GSE Reform, by Stealth?

Photo By Greg Willis

The Urban Institute’s Housing Finance Policy Center has issued its January 2016 Housing Finance at a Glance Chartbook. It opens by noting,

The FHFA recently released its 2016 Scorecard for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with updated guidance for credit risk transfer transactions. A year ago, under the 2015 scorecard, the FHFA had required Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to transfer credit risk on a fixed dollar amount of UPB [unpaid principal balance] – $150 billion for Fannie Mae and $120 billion for Freddie Mac. Both exceeded those targets (Fannie $187 billion and Freddie 210 billion). Additionally, the 2015 scorecard did not indicate how much credit risk should be transferred (expected or unexpected, or a specific numeric threshold for example), instead leaving it to the GSEs’ discretion.
But that changes in 2016. FHFA’s 2016 scorecard is a notable departure from 2015 in that it requires the GSEs to transfer credit risk on “at least 90 percent” of the newly acquired UPB (with exceptions for HARP refinances, mortgages with maturities 20 years and below and with loan-to-value ratios 60 percent and below). Another departure from 2015 is the added requirement to transfer a substantial portion of credit risk covering “most of the credit losses projected to occur during stressful economic scenarios.” In other words, GSEs are required to transfer nearly all credit risk on new production, except for what is catastrophic. These two requirements are highly noteworthy because over time they will put the GSEs (and hence the taxpayers) in a remote, catastrophic risk position, letting private capital bear vast majority of credit losses the vast majority of the time – a key objective of most housing finance reform proposals. (3)
I have been arguing for a long time that the private sector should bear the credit risk in the mortgage market, so I think this is a good thing in principle. The FHFA needs to ensure, of course, that the agencies are pricing the transfer of credit risk properly, but overall this is a step in the right direction. Not being privy to any conversations in the Beltway, I always wonder if things like this happen with some kind of bipartisan acquiescence, but I guess we won’t know until someone tells us what happened behind closed doors.

Fannie/Freddie 2016 Scorecard

Anne Madsen

The Federal Housing Finance Agency has posted the 2016 Scorecard for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Common Securitization Solutions. The FHFA assesses the three entities using the following criteria, among others:

  • The extent to which each Enterprise conducts initiatives in a safe and sound manner consistent with FHFA’s expectations for all activities;
  • The extent to which the outcomes of their activities support a competitive and resilient secondary mortgage market to support homeowners and renters . . . (2)

The FHFA expects Fannie and Freddie to “Maintain, in a Safe and Sound Manner, Credit Availability and Foreclosure Prevention Activities for New and Refinanced Mortgages to Foster Liquid, Efficient, Competitive, and Resilient National Housing Finance Markets.” (3) The specifics are, unfortunately, not too specific when it comes to big picture issues like maintaining credit availability in a safe and sound manner, although the scorecard does discuss particular programs and policies like the Reps and Warranties Framework and the expiration of HAMP and HARP.

The FHFA also expects Fannie and Freddie to “Reduce Taxpayer Risk Through Increasing the Role of Private Capital in the Mortgage Market.” Here, the FHFA has more specifics, as it outlines particular risk transfer objects, such as requiring the Enterprises to transfer “credit risk on at least 90 percent of the unpaid principal balance of newly acquired single-family mortgages in” certain loan categories. (5)

The last goals relate to the building of the Common Securitization Platform and Single Security: Fannie and Freddie are to “Build a New Single-Family Infrastructure for Use by the Enterprises and Adaptable for Use by Other Participants in the Secondary Market in the Future.” (7) The FHFA us moving with all deliberate speed to reshape the secondary mortgage market in the face of indifference or gridlock in Congress.

The FHFA may implement the reform of Fannie and Freddie all by its lonesome. Maybe that’s the best result, given where Congress is these days.