Tag Archives: default

Kroll on Mortgage Performance

Posted on by

The Kroll Bond Rating Agency has issued an update of its residential mortgage-backed securities model methodology, Residential Mortgage Default and Loss Model. Before the financial crisis, ratings models seemed to be very reliable, data-driven models of probity and caution. We have since learned that different mortgage vintages (the year of origination) can behave very differently and ratings models could be based on simplistic assumptions. Hopefully, the updated Kroll model does not suffer from those flaws, although their key takeaways seem pretty basic to me:

  • Underwriting standards are the fundamental determinant of mortgage quality.
  • Negative home equity creates a major incentive for borrower default, resulting in substantial credit loss.
  • Credit scores continue to have value as a relative indicator of risk.
  • Inflation of real home prices above the long-term mean is unsustainable and represents increased credit risk. (4-5)

Kroll’s update does include some interesting revisions, including,

Reduced default expectations for purchase loans. It has long been observed that purchase loans generally have lower default risk than refinancings, all else being equal. This is attributed to the fact that a purchase represents an actual arms-length transaction which yields a more accurate view of a home’s value than an equivalent refinancing transaction. However the pre-crisis mortgage vintages showed high levels of default associated with purchase mortgages. This was largely due to the practice of extending credit to first time homebuyers, often on very favorable terms despite these borrowers having little credit history or poor credit history. This poor performance by purchase loans was reflected in the historical data regression analysis used to develop the RMBS model.

Based on analysis focused on both jumbo and conforming prime mortgages, KBRA has found that, for these loans, the traditional benefits of purchase loans remain well established, and we have adjusted the model ‘s treatment of purchase loans to reflect lower default expectations relative to equivalent refinancing mortgages. This revision is effective with the publication of this report.

*     *     *

Penalty for high debt-to-income (DTI) loans. While the KBRA RMBS model does not contain a specific risk parameter based on DTI, it is our opinion that very high DTI loans can bear significant incremental risk. When we began to encounter newly originated loans with back-end DTIs in excess of 45%, we assigned an additional default penalty to such loans. This has been documented in presale reports for those rated RMBS backed by loans with high DTIs. (3)

Time will tell if Kroll got it right . . ..

Hockett on NYC Eminent Domain

Posted on by

Bob Hockett has posted ‘We Don’t Follow, We Lead’: How New York City Will Save Mortgage Loans by Condemning Them to SSRN. The abstract reads,

This brief invited essay lays out in summary form the eminent domain plan for securitized underwater mortgage loans that the author has been advocating and helping to implement for some years now. It does so with particular attention in this case to New York City, which is now actively considering the plan. The essay’s first part addresses the plan’s necessity. Its second part lays out the plan’s basic mechanics. The third part then systematically addresses and dispatches the battery of remarkably weak legal and policy arguments commonly proffered by opponents of the plan.

Hockett has been advocating this plan for some time in the face of concerted opposition from the financial industry. One industry argument that I have found to be over the top is that lenders will refuse to lend in communities that employ eminent domain to address the foreclosure crisis. Hockett writes,

Another policy argument made by some members of the securitization industry is that using eminent domain to purchase loans will dry up the sources of mortgage credit, rendering the American dream of homeownership unattainable. The financial services industry and its legislative supporters have made this kind of claim against regulatory and consumer protection proposals emerging from national, state, or municipal legislatures.

One problem with this argument is that private credit has not flowed to non-wealthy mortgage borrowers since the crash. Federal lenders and guarantors are nearly the only game in town, and they are likely to remain so until the underwater PLS loan logjam is cleared.

Another problem with the credit withdrawal argument is that it characterizes a benefit as a burden. The housing bubble was, like most of the more devastating bubbles through history, the upshot of an over-extension of credit. Lenders extended excess credit through reverse redlining and other predatory lending practices perpetrated or aided and abetted by participants in the securitization industry itself. Hence the securitization industry’s warning that credit might not be overextended in the future is a warning of something that might well be desirable. (142-43, footnotes omitted)

Given that lenders always rush to lend to countries that have recently defaulted on their sovereign debt, I don’t find the credit withdrawal argument to be particularly convincing here. But it may succeed in convincing some local governments not to proceed with their eminent domain strategies. I do hope, however, that at least one locality will follow through during the current foreclosure crisis. That way, we will at least have a proof of concept for the next foreclosure crisis.

 

Reiss on Saving Thousands on Your Mortgage!

Posted on by

MainStreet.com quoted me in You Can Save Thousands on Your Mortgage By Taking This Tiny Step.  It reads in part,

Homeowners can save thousands of dollars when they work with counselor to get their mortgages modified and decrease their odds of defaulting again.

A new study for NeighborWorks America by the Urban Institute determined that homeowners were able to avoid spending millions of dollars annually because of the National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling (NFMC) program. Homeowners working with NFMC program counselors are nearly three times more likely to obtain a mortgage modification and are nearly twice as likely to get their mortgage back on track without a modification.

After working with counselors, homeowners are 60% less likely to re-default after curing a serious delinquency and able to complete short sales faster than homeowners who don’t work with counselors.

The research is based on analysis of nearly 240,000 homeowners with outcomes observed through June 2013. More than 1.8 million homeowners have been helped by the NFMC program, administered by NeighborWorks America since it began in March 2008.

  *     *     *

Since buying a home is something that most people only do once or twice in their lives, there is no question that homeowners whose mortgages are in default or at risk of default should look for assistance as soon as possible, said David Reiss, professor of law at Brooklyn Law School in New York.

“Losing their home is something that most never do at all, so to think that going it alone is the best strategy is a mistake,” he said. “Foreclosure counselors know the range of options available to borrowers and may have access to more direct lines of communication with lenders. They also will have a better sense of when to complain to regulators about bad behavior by lenders.”

Georgia Court Finds that MERS Was Within Its Right in Transferring and Assigning Deed, Along with Power of Sale, to Another Party

Posted on by

The court in deciding Brannigan v. Bank of Am. Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Ga., 2013) found that MERS could transfer and assign the deed, along with the power of sale, to another party.

After Plaintiffs defaulted on their mortgage, U.S. Bank initiated non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiffs Wade and Angelina Brannigan initiated this action and requested that the court set aside a foreclosure sale on the grounds of wrongful foreclosure.

Plaintiff asserted that U.S. Bank, Bank of America, the Albertelli Firm, and MERS conspired to file an alleged ‘Transfer and Assignment,’ whereby MERS purported to transfer, sell, convey and assign to U.S. Bank all of its right, title and interest in and to the security deed. Plaintiffs argued, “MERS retained no interest in their security deed to transfer, and said transfer and assignment were not only fraudulent but a legal nullity” as plaintiffs’ mortgage loan had already been assigned to LaSalle Bank.

In regards to the plaintiff’s claim against MERS, the court found that the plaintiffs executed a security deed listing MERS as grantee and nominee for the lender and its successors and assigns. By the terms of the security deed, MERS could transfer and assign the deed, along with the power of sale, to another party, and did so by transferring it to U.S. Bank. Moreover, the court noted that under Georgia law, the security deed assignee “may exercise any power therein contained,” including the power of sale in accordance with the terms of the deed. O.C.G.A. § 23-2-114.

Therefore, even if Plaintiffs had standing to challenge the assignment, by the terms in the security deed U.S. Bank was within its authority to foreclose after Plaintiffs’ default.

Posted on by

The court in deciding Brannigan v. Bank of Am. Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Ga., 2013) agreed with the defendants that the plaintiffs’ complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and was to be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).

Plaintiffs filed an action asserting several state-law claims related to wrongful foreclosure. The claims against the defendants also included: fraud, intentional misrepresentation, and deceit (Count One); negligent misrepresentation (Count Two); negligence (Count Three); wrongful foreclosure (Count Four); and violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (Count Six).

Plaintiffs contended that the defendants wrongfully foreclosed on their property.
Plaintiffs challenged the assignment of the security deed from MERS to U.S. Bank as wholly void, illegal, ineffective and insufficient to transfer any interest to anyone.

Defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the validity of the assignment. The court ultimately agreed. The court noted that the plaintiffs could not challenge the assignment’s validity because they were not parties to the assignment or intended third-party beneficiaries.

Next, the plaintiffs argued that the assignment from MERS to U.S. Bank was invalid because after the mortgage loan was assigned to LaSalle Bank, MERS retained no interest in the plaintiff’s security deed to transfer.

The court noted that the plaintiffs executed a security deed listing MERS as grantee and nominee for the lender and its successors and assigns. By the terms of the security deed, MERS could transfer and assign the deed, along with the power of sale, to another party, and did so by transferring it to U.S. Bank. Therefore, the court reasoned that even if the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the assignment, by the terms in the security deed, U.S. Bank was within its authority to foreclose after the plaintiffs’ default.

Finally, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant Albertelli Firm’s notice of default was inadequate because it “failed to properly identify the secured creditor, note holder and loan servicer.” The court found that the defendants complied with Georgia’s notice requirements. Therefore, the plaintiff could not state a claim for wrongful foreclosure.

Risky Cash-Out Refis

Posted on by

Anil Kumar of the Dallas Fed has posted Do Restrictions on Home Equity Extraction Contribute to Lower Mortgage Defaults? Evidence from a Policy Discontinuity at the Texas’ Border to SSRN.  The abstract reads

Given that excessive borrowing helped precipitate the housing crisis, a key component of a policy agenda to prevent future meltdowns is effective regulation to curb unaffordable mortgage debt. Texas is the only US state that limits home equity borrowing to 80 percent of home value. Anecdotal reports have long suggested that home equity restrictions shielded Texas homeowners from the worst of the subprime mortgage crisis. But there is, as yet, no formal empirical investigation of these restrictions’ role in curbing mortgage default. This paper is the first to empirically estimate the impact of Texas home equity restrictions on mortgage default using individual and loan level data from three different sources. The paper exploits the policy discontinuity around Texas’ interstate borders induced by the home equity restrictions to identify the causal effect of home equity extraction on mortgage default in a border discontinuity design framework. The paper finds that limits on home equity borrowing in Texas lowered the likelihood of mortgage default by about 2 percentage points with a significantly larger impact on mortgage borrowers in the bottom quartile of the credit score distribution. Estimated default hazards for mortgages within 50 to 100 miles of the Texas’ border decline sharply as one crosses into Texas. Overall, the paper finds evidence that Texas’ home equity restrictions exert a robust negative impact on mortgage default.

This is a really important paper asking a really important question.  If its findings are confirmed, it brings us back to that age-old question of paternalism in consumer financial protection: should we limit a consumer’s choice if that choice is consistently shown to have harmful effects?  I am not sure where I come down in this particular case, but I wonder if some version of Quercia et al.‘s benefit ratio could help measure the costs and benefits of such a rule. The benefit ratio compares “the percent reduction in the number of defaults to the percent reduction in the number of borrowers who would have access to [a certain type of] mortgages.” (20) I am not sure whether access to cash out refi mortgages is of the same import as purchase mortgages or even plain old refis, but the concept of the benefit ratio might still make sense in this context.

Mortgage Market Trending in the Right Direction, but . . .

Posted on by

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) released its OCC Mortgage Metrics Report, First Quarter 2014. the report is a “Disclosure of National Bank and Federal Savings Association Mortgage Loan Data,” and it “presents data on first-lien residential mortgages serviced by seven national banks and a federal savings association with the largest mortgage-servicing portfolios. The data represent 48 percent of all first-lien residential mortgages outstanding in the country and focus on credit performance, loss mitigation efforts, and foreclosures.” (8, footnote omitted) As a result, this data set is not representative of all mortgages, but it does cover nearly half the market.

The report found that

93.1 percent of mortgages serviced by the reporting servicers were current and performing, compared with 91.8 percent at the end of the previous quarter and 90.2 percent a year earlier. The percentage of mortgages that were 30 to 59 days past due decreased 20.9 percent from the previous quarter to 2.1 percent of the portfolio, a 19.8 percent decrease from a year earlier and the lowest since the OCC began reporting mortgage performance data in the first quarter of 2008. The percentage of mortgages included in this report that were seriously delinquent—60 or more days past due or held by bankrupt borrowers whose payments were 30 or more days past due — decreased to 3.1 percent of the portfolio compared with 3.5 percent at the end of the previous quarter and 4.0 percent a year earlier. The percentage of mortgages that were seriously delinquent has decreased 22.4 percent from a year earlier and is at its lowest level since the end of June 2008.

At the end of the first quarter of 2014, the number of mortgages in the process of foreclosure fell to 432,832, a decrease of 52.3 percent from a year earlier. The percentage of mortgages that were in the process of foreclosure at the end of the first quarter of 2014 was 1.8 percent, the lowest level since September 2008. During the quarter, servicers initiated 90,852 new foreclosures — a decrease of 49.1 percent from a year earlier. Factors contributing to the decline include improved economic conditions, aggressive foreclosure prevention assistance, and the transfer of loans to servicers outside the reporting banks and thrift. The number of completed foreclosures decreased to 56,185, a decrease of 7.5 percent from the previous quarter and 33.9 percent from a year earlier. (4)

These trends are all very good of course, but it is worth remembering how far we have to go to get back to historical averages, particularly for prime mortgages.  Pre-Financial Crisis prime mortgages typically have done much better than these numbers, with delinquency rates in the very low single digits.