Tag Archives: default

High and Low Property Taxes

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photo by JRPG

Newsmax quoted me in Lowest Property Tax Is Hawaii and the Highest Is New Jersey. It reads, in part,

The average American household spends $2,089 on real estate property taxes each year and residents of the 27 states with vehicle property taxes shell out another $423, according to the National Tax Lien Association.

However, some states cost more than others when it comes to the American Dream and its staples of a house and car.

“Different parts of the country have different levels of taxation and amenities paid for by the tax receipts,” said David Reiss, professor of law and research director with the Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship at Brooklyn Law School.

The state with the lowest real estate property taxes is Hawaii where residents pay only $482 per household, which is the least average amount typically shelled out by a taxpayer, according to a 2016 WalletHub study, ranking states with the highest and lowest property taxes.

“High property taxes tend to be correlated with high income and high income tends to be correlated with Blue States, so it is not surprising that high property taxes are correlated with Blue States,” Reiss said.

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“Local property taxes can help pay for all sorts of municipal services, including schools, road maintenance and emergency services,” Reiss said.

Alabama, Louisiana and Delaware, D.C. and South Carolina follow Hawaii among the states with the lowest property taxes.

High tax localities, such as Westchester County in New York, could have annual taxes that easily are in the tens of thousands of dollars a year range but such areas also have some of the best schools in the nation.

The WalletHub report further found that in Blue states, real estate property taxes are 39% higher at $2,250 a year than homeowners in Red states who pay $1,613.

The yearly burden weighs far more heavily on taxpayers in some states than in others based on region.

For example, communities in the Northeast typically have higher property taxes than many of those in the rest of the country.

“Monthly mortgage payments are usually much higher than monthly real property tax payments, measuring in the high hundreds in low-cost metros like Pittsburgh to the thousands in a high-cost metro like San Francisco so it is hard to put default rates squarely on the shoulders of real property taxes,” said Reiss.

Why Doctors Buy Bigger Homes Than Lawyers

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photo by Ben Jacobson

Realtor.com quoted me in Why Doctors Buy Bigger Homes Than Lawyers (and What It Means to You). It reads, in part,

Take that, Alan Dershowitz: Although both doctors and lawyers can typically afford better-than-decent-sized homes, a new working paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research found that in states with a certain legal provision, physicians’ houses are bigger. Often much bigger.

So what’s the deal? It seems to come down to two factors: First, the skyrocketing costs of financially devastating medical malpractice suits; second, a once-obscure provision called “homestead exception” which can protect the assets of doctors in some states from being wiped out by those suits when they invest their cash in their homes.

“We have been interested in understanding how does that pervasive aspect of a physician’s career influence the decisions they make … whether it means they invest more in houses to protect themselves against liability,” Anupam Jena, an associate professor of health care policy at Harvard Medical School and a co-author of the paper, tells the Washington Post.

Here’s how homestead exception works: If creditors are hounding you for unsecured debts—as opposed to secure ones, like your mortgage—they can’t take your home as collateral, as long as you declare bankruptcy. In fact, they can’t even place a lien on the property to collect when you sell. These exemptions vary by state: Some, such as New Jersey, have no such safeguard; in California, individuals’ homes are protected up to $75,000 (which generally won’t get you past the front porch).

Yet a handful of states—Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas, as well as the District of Columbia—have unlimited homestead exemption. Doctors in those states bought homes that were 13% more expensive than the homes of doctors elsewhere. The homes of medical doctors (and dentists, who are essentially in the same medical malpractice boat) were markedly more expensive than the homes of professionals making similar salaries—even lawyers, who know a thing or two about malpractice suits. The authors drew from U.S. Census Bureau data on 3 million households about profession, household income, and home value.

So why should you care? Because homestead exemptions apply to you, too—even if the closest you come to the medical profession is annual checkups and late night reruns of “ER.”

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But don’t get the wrong idea: The homestead exemption isn’t a bulletproof way to ward off foreclosure. Remember, it applies only to unsecured debt such as credit cards—not secured debt like your mortgage.

“If you borrow money for a home, the homestead exemption typically does not apply,” says David Reiss, research director at the Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship at Brooklyn Law School. In other words, if you don’t pay your mortgage and default on your loan, your lender can foreclose and seize your home.

And we’re not saying you should run from your creditors, because eventually they’ll catch up to you. But if you are in financial straits and scared sick of losing your house, check your local homestead exemption laws first—you might be safer than you think.

Foreclosure Body Count

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respres

Case Western’s Matt Rossman has posted Counting Casualties in Communities Hit Hardest by the Foreclosure Crisis (forthcoming in the Utah Law Review) to SSRN. The abstract reads,

Recent statistics suggest that the U.S. housing market has largely recovered from the Foreclosure Crisis. A closer look reveals that the country is composed not of one market, but of thousands of smaller, local housing markets that have experienced dramatically uneven levels of recovery. Repeated waves of home mortgage foreclosures inundated certain communities (the “Hardest Hit Communities”), causing their housing markets to break rather than bend and resulting in what amounts to a permanent transition to a lower value plateau. Homeowners in these predominantly low and middle income and/or minority communities who endured the Foreclosure Crisis lost significant equity in what is typically their principal asset. Public sector responses have largely ignored this collateral damage.

As the ten-year mark since the onset of the Foreclosure Crisis approaches, this Article argues that homeowners in the Hardest Hit Communities should be able to deduct the damage to their home values caused by the Crisis from their federal taxable income. This means overcoming the tax code’s usual normative assumption that a decline in a home’s value represents consumed wealth and, thus, is fully taxable. To do so, this Article likens the rapid, unusual and enduring plunge in home values experienced by homeowners in the Hardest Hit Communities to casualty losses – i.e. damages to personal property caused by a sudden force like a storm or a hurricane – which are deductible. The IRS and most courts have insisted this deduction is limited to physical damage. This Article carefully dissects the law and principles underlying the deduction to reveal that the physical damage requirement is overbroad and inequitable. When viewed in the larger context of other recent tax code interventions that allow those who have experienced personal financial harm due to a crisis to reduce their income tax base accordingly, home value damage in the Hardest Hit Communities actually fits comfortably within the concept of a casualty loss.

Notwithstanding its normative and equitable fit, the casualty loss deduction poses several administrative challenges in its application to the Foreclosure Crisis. This Article addresses each challenge in turn, explaining the extent to which the Treasury Department and the IRS, through administrative action and/or a careful application of case law precedent, can resolve it. The Article also identifies and grapples with the distributional reality that the casualty loss deduction, in its current form, provides a small or no return on lost home equity for a sizable number of low and middle income homeowners, which would make it a problematic method of recovery for homeowners in the Hardest Hit Communities. To make the deduction a better and more equitable fit under the circumstances, this Article identifies two, larger-scale modifications the federal government could adopt: (i) changing the method by which a casualty loss is valued for damage caused by the Foreclosure Crisis and/or (ii) lifting the floors and limits Congress has over time imposed on the deduction, as it has done for those taxpayers most heavily impacted by several recent hurricanes and droughts.

The article offers a creative response to ameliorate an aspect of the foreclosure crisis. Rossman concludes, “Once these homeowners are considered equally worthy of claiming a casualty loss, the question then shifts to how the IRS, the Treasury Department and/or Congress can best adapt and address the administrative and distributional challenges attendant to utilizing the casualty loss deduction in this context. These challenges are not insurmountable barriers, but rather issues to be carefully considered and strategically addressed.” (67)

I can certainly imagine some of those challenges, such as how to reliably identify a “permanent transition to a lower value plateau,” but articles of this type are just what we need as we try to figure out how to address housing crises of this magnitude.  While there was a big gap between the housing crises of the Great Depression and the Great Depression we can be sure that there will be another such event at some point in the 21st century.

P2P, Mortgage Market Messiah?

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Monty Python's Life of Brian

As this is my last post of 2015, let me make a prediction about the 2016 mortgage market. Money’s Edge quoted me in Can P2P Lending Revive the Home Mortgage Market? It opens,

You just got turned down for a home mortgage – join the club. At one point the Mortgage Bankers Association estimated that about half of all applications were given the thumbs down. That was in the darkest housing days of 2008 but many still whisper that rejections remain plentiful as tougher qualifying rules – requiring more proof of income – stymie a lot of would be buyers.

And then there are the many millions who may not apply at all, out of fear of rejection.

Here’s the money question: is new-style P2P lending the solution for these would-be homeowners?

The question is easy, the answers are harder.

CPA Ravi Ramnarain pinpoints what’s going on: “Although it is well documented that banks and traditional mortgage lenders are extremely risk-averse in offering the average consumer an opportunity for a home loan, one must also consider that the recent Great Recession is still very fresh in the minds of a lot of people. Thus the fact that banks and traditional lenders are requiring regular customers to provide impeccable credit scores, low debt-to-income (DTI) ratios, and, in many cases, 20 percent down payments is not surprising. Person-to-person lending does indeed provide these potential customers with an alternate avenue to realize the ultimate dream of owning a home.”

Read that again: the CPA is saying that for some on whom traditional mortgage doors slammed shut there may be hope in the P2P, non-traditional route.

Meantime, David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law, sounded a downer note: “I am pretty skeptical of the ability of P2P lending to bring lots of new capital to residential real estate market in the short term. As opposed to sharing economy leaders Uber and Airbnb which ignore and fight local and state regulation of their businesses, residential lending is heavily regulated by the federal government. It is hard to imagine that an innovative and large stream of capital can just flow into this market without complying with the many, many federal regulations that govern residential mortgage lending. These regulations will increase costs and slow the rate of growth of such a new stream of capital. That being said, as the P2P industry matures, it may figure out a cost-effective way down the line to compete with traditional lenders.”

From the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to Fannie and Freddie, even the U.S. Treasury and the FDIC, a lot of federal fingers wrap around traditional mortgages. Much of it is well intended – the aims are heightened consumer protections while also controlling losses from defaults and foreclosures – but an upshot is a marketplace that is slow to embrace change.

Reviewing the Big Short

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Jared

Wax Statue of Ryan Gosling at Madame Tussauds

Realtor.com quoted me in Explaining the Housing Crash With Jenga—Did ‘The Big Short’ Get It Right? The story reads in part,

One of the more hyped movie releases this Oscar season stars the housing crisis itself: “The Big Short,” in which four financial wheelers and dealers (Christian Bale, Steve Carell, Ryan Gosling and Brad Pitt) join forces to figure out what caused the housing bubble of 2003-2005 to burst (and how they could profit from it, of course). It’s based on the best-selling, intensively reported book by journalist Michael Lewis.

Granted, the subprime mortgage meltdown is a complicated subject… but this movie purports to illuminate all with a simple visual aid: a tower of Jenga blocks. As Gosling explains in [this video clip], mortgage bonds at that time were made up of layers called tranches, with the highest-rated and most secure loans stacked on top of the lower-rated “subprime” ones. And once holders of those subprime mortgages defaulted in droves, as they did starting in 2006, the whole structure collapsed. Jenga!

Which seems simple enough. Only is this depiction accurate, or just a Hollywood set piece?

Well, according to David Reiss, Research Director at the Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship at Brooklyn Law School, this movie’s high-concept depiction of the mortgage crisis is largely on the money.

“There is a lot that is accurate in the clip: the history of mortgage-backed securities, the degradation of mortgage quality during the subprime boom, the loss of value of lower grade tranches,” he says.

*     *     *

Yet there is one thing that the movie did fudge, according to Reiss.

“I would argue that there is one big inaccuracy that exists, I am sure, for dramatic effect,” he says. “I would have put the AAA [tranches] at the bottom of the Jenga stack. In fact, the failure of the Bs and BBs did not cause the failure of AAAs, and many AAAs survived just fine or with modest losses.”

In other words, only the top half of the Jenga tower should have crumbled … but that wouldn’t have looked quite as flashy, would it?

“It would not sound as cool if only the top part of the stack crashed,” Reiss concedes. “But the bigger point, that the failures of the secondary mortgage market led to the crash of the housing market, is spot on.”

And hopefully one that won’t play out again in real life.

Wednesday’s Academic Roundup

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Loose Credit. Plummeting Prices.

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"Durdach Bros Miller Lite pic4" by MobiusDaXter

Christopher Palmer has posted Why Did So Many Subprime Borrowers Default During the Crisis: Loose Credit or Plummeting Prices? to SSRN. While this is a technical paper, it is clear from the title that it addresses an important question. If it can help us get to the root causes of the foreclosure crisis, it is worth considering. The abstract reads,

The surge in subprime mortgage defaults during the Great Recession triggered trillions of dollars of losses in the financial sector and accounted for more than 50% of foreclosures at the height of the crisis. In particular, subprime mortgages originated in 2006-2007 were three times more likely to default within three years than mortgages originated in 2003-2004.

In the ensuing years of debate, many have argued that this pattern across cohorts represents a deterioration in lending standards over time. I confirm this important channel empirically and quantify the relative importance of an alternative hypothesis: later cohorts defaulted at higher rates in large part because house price declines left them more likely to have negative equity.

Using comprehensive loan-level data that includes much of the recovery period, I find that changing borrower and loan characteristics can explain up to 40% of the difference in cohort default rates, with the remaining heterogeneity across cohorts caused by local house-price declines. To account for the endogeneity of prices — especially that price declines themselves could have been caused by subprime lending — I instrument for house price changes with long-run regional variation in house-price cyclicality.

Control-function results confirm that price declines unrelated to the credit expansion causally explain the majority of the disparity in cohort performance. Counterfactual simulations show that if 2006 borrowers had faced the price paths that the average 2003 borrower did, their annual default rate would have dropped from 12% to 5.6%.

Ok, ok — this is hyper-technical! The implications, however, are important: “These results imply that a) tighter subprime lending standards would have muted the increase in defaults, but b) even the relatively “responsible” subprime mortgages of 2003–2004 were sensitive to significant property value declines.” (40) It concludes that, “In reality, cohort outcomes are driven by both vintage effects (i.e. characteristics bottled into the contracts at origination) and path dependency in that exposure to economic conditions affect cohorts differently depending on their history.” (40)

So, the bottom line is that loose credit and plummeting prices were both causes of the defaults during the crisis. Mortgage underwriters and policymakers are on notice that they need to account for both of them in order to be prepared for the next crisis. This paper’s contribution is that it has quantified the relative impact of each of those causes.