Tag Archives: wrongful foreclosure

Court Decides that Lower Court Was Correct in Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Bank of America and ReconTrust on FDCPA Claims

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The court in deciding Brown v. Bank of Am., N.A. (In re Brown), 2013 Bankr. (B.A.P. 9th Cir., 2013) affirmed the lower court’s holding.

The plaintiff in this case alleged alleged that BAC and ReconTrust violated the CPA by promulgating, recording, and relying on documents they should have known were false, in particular: the MERS’ assignment, the successor trustee appointment, and the notice of default. Plaintiffs also alleged that ReconTrust’s issuance and use of the notice of default violated the FDCPA and that ReconTrust’s attempts to dispossess the debtor of her property constituted malicious prosecution.

As to the claim for wrongful foreclosure, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the Washington Deed of Trust Act when they designated MERS as a beneficiary in the trust deed and MERS subsequently executed the MERS Assignment.

The plaintiffs contended that BAC’s authority to execute the successor trustee appointment and ReconTrust’s authority to execute the Notice of Default derived solely from the invalid MERS Assignment, invalidating both documents. They alleged that these transactions constituted a deception and, therefore, invalid transactions under the Trust Deed Act.

ReconTrust, Bank of America, N.A., as successor by merger to BAC, and MERS jointly brought a motion to dismiss the SAC pursuant to Civil Rule 12(b)(6). The defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead the identified claims and, in addition, that the plaintiffs should be collaterally estopped from contending that BofA could not initiate foreclosure proceedings, based on the order entered by the bankruptcy court on the uncontested relief from stay motion.

Georgia Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s RESPA, TILA and HOEPA Claims

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The court in deciding Mitchell v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Ga., 2013) found no plain error in the lower court’s conclusion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims.

Plaintiffs Reginald and Jamela Mitchell filed a complaint against Deutsche Bank and MERS, the complaint alleged federal violations of the Truth-in-Lending Act (“TILA”), the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act (“RESPA”), and the Homeownership Equity Protection Act (“HOEPA”).

The Complaint also asserted the following state law claims: (1) fraud; (2) wrongful foreclosure; (3) quiet title; (4) slander of title; (5) infliction of emotional distress and (6) unfair business practices.

The crux of the plaintiffs’ claims under the federal statutes was that the defendants failed to provide them with the required disclosures, thereby allowing plaintiffs to rescind their mortgage transaction and seek damages. The lower court concluded that the Plaintiffs’ claims arising under TILA, HOEPA and RESPA were barred by the statute of limitations. The lower court recommended that the plaintiffs’ complaint be dismissed as the plaintiffs failed to state any federal or state law claim upon which relief could be granted. The plaintiff then appealed.

Upon review of the lower court’s decision, this court found no plain error in the lower court’s findings and recommendation that the defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims be granted.

Georgia Court Dismisses TILA and RESPA Claims Brought by Plaintiff

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The court in deciding Mitchell v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2013) granted the motion to dismiss proffered by the defendant.

The first enumerated cause of action in Plaintiffs’ complaint was a claim for fraud. Plaintiffs argued that their original mortgage lender, Accredited, engaged in a practice of filing false prospectus supplements with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Plaintiffs’ complaint also included a claim for wrongful foreclosure.

Next, the plaintiffs asserted that Deutsche Bank and MERS had “unclean hands” as they failed to make certain disclosures required by TILA. Plaintiffs also asserted that the defendants or their predecessors in interest violated RESPA in a number of ways. Plaintiffs’ complaint also included a claim for fraud in the inducement. Moreover, the plaintiffs’ complaint raised a claim for quiet title under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-40 and O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60 et seq. Lastly, the plaintiffs’ complaint raised a claim for fraudulent assignment.

Ultimately the court concluded that the plaintiffs’ complaint failed to state a viable claim for relief. Accordingly, this court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint.

California Court Holds that the Securitization of Mortgage Loan did not Nullify Rights Granted Under Deed, Including the Right to Foreclose

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The court in deciding Rivac v. Ndex West LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2013) granted the motion to dismiss tendered by the defendant.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint that alleged eight causes of action including; (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of implied agreement, (3) slander of title, (4) wrongful foreclosure, (5) violation of § 17200, (6) violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq. (TILA) (7) violation of 12 U.S.C. § 2605 (RESPA), and (8) violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. (FDCPA).

After considering the plaintiff’s contentions, the court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court then held that the securitization of borrowers’ mortgage loan did not nullify any rights granted under a deed of trust, including the right to foreclose against the borrowers’ real property upon the borrowers’ default.

Further, the absence of the original promissory note in the nonjudicial foreclosure did not render the foreclosure invalid. Moreover, the court held that mere allegations that documents related to the deed of trust were robo-signed by persons who had no authority to execute the documents had no effect on the validity of the foreclosure process.

Lastly, the court held that there was no breach of the deed of trust since the beneficiary was expressly authorized to sell the underlying note, and the borrowers themselves did not perform under the deed of trust.

Texas Court Dismisses Claims Centered Around FDCPA and TDCPA Violations

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The court in deciding Warren v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Tex., 2013) granted defendant’s motion to dismiss all of the claims brought by the plaintiff.

Plaintiff alleged that MERS could not assign the note or deed of trust because it was not a party to, and never had a beneficial interest in, the note. Plaintiff further alleged that the note was “securitized”, thus defendant was not the owner of the note or deed of trust and had no right to foreclose on the Property. Plaintiff asserted a claim to quiet title and requested declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to restrain defendant from foreclosing and evicting him from the Property.

Although the complaint did not formally list any substantive claims, plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief contained allegations that may liberally construed as claims for wrongful foreclosure and violations of the Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(B), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), and the Texas Debt Collection Practices Act (TDCPA).

Plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to notify him of the pending foreclosure sale, since the foreclosure notice was “returned as undeliverable” by the U.S. Postal Service (USPS). Before filing suit, he sent the defendant a request “for a verification of the debt” pursuant to the federal FDCPA and the TDCPA. Plaintiff believed that pursuant to the FDCPA, the foreclosure could not have been conducted until 30 days had passed after the date he sent his request.

Plaintiff further claimed that the defendant could not foreclose because there were defects in the original loan financing and the original foreclosure order and because defendant failed to “physically post” a copy of the foreclosure sale notice at “the courthouse” where the sale was to take place.

This court considered the plaintiff’s contentions and eventually found them without merit.

Defendants Could Not Show They Were not Debt Collectors as Defined by 15 U.S.C.S. § 1692a(6)(F)

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The court in deciding Dias v. Fannie Mae, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181584 (D. Haw., 2013) rejected all but one of the plaintiff’s claims.

The court found that the plaintiff’s Haw. Rev. Stat. § 667-5 defective assignment claims against defendants failed because the mortgage gave the requisite authority.

The court found that a claim that no sale could be held pending a Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) modification failed because the mortgagor lacked standing. The false mortgage assignment claim failed because nothing showed a publicly recorded assignment was false. Likewise, the breach of contract claim for violating HAMP guidelines failed because the mortgagor had no such claim, no HAMP trial payment plan supported it, and she was not an intended beneficiary of any HAMP agreement between defendants and the U.S. Treasury.

However, the plaintiff’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1692, claims survived because a defaulted debt was assigned, so defendants could not show they were not debt collectors, under 15 U.S.C.S. § 1692a(6)(F).

Open Season on Homeowners

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A case coming out of California, Peng v. Chase Home Finance LLC et al., No. B245436 (California Courts of Appeal Second App. Dist., Div. 8, April 8th, 2014, has attracted a lot of attention in the blogosphere. This is particularly notable because this case is not to be published in the official reports and thus has no precedential value. Judge Rubin’s dissent has attracted much of the attention. It opens,

The promissory note signed by appellants Jeffry and Grace Peng obligated them to repay their home loan. In August 2007, Freddie Mac acquired the promissory note from Chase. Based on Freddie Mac owning the note, appellants seek to amend their complaint to allege Chase did not have authority to enforce the promissory note or to foreclose on their home, but the majority rejects appellants’ proposed amendment. Relying on case law rebuffing a homeowner’s challenge to a creditor-beneficiary’s authority to foreclose, the majority notes that courts have traditionally reasoned that the homeowner’s challenge is futile because, even if successful, the homeowner “merely substitute[s] one creditor for another, without changing [the homeowner’s] obligations under the note.” (Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 271.) The only party prejudiced by an illegitimate creditor-beneficiary’s enforcement of the homeowner’s debt, courts have reasoned, is the bona fide creditor-beneficiary, not the homeowner.

Such reasoning troubles me. I wonder whether the law would apply the same reasoning if we were dealing with debtors other than homeowners. I wonder how most of us would react if, for example, a third-party purporting to act for one’s credit card company knocked on one’s door, demanding we pay our credit card’s monthly statement to the third party. Could we insist that the third party prove it owned our credit card debt? By the reasoning of Fontenot and similar cases, we could not because, after all, we owe the debt to someone, and the only truly aggrieved party if we paid the wrong party would, according to those cases, be our credit card company. I doubt anyone would stand for such a thing. (Dissent, 1)

The dissent’s concern is justified. As Professor Whitman has recently noted on the Dirt Listserv and elsewhere, it is a “bizarre notion that anyone can foreclose a mortgage without showing that they have the right to enforce the note.” He also notes that the majority (and even the dissent) in Peng confuse ownership of the note with the right to enforce it. Until courts fully understand how the UCC governs the enforcement of notes, one should worry that some state court judges might declare an open season on homeowners as the majority does here in Peng.