- House Prices and Job Losses, Gabor Pinter, Bank of England Working Paper No. 569.
- The Dynamics of Adjustable-Rate Subprime Mortgage Default: A Structural Estimation, Hanming Fang, You Suk Kim & Wenli Li, PIER Working Paper No. 041.
- High and Low Activity Spells in Housing Markets, Eric Smith, CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5601.
- House Prices, Local Demand, and Retail Prices, Johannes Stroebel & Joseph Vavra, CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5607.
- Anticipation, Distance, Elevation: Multi-Dimensional Gradients in Urban Spatial Modeling, Victor Yifan Ye & Charles Becker, Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper No. 202.
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- The Fair Market Value of Public Resources, Bruce R. Huber, California Law Review, Vol. 103, No. 6, 2015.
The Inspector General of the Federal Housing Finance Agency released an audit, FHFA’s Representation and Warranty Framework. Reps and warranties are a risk-shifting device that sophisticated commercial parties use in transactions. If a party makes a representation or warranty that turns out to be false, they other party may have some remedy — maybe the ability to return something or to get some kind of payment to make up for the failure to live up to the promise.
For instance, a lender may sell a bunch of mortgages to a securitizer and represent that all of the borrowers have FICO (credit) scores of 620 or higher. If it turns out that some of the borrowers had scores of less than 620, the securitizer may be able to make the lender buy back those mortgages pursuant to a rep and warranty clause. The IG undertook this audit because of recent changes to the reps and warranties framework for Fannie and Freddie. Before these changes were implemented,
the Enterprises’ risk management model primarily relied on reviewing loans for underwriting deficiencies after they defaulted as the representations and warranties were effective for the life of the loans. In contrast, the new framework transfers responsibility to the Enterprises to review loans upfront for eligible representation and warranty deficiencies that may trigger repurchase requests. If the Enterprises fail to do so within the applicable period, their ability to pursue a repurchase request expires if it is based upon a representation and warranty that qualifies for repurchase relief. (2)
The IG’s findings are disturbing. It “found that FHFA mandated a new framework despite significant unresolved operational risks to the Enterprises.” (3) It also found that
FHFA mandated a 36-month sunset period for representation and warranty relief without validating the Enterprises’ analysis or performing sufficient additional analysis to determine whether financial risks were appropriately balanced between the Enterprises and sellers. Freddie Mac, in contrast to Fannie Mae which provided analysis limited to a 36-month period, provided FHFA with the results of an internal analysis of loans that indicated loans with a 48-month clean payment history were significantly less likely to exhibit repurchaseable defects than loans with a 36-month clean payment history. Thus, losses to the Enterprise could be less with a longer sunset period. Therefore, FHFA cannot support that the sunset period selected does not unduly benefit sellers at the Enterprises’ expense. (3)
This is all very technical stuff, obviously. But it is of great significance. Basically, the IG is warning that the FHFA has not properly evaluated the credit risk posed by changes to the agreements that Fannie and Freddie enter into with the lenders who convey mortgages to them. It also implies that this new framework “unduly” benefits the lenders.
The FHFA’s response is unsettling — it effectively rejects the IG’s concern without providing a reasoned basis for doing so. Its express rationale for doing so is to avoid “adverse market effects” and because addressing the IG’s concern “may not align with the FHFA objective of increased lending to consumes . . ..” (32)
Whenever federal regulators place increased lending as a priority over safety and soundness, warning bells should start ringing. Crises at Fannie and Freddie (and the FHA, for that matter) begin with this kind of thinking. Increased lending may be important today, but it should not be done at the expense of safety and soundness tomorrow. We are too close to our last housing finance crisis to forget that lesson.