Tag Archives: lender

Georgia Court Dismisses RESPA, TILA, and HOEPA Claims

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The court in deciding Mitchell v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Ga., 2013) granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Plaintiffs Reginald and Jamela Mitchell claimed that the defendants Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. and MERS violated the Truth-in-Lending Act (“TILA”), the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), the Home Ownership Equity Protection Act (“HOEPA”) and state law by commencing foreclosure proceedings against Plaintiffs’ home.

After consideration of the plaintiff’s assertions, the court concluded that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Alabama Court Reverses Lower Court’s Decision Granting Summary Judgment to Foreclosing Entity

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The court in deciding Sturdivant v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, 2013 Ala. Civ. App. (Ala. Civ. App., 2013) reversed the lower court’s ruling that granted summary judgment to a foreclosing entity with respect to its complaint in ejectment against a mortgagor under Ala. Code § 6-6-280(b).

The court’s decision was based on the fact that the foreclosing entity presented no evidence that it was either the assignee of the mortgage or the holder of the note at the time it foreclosed, it failed to present a prima facie case that it had the authority to foreclose and, thus, had valid title to or the right to possess the property–one of the elements of its claim in ejectment.

Kroll: Non-Banks A Non-Systemic Risk

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Kroll Bond Rating Agency released a Commentary on Capital Requirements for Non-Bank Mortgage Companies. I may be missing something, but this just seems to be a love letter to the securitization industry. The Commentary opens,

Federal and state regulators are currently considering the imposition of capital requirements and other prudential rules on various classes of non-bank financial institutions, including insurers and mortgage servicers. This report examines some of the issues involving non-bank financial companies with a focus on non-bank loan mortgage originators and/or servicers (“seller/servicers”) in the context of the evolving discussion among regulators and researchers toward developing “appropriate” regulation and supervision like that traditionally applied to insured depository institutions (IDIs).

We believe that regulatory efforts to impose capital requirements on non-bank financial institutions such as mortgage loan seller/servicers need to consider the following factors:

• First, most non-bank financial companies operating in the mortgage space have significantly higher levels of tangible capital and lower risk-weighted assets than do IDIs, especially when considering that much of the asset base of a seller/servicer is collateralized and that the mortgages which they service typically are owned by third parties, in most cases institutional investors. The chief sources of risk for seller/servicers are operational and legal, not credit or market risk.

• Second, the recent call by state and federal regulators for capital requirements for non-bank mortgage companies somewhat ignores the real point of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, namely the vulnerability of IDIs and non-banks which perform bank-like functions to a sudden decline in investor confidence and a related drop in market liquidity.

• Third, since non-banks in the US are already dependent upon the commercial banking system for short-term funding and are effectively prohibited from capitalizing their asset and maturity transformation activities in the short-term debt capital markets (e.g., commercial paper), it is unclear why capital requirements for non-banks are appropriate.

We believe that large non-bank companies and particularly seller/servicers in the mortgage sector do not require formal capital requirements and other types of prudential regulation. In our view, the real issue behind the 2007-2009 financial crisis involved securities fraud and the resulting withdrawal of investor liquidity behind various classes of securities issued by off balance sheet vehicles, not a lack of capital in either IDIs or non-bank firms. (1, footnotes omitted)

First of all, it is not clear to me why Kroll is conflating mortgage originators with seller/servicers in this analysis. I think that Kroll is right that seller/servicers predominantly face operational risk, and whatever credit risk they might face (unless they own mortgages that they service) is quite low. But mortgage originators are a different story completely. If they fund themselves from the short-term commercial paper market they are subject to runs much like an uninsured bank would be. See generally Gary Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand (2009). One would expect that regulators would prescribe different capital levels for different types of non-banks — and could conceivably exempt some seller/servicers completely.

Second, Kroll writes that the financial crisis was caused by “the vulnerability of IDIs and non-banks which perform bank-like functions to a sudden decline in investor confidence and a related drop in market liquidity.” But capital requirements go directly to investor confidence in individual firms as well as in an entire sector.

Third, Kroll’s analysis is heavily dependent on describing the troubles of IDIs. Yes, big banks were at the heart of the problems of the financial crisis, but that does not mean that non-banks should get a free pass on regulation, one that will allow them to grow to be the 800 pound gorillas of the next crisis.

Finally, Kroll writes,

One of the most widely held views espoused by US regulators is that non-bank financial firms caused the subprime crisis. A better way to state the reality is that the non-bank firms were involved in subprime mortgage origination and sales because the largest commercial banks and their partners such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had a monopoly position in the prime mortgage space. Large banks and the GSEs made the whole subprime market work by being willing to buy the senior tranches of subprime deals. (7)

I am not sure how to best characterize that argument, but it is of the ilk of “The Devil made me do it” or “Everyone else was doing it” or “I was just a small fry — much bigger companies than mine were doing it.” This is really not an argument against regulation — if anything it is a call for regulation. If appropriate incentives do not align without regulation, then that is just when the government should step in.

Georgia Court Dismisses TILA and RESPA Claims Brought by Plaintiff

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The court in deciding Mitchell v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2013) granted the motion to dismiss proffered by the defendant.

The first enumerated cause of action in Plaintiffs’ complaint was a claim for fraud. Plaintiffs argued that their original mortgage lender, Accredited, engaged in a practice of filing false prospectus supplements with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Plaintiffs’ complaint also included a claim for wrongful foreclosure.

Next, the plaintiffs asserted that Deutsche Bank and MERS had “unclean hands” as they failed to make certain disclosures required by TILA. Plaintiffs also asserted that the defendants or their predecessors in interest violated RESPA in a number of ways. Plaintiffs’ complaint also included a claim for fraud in the inducement. Moreover, the plaintiffs’ complaint raised a claim for quiet title under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-40 and O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60 et seq. Lastly, the plaintiffs’ complaint raised a claim for fraudulent assignment.

Ultimately the court concluded that the plaintiffs’ complaint failed to state a viable claim for relief. Accordingly, this court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint.

Supreme Court of New York (Kings County) Denies Summary Judgment Motion on Plaintiff’s Standing To Foreclose

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The court in deciding U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v Steinberg, 42 Misc. 3d 1201(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety.

The Morgan Stanley Mortgage Trust commenced this foreclosure action against the Steinbergs. Plaintiff’s unverified complaint contained a single allegation regarding its standing to maintain this foreclosure action, alleged that plaintiff was the holder of the note and mortgage, which was indorsed by blank indorsement and delivered to plaintiff prior to commencement of this action.

In regards to plaintiff’s standing to foreclose, the court found that the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief it sought because it has failed to proffer any evidence of its standing to foreclose under the Steinberg Note at the time of commencement.

Further, the court found that there were triable issues of fact regarding delivery of the Steinberg note from the originating lender and indorser, Hemisphere National Bank, to the Morgan Stanley Mortgage Trust, requiring denial of the instant summary judgment motion in its entirety.

Reiss on Abandoned Homes

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Interest.com quoted me in How to Deal with An Abandoned Home. It reads in part,

5 places to look for help

An abandoned home in an otherwise thriving neighborhood can be an eyesore – or worse.

What happens if the lawn goes uncut for weeks or months? If a pipe bursts inside? If a squatter takes up residence?

This abandoned property can quickly move from nuisance to become a real hazard. And if you’re trying to sell your home, an empty property next door can scare away potential buyers, or lead to lower bids than if your neighbor maintained that property.

You don’t need to fight this battle alone, though.

There are resources available to help turn that property around, whether you just want to cut the lawn, or try to get it out of the hands of an owner who is trying to squeeze every dime out of the property, at the expense of your street. Here’s who to call in what situation.

*     *     *

Call the homeowner’s association

If you’re part of a homeowner’s association, it can help, too.

“HOAs have broad powers to enforce standards for homeowners,” says David Reiss, professor of law at the Brooklyn Law School in New York, where he teaches courses on real estate practice.

How much power they have depends on the HOA’s bylaws, rules and regulations, but HOAs can impose fines for non-compliance with standards laid out in those rules.

“Some might go further and allow and HOA to enter onto a property to conduct maintenance,” Reiss says, which can take care of immediate problems.

He warns, though, that an HOA should consult a lawyer before taking that step, not only to make sure what they’re doing is allowed according to its bylaws, but also because, even if the owner is delinquent on maintenance, they could still accuse the HOA of trespassing or stealing for entering the property.

Since Bank was the Note-Holder it was a Person Entitled to Enforce the Note Pursuant to R.C. 1303.31(A)(1)

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The court in deciding Bank of Am., N.A. v. Pasqualone, 2013-Ohio-5795 (Ohio Ct. App., Franklin County, 2013) affirmed the decision of the lower court.

The court found that the promissory note was a negotiable instrument subject to relevant provisions of R.C. Chapter 1303 because it contained a promise to pay the lender the amount of $100,000, plus interest, and did not require any other undertakings that would render the note nonnegotiable.

Further, the court found that since the bank was the holder of the note it was a person entitled to enforce the note pursuant to R.C. 1303.31(A)(1). Based on the authorization, the note became payable to the bank as an identified person and, because the bank was the identified person in possession of the note, it was the holder of the note.

Lastly, as the property owner’s defenses to the mortgage foreclosure did not fit the criteria of a denial, defense, or claim in recoupment under R.C. 1303.36 or R.C. 1303.35, the bank’s right to payment and to enforce the obligation was not subject to the owner’s alleged meritorious defenses.