Bullying the Fed

Fed Chair Jerome Powell

Central Banking quoted me in Economists Denounce Trump’s ‘Bullying’ of Fed Chair (sign up required). It opens,

Economists have attacked what they regard as US president Donald Trump’s bullying of Federal Reserve chair Jerome Powell, describing it as dangerous for the central bank’s continued independence.

On June 30, Trump posted on his social media platform a copy of a handwritten letter to Powell showing interest rates around the world. In the letter, Trump had written: “Jerome, you are as usual, too late. You have cost the USA a fortune, and continue to do so. You should lower the rate by a lot. Hundreds of billions of dollars being lost. No inflation.”

Along with the note, Trump posted that “Jerome ‘Too Late’ Powell, and his entire Board, should be ashamed of themselves for allowing this to happen to the United States. They have one of the easiest, yet most prestigious, jobs in America, and they have FAILED — And continue to do so”.

He added: “If they were doing their job properly, our Country would be saving Trillions of Dollars in Interest Cost. The Board just sits there and watches, so they are equally to blame. We should be paying 1% Interest, or better!”

On July 1, Powell said the Fed would probably have lowered rates already had it not been for the tariffs and trade policies introduced by the Trump administration.

Ralf Fendel, professor of economics at WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management in Germany, says Trump’s note bears all the hallmarks of political interference.

“Handwritten personal correspondence is traditionally reserved for heartfelt gratitude or strategic diplomacy, but not for exerting pressure on an independent central bank,” he tells Central Banking. “In resisting such pressure, Mr Powell is upholding the Fed’s institutional credibility and responding appropriately to a macroeconomic environment clouded by trade policy uncertainty and various economic risks.”

Fendel adds that Fed decisions must be guided by economic data and not the demands of the White House.

William English – professor of economics at Yale University, and a former director of the Fed’s monetary affairs division and secretary to the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) – says that having a president who is so publicly critical makes the Fed’s job more complicated. “But they have their mandate and will do their best to achieve that,” he says. “We’ll see how it goes!”

Francesco Bianchi, professor of economics and department chair at Johns Hopkins University, says the most recent remarks by Trump represent a turn for the worse.

“Such a confrontational stance cannot be good for central bank independence,” he says. “Powell probably feels that he needs to push back against the pressure and that he has a bit more freedom given that his second term is coming to an end.”

Fed historian Robert Hetzel adds that Trump appears to want to return to a time when the central bank was subservient to the US Treasury.

David Reiss, professor of law at Cornell University, says there is an extensive history of presidents “jawboning” the Fed chair to lower rates. However, he says central banks work better when “insulated from the political exigencies of political leaders”.

“Paradoxically, bullying the central bank can lead to interest rates increasing, as markets demand a higher risk premium as trust in the central bank’s decision-making decreases,” he says. He also concurs with Powell’s assessment that tariffs are inflationary through many channels.

Investing in Mortgage-Backed Securities

photo by https://401kcalculator.org

US News & World Report quoted me in Why Investors Own Private Mortgage-Backed Securities. It opens,

Private-label, or non-agency backed mortgage securities, got a black eye a few years ago when they were blamed for bringing on the financial crisis. But they still exist and can be found in many fixed-income mutual funds and real estate investment trusts.

So who should own them – and who should stay away?

Many experts say they’re safer now and are worthy of a small part of the ordinary investor’s portfolio. Some funds holding non-agency securities yield upward of 10 percent.

“The current landscape is favorable for non-agency securities,” says Jason Callan, head of structured products at Columbia Threadneedle Investments in Minneapolis, pointing to factors that have reduced risks.

“The amount of delinquent borrowers is now at a post-crisis low, U.S. consumers continue to perform quite well from a credit perspective, and risk premiums are very attractive relative to the fundamental outlook for housing and the economy,” he says. “Home prices have appreciated nationwide by 5 to 6 percent over the last three years.”

Mortgage-backed securities are like bonds that give their owners rights to share in interest and principal received from homeowners’ mortgage payments.

The most common are agency-backed securities like Ginnie Maes guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration, or securities from government-authorized companies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

The agency securities carry an implicit or explicit guarantee that the promised principal and interest income will be paid even if homeowners default on their loans. Ginnie Mae obligations, for instance, can be made up with federal tax revenues if necessary. Agency securities are considered safe holdings with better yields than alternatives like U.S. Treasurys.

The non-agency securities are issued by financial firms and carry no such guarantee. Trillions of dollars worth were issued in the build up to the financial crisis. Many contained mortgages granted to high-risk homeowners who had no income, poor credit or no home equity. Because risky borrowers are charged higher mortgage rates, private-label mortgage securities appealed to investors seeking higher yields than they could get from other holdings. When housing prices collapsed, a tidal wave of borrower defaults torpedoed the private-label securities, triggering the financial crisis.

Not many private-label securities have been issued in the years since, and they accounted for just 4 percent of mortgage securities issued in 2015, according to Freddie Mac. But those that are created are considered safer than the old ones because today’s borrowers must meet stiffer standards. Also, many of the non-agency securities created a decade or more ago continue to be traded and are viewed as safer because market conditions like home prices have improved.

Investors can buy these securities through bond brokers, but the most common way to participate in this market is with mutual funds or with REITs that own mortgages rather than actual real estate.

Though safer than before, non-agency securities are still risky because, unlike agency-backed securities, they can incur losses if homeowners stop making their payments. This credit risk comes atop the “prepayment” and “interest rate” risks found in agency-backed mortgage securities. Prepayment risk is when interest earnings stop because homeowners have refinanced. Interest rate risk means a security loses value because newer ones offer higher yields, making the older, stingier ones less attractive to investors.

“With non-agencies, you own the credit risk of the underlying mortgages,” Callan says, “whereas with agencies the (payments) are government guaranteed.”

Another risk of non-agency securities: different ones created from the same pool of loans are not necessarily equal. Typically, the pool is sliced into “tranches” like a loaf of bread, with each slice carrying different features. The safest have first dibs on interest and principal earnings, or are the last in the pool to default if payments dry up. In exchange for safety, these pay the least. At the other extreme are tranches that pay the most but are the first to lose out when income stops flowing.

Still, despite the risks, many experts say non-agency securities are safer than they used to be.

“Since the financial crisis, issuers have been much more careful in choosing the collateral that goes into a non-agency MBS, sticking to plain vanilla mortgage products and borrowers with good credit profiles,” says David Reiss, a Brooklyn Law School professor who studies the mortgage market.

“It seems like the Wild West days of the mortgage market in the early 2000s won’t be returning for quite some time because issuers and investors are gun shy after the Subprime Crisis,” Reiss says. “The regulations implemented by Dodd-Frank, such as the qualified residential mortgage rule, also tamp down on excesses in the mortgage markets.”