Tag Archives: federal government

Reiss on SCOTUS Junior Lien Decision

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Bloomberg BNA quoted me in Nagging Economic and Credit Questions Dampen Bankruptcy Victory for Bankers (behind paywall). It reads, in part:

The U.S. Supreme Court delivered an important bankruptcy ruling for bankers that doesn’t, however, do anything about still-struggling homeowners (Bank of Am. N.A. v. Caulkett, 2015 BL 171240, U.S., No. 13-cv-01421, 6/1/15); (Bank of Am. N.A. v. Toledo-Cardona, 2015 BL 171240, U.S., No. 14-cv-00163, 6/1/15).

In a June 1 decision, the court said Chapter 7 debtors cannot void junior liens on their homes when first-lien debt exceeds the value of the property, as long as the senior debt is secured and allowed under the Bankruptcy Code.

The decision is a victory for Bank of America, which held both junior liens in the two related cases, and for banking groups that said a different result could have destabilized more than $40 billion in commercial loans secured by similar liens.

But Brooklyn Law School Professor David Reiss June 2 said the case highlights the need for a broad remedy for homeowners who have continued to struggle to make payments since the financial crisis.

“The bank’s position as a legal matter is a very reasonable one, but from a policy perspective we needed and still need a bigger and more systemic solution to the problems that households face,” Reiss told Bloomberg BNA.

*     *     *

[S]ome said the ruling highlights economic questions on several levels.

Reiss, who coedits a financial blog, June 2 said the case shows the federal government’s inability to deal head-on with the impact of financial turmoil in 2008 and 2009.

“Not enough is being done to move households beyond the crisis, and it’s bad for households and it’s bad for the financial sector,” Reiss said. “Here we are seven or eight years later and we’re sitting here with these valueless second mortgages. We’re just slogging through the muck and we’re not coming up with any good solutions to get past it.”

HAMP-ered Foreclosure Prevention

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The Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) released a report, Treasury’s Opportunity to Increase HAMP’s Effectiveness by Reaching More Homeowners in States Underserved by HAMP. The Introduction opens,

TARP’s signature foreclosure prevention program, the Home Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”), has struggled to reach the expected number of homeowners Treasury envisioned for the program. According to Treasury, TARP’s housing support programs were intended to “help bring relief to responsible homeowners struggling to make their mortgage payments, while preventing neighborhoods and communities from suffering the negative spillover effects of foreclosure.” Treasury announced that HAMP itself aimed “to help as many as three to four million financially struggling homeowners avoid foreclosure by modifying loans to a level that is affordable for borrowers now and sustainable over the long term,.” The only long-term sustainable help provided through HAMP is a permanent mortgage modification, which become effective after the homeowner successfully completes a trial period plan. Through December 31, 2014, according to Treasury data, 1,514,687 homeowners have been able to get into a more affordable permanent HAMP modification (of which, 452,322 homeowners, or 29%, subsequently redefaulted on their HAMP modifications), while there have been 6,165,544 foreclosures nationwide over the same period based on CoreLogic data.” (1, footnotes omitted)

There is a lot of soul searching in this report about why HAMP has been so ineffective and the report offers tweaks to the program to improve it. But perhaps the problem is structural — a program like HAMP was never really in a position to make a bigger impact on the foreclosure crisis.

When compared to the federal government’s intervention during the Great Depression, HAMP seems too modest. President Roosevelt’s Home Owners’ Loan Corporation bought out mortgages from banks in bulk and then refinanced them on more attractive terms than the private sector offered. HAMP, on the other hand, has trouble getting homeowners to apply to the program in the first place.

Bottom line: HAMP is too retail and what we needed and need is something that could be done wholesale.

 

The Second Frannie Bailout: Who Could’ve Known?

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There is a good chance that five or so years from now, Fannie and Freddie will be in the midst of another bailout. This next crisis will be directly caused by the Executive and Legislative branches of the federal government. But members of those branches will say, “Nobody could have known that this crisis was going to happen, nobody is at fault.” That won’t be true, but nobody will be punished in any case. That’s because the crisis will result from inaction, that most fearsome of government flaws.

Who is the Cassandra, warning us of this impending crisis? None other than Donald Layton, the CEO of Freddie. You may think that he is speaking merely from self-interest and you would probably be right. But his self-interest happens to align with the truth in this matter.

In a letter to FHFA Director Watt, Layton writes:

the ability of Freddie Mac to continue to support the mortgage markets and the U.S. economy duling an unprecedentedly lengthy transition period should be one of the most important objectives of a housing finance reform proposal, such as the Johnson-Crapo Bill. The existing Bill draft does not focus on this issue and so, in my personal but experienced opinion, leaves the risk of a failure in Freddie Mac’ss Core Policy Function unacceptably high. With certain specific changes, none of which alter the fundamental nature of the future state envisioned or even the key aspects of the transition, l believe this risk can be reduced, although it would still remain high. (7)

Layton highlights the extraordinary complexity of Freddie’s activities in an appendix to the letter. The highlights include the fact that Freddie Mac guarantees  “about  17% of all U.S. mortgage debt outstanding;” 1,400 Servicers and 2,000 Sellers work with Freddie; and Freddie manages 44,600 REO properties. (8)

Layton states that “It goes without saying that Freddie Mac cannot deliver upon its Core Policy Function, its support of the transition to a future state, or its support of Conservatorship initiatives without experienced and knowledgeable people in place at the executive level, at the Subject matter expert level and at the “been-here-a-long-time-to-know-how-everything-works level.” (3) He believes that departures are likely to cripple the company as experienced staff move on to other, more stable opportunities, leaving behind the quagmire that life in a GSE has become.

The Executive and Legislative branches are not really moving toward some kind of resolution of the Fannie and Freddie conservatorships, although we are now five years past the initial crisis. There is a good chance that the federal government will not move us to the next phase of housing finance in the next couple of years. Operations at the two GSEs will thus continue to suffer and will likely build up to a new crisis. And it will be a totally predictable crisis.

I am the kind of person who likes to say, “I told you so.” But the stakes here are so humungous and so important for the health of the economy, that I could take no pleasure in saying I told you in 2014 that our entire housing finance edifice was going to crumble a second time in a decade. But it will, if nothing is done to prevent it today.

New York Times Criticizes $8.5b Foreclosure Settlement

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The New York Times published a story announcing an $8.5 billion settlement with 10 major banks to settle about four million foreclosure actions. The money will be split in two, with $3.3 billion going directly to 3.8 million homeowners, and the rest going towards lowering interest payments and loan amounts. The settlement is controversial, however, because in addition to the payout the settlement will also end the federal government’s review of those foreclosures, and the money is going to be split evenly amongst consumers regardless of whether harm was actually determined. Some believe that the settlement is the result of a flawed and incompetent review process, which became so costly and slow that the government decided to give up on the review. Others think that the rough justice achieved by the settlement is the closest that regulators can come to making victims of unlawful foreclosures whole again. Former FDIC chairwoman Sheila Bair was quoted in the article stating that the government is “mak[ing] the best out of a very bad situation.”