Tag Archives: mortgage

Reiss on Paying off Underwater Mortgages

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MainStreet.com quoted me in What Bills Should You Pay First? It reads in part,

Consumers started prioritizing their mortgage payments ahead of their credit card payments as of September 2013, according to a new TransUnion study.

This reverses a trend that began in September 2008 when the mortgage crisis drove consumers to pay their credit cards bills ahead of mortgages. Consumers have placed an emphasis on paying their auto loans before their mortgages and credit card payments by a wide margin – since at least 2003, TransUnion said. The study obtained anonymous consumer information from December 2002 through December 2012, and each monthly sample included about 2.5 million consumers.

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Many consumers were faced with devaluing home prices and chose to preserve their credit line, said David Reiss, professor of law at Brooklyn Law School in New York.

“The underwater mortgage may have seemed like a sinkhole when prices were dropping and putting limited funds into it might have seemed like throwing good money after bad,” he said. “When a household’s income can’t cover all of its expenses, it has to prioritize its payments. If the mortgage is underwater, it may make sense to use those limited funds to protect assets that are integral to daily living and wage earning like an auto or to focus on tools like credit cards that may have some use going forward, if there is still any available credit left.”

Homeowners have reversed that logic with the rebound of housing prices, Reiss said.”If homeowners have equity in their home from those rising prices, prioritizing the mortgage protects that equity and keeps the household in the house to boot,” he said. “Not everyone makes such a calculation, but many do.”

Appellate Court of Illinois Awarded Summary Judgment to Plaintiff Where Defendant Failed to Show That Plaintiff was an Unlicensed Debt Collector Under the Collection Agency Act

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The Illinois court in deciding Kondaur Capital Corp. v. Sreenan, 2013 Ill. App. (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2013) affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment for the plaintiff.

In the summary judgment motion, the plaintiff asserted that it was the legal holder and in possession of the note at issue pursuant to the assignment from PNC.

The court held that the circuit court did not err in awarding summary judgment to the plaintiff where the defendant failed to demonstrate that the plaintiff was an unlicensed debt collector under the Collection Agency Act (225 ILCS 425/1 et seq.).

The court also held that there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to strike affidavits in support of the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment where the affidavits were premised upon documents that qualified as “business records” under Supreme Court Rule 236 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 236).

Lastly, the court held that any error in allowing the plaintiff to respond to the defendant’s affirmative defenses in the context of the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion was harmless.

Appellate Court of Illinois Denies Defendants’ Motion for Presentment and Cause to Vacate Judgment was Misplaced and Had no Legal Significance

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The Appellate Court of Illinois in deciding Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Cole, 2013 IL App (2d) 130450-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2013) held that the trial court properly confirmed a judicial sale, as the plaintiff had no obligation to produce the originals of the mortgage and the note. Moreover under the appropriate standard, the court had subject-matter jurisdiction, and defendant failed to cogently explain plaintiff’s alleged lack of standing.

Lorie Cole, one of two property-owner defendants in a foreclosure action, appealed to this court after the confirmation of the judicial sale of the property and the denial of what the trial court treated as a motion to reconsider. This court, after considering the Cole’s appeal found that all of the issues that defendant Cole had raised were without merit, thus this court affirmed the decision of the lower court.

This Note and Mortgage Are Unenforceable

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The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit issued a thoughtful opinion in In re: Dorsey, File No. 14b0002n.06 (March 7, 2014) but it leaves me dissatisfied. As Elizabeth Renuart and Dale Whitman have each demonstrated, courts have had a hard time parsing how UCC Article 3 relates to the enforceability of mortgage notes. That is not the problem with this opinion — the Court carefully applies UCC Article 3, but still concludes that the possessor of the note could not establish that it was a Person Entitled To Enforce it. As a result, the Court concludes that the possessor of the note cannot enforce the note and as a result, the mortgage is “no longer enforceable under Kentucky law.” (12)

Because of the complexity of the analysis, I refer interested readers directly to the opinion itself, which is as clear as can be expected for such a technical subject. But I will note that the Court’s result means that a party that holds the note itself and has much circumstantial evidence that the note was transferred to it by the original lender under the note can forfeit the entire value of the note and mortgage. I generally believe that lenders should be held to strict standards when seeking to enforce the terms of a mortgage loan. But in this bankruptcy proceeding, the possessor of the note is left with nothing and the borrower is granted a windfall — the entire mortgage debt has been extinguished. This does not seem to be consistent with the principles of equity.

I am curious to know what others think, particularly bankruptcy experts. Perhaps I am missing something.

 

[HT April Charney]

Ohio Court Dismisses Claims Asserting that MERS Could Not Act as Nominee

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The court in deciding Cline v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 2013-Ohio-5706 (Ohio Ct. App., Franklin County 2013) overruled appellant’s seven assignments of error, thus this court upheld the judgment of the lower court.

The lower court granted MERS’ motion after concluding that, because appellant voluntarily signed the mortgage and agreed to the existing lien, the mortgage could not constitute a cloud on appellant’s title subject to R.C. 5303.01. On appeal, appellant argued the original loan was originated by CBSK, a company no longer in business; therefore, any agreement between CBSK and MERS that MERS would act as nominee for CBSK is void.

In appellant’s view, because the agreement between CBSK and MERS was void, the note and mortgage were no longer in effect and constituted a cloud upon her title. Appellant argued that, unlike Unger, which concerned mortgage assignments, this matter was different as it concerns the underlying mortgage itself.

Upon review, this court found that the appellant’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and, thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing appellant’s complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Accordingly, all of the appellant’s claims were overruled.

Ohio Court Finds that Bank of America had Standing to Foreclose and MERS had Authority to Assign

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The court in deciding Bank of Am., N.A. v. Harris, 2013-Ohio-5749 (Ohio Ct. App., Cuyahoga County Dec. 26, 2013) found there was no merit to plaintiff’s appeal, and affirmed the lower court’s dismissal.

Defendant, Frederick Harris, appealed from the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment to plaintiff, Bank of America. Plaintiff argued that the trial court erred as a matter of law by granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff-appellee.

Plaintiff argued that Bank of America lacked standing to pursue the foreclosure because the bank was a party solely by virtue of a purported assignment from MERS. It argued that MERS had no authority to assign the mortgage to Bank of America, and thus, Bank of America had no standing to bring the suit.

The court rejected the plaintiff’s contentions, finding that the bank had standing to bring a foreclosure action because it was the real party in interest at the time that a foreclosure complaint was filed. The court also found that the bank had possession of the note, which was payable to bearer. Therefore, it was the current holder of the note and entitled to enforce it under R.C. 1303.31 and that after the merger, the bank stepped into the shoes of the absorbed company and had the ability to enforce. As such no further action was necessary to become a real party in interest.

United States District Court for the District of Columbia Dismisses Case Due to Lack of Jurisdiction

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The court in deciding Glaviano v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. 180582 (D.D.C. Dec. 27, 2013) dismissed the plaintiff’s claim due to lack of jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants did not have “possession of the note” or a “documented property interest in the note and mortgage or deed of trust.” Plaintiff also alleged that the “deed of trust was void and ineffective due to fraud,” and that the trustee’s foreclosure sale was “void because the alleged beneficiary . . . never had standing to substitute the trustee.” They further claimed that the sale of their property at a foreclosure sale violated their due process rights under the U.S. Constitution. Based on these allegations, plaintiff sought an injunction against the foreclosure sale.

The court considered the plaintiff’s argument and found that the court lacked jurisdiction, as such the case must be dismissed. Because the plaintiff sought the equivalent of appellate review of state court rulings, the district court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman. The court found that plaintiffs in this case also asked the federal district court to review state court rulings.

Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and the motion for injunction was denied as moot due to dismissal of the case.