Author Archives: David Reiss

DATA! On US Housing Market Conditions

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HUD has released a new online database on U.S. Housing Market Conditions.  It can be searched by location and by report type. The website also includes some analysis of national, regional, state, metropolitan and local markets. The website includes some important reports, including National Housing Market Summaries, HUD Policy Development and Research Briefings and the Administration’s National Housing Scorecards.

I found the National Housing Market Summary particularly interesting, with figures from the second quarter of 2013 on

Mortgage Interest Rates (%)
Mortgage Delinquency Rates (%)
FHA Market Share
FHA Mortgage Insurance (thousands)
Private and VA Mortgage Insurance (thousands)
Residential Fixed Investment (SA real annual growth rate, %)
Homeownership Rates (%)
Vacancy Rates (%)
Housing Stock (thousands)
Households (thousands)

Post-Bubble Foreclosure-Prevention and -Mitigation Options in Your Town?

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Bob Hockett has posted Post-Bubble Foreclosure-Prevention and -Mitigation Options in Seattle. I recommend it to those interested in issues beyond Seattle’s borders because it actually covers foreclosure-prevention and mitigation options across the country, although it looks at them with a Seattle focus.

He argues that

There is a potentially bewildering array of means available to at least some underwater homeowners, and these programs are also noteworthy for failing to solve the fundamental problems affecting these mortgages. There are three vitiating weakness share by nearly all of these means . . ..

The first weakness among currently available options is that they do not concentrate upon mortgage principal-reduction, meaning that they do nothing about the underwater status of underwater mortgage loans – which is the principal predictor of default and foreclosure – at all. Instead they rely upon temporary forbearance, term-extension, or interest rate reduction. . . .

The second weakness of the currently available options is that they are voluntary from the creditor’s point of view. That is problematic not because creditors lack in appreciation of their own enlightened self-interest or in desire to do the right thing, but because where there are structural or contractual barriers to principal reduction, as we shall see there are here in abundance, even creditor-benefiting such changes cannot occur on an adequate scale. Creditors are very often unable to do what benefits themselves and homeowners alike, meaning that voluntary programs can be useless.

Finally, the third weakness that the options discussed here suffer is that they do not extend to underwater PLS loans, which, as seen above, constitute the great bulk of troubled mortgage loans; they are in general available only to GSE and bank portfolio loans . . .. (11)

I found the review of “publicly encouraged debt relief” programs useful. (14) They include

  1. HAMP (the federal Home Affordable Modification Program)
  2. HARP (the federal Home Affordable Refinance Program)
  3. Miscellaneous Specialized HAMP Analogues
  4. FHA Short Refinance Program
  5. HAFA(federal Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternative)
  6. “Hardest Hit” Fund & Program (Treasury)
  7. HOPE NOW Alliance
  8. The Attorney Generals’ Settlement

Hockett also proposes some innovative approaches that he suggests that Seattle should consider including the use of eminent domain as well as a land bank. Worth the read.

 

A Welling of Judicial Discontent

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Reuters ran a story that provides the next chapter to my post, Federal Judge Declares War on Wells Fargo.  The Reuters story is Massachusetts Judge Challenges Wells Fargo, Sparks Legal Fight (behind a paywall) and it reads in part:

A legal battle is heating up over an unusual challenge by a Massachusetts federal judge to banking giant Wells Fargo to waive what the judge called a technical defense in a mortgage lawsuit and to argue its case at trial.

Calling the judge’s order “unauthorized and unprecedented,” Wells Fargo has asked a federal appeals court to overturn it before it sparks “copycat” demands across the country.

It seems to me that Wells Fargo is right to be concerned about “copycat” demands across the country.  My sense from reading many of the upstream and downstream cases that I blog about is that many judges have internalized the populist critique of financial institutions that has crystallized during the financial crisis. This came about, no doubt, in large part because of the relentless headlines about actionable and non-actionable misconduct by these institutions.

That being said, judges must apply the law impartially, so the First Circuit’s review of this case, Henning v. Wachovia Mortgage, F.S.B., n/k/a Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 11-11428 (Sept. 17, 2013), will be of particular interest. The transcript of yesterday’s District Court hearing on a motion to stay the Henning case during the pendency of the appeal can be found here. Judge Young makes clear that he is not budging on the requirement that Wells Fargo produce a corporate resolution, although that order is stayed until the First Circuit decides the appeal.

Rating Agency 1st Amendment Defense Weakened, Again

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Federal District Judge O’Toole (D. Mass.) issued an Opinion and Order in Federal Home Loan Bank of Boston v. Ally Financial Inc. et al., No. 11-10952 (Sept. 30, 2013)  relating to the potential liability of S&P and Moody’s (the Rating Agency Defendants) for their ratings. The case “arises from the purchase of private label mortgage-backed securities” (PLMBS) by the plaintiff, FHLB Boston. (1)  FHLB Boston alleges that the rating agency defendants knew that their ratings “were inaccurate and based on flawed models, and that their conduct gives rise to” a claim for fraud as well as other causes of action. (1) The Rating Agency Defendants sought to have the claims dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Court rejected this as to the fraud claim:

The Rating Agency Defendants’ argument that their ratings are non-actionable opinions is unconvincing. As discussed in Abu Dhabi I, “[a]n opinion may still be actionable if the speaker does not genuinely and reasonably believe it or if it is without basis in fact.” 651 F. Supp. 2d at 176 (internal citations omitted). Here the Bank has pled with sufficient particularity that the Rating Agency Defendants issued ratings that they did not genuinely or reasonably believe. For example, the Amended Complaint alleges that the Rating Agency Defendants diluted their own standards and carried out their ratings procedures in an intentionally lax manner as to PLMBS while maintaining higher standards in other contexts. The Bank has also sufficiently pled scienter, alleging that the Rating Agency Defendants competed for business by artificially inflating ratings, as they were only paid if they provided high ratings. (4)

Rating agencies were able to avoid liability for decades, claiming that their ratings were like min-editorials that were protected by the First Amendment. A number of recent cases reject that defense in a variety of contexts (See here, here and here for instance). It is unclear what will happen when these cases are appealed, but for now it appears that a number of courts have identified situations where an opinion can be more than an opinion — it can amount to actionable fraud.

Lifting a Shadow from Qualified Residential Mortgages

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The self-named Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee of the American Enterprise Institute has issued a statement on The New Qualified Residential Mortgage Rule Proposal.  The Shadow Committee argues that agencies promulgating the newest version of the QRM rule

completely abandoned the Act’s requirement for a separate high-quality QRM. Instead, they proposed a QRM that was essentially the equivalent of the QM. This not only violated the congressional intent and nullified the retainage, but it pushed the US mortgage system back toward the very policies that fed the housing bubble, the mortgage meltdown and the financial crisis. It responds to those want the mortgage finance system to make mortgage credit widely available, but it ignores the need for a stable system that will avoid a future crisis. (2)

This is not fully accurate. The QRM proposal does not violate congressional intent because Congress merely stated that the QRM be “no broader” than the QM. (Dodd-Frank Act Section 941) There is also a fair amount of fear-mongering here because the Shadow Committee does not propose how we can responsibly balance credit availability with systemic stability.

Nonetheless, the Shadow Committee is right to note that the rules governing mortgages must balance a number of competing goals.
When the proposed rule was released, I had written that it should incorporate a “benefit ratio” which

compares “the percent reduction in the number of defaults to the percent reduction in the number of borrowers who would have access to QRM mortgages.” (20) A metric of this sort would go a long way to ensuring that there is transparency for homeowners as to the likelihood that they can not only get a mortgage but also pay it off and keep their homes.

A benefit ratio would not only help ensure that homeowners received sustainable mortgages, but it would also address the systemic concerns raised by the Shadow Committee. This is because the benefit ratio would protect lenders from their own worse instincts as they lower their underwriting standards in pursuit of increased market share in a booming market.

Financial Education: Miles to Go Before We Can Sleep Easily

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The CFPB has posted Financial Empowerment Training for Social Service Programs: A Scan of Community-Based Initiatives. The report opens well, with Gail Hillebrand, the Associate Director for Consumer Education and Engagement, noting that

Consumers need four things to be financially empowered. First, consumers need consistent access and the ability to choose among high-quality financial services. Second, consumers need sufficient information about the costs, the benefits, and the risks, of choices in the marketplace. Third, consumers need a set of financial habits and skills that constitute financial capability to help them to make the financial decisions that benefit themselves and their families. Finally, consumers need to know that they can get a better shot at achieving their own life goals if they affirmatively seek information, make choices, and take steps to control their financial lives. (1)

No argument there.

But the “scan” in this document makes me fear for a strong connection between what consumers need, as outlined above, and what existing programs are doing.  Finding 9 of the report state that “Most training initiatives targeted at case managers recommended some form of assessment of the effectiveness of the initiatives, but few tracked whether case managers were using this information with clients.” (6-7)

This was the only finding that really talked about evaluating the success of financial education/empowerment initiatives. And it indicates that programs don’t really try to measure their implementation, let alone their effectiveness.  I have earlier critiqued (and here) the CFPB’s financial education agenda and this most recent report only strengthens my belief that the CFPB should do more fundamental research on what actually helps consumers make good financial decisions before it begins to fund financial education initiatives.

Borden & Reiss on REMIC Failure, in a Big Way

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Brad and I posted REMIC Tax Enforcement as Financial-Market Regulator to SSRN (as well as to BePress). The article is forthcoming in the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Law and Business and it provides our extended analysis of how the organizers of purported Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (REMICs) failed to abide by the requirements necessary to obtain the favorable REMIC tax status. We had addressed this topic in shorter articles here, here, and here, but this is our most comprehensive take on the subject. We look forward to hearing reactions to it.

The abstract reads:

Lawmakers, prosecutors, homeowners, policymakers, investors, news media, scholars and other commentators have examined, litigated, and reported on numerous aspects of the 2008 Financial Crisis and the role that residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) played in that crisis. Big banks create RMBS by pooling mortgage notes into trusts and selling interests in those trusts as RMBS. Absent from prior work related to RMBS securitization is the tax treatment of RMBS mortgage-note pools and the critical role tax enforcement should play in ensuring the integrity of mortgage-note securitization.

This Article is the first to examine federal tax aspects of RMBS mortgage-note pools formed in the years leading up to the Financial Crisis. Tax law provides favorable tax treatment to real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs), a type of RMBS pool. To qualify for the favorable REMIC tax treatment, an RMBS pool must meet several requirements relating to the ownership and quality of mortgage notes. The practices of loan originators and RMBS organizers in the years leading up to the Financial Crisis jeopardize the tax classification of a significant portion of the RMBS pools. Nonetheless, the IRS appears to believe that there is no legal or policy basis for challenging REMIC classification of even the worst RMBS pools. This Article takes issue with the IRS’s inaction and presents both the legal and policy grounds for enforcing tax law by challenging the REMIC classification of at least the worst types of RMBS pools. The Article urges the IRS to take action, recognizing that its failure to police these arrangements prior to the Financial Crisis is partly to blame for the economic meltdown in 2008. The IRS’s continued failure to police RMBS arrangements provides latitude to industry participants, which facilitates future economic catastrophes. Even without the IRS taking action, private parties can rely upon the blueprint set forth in the Article to bring qui tam or whistleblower claims to accomplish the purposes of the REMIC rules and obtain the beneficial results that would occur if the IRS enforced the REMIC rules.