies during the early years of the crisis without funding the Housing Trust Fund.

The plaintiffs allege that despite “the record profits of the Enterprises and despite the statutory requirement that any suspension of payments be temporary,  the Federal Defendants have failed and refused to review these findings and/or discontinue their suspension of the statutorily required payments by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into the Housing Trust Fund.” (17) The plaintiffs allege that this is “arbitrary and capricious in light of the changed and current financial condition of the Enterprise. The required statutory contribution is a small percentage of the Enterprise’s profits and thus would not contribute to the financial instability” of the two companies or to the other two bases for suspending the contributions pursuant to section 4567(b). (18, citations omitted) In sum, “the level of capitalization is solely a function of the policy decisions of the conservator not the cost of contributions to the Housing Trust Fund.” (22)

The big challenge that the plaintiffs face, as far as I can tell, is how they can convince the Court that the two companies are financially stable when they are still so deeply in debt to the federal government, notwithstanding the billions of dollars of profits that they two companies have remitted so far to the Treasury.

Fannie, Freddie & Affordable Housing

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I was quoted in a Law360.com story, Affordable Housing May Trip Up Fannie, Freddie Fixes (behind a paywall).  It reads in part,

While the debate over housing finance reform in Washington has focused on the government’s role as market backstop, analysts say questions about federal funding for affordable housing add another potential pitfall for lawmakers looking to dismantle and replace Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

Fannie and Freddie long have been part of a broader government program to add to the country’s affordable housing stock. Republicans have been critical of that mission and targeted it as something that should be abolished along with the two mortgage giants, while Democrats want to keep programs promoting affordable housing in any reform of the housing finance system.

As the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate move forward with their own visions of a new system for financing home purchases, it is likely that those two perspectives on affordable housing promotion will clash, said Rick Lazio, a former four-term Republican member of Congress from New York.

“That will be a significant obstacle to getting an agreement,” said Lazio, now the chairman of Jones Walker LLP’s housing and housing finance industry team.

One of the main issues lawmakers will have to confront will be what to do with the National Housing Trust Fund, a program created by the 2008 Housing and Economic Recovery Act.

HERA required Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to transfer a small percentage of the money from new business to the fund, which would then be used to subsidize the construction of rental housing for low-income families.

The fund’s inclusion in HERA was seen as a major victory for affordable housing advocates, but the benefits never materialized.

Soon after HERA passed, Fannie and Freddie were placed into conservatorship after mounting losses from exposure to subprime mortgages, and the two companies took a combined $187 billion bailout. The Federal Housing Finance Agency canceled all contributions to the fund.

Several housing advocacy groups have sued the FHFA to force the agency to allow Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to resume their contributions now that the entities are generating profits and repaying the bailout money.

What seems more likely than getting the money the two companies were supposed to pay out is that the funds allocated to affordable housing will be shrunk under a new system, as envisioned by a Senate bill, or eliminated altogether, as proposed by a bill introduced by House Republicans.

“If it’s included at all, it will be smaller,” Brooklyn Law School professor David Reiss said of affordable housing money.

Fannie/Freddie Take Down 3: Washington Federal v. The U.S. of A.

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This should catch us up on the Fannie/Freddie preferred stock Takings litigation (see here and here for two other suits).  Washington Federal et al. v. United States was filed June 10, 2013 and is a class action complaint. The theories are pretty similar in the three cases. I had earlier written about the importance of narrative in these Takings cases. Having lived through this history myself and having read the “first draft” of history carefully in the pages of the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal and many trade periodicals, I am somewhat taken aback by this revisionist history. For instance, the complaint states that the companies were not “likely to incur losses that would deplete all or substantially all of” their capital. (38) News to me!

But what is most striking about the complaint is this notion that if the government had just taken this action (allowing the companies to buy more subprime mortgages) or not taken that action (strong arming the board to accept the conservatorship) or not deferring taking this other action (waiting to raise the guarantee fee), then everything would have worked out for the companies and their shareholders.  Maybe so, but it sure will be hard to categorize each of the government’s actions as either totally okay or completely inappropriate for the companies’ health in the context of the financial crisis. This leaves the plaintiffs with some tough work ahead. They are going to need to show a judge just how to categorize each of those facts and ensure that the categorization does not interfere with their theory of the case.

All of this raises a bigger, more interesting question. What role should these types of lawsuits play after a crisis has passed? Some would say that they are an outrage — second-guessing what are leaders did to avert financial ruin. Others might say that this is an efficient way to respond to crises: allow the government to do what it needs to do during the crisis, but use litigation to make an accounting to all of the stakeholders once the situation has stabilized. I don’t have a fully thought out view on this, but I am struck by the dangers of each approach. The first allows for various kinds of scapegoating (as Hank Greenberg argues in the AIG bailout litigation) while the second allows for the kind of revisionism that favors the wealthy and powerful (as with these Takings suits by powerful investors who bought Fannie and Freddie preferred shares on the cheap as a sort of long shot bet on what the two companies will look like going forward). Tough to choose between the two . . ..