Tag Archives: Appellate Division

Reps and Warranties Mean What They Say

Posted on by

Derek Jensen

The New York Appellate Division, 1st Department, issued a ruling in Bank of New York Mellon v. WMC Mortgage, 654464/12 (Dec. 1, 2015) that stands for the proposition that representations and warranties regarding mortgage-backed securities mean what they say and say what they mean. The opinion opens,

This breach of warranty action arises from a residential mortgage backed securitization called the J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Trust 2006-WMC4 (the Trust). The Trust was arranged and sponsored by defendant J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corporation (JPMMAC), which made certain representations and warranties as to the quality of the mortgage loans in the Trust. We find that plaintiff’s interpretation of the language of the representations and warranty at issue is the only reasonable interpretation . . ..

The Pooling and Servicing Agreement represented and warranted that

“With respect to the period from [the] Whole Loan Sale Date to and including the Closing Date, [JPMMAC] hereby makes the representations and warranties contained in paragraph (a) . . . of Schedule 4 attached hereto . . . . [that] [t]he information set forth in the Mortgage Loan Schedule and the tape delivered by [WMC] to [JPMMAC] is true, correct and complete in all material respects.”

It also stated that if “JPMMAC breached a representation or warranty it made . . . it was to cure the breach within 90 days after notification; if it failed to do so, it was to repurchase the defective mortgage loan or substitute a qualifying loan for the defective one.” This is pretty standard stuff so far.

By 2012, it appeared that more than 40% of the mortgages remaining in the pool were delinquent and that the R&Ws had been violated. The certificate holders therefor demanded that JPMMAC repurchase the mortgages that were in breach of the R&Ws, which JPMMAC refused to do.

JPMorgan argued, against the plain language of the R&Ws, that it only covered defects that arose during a short period prior to the closing date of the securitization. The Court gave short shrift to this implausible reading of the R&Ws.

This opinion does not make new law, but one wonders what effect it will have on securitization business practices. R&Ws are driven by many things — concerns about credit risk, but also tax compliance with the REMIC rules, to name a couple.  I am curious as to how MBS R&Ws have changed since the early 2000s — and whether the parties to these transactions understand how R&Ws allocate risk among them.

Possession of Note Confers Standing to Foreclose

Posted on by

Jupiter.Aurora.HST.UV

Dale Whitman posted this discussion of Aurora Loan Services, LLC v. Taylor, 2015 WL 3616293 (N.Y. Ct. App., June 11, 2015) on the DIRT listserv:

There is nothing even slightly surprising about this decision, except that it sweeps away a lot of confused and irrelevant language found in decisions of the Appellate Division over the years. The court held simply holds (like nearly all courts that have considered the issue in recent years) that standing to foreclose a mortgage is conferred by having possession of the promissory note. Neither possession of the mortgage itself nor any assignment of the mortgage is necessary. “[T]he note was transferred to [the servicer] before the commencement of the foreclosure action — that is what matters.” And once a note is transferred, … “the mortgage passes as an incident to the note.” Here, there was a mortgage assignment, the validity of which the borrower attacked, but the attack made no difference; “The validity of the August 2009 assignment of the mortgage is irrelevant to [the servicer’s] standing.”

The opinion in Aurora makes it clear that prior Appellate Division statements are simply incorrect and confused when they suggest that standing would be conferred by an assignment of the mortgage without delivery of the note. See, e.g., GRP Loan LLC v. Taylor 95 A.D.3d at 1174, 945 N.Y.S.2d 336; Deutsche Bank Trust Co. v. Codio, 94 A.D.3d 1040, 1041, 943 N.Y.S.2d 545 [2d Dept 2012].) For an excellent analysis of why these decisions are wrong, see Bank of New York Mellon v. Deane, 970 N.Y.S.2d 427  (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013).

The Aurora decision implicitly rejects such cases as Erobobo, which suppose that the failure to comply with a Pooling and Servicing Agreement would somehow prevent the servicer from foreclosing. In the present case, the loan was securitized in 2006, but the note was delivered to the servicer on May 20, 2010, only four days before filing the foreclosure action. This presented no problem at all the court. If the servicer had possession at the time of the filing of the case (as it did), it had standing. (I must concede, however, that the rejection is only implicit, since the Erobobo theory was not argued in Aurora.)

If there is a weakness in the Aurora decision, it is its failure to determine whether the note was negotiable, and (assuming it was) to analyze the application UCC Article 3’s “person entitled to enforce” language. But this is not much of a criticism, since it is very likely that under New York law, the right to enforce would be transferred by delivery of the note to the servicer even if the note were nonnegotiable.

It has taken the Court of Appeals a long time to get around to cleaning up this area of the law, but its work is exactly on target.