Frannie Effects on Mortgage Terms

The Federal Reserve’s Alex Kaufman has posted The Influence of Fannie and Freddie on Mortgage Loan Terms to SSRN.  It is behind a paywall on SSRN, but an earlier draft is available elsewhere on the web. The abstract reads,

This article uses a novel instrumental variables approach to quantify the effect that government‐sponsored enterprise (GSE) purchase eligibility had on equilibrium mortgage loan terms in the period from 2003 to 2007. The technique is designed to eliminate sources of bias that may have affected previous studies. GSE eligibility appears to have lowered interest rates by about ten basis points, encouraged fixed‐rate loans over ARMs and discouraged low documentation and brokered loans. There is no measurable effect on loan performance or on the prevalence of certain types of “exotic” mortgages. The overall picture suggests that GSE purchases had only a modest impact on loan terms during this period.

This is pretty dry reading, but it is actually an important project: “[g]iven the GSEs’ vast scale, the liability they represent to taxpayers, and the decisions that must soon be made about their future, it is crucial to understand how exactly they affect the mortgage markets in which they operate.” (2, earlier draft) The current conventional wisdom is that the two companies will return in something that looks like their pre-conservatorship form.

Given that that is the case, studies such as these are useful for providing some facts about the actual impact that these two companies actually have on the mortgage market.  In terms of their impact on loan terms, it appears that the two companies have a modest or even “mixed” effect, at least for the subset of mortgages studied. (22, earlier draft) And there “is no measurable effect on loan performance” at all. (22, earlier draft)

I have argued previously that returning Fannie and Freddie to their pre-conservatorship ways is a bad call. I still think that is the case. And I think studies such as these offer support for that view, in the face of the conventional wisdom.

 

Discovery War in GSE Litigation

The United States filed a motion for a protective order in the Fairholme Funds case in the Court of Federal Claims (the Fairholme Takings case). You may not be familiar with protective orders. By way of background, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) states that “The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense . . ..”

The federal government can request a protective order, like any other party.  But there may be some unique policies at issue when the federal government makes such a request.  For instance, the federal government may assert a variety of privileges to limit discovery.  These may include the deliberative process qualified privilege.  This privilege is asserted to protect communications about the government’s decisions.  Another example would be the qualified government privilege for official information.  This privilege would be asserted to maintain the confidentiality of official government records.  These are just two examples – there are a whole other range of privileges that the government might assert.  A court’s protective order analysis involving the federal government thus might take into account a variety of legitimate objectives that would not apply in a dispute between two private parties.

Here, the United States is seeking to limit discovery requests that “seek documents that relate in their entirety to the future termination of the conservatorships, with no end date” and “documents that relate (in part) to the future profitability of the Enterprises, again with no end date.” (2) The government argues that

Disclosure of these documents is contrary to the strictures of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), which bars a court from taking “any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions” of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) as conservator. 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f). The declaration of FHFA Director Melvin Watt explains that disclosure would “have extraordinarily deleterious  consequences on the Conservator’s conduct of the ongoing and future operations of the conservatorships.”  Decisions about when and how to terminate the conservatorships and the future profitability of the Enterprises are at the heart of FHFA’s responsibilities as conservator, and Court-mandated disclosure of information bearing on such matters would jeopardize the stewardship of the Enterprises. (2, footnotes and some citations omitted)

While some of the government’s language in the motion seems hyperbolic, the court should certainly focus on the deliberative process privilege that the government asserts. Defining its scope will have implications far beyond this case, no matter that this case is incredibly important itself.

As to this case itself, it is interesting to see how even procedural disputes in the GSE lawsuits implicate the current operations of the GSEs as well as their post-conservatorship future. There is no question that the plaintiffs are very aware of their effect on the broader debates about the housing finance system as they press their individual claims in court. It is not yet clear to me how much the Court will weigh those considerations in its decision regarding the reach of the deliberative process privilege.

More on GSE Litigation

Inside Mortgage Finance did a longer story on the GSE litigation that profiled my take on it, Expert: GSE Shareholder Suits at ‘Early Stage’ of a Long Process; Litigation No Barrier to Dissolution, Says Group.

Look for the various lawsuits filed by private owners of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stock against the federal government to take a “very long time to be decided,” as the courts may take up to a year to resolve just the introductory motions, according to a legal expert. Beyond that, the litigation over shares in the two government-sponsored enterprises could stretch out to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Brooklyn Law School Professor David Reiss, speaking during a Bloomberg Industries webinar last week, noted that lawsuits stemming from the savings and loan debacle of 20 years ago give a sense of the possible timeframe, but litigation brought by disenfranchised Fannie and Freddie investors against the government offers an entirely different and deeper set of legal complexities.

“These are factually and legally complex cases and don’t trust anyone who thinks this is a slam dunk for any one of the parties,” said Reiss. He added that neither the government nor shareholders of the two government-sponsored enterprises can cut a deal and settle for anything short of total victory.

“I think we have plaintiffs that are going to go all the way on this because they have a lot at stake and they have a lot of resources to pursue their claims. You have a government that doesn’t have an incentive to settle like a normal private party does. They’re not worried about litigation costs or time, so I foresee this going on for a very, very long time,” said Reiss.

More than a dozen lawsuits filed against the government – led by hedge funds Perry Capital and Fairholme Capital Management – are pending in federal district court in Washington, DC, and in the Court of Federal Claims. The shareholder plaintiffs allege that the Treasury’s 2012 change in the dividend structure of its preferred stock leaves no funds to pay dividends to junior shareholders.

The government in its pending motion to dismiss gives some clear indication as to the tactics it will take to derail the various shareholder suits, Reiss explained. The government’s brief states that not a single plaintiff is entitled to recover anything – either on their individual or derivative claims – in light of the extensive powers that the Housing and Economic Recovery Act vests in the Federal Housing Finance Agency in its capacity as conservator to the GSEs.

“Until we have some motions to dismiss decided, we’re not really going to know how wide a scope these cases will have,” he said. “Only when we having a ruling on a summary judgment motion, will we have a sense of the real issues in contention. I will say that we are at an absolutely early stage.”

With the “entire range of private, administrative and constitutional principles” due to be called into question through the litigation, Reiss said there’s a great deal of uncertainty how the courts will decide the issue, including whether the Supreme Court will hear the inevitable appeal by plaintiffs or the defendant.

Although the pending shareholder litigation and investors’ claims of a government taking “must be taken seriously,” there’s no barrier – either from a legal or safety and soundness standpoint – preventing Fannie and Freddie from being dissolved, the Heritage Foundation argued in an issue brief.

“Protecting property rights, however, does not mean that taxpayers and consumers must continue to be put at risk by these government-sponsored housing giants,” said Heritage. “The ongoing lawsuits need not impede and should not distract Congress from the critical task of dissolving these economically dangerous institutions.”

Each of the GSE charters explicitly grants Congress the power to dissolve the corporations free of any conditions. After dissolution, Heritage notes that creditors would be paid off, with any remaining assets divided among shareholders, taking into account the priorities of different classes of shares.

“Because the United States is a defendant in the lawsuits, the litigation can proceed independently of the GSEs’ dissolution,” said Heritage. “If shareholders prevail on their takings claim, or any other monetary claim, they would still be able to receive full restitution for any legitimate claims.”

Reiss on GSE Litigation

Inside Mortgage Finance profiled me in Legal Expert: GSE Shareholder Plaintiffs, U.S. Want ‘Total’ Victory (behind a paywall). It reads,

Look for the various GSE shareholder lawsuits against the federal government to take a “very long time to be decided” with the courts taking up to a year to resolve just the introductory motions and an ultimate appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.

That’s the view of one legal expert speaking during a recent Bloomberg Industries webinar on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac litigation. Brooklyn Law School Professor David Reiss noted there are some parallels to the savings and loan lawsuits brought by owners against the federal government 20 years ago. But the attorney stressed that the litigation from the Fannie and Freddie investors against the government offers an entirely different and deeper set of legal complexities.

“These are factually and legally complex cases and don’t trust anyone that thinks this is a slam dunk for any one of the parties,” predicted Reiss. He added that neither the government nor GSE shareholders can cut a deal and settle for anything short of total victory.

In its motion to dismiss, the government argues that the plaintiffs – hedge funds that have speculated in the junior preferred – are not entitled to recover anything, either on their individual or derivative claims, in light of the extensive powers that the Housing and Economic Recovery Act granted to the Federal Housing Finance Agency in its capacity as conservator.

With the “entire range of private, administrative and constitutional principles” due to be called into question in this litigation, Reiss said there’s a great deal of uncertainty over how the courts will decide the issue, including whether the Supreme Court will hear the inevitable appeal by plaintiffs or defendant.

Reiss in Bloomberg Industries Q&A on Frannie Litigation

Bloomberg Industries Litigation Analyst Emily Hamburger interviewed me about The Government as Defendant: Breaking Down Fannie-Freddie Lawsuits (link to audio of the call). The blurb for the interview is as follows:

As investors engage in jurisdictional discovery and the government pleads for dismissals in several federal cases over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stock, Professor David Reiss of Brooklyn Law School will provide his insights on the dynamics of the lawsuits and possible outcomes for Wall Street, the U.S. government and GSEs. Reiss is the author of a recent article, An Overview of the Fannie and Freddie Conservatorship Litigation.

Emily questioned me for the first half of the one hour call and some of the 200+ participants asked questions in the second half.

Emily’s questions included the following (paraphrased below)

  • You’re tracking several cases that deal with the government’s role in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and I’d like to go through about 3 of the major assertions made by investors – investors that own junior preferred and common stock in the GSEs – against the government and hear your thoughts:
    • The first is the accusation that the Treasury and FHFA’s Conduct in the execution of the Third Amendment was arbitrary and capricious. What do you think of this?
    •  Another claim made by the plaintiffs is that the government’s actions constitute a taking of property without just compensation, which would be seen as a violation of the 5th Amendment – do you think this is a stronger or weaker claim?
    • And finally – what about plaintiffs asserting breach of contract against the government? Plaintiffs have said that the Net Worth Sweep in the Third Amendment to the Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement nullified Fannie and Freddie’s ability to pay dividends, and that the two companies can’t unilaterally change terms of preferred stock, and that the FHFA is guilty of causing this breach.
  • Is the government correct when they say that the section 4617 of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act barred plaintiff’s right to sue over the conservator’s decisions?
  • Former Solicitor General Theodore Olson, an attorney for Perry Capital, has said that the government’s powers with respect to the interventions in Fannie and Freddie “expired” – is he correct?
  • Can you explain what exactly jurisdictional discovery is and why it’s important?
  • Do we know anything about what might happen if one judge rules for the plaintiffs and another judge rules for the government?
  • Is there an estimate that you can provide as to timing?
  • Are there any precedents that you know of from prior crises? Prior interventions by the government that private plaintiffs brought suit against?
  • How do you foresee Congress and policymakers changing outcomes?
  • What do we need to be looking out for now in the litigation?
  • How does this end?

You have to listen to the audiotape to hear my answers, but my bottom line is this — these are factually and legally complex cases and don’t trust anyone who thinks that this is a slam dunk for any of the parties.

 

The Government Takeover of Fannie and Freddie

Richard Epstein has posted a draft of The Government Takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Upending Capital Markets with Lax Business and Constitutional Standards. The paper addresses “the various claims of the private shareholders, both preferred and common, of Fannie and Freddie.” (2) He notes that those claims have

now given rise to seventeen separate lawsuits against the Government, most of which deal with the Government’s actions in August, 2012. One suit also calls into question the earlier Government actions to stabilize the home mortgage market between July and September 2008, challenging the constitutionality of the decision to cast Fannie and Freddie into conservatorship in September 2008, which committed the Government to operating the companies until they became stabilized. What these suits have in common is that they probe, in overlapping ways, the extent to which the United States shed any alleged obligations owed to the junior preferred and common shareholders of both Fannie and Freddie. At present, the United States has submitted a motion to dismiss in the Washington Federal case that gives some clear indication as to the tack that it will take in seeking to derail all of these lawsuits regardless of the particular legal theory on which they arise. Indeed, the brief goes so far to say that not a single one of the plaintiffs is entitled to recover anything in these cases, be it on their individual or derivative claims, in light of the extensive powers that HERA vests in FHFA in its capacity as conservator to the funds. (2-3, citations omitted)

Epstein acknowledges that his “work on this project has been supported by several hedge funds that have hired me as a legal consultant, analyst, and commentator on issues pertaining to litigation and legislation over Fannie and Freddie discussed in this article.”(1, author footnote) Nonetheless, as a leading scholar, particularly of Takings jurisprudence, his views must be taken very seriously.

Epstein states that “major question of both corporate and constitutional law is whether the actions taken unilaterally by these key government officials could be attacked on the grounds that they confiscated the wealth of the Fannie and Freddie shareholders and thus required compensation from the Government under the Takings Clause. In addition, there are various complaints both at common law and under the Administrative Procedure Act.” (4)

Like Jonathan Macey, Epstein forcefully argues that the federal government has greatly overreached in its treatment of Fannie and Freddie. I tend in the other direction. But I do agree with Epstein that it “is little exaggeration to say that the entire range of private, administrative, and constitutional principles will be called into question in this litigation.” (4) Because of that, I am far from certain how the courts should and will decide the immensely complicated claims at issue in these cases.

In any event, Epstein’s article should be read as a road map to the narrative that the plaintiffs will attempt to convey to the judges hearing these cases as they slowly wend their way through the federal court system.

Stealing Fannie and Freddie?

Jonathan Macey and Logan Beirne have posted a short working paper, Stealing Fannie and Freddie, to SSRN. It advocates a position similar to that taken by the plaintiffs in the GSE shareholder litigation. They argue,

Politicians are running rough-shod over the rule of law as they seek to rob private citizens of their assets to achieve their own amorphous political objectives. If we were speaking of some banana republic, this would be par for the course – but this is unfolding in the United States today.

“The housing market accounts for nearly 20 percent of the American economy, so it is critical that we have a strong and stable housing finance system that is built to last,” declares the Senate Banking Committee Leaders’ Bipartisan Housing Finance Reform Draft. The proposed legislation’s first step towards this laudable goal, however, is to liquidate the government sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – in defiance of the rule of law. This paper analyzes the current House and Senate housing finance reform proposals and faults their modes of liquidation for departing from legal norms, thereby harming investors and creditors, taxpayers, and the broader economy.

Under proposals before Congress, virtually everyone loses. First, the GSEs’ shareholders’ property rights are violated. Second, taxpayers face the potential burden of the GSEs’ trillions in liabilities without dispensing via the orderly and known processes of a traditional bankruptcy proceeding or keeping the debts segregated as the now-profitable GSEs seek to pay them down. Finally, the rule of law is subverted, thereby making lending and business in general a riskier proposition when the country and global economy are left to the political whims of the federal government. (1)

I found a number of unsupported assertions throughout the piece. For instance, they assert, without support, that Fannie and Freddie “never reached the point of insolvency.” (3)  Badawi & Casey convincingly argue that without “government intervention, [Fannie and Freddie] would have defaulted on their guaranty obligations and more generally on obligations to all creditors.” (Badawi & Casey at 5) All in all, I don’t find this short working paper to be compelling reading — perhaps a more comprehensive one is in the works.