Tag Archives: show me the note

California Court Rules That State Law Did Not Require Possession of the Promissory Note in Order to Initiate a Non-Judicial Foreclosure

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The Eastern District of California in deciding Chilton v. Federal National Mortgage Association, No. 1:09; 2187 (E.D. Cal., 2010) dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint claiming wrongful foreclosure and lack of standing. The court held that California law did not require possession of the promissory note in order to initiate a non-judicial foreclosure.

Although MERS was not explicitly named as a defendant in the action, the plaintiff argued that MERS lacked standing to foreclose since the note and deed of trust had been separated. The court rejected this argument.

California Court Held That State Law Did Not Require Possession of the Note as a Precondition for Initiating a Foreclosure Sale

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The Los Angeles County Superior Court in deciding Linares, et al. v. JLM Corporation, et al., No. YC060372 (2009), after considering the plaintiff’s contentions, rejected them in favor of the defendant’s argument. In accepting the defense’s argument, the court held that California law did not require the possession of the original note as a precondition for initiating a foreclosure sale.

Additionally, the court found that under California law, an “allegation that the trustee did not have the original note or had not received it, is insufficient to render the foreclosure proceeding invalid.”

Show Me The Note, NY Style

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Steiner, Goldstein & Sohn published a short article in the New York Law Journal, Clearing The Confusion:  Misplaced Notes and Allonges (Sept. 18, 2012) (behind a paywall). While intended to address commercial real estate finance, it relies on an interesting residential real estate finance case, Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Deane, 2013 Slip Op. 23244 (Sup. Ct. Kings Country July 11, 2013). The authors write that

Mortgage assignments, when properly drafted, assign both the mortgage and the note. Assuming the chain of mortgage assignments is intact, lenders can gain comfort knowing that under New York case law they have standing to enforce the full amount of the debt evidenced by these assignments. Nevertheless, defendants in foreclosure proceedings often challenge the lenders’ standing to enforce the note, demanding that lenders demonstrate physical possession of the note to initiate a foreclosure despite the fact that physical possession is not required by the law.

They conclude:

New York courts in the cases described herein consistently follow well-established precedent permitting standing in a foreclosure action without the plaintiff having physical possession of the original notes. New York case law makes clear that physical possession of all notes in a chain of loan assignments and refinancings is unnecessary for standing in a foreclosure action and that proper execution of a [Consolidated Extension and Modification Agreement] is sufficient to confer standing when missing notes have been consolidated. Likewise, inclusion of an allonge or other endorsement for every note transfer is not required under New York law for standing in a foreclosure action when the note has been assigned by other means, such as through a properly drafted assignment of mortgage.

The article’s discussion of Deane is most interesting:

the court found physical possession of the note to be determinative regardless of whether a written assignment was executed. The court criticized the approach followed by case law in New York, stating that allowing an assignee to have standing without possession of the note “would be inconsistent with Revised Article 3, and put New York out-of-step with the 49 states that have adopted the revision[.]” Notably, however, New York has opted not to adopt those proposed revisions to Article 3. The court continued, “that misstep, however, if such it is, has apparently already been taken. The case law quoted and cited above clearly speaks, in the disjunctive, of standing obtained by ‘assignment’ or ‘physical delivery’ of the note[.]”

I will return to Deane in a later post.

Arizona Court Grants Summary Judgment in Favor of MERS in Show Me the Note Claim

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The Arizona court in deciding the case of Sparlin v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, CA-CV-2010-0173 (Ct. Ap. AzDiv. 2, 2011), had to consider arguments based on the theory of ‘show me the note.’ Sparlin had appealed the lower court decision to grant summary judgment to MERS. Upon reconsideration, the court affirmed the lower court decision and granted summary judgment.

In arguing their ‘show me the note’ claim, the borrowers alleged that MERS was required to actually prove that it was in possession of the original promissory note in order to execute a substitution of trustee appointing Recon-Trust as the substitute trustee and executing an assignment to BAC Home Loans Servicing. These were the documents that allowed the trustee to initiate foreclosure.

The court, in affirming the lower court’s dismissal, found that MERS, as the beneficiary on the deed of trust, had the right to enforce the security instrument. Additionally, the court found that under Arizona law, it was not required of MERS to be the note holder.

Arizona Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Show-Me-The-Note Claim in Its Entirety

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The Arizona Court that decided AOM Group LLC et al v. Mortgage IT, Inc. et al., No. CV 09-2639-PHX-SRB (D.Ariz.)(2010) held that the plaintiff’s ‘show me the note’ argument was lacking in merit.

The plaintiff brought an action that challenged the validity of completed trustee sale. The plaintiff made several allegations, one of which was unlawful fraudulent foreclosure by MERS and the servicer. The court after considering the arguments dismissed the plaintiff’s action its entirety.

Alabama Court Rules That Demonstration of Note Ownership is Not Needed

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The court in Farkas v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc, et al., 447 F. App’x 972 (11th Cir. 2011) found that Alabama is a non-judicial foreclosure state and that the party seeking foreclosure was not required to demonstrate ownership of the promissory note before taking action on the corresponding mortgage. This action involved MERS as the foreclosing mortgagee.

The debtor claimed that Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) required that the party seeking foreclosure had to prove an interest in the note. However, the court reasoned that the UCC was not relevant to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings.

NJF and UCC and Contract Law, Oh My!

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Parsing how a court should approach a particular deed of trust foreclosure case can put you to sleep faster than crossing the poppy fields next to the yellow brick road.  Does the Non-Judicial Foreclosure (NJF) statute govern? Does the state’s Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) govern? Does the contract terms of the deed of trust itself govern? Or, more likely, do all three govern? And, if so, how do they interact with each other?

Brad Borden and I have recently noted that while

“show me the note” does come up in federal cases, federal courts defer to the applicable state law in reaching their results.  [T]he courts’ holdings tend to flow from a careful reading of the relevant state foreclosure statute, so a particular state’s law can have a big effect on the outcome.  We would note that many scholars and leaders of the bar are befuddled by courts’ failure to do a comprehensive analysis under the UCC as part of their reasoning in mortgage enforcement cases, but judges make the law, not scholars and members of the bar.  See Report of The Permanent Editorial Board for The Uniform Commercial Code Application of The Uniform Commercial Code to Selected Issues Relating to Mortgage Notes at 1 (Nov. 14, 2011).

Zadrozny v. Bank of New York Mellon, No. 11-16597 (June 28, 2013), a recent 9th Circuit case demonstrates the problem of an incomplete analysis in an Arizona non-judicial foreclosure case.  The Court notes that

The PEB [Permanent Editorial Board] Report [] clarifies:

the UCC does not resolve all issues in this field. Most particularly, the enforcement of real estate mortgages by foreclosure is primarily the province of a state’s real property law (although determinations made pursuant to the UCC are typically relevant under that law).

Given the PEB Report’s recognition that state law is typically controlling on foreclosure issues, the Zadroznys are unable to allege a cause of action premised on the PEB Report . . ..(14-15, citation omitted)

This is confusing in a few ways.  First, the UCC is state law, adopted with variants by all of the states’ legislatures.  What the PEB is calling for is for courts to apply state UCC law as appropriate.

Second, state foreclosure law does not “control” foreclosure issues in some inchoate and expansive way. It governs it to the extent that it governs it and not one bit more. So if state UCC law governs one facet of a foreclosure case, it is not trumped by the states’ foreclosure law. Or if the terms of the deed of trust were to govern, it would not be trumped by the foreclosure law either (so long as it did not violate it).

Finally, it is just plain weird to say that the Zadroznys would have a “cause of action premised on the PEB report.” How would that work?!?  The PEB report is merely an interpretation of general UCC principles. The Court should be asking how the Arizona UCC applies to this case.

I am not saying that the Court reached the wrong result under Arizona law in this regard, but the Court’s incomplete analysis offers no clarity to litigants, no more than the Wizard of Oz offered real solutions to his supplicants’ pleas. But judges decide the cases, not me and not you . . ..