Tag Archives: foreclosure

Mortgage Market Trending in the Right Direction, but . . .

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The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) released its OCC Mortgage Metrics Report, First Quarter 2014. the report is a “Disclosure of National Bank and Federal Savings Association Mortgage Loan Data,” and it “presents data on first-lien residential mortgages serviced by seven national banks and a federal savings association with the largest mortgage-servicing portfolios. The data represent 48 percent of all first-lien residential mortgages outstanding in the country and focus on credit performance, loss mitigation efforts, and foreclosures.” (8, footnote omitted) As a result, this data set is not representative of all mortgages, but it does cover nearly half the market.

The report found that

93.1 percent of mortgages serviced by the reporting servicers were current and performing, compared with 91.8 percent at the end of the previous quarter and 90.2 percent a year earlier. The percentage of mortgages that were 30 to 59 days past due decreased 20.9 percent from the previous quarter to 2.1 percent of the portfolio, a 19.8 percent decrease from a year earlier and the lowest since the OCC began reporting mortgage performance data in the first quarter of 2008. The percentage of mortgages included in this report that were seriously delinquent—60 or more days past due or held by bankrupt borrowers whose payments were 30 or more days past due — decreased to 3.1 percent of the portfolio compared with 3.5 percent at the end of the previous quarter and 4.0 percent a year earlier. The percentage of mortgages that were seriously delinquent has decreased 22.4 percent from a year earlier and is at its lowest level since the end of June 2008.

At the end of the first quarter of 2014, the number of mortgages in the process of foreclosure fell to 432,832, a decrease of 52.3 percent from a year earlier. The percentage of mortgages that were in the process of foreclosure at the end of the first quarter of 2014 was 1.8 percent, the lowest level since September 2008. During the quarter, servicers initiated 90,852 new foreclosures — a decrease of 49.1 percent from a year earlier. Factors contributing to the decline include improved economic conditions, aggressive foreclosure prevention assistance, and the transfer of loans to servicers outside the reporting banks and thrift. The number of completed foreclosures decreased to 56,185, a decrease of 7.5 percent from the previous quarter and 33.9 percent from a year earlier. (4)

These trends are all very good of course, but it is worth remembering how far we have to go to get back to historical averages, particularly for prime mortgages.  Pre-Financial Crisis prime mortgages typically have done much better than these numbers, with delinquency rates in the very low single digits.

Tennessee Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s TCPA Claim

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The court in deciding Amour v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. (E.D. Tenn., 2013) granted in part and denied in part the defendant’s motion to dismiss

The plaintiffs brought three separate causes of action each of which the defendant moved to dismiss. The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692, et seq., the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. 47-18-101, et seq., and wrongful foreclosure.

The court ultimately decided to allow all but the one of the plaintiffs’ claims. The one cause of action dismissed was the TCPA claim.

Court Decides that Lower Court Was Correct in Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Bank of America and ReconTrust on FDCPA Claims

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The court in deciding Brown v. Bank of Am., N.A. (In re Brown), 2013 Bankr. (B.A.P. 9th Cir., 2013) affirmed the lower court’s holding.

The plaintiff in this case alleged alleged that BAC and ReconTrust violated the CPA by promulgating, recording, and relying on documents they should have known were false, in particular: the MERS’ assignment, the successor trustee appointment, and the notice of default. Plaintiffs also alleged that ReconTrust’s issuance and use of the notice of default violated the FDCPA and that ReconTrust’s attempts to dispossess the debtor of her property constituted malicious prosecution.

As to the claim for wrongful foreclosure, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the Washington Deed of Trust Act when they designated MERS as a beneficiary in the trust deed and MERS subsequently executed the MERS Assignment.

The plaintiffs contended that BAC’s authority to execute the successor trustee appointment and ReconTrust’s authority to execute the Notice of Default derived solely from the invalid MERS Assignment, invalidating both documents. They alleged that these transactions constituted a deception and, therefore, invalid transactions under the Trust Deed Act.

ReconTrust, Bank of America, N.A., as successor by merger to BAC, and MERS jointly brought a motion to dismiss the SAC pursuant to Civil Rule 12(b)(6). The defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead the identified claims and, in addition, that the plaintiffs should be collaterally estopped from contending that BofA could not initiate foreclosure proceedings, based on the order entered by the bankruptcy court on the uncontested relief from stay motion.

Texas Court Rejects Claims Brought on the Grounds of “Show-me-the-Note” and “Split-the-Note” Theories

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The court in deciding Hunt v. Worldwide Mortg. Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Tex., 2013) dismissed the plaintiff’s action in its entirety and specifically granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Plaintiffs asserted claims for fraud (only against MidFirst and its mortgage servicer), wrongful foreclosure, and violations of the Texas Business and Commerce Code and Finance Code. The plaintiffs also sought to quiet title and declaratory relief.

Specifically, the plaintiffs argued variations of the roundly discounted “show me the note” and “split the note” theories, alleging that the defendants did not have the authority to foreclose on the Property because MERS was not holder of the note and thus was not entitled to enforce the deed of trust.

The plaintiffs also contended MidFirst perpetrated a fraud by misrepresenting that it was the holder or beneficiary of the deed of trust entitled to receive mortgage payments on the note, thus collecting on a debt that it had “no legal, equitable or pecuniary interest in.”

Plaintiffs also alleged violations of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, arguing that the defendant had failed to produce the note and that it is very likely that the defendant was not the holder of the note.

Defendants’ moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, this was granted by the court.

Alabama Court Reverses Lower Court’s Decision Granting Summary Judgment to Foreclosing Entity

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The court in deciding Sturdivant v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, 2013 Ala. Civ. App. (Ala. Civ. App., 2013) reversed the lower court’s ruling that granted summary judgment to a foreclosing entity with respect to its complaint in ejectment against a mortgagor under Ala. Code § 6-6-280(b).

The court’s decision was based on the fact that the foreclosing entity presented no evidence that it was either the assignee of the mortgage or the holder of the note at the time it foreclosed, it failed to present a prima facie case that it had the authority to foreclose and, thus, had valid title to or the right to possess the property–one of the elements of its claim in ejectment.

California Court Denies Claims that Deficiencies Rendered any Security Interest in the Deed of Trust Invalid

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The court in deciding Sollenne v. United States Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 2013 U.S. Dist. (S.D. Cal., 2013) ultimately found that the plaintiffs’ claims premised upon the securitization of the loan and violations of the PSA were to be dismissed. The court also found that the plaintiffs could not require the defendants to take any actions to prove their authority unless such factual allegations are presented.

Plaintiffs alleged three causes of action: 1) quiet title; 2) declaratory relief to determine the validity of the deed of trust on the date the note was assigned and to determine if any defendant has authority to foreclose; and 3) injunctive relief to stop further collection activity, including the sale of the property. Plaintiffs’ desired remedies also included a request for an order compelling the defendants to transfer or release legal title and any alleged encumbrances, and possession of the property to plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs also alleged that the procedures in the pooling and services agreement (PSA) for the trust had not been followed. They alleged that the note and the mortgage, the debt or obligation evidenced by the note and deed of trust were not properly assigned and transferred from CMG (the originator) to USBNA (the trustee of the Trust) in accordance with the PSA. Plaintiffs claimed the PSA was violated by a failure to complete the assignment before the closing date, and a failure to provide a complete and unbroken chain of transfers and assignments. Plaintiffs claimed that no perfected chain of title exists transferring the mortgage loan from CMG to the Trust.

In the alternative, Plaintiffs claimed that Nationstar alleged to be the holder and owner of the note and beneficiary of the deed of trust, but that the note identified the originator as the holder, and there is no perfected chain of title between CMG and Nationstar. Plaintiffs claimed that no documents or records have been produced to demonstrate the note or deed of trust was properly transferred prior to the closing date, and that any documents  transferring it after the closing date are void under the PSA.

Plaintiffs listed the following deficiencies which they contended render invalid any security interest in the deed of trust: 1) the separation of title, ownership and interest in the note and deed of trust; 2) the lack of assignments to or from the intervening entities when the loan was sold; 3) the failure to assign and transfer the beneficial interest in the DOT to Defendants in accordance with the PSA; 4) the failure to endorse, assign, and transfer the note to USBNA in accordance with the PSA and California law; 5) that there were no assignments of beneficiary or endorsements of the note to each intervening entity; and 6) Defendants violated terms of the PSA.

Ultimately, the court determined that the plaintiffs’ claims premised upon the securitization of the loan and violations of the PSA were to be dismissed. The court also found that the plaintiffs could not require the defendants to take any actions to prove their authority unless such factual allegations were presented.

Michigan Court Rejects TILA and RESPA Claims in Granting Summary Judgment

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The court in deciding Morton v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. (W.D. Mich., 2013) ultimately concluded that the moving defendants are entitled to judgment on all plaintiff’s claims as a matter of law.

Plaintiff asserted that none of the defendants had standing to foreclose on the mortgage. He also alleged that defendants were liable for violations of the Truth In Lending Act (TILA) and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA). Defendants Bank of America, MERS, and Crain had moved for judgment on the pleadings, but supported their motion with documents beyond the pleadings. Therefore, this court elected to treat the motion as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.

Plaintiff’s complaint identifies two federal claims, in addition to claims arising under Michigan law. The complaint mentions the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f. Plaintiff also purports to assert a claim under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617. The court determined that neither the TILA claim nor the RESPA claim had merit. Plaintiff also asserted three purported state-law claims, which the court deemed to be both redundant and lacking merit. Accordingly, the court recommended that the entry of a summary judgment in favor of the defendants.