Reiss on Financial Crisis Litigation

Law360 quoted me in Feds’ Moody’s Probe Marks Closing Of Financial Crisis Book (behind a paywall). It opens,

A reported investigation into Moody’s Investors Service’s ratings of residential mortgage-backed securities during the housing bubble era could be the beginning of the last chapter in the U.S. Department of Justice’s big financial crisis cases, attorneys say.

Federal prosecutors are reportedly making their way through the ratings agencies for their alleged wrongdoings prior to the financial crisis after wringing out more than $100 billion from banks and mortgage servicers for their roles in inflating the housing bubble. But the passage of time, the waning days of the Obama administration and the few remaining rich targets likely means that the financial industry and prosecutors will soon put financial crisis-era enforcement actions behind them, said Jim Keneally, a partner at Harris O’Brien St. Laurent & Chaudhry LLP.

“I do look at this as sort of the tail end of things,” he said.

With the ink not yet dry on a rumored $1.375 billion settlement between the Justice Department, state attorneys general and Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services, prosecutors have already reportedly turned their attention to the ratings practices at S&P’s largest rival, Moody’s, in the period leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, according to The Wall Street Journal.

The federal government and attorneys general in 19 states and Washington, D.C., had launched several suits since the financial crisis accusing S&P of assigning overly rosy ratings to mortgage-backed securities and other bond deals that ended up imploding amid a wave of defaults, causing a cascade of investor losses that amounted to billions of dollars.

Although S&P originally elected to fight the government, it ultimately elected to settle. The coming $1.375 billion settlement arrives on top of an earlier $77 million settlement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the attorneys general of New York and Massachusetts over similar claims.

Moody’s is reportedly next in line, with Justice Department investigators reportedly having had several meetings with officials from the ratings agency that looked into whether the Moody’s Corp. unit had softened its ratings of subprime RMBS in order to win business as the housing bubble inflated.

Both the Justice Department and Moody’s declined to comment for this story.

The pursuit of Moody’s as the S&P case wraps up follows a pattern that the Justice Department set with big bank settlements for the financial crisis.

“You would expect that they would sweep through, so to speak,” said Thomas O. Gorman, a partner with Dorsey & Whitney LLP.

After reaching a $13 billion deal with JPMorgan Chase & Co. in November 2014, the Justice Department quickly turned its attention to Citigroup Inc. and Bank of America Corp., which reached their own multibillion-dollar settlements last summer.

Now prosecutors are in talks with Morgan Stanley about another large settlement, according to multiple reports.

All of those deals follow the $25 billion national mortgage settlement from 2012 that targeted banks’ pre-crisis mortgage servicing practices.

Time may be catching up with the Justice Department more than six years following the height of the crisis, even after the Justice Department began employing novel uses of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, a 1989 law passed following the savings and loan crisis, Keneally said.

Using FIRREA extended the statute of limitations on financial crisis-era cases, allowing for prosecutors to develop their cases and take a systematic approach. Even that statute may have run its course, as it pertains to the crisis.

“The passage of time is such that you have evidence that no longer exists,” Keneally said.

Politics may also play a role as the financial crisis recedes from memory and the next holder of the presidency potentially looks to move forward, he said.

“We’re getting to the end of the Obama administration,” Keneally said. “I think it’s going to be hard for any administration to ramp things up again.”

And that has some wondering whether the Obama administration and the Justice Department under Attorney General Eric Holder followed the correct path.

“The Justice Department and the states’ attorneys general collected far more in their penalties and settlements than anyone could have imagined before the financial crisis,” said Brooklyn Law School professor David Reiss.

Those large settlements may give investors and top management pause when it comes to questionable activity. However, because no traders or other top banking personnel went to prison, questions remain about what deterrent effect those settlements will have on individuals.

“Big institutions are now probably deterred from some of this behavior, but are individuals who work on these institutions deterred?” Reiss said.

The Secret to Financial Well-Being?

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has issued a report, Financial Well-Being:  The Goal of Financial Education. I have been somewhat critical of the CFPB’s approach to financial literacy education, but I think that this report sets forth a pretty reasonable baseline for future research. It states,

A growing consensus is emerging that the ultimate measure of success for financial literacy efforts should be improvement in individual financial well-being. But financial well-being has never been explicitly defined, nor is there a standard way to measure it. Overall, the literature paints a picture of nuanced, complex interactions between financial knowledge, understanding, and actions taken. However, rigorously identified links between these factors and financial outcomes have yet to be established.

Our project provides a conceptual framework for defining and measuring success in financial education by delivering a proposed definition of financial well-being, and insight into the factors that contribute to it. This framework is grounded in the existing literature, expert opinion, and the experiences and voice of the consumer garnered through in-depth, one-on-one interviews with working-age and older consumers. (4-5)

The CFPB proposes a definition of financial well-being “as a state of being” where people

  • Have control over day-to-day, month-to-month finances;
  • Have the capacity to absorb a financial shock;
  • Are on track to meet your financial goals; and
  • Have the financial freedom to make the choices that allow you to enjoy life.

Because individuals value different things, traditional measures such as income or net worth, while important, do not necessarily or fully capture this last aspect of financial well-being. (5)

 This all seems reasonable to me in the abstract, although I am not sure how you would measure success across a large group of people given the very different ways that people would respond to the prongs of that definition. I would also note that events beyond the control of a financially literate person (illness, structural unemployment etc.) could devastate that person’s financial well-being, much as upright Job was devastated by the tests he had to endure.  Notwithstanding these concerns, I am looking forward to see how the CFPB uses its definition to develop its research agenda and to design its policies.

Enhanced REFinblog — in Beta

REFinblog.com is adding new content, Mondays through Fridays.  Brooklyn Law School student fellows will post links to important real estate documents each day at 9:30am on the following topics:

  • Monday: Adjudications (Court & Administrative Decisions)
  • Tuesday: Regulatory Updates
  • Wednesday: Research Papers
  • Thursday: Advocacy Documents
  • Friday: Tax Friday & Weekly Roundup

Once we have it down to a science, we will post more information about this new service.  We hope you find it useful.

 

Housing in Smart Cities

I attended an interesting research seminar led by Anthony Townsend yesterday at NYU’s Center for Urban Science and Progress (conveniently located in downtown Brooklyn). Professor Townsend is affiliated to NYU’s Rudin Center for Transportation Policy & Management. He discussed his recent book, Smart Cities: Big Data, Civic Hackers, and the Quest for a New Utopia. Townsend argued that the 21st century will be defined by two global trends – urbanization of the world’s population, and ubiquitous computing. He traced the origins of the “smart cities” movement, its goals and the problems it faces.

As noted on Amazon, the book argues that

cities worldwide are deploying technology to address both the timeless challenges of government and the mounting problems posed by human settlements of previously unimaginable size and complexity. In Chicago, GPS sensors on snow plows feed a real-time “plow tracker” map that everyone can access. In Zaragoza, Spain, a “citizen card” can get you on the free city-wide Wi-Fi network, unlock a bike share, check a book out of the library, and pay for your bus ride home. In New York, a guerrilla group of citizen-scientists installed sensors in local sewers to alert you when stormwater runoff overwhelms the system, dumping waste into local waterways.

While Townsend’s talk did not apply his thesis to urban housing and his book only touches on it, it is certainly worth thinking through how Big Data can help provide more housing and better housing in big cities.

Housing is as “unvirtual,” or perhaps as “real,” a good as a good can be. But businesses such as Airbnb show how the virtual and the real can combine into something quite new. Obviously Airbnb does not solve many housing problems for residents of cities, but it does demonstrate that there is a brave new world ahead. Housing policymakers should try to discern what it is going to look like and how it can be harnessed as a force of civic good.

Krimminger and Calabria on Conservatorships

When the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) was appointed conservator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, it was the first use of the conservatorship authority under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (“HERA”), but it was not without precedent. For decades, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) has successfully and fairly resolved more than a thousand failing banks and thrifts using the virtually identical sections of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (“FDIA”).
*     *     *
The predictability, fairness, and acceptance of this model led Congress to adopt it as the basis for authorizing the FHFA with conservatorship powers over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in HERA. Instead of following this precedent, however, FHFA and Treasury have radically departed from HERA and the principles underlying all other U.S. insolvency frameworks and sound international standards through a 2012 re-negotiation of the original conservatorship agreement.
*     *     *
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     This paper will:
  • Describe the historical precedent and resolution practice on which Congress based FHFA’s and Treasury’s statutory responsibilities over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac;
  • Explain the statutory requirements, as well as the procedural and substantive protections, in place so that all stakeholders are treated fairly during the conservatorship;
  • Detail the important policy reasons that underlie these statutory provisions and the established practice in their application, and the role these policies play in a sound market economy; and
  •  Demonstrate that the conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ignore that precedent and resolution practice, and do not comply with HERA. Among the Treasury and FHFA departures from HERA and established precedents are the following:
    • continuing the conservatorships for more than 6 years without any effort to comply with HERA’s requirements
      to “preserve and conserve” the assets and property of the Companies and return them to a “sound and solvent” condition or place them into receiverships;
    • rejecting any attempt to rebuild the capital of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac so that they can return to “sound and solvent” condition by meeting regulatory capital and other requirements, and thereby placing all risk of future losses on taxpayers;
    • stripping all net value from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac long after Treasury has been repaid when HERA, and precedent, limit this recovery to the funding actually provided;
    • ignoring HERA’s conservatorship requirements and transforming the purpose of the conservatorships from restoring or resolving the Companies into instruments of government housing policy and sources of revenue for
      Treasury;
    • repeatedly restructuring the terms of the initial assistance to further impair the financial interests of stakeholders contrary to HERA, fundamental principles of insolvency, and initial commitments by FHFA; and
    • disregarding HERA’s requirement to “maintain the corporation’s status as a private shareholder-owned company” and FHFA’s commitment to allow private investors to continue to benefit from the financial value of the company’s stock as determined by the market. (1-3, footnotes omitted)

I am intrigued by the recollections of these two former government officials who were involved in the drafting of HERA (much as I was by those contained in a related paper by Calabria). But I am not convinced that their version of events amounts to a legislative history of HERA, let alone one that should be given any kind of deference by decision-makers. The firmness of their opinions about the meaning of HERA is also in tension with the ambiguity of the text of the statute itself. The plaintiffs in the GSE conservatorship litigation will see this paper as a confirmation of their position. I do not think, however, that the judges hearing the cases will pay it much heed.

Who Benefits from the Low Income Housing Tax Credit?

HUD’s Office of Policy Development and Research has released a report, Understanding  Whom  the  LIHTC  Program  Serves: Tenants  in  LIHTC  Units  as  of  December  31,  2012. By way of background,

The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) Program provides tax credits to developers of affordable rental housing. The tax credits are provided during the first 10 years of a minimum 30-year compliance period during which rent and income restrictions apply. The LIHTC Program, although established in the U.S. Internal Revenue Code (IRC), is structured such that state-allocating agencies administer most aspects of the program, including income and rent compliance, with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) providing oversight and guidance. Local administration allows states to address affordable housing needs specific to their populations. (1)

 Here are some findings of note:

  • Approximately three-fourths of reported households include disability status for at least one household member.
  • 36.4 percent of reported LIHTC households had a least one member under 18 years old.
  • Nearly 33 percent of reported LIHTC households have an elderly member, and 28.6 percent of reported LIHTC households have a head of household at least 62 years old.
  • The overall median annual income of households living in LIHTC units was $17,066, ranging from $8,769 in Kentucky to $22,241 in Florida. By comparison, the median income of HUD-assisted tenants was $10,272 in 2012.
  • Approximately 60 percent of reported households nationwide had incomes below $20,000.
  • The study found that approximately 39 percent of all LIHTC households paid more than 30 percent of their income for rent, thus making them housing cost burdened. Ten percent of all LIHTC households faced a severe housing cost burden, paying more than 50 percent of their income towards rent.
  • In 23 states, HUD was able to collect some data on the use of rental assistance in LIHTC units, which can eliminate cost burden for households who have it. Approximately half of reported households receive some form of rental assistance, with the greatest use in Vermont (64 percent) and least use in Nevada (23 percent).

The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 requires that this information be collected on an ongoing basis. It should be of great value as policymakers formulate federal housing policy for low-income households going forward.

Assignments Not Standing up

The District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida (4th Dist.) ruled in Murray v. HSBC Bank USA et al., (No. 4D13-4316, Jan. 21, 2015) that HSBC did not have standing to foreclose. This case highlights the difficulties that so many judges have in applying the UCC appropriately in foreclosures. The Court quotes the trial court as stating,

     To me, that’s the only issue in the case; can this Court enter a judgment on what you say is that possession is enough without the [i]ndorsement.

      In every other respect they have it. They got the mortgage. They got the records. They got the servicing. They got the whole thing. They just don’t have the [i]ndorsement, and is that fatal?

       In other words do you have to go and get, and then start over again? That’s the question. I don’t know the answer. (2, n.1)

It is well documented that many, many courts have trouble applying the relevant provisions of the UCC in harmony with the relevant provisions of the state foreclosure procedure statute.

The District Court of Appeal goes to great efforts to get it right here, given that the trial court apparently punted on the analysis. I found the the Appendix to the opinion to be of particular of interest. It carefully walks through the chain of transfers to identify the “missing piece” that results in the HSBC’s lack of standing. It also distinguishes these transfers from those between servicers, which some courts conflate with transfers between those with the right to enforce a mortgage.

From a law reform perspective, I wonder what should be done to get courts to apply the law as it is written, instead of just trying to get the gist of it right. Given that the Permanent Editorial  Board of the UCC has issued guidance in this area, I don’t think the issue is lack of clarity. Rather, I think it is just straightforward complexity — judges have a hard time going through all of the steps of the analysis. Can this area of law be simplified so that courts can achieve more just and equitable results? I wonder if Dale Whitman has any ideas . . ..