Independent Foreclosure Review: Case Closed?

The Federal Reserve Board issued its Independent Foreclosure Review. By way of background,

Between April 2011 and April 2012, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Federal Reserve”), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) issued formal enforcement actions against 16 mortgage servicing companies to address a pattern of misconduct and negligence related to deficient practices in residential mortgage loan servicing and foreclosure processing identified by examiners during reviews conducted from November 2010 to January 2011. Beginning in January 2013, 15 of the mortgage servicing companies subject to enforcement actions for deficient practices in mortgage loan servicing and foreclosure processing reached agreements with the OCC and the Federal Reserve (collectively, the “regulators”) to provide approximately $3.9 billion in direct cash payments to borrowers and approximately $6.1 billion in other foreclosure prevention assistance, such as loan modifications and the forgiveness of deficiency judgments. For participating servicers, fulfillment of these agreements satisfies the foreclosure file review requirements of the enforcement actions issued by the OCC, the Federal Reserve, and the OTS in 2011 and 2012. (1)

The government’s actions regarding the Independent Foreclosure Review have been its controversial, with some believing that it was completed too hastily. I am less interested in that debate than in FRB’s sense of the the servicing sector going forward.

The report states that “the initial supervisory review of the servicer and holding company action plans has shown that the banking organizations under Consent Orders have implemented significant corrective actions with regard to their mortgage servicing and foreclosure processes, but that some additional actions need to be taken.” (24) Overall, the report reflects an optimism that endemic servicer problems are a thing of the past.

drumbeat of reports and cases seems to be at odds with that assessment, although there is obviously a significant lag between the occurrence of  problems and the report of them in official sources. As a close observer of the mortgage industry, however, I am not yet convinced that regulators have their hands around the problems in the servicer industry. Careful monitoring remains the order of the day.

Reiss on GSE Transfer Taxes

Law360 quoted me in Fannie, Freddie Look Unstoppable In Transfer Tax Fight (behind a paywall).  It reads in part,

Class actions against Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac over hundreds of millions of dollars in unpaid transfer taxes in states and cities around the country continue to pile up, but experts say any attempt to challenge the housing giants’ exempt status is likely futile as court after court rules in their favor.

The Eighth Circuit on Friday joined the Third, Fourth, Sixth and Seventh circuits in ruling that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are exempt from local transfer taxes when it ruled in favor of the government-sponsored enterprises, or GSEs, after reviewing a suit brought by Swift County, Minnesota.

Swift County, as with a multitude of counties, municipalities and states before it, sought to dispute Fannie and Freddie’s claim that while they must pay property taxes, they are exempt from additional taxes on transfers of assets. But in what some experts say has come to seem like an inevitable answer, the Eighth Circuit found in favor of Fannie and Freddie.

“The federal statutes that set forth the charters of Fannie and Freddie are pretty clear that the two companies have a variety of regulatory privileges that other companies don’t,” David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School, said. “One of the privileges is an exemption from nearly all state and local taxation.”

The legal onslaught against the GSEs began in 2012 after U.S. District Judge Victoria A. Roberts ruled in March that they should not be considered federal agencies. In a suit filed by Oakland County, Michigan, over millions in unpaid transfer taxes, Judge Roberts rejected the charter exemption argument and, citing a 1988 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in U.S. v. Wells Fargo, found that “all taxation” refers only to direct taxes and not excise taxes like those imposed on asset transfers.

Counties, municipalities and states across the country were emboldened by the decision. Putative class actions soon followed in West Virginia, Illinois, Minnesota, Florida, Rhode Island, Georgia and elsewhere as plaintiffs rushed to see if they could elicit a similar ruling and recoup millions of dollars allegedly lost thanks to the inability to tax Fannie and Freddie’s mortgage foreclosure operations.

But Judge Roberts’ decision was later overturned by the Sixth Circuit, as were other similar orders, though many district judges found in favor of Fannie and Freddie from the start.

*     *    *

Many cases remain in the lower courts as well, but experts say the outcomes will likely echo those that played out in the Third, Fourth Sixth, Seventh and Eighth circuits, because the defendants’ chartered exemption defense appears waterproof.

“I find the circuit court decisions unsurprising and consistent with the letter and spirit of the law,” Reiss said. “I am guessing that other federal courts will follow this trend.”

Mortgage Servicer Accountability

Joseph A. Smith, Jr, the Monitor of the National Mortgage Settlement, issued his third set of compliance reports (I blogged about the second here). For those needing a recap,

As required by the National Mortgage Settlement (Settlement or NMS), I have filed compliance reports with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (the Court) for each servicer that is a party to the Settlement. The servicers include four of the original parties – Bank of America, Chase, Citi and Wells Fargo. Essentially all of the servicing assets of the fifth original servicer party, ResCap, were sold to and divided between Ocwen and Green Tree pursuant to a February 5, 2013, bankruptcy court order. Accordingly, Ocwen and Green Tree are now subject to the NMS for the portions of their portfolios they acquired from ResCap.1 These reports provide the results of my testing regarding compliance with the NMS servicing standards during the third and fourth calendar quarters of 2013, or test periods five and six. They are the third set of reports for the original four bank servicers, the second report for Ocwen and the first report assessing Green Tree. (3)

The Monitor concludes that Bank of America, Citi, Chase, Ocwen and Wells Fargo “did not fail any metrics during the most recent testing periods.” (2) The Monitor also reports on “fourth-quarter compliance testing results for the loans Green Tree acquired from the ResCap Parties. Green Tree implemented the Settlement’s servicing standards after such acquisition. Green Tree failed a total of eight metrics during this time period.” (2) The metrics that Green Tree failed include a number of practices that have made the lives of borrowers miserable during the foreclosure crisis. They are,

  • whether the servicer accurately stated amounts due from borrowers in proofs of claims filed in bankruptcy proceedings
  • whether the servicer accurately stated amounts due from borrowers in affidavits filed in support for relief from stay in bankruptcy proceedings
  • whether loans were delinquent at the time foreclosure was initiated and whether the servicer provided borrower with accurate information in a pre-foreclosure letter
  • whether the servicer provided borrower with required notifications no later than 14 days prior to referral to foreclosure and whether required notification statements were accurate
  • whether the servicer waived post-petition fees, charges or expenses when required by the Settlement
  • whether the servicer has documented policies and procedures in place to oversee third party vendors
  • whether the servicer responded to government submitted complaints and inquiries from borrowers within 10 business days and provided an update within 30 days
  • whether the servicer notified the borrower of any missing documents in a loan modification application within five days of receipt (9, emphasis added)

These metrics seem pretty reasonable — one might even say they are a low bar for sophisticated financial institutions to exceed. Until the servicing industry can do such things as a matter of course, close government regulation seems appropriate. The monitor notes that “work still remains to ensure that the servicers treat their customers fairly.” (2) Amen to that, Monitor.

Open Season on Homeowners

A case coming out of California, Peng v. Chase Home Finance LLC et al., California Courts of Appeal Second App. Dist., Div. 8, April 8th, 2014, has attracted a lot of attention in the blogosphere. This is particularly notable because this case is not to be published in the official reports and thus has no precedential value. Judge Rubin’s dissent has attracted much of the attention. It opens,

The promissory note signed by appellants Jeffry and Grace Peng obligated them to repay their home loan. In August 2007, Freddie Mac acquired the promissory note from Chase. Based on Freddie Mac owning the note, appellants seek to amend their complaint to allege Chase did not have authority to enforce the promissory note or to foreclose on their home, but the majority rejects appellants’ proposed amendment. Relying on case law rebuffing a homeowner’s challenge to a creditor-beneficiary’s authority to foreclose, the majority notes that courts have traditionally reasoned that the homeowner’s challenge is futile because, even if successful, the homeowner “merely substitute[s] one creditor for another, without changing [the homeowner’s] obligations under the note.” (Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 271.) The only party prejudiced by an illegitimate creditor-beneficiary’s enforcement of the homeowner’s debt, courts have reasoned, is the bona fide creditor-beneficiary, not the homeowner.

Such reasoning troubles me. I wonder whether the law would apply the same reasoning if we were dealing with debtors other than homeowners. I wonder how most of us would react if, for example, a third-party purporting to act for one’s credit card company knocked on one’s door, demanding we pay our credit card’s monthly statement to the third party. Could we insist that the third party prove it owned our credit card debt? By the reasoning of Fontenot and similar cases, we could not because, after all, we owe the debt to someone, and the only truly aggrieved party if we paid the wrong party would, according to those cases, be our credit card company. I doubt anyone would stand for such a thing. (Dissent, 1)

The dissent’s concern is justified. As Professor Whitman has recently noted on the Dirt Listserv and elsewhere, it is a “bizarre notion that anyone can foreclose a mortgage without showing that they have the right to enforce the note.” He also notes that the majority (and even the dissent) in Peng confuse ownership of the note with the right to enforce it. Until courts fully understand how the UCC governs the enforcement of notes, one should worry that some state court judges might declare an open season on homeowners as the majority does here in Peng.

Reiss on Dimming of FIRREA

Inside MBS & ABS quoted me in Judge Recommends Dismissal of DOJ’s Fraud Case Against BofA, But It May Not End FIRREA Claims (behind paywall). It reads,

A North Carolina federal magistrate has recommended that a Justice Department fraud case against Bank of America be dismissed, but he also said a separate Securities and Exchange Commission lawsuit against the bank based on a different federal law should proceed.

The DOJ last August filed suit against BofA under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, accusing the bank of defrauding investors in the sale of $855 million of nonagency MBS. Last week, U.S. Magistrate David Cayer of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina found that the government failed to prove the bank made “material” false statements to the former Federal Housing Finance Board.

The DOJ claimed that BofA “willfully” misled investors, including the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco and Wachovia Corp. – now owned by Wells Fargo – about the risks in the 2008 offering by failing to fully disclose the risk of 1,191 jumbo adjustable-rate mortgages backing the deal.

FIRREA allows the government to seek civil penalties equal to losses suffered by federally insured financial institutions, with a maximum of $1.1 million per violation. The 1989 law was a little used relic of the savings and loan aftermath until government lawyers began recently to invoke it widely in addition to other charges.

The law gives agency lawyers the ability to tap grand jury material and to subpoena documents. FIRREA also has a 10-year statute of limitations, longer than the typical five years for fraud cases, allowing government lawyers more time to pursue cases related to the 2007-2008 financial crisis.

The magistrate rejected the government’s claim that BofA’s statements were in violation of FIRREA because the FHLBank of San Francisco was within the jurisdiction of the FHFB. Cayer found that policing such statements did not fall within the agency’s purview and there was no indication that either the FHFB or the FHLBank ever complained about the MBS.

The magistrate recommended the DOJ’s case be dismissed without prejudice, although District Judge Max Cogburn will have the final word. Cayer allowed a parallel complaint filed by the SEC to move forward.

David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School, noted that U.S. district judges often give deference to reports from magistrate judges. But even if Cogburn opts to dismiss the DOJ’s case, it’s less an indictment against the use of FIRREA and more an indication that the government filed its case incorrectly, he said.

“Is it a harbinger that all other judges are going to change their minds about the broad reading of FIRREA? I don’t see that at all,” Reiss told Inside MBS & ABS. “I see judges in New York and in other jurisdictions continuing to allow the government to broadly interpret FIRREA based on its plain language. They are reading the text of the statute and saying the government can act.”

Is $50 Billion of Mortgage Relief Enough?

The National Mortgage Settlement Monitor issued his Final Crediting Report. The report states that

In total, the servicers have provided more than $50 billion of gross dollar relief, which translates into more than $20 billion in credited relief under the Settlement’s scoring system. More than 600,000 families received some form of relief under the Settlement. Aggregate credited relief includes:

• $7,589,277,740, or 37 percent of total credited relief, of first lien principal forgiveness.

• $3,105,152,359, or 15 percent of total credited relief, of second lien forgiveness.

• $3,587,672,814, or 17 percent of total credited relief, of refinancing assistance.

• $6,410,554,173, or 31 percent of total credited relief, of other forms of relief, including, but not  limited to, assistance related to short sales and deeds in lieu of foreclosure. (2)

I am not going to criticize the substance of the mortgage settlement. But I have a hard time translating these massive numbers into an understanding of how much help people got from the settlement. $20 Billion of credited relief divided by 600,000 households comes out to about $33,000 in relief per household. The Monitor gives us no sense as to whether that $33,000 made a difference to the affected families.

Perhaps going forward, massive settlements like this should include metrics that help to break down these large numbers into categories that make more intuitive sense:  for instance, did the mortgage relief reduce the monthly payment to a sustainable level?  What percent reduction was there in monthly mortgage payments? How many mortgages were converted from underwater mortgages into ones that were in the money as a result of the settlement? Metrics such as these would help give an understanding of how many people were helped (certainly more than one of the metrics often repeated by the monitor, “My team spent 36,000 hours reviewing and testing the consumer relief and refinancing activities reported by the banks.

As counter-intuitive as the question may seem, do we have enough information to really know whether $50 Billion of mortgage relief made a meaningful difference for American households?

National Mortgage Settlement Update

Joseph A. Smith, Jr., the Monitor of the National Mortgage Settlement (NMS), has issued his Second Compliance Report (I blogged about an earlier report here) which has been filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia. According to the Monitor, Ally Financial and Wells Fargo were not in violation of the settlement at all during 2013 and BoA’s and Chase’s deficiencies were not widespread. Citi had a widespread deficiency.

The Monitor’s conclusion echoes his earlier report although his tone is more optimistic than last time:

It is clear to me that the servicers have additional work to do both in their efforts to fully comply with the NMS and to regain their customers’ trust. The Monitor Reports that I have just filed with the Court show, however, that the Settlement is addressing shortcomings in the treatment of distressed borrowers.

CAPs [corrective action plans], including remediation efforts when required, have been implemented or are in process. If the CAPs are not successful, the Monitoring Committee and I will take additional action, as dictated by the Settlement. In addition, we have applied what we have learned to enhance our oversight of the servicers by creating four new metrics to address persistent issues in the marketplace. (16)

The big five banks appear to be improving their compliance with the settlement, which is obviously a good thing. But there is still work to be done to improve loan servicing. The monitor notes the top ten complaints about servicers that were submitted by elected officials on behalf of their constituents:

1 Single point of contact was not provided, was difficult to deal with or was difficult to reach.

2 Single point of contact was non-responsive.

3 Servicer did not take appropriate action to remediate inaccuracies in borrower’s account.

4 Servicer failed to update the borrower’s contact information and/or account balance.

5 Servicer failed to correct errors in the borrower’s account information.

6 The borrower was “dual-tracked.” In other words, the borrower submitted an application for loss mitigation, and although it was in process or pending, the borrower was foreclosed upon.

7 Servicer did not accept payments or incorrectly applied them.

8 Servicer did not follow appropriate loss mitigation procedures.

9 The borrower received requests for financial statements they already provided.

10 The completed first lien modification request was not responded to within 30 days.

Total Executive Office complaints for all servicers: 44,570 (n.p.)

Obviously not every complaint is valid, but these numbers suggest that the settlement is not being fully complied with.