- Ocwen and Assurant settle with homeowners for $140 million in class action suit, in which the homeowners alleged that Ocwen received kickbacks by inflating premium costs for forced-placed insurance.
- New York’s Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed dismissal of suit against UBS AG for $30 million, brought by Hanwha Life Insurance Co. (a Korean corporation) claiming that NY courts do not have an interest in adjudicating the suit. Hanwha purchased $30 million in credit-linked notes from UBS that turned out to be worthless. It was trying to recover its losses because it relied on UBS’s advice in purchasing the notes.
- CFPB and the Maryland Attorney General filed suit and settlement consent orders against a title company and participants in an alleged illegal mortgage-kickback scheme.
- After the National Credit Union Administration Board (NCUA) filed a complaint against HSBC for failing as trustee of $2 billion in residential mortgage-backed securities trusts, HSBC claims that the regulator lacks standing to represent the trusts and is barred by Delaware’s three-year statute of limitations.
- Wells Fargo and Deutsche Bank moved to dismiss fives suits from BlackRock Inc., Pacific Investment Management Co. and NCUA for allegedly failing to watch over 850 RMBS trusts as the trustees.
Tag Archives: hsbc
Monday’s Adjudication Roundup
- Bankrupt Washington Mutual settles in class action suit for $10 million after duping plaintiffs into taking out mortgages with low “teaser rates.”
- Goldman Sachs asks NY Federal Judge not to certify class action suit over its Abacus collateralized debt obligation, which caused $1 billion in investor losses.
- The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) covers foreclosure complaints in suit brought by Bank of America and a NJ law firm.
- First Horizon National Corp.’s subsidiary First Tennessee Bank settles with FDIC over violation of due-diligence regulations for Federal Housing Administration-insured home loans for $212.5 million.
- HSBC and Assurant settle for $1.8 billion over allegations that the bank got kickbacks for getting consumers to purchase inflated flood insurance.
Monday’s Adjudication Roundup
- HSBC facing suit for breaching its duties as trustee for 271 residential mortgage-backed securities trusts.
- The US Supreme Court considered whether debtors should have an absolute right to appeal denial of proposed bankruptcy plan after three circuit courts have found that debtors can automatically can appeal, while in other jurisdictions, the bankruptcy judge must permit the appeal.
- BNP Paribas Mortgage Corp. suit from 2009 regarding Bank of America’s mishandling of hundreds of millions of dollars of mortgage-backed notes issued by Taylor Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp. finally settles.
Monday’s Adjudication Roundup
- Court denies US Bank’s opportunity to revive suit against Citigroup over hundreds of millions of dollars in mortgage-backed securities sold during the financial crisis.
- IL court refuses to dismiss suit against Bank of America over lowering underwriting standards for borrowers protected by the Fair Housing Act.
- National Credit Union Administration sues HSBC claiming it failed as trustee for $2 billion of residential mortgage-backed securities trusts and lead to the downfall of five credit unions.
Assignments Not Standing up
The District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida (4th Dist.) ruled in Murray v. HSBC Bank USA et al., (No. 4D13-4316, Jan. 21, 2015) that HSBC did not have standing to foreclose. This case highlights the difficulties that so many judges have in applying the UCC appropriately in foreclosures. The Court quotes the trial court as stating,
To me, that’s the only issue in the case; can this Court enter a judgment on what you say is that possession is enough without the [i]ndorsement.
In every other respect they have it. They got the mortgage. They got the records. They got the servicing. They got the whole thing. They just don’t have the [i]ndorsement, and is that fatal?
In other words do you have to go and get, and then start over again? That’s the question. I don’t know the answer. (2, n.1)
It is well documented that many, many courts have trouble applying the relevant provisions of the UCC in harmony with the relevant provisions of the state foreclosure procedure statute.
The District Court of Appeal goes to great efforts to get it right here, given that the trial court apparently punted on the analysis. I found the the Appendix to the opinion to be of particular of interest. It carefully walks through the chain of transfers to identify the “missing piece” that results in the HSBC’s lack of standing. It also distinguishes these transfers from those between servicers, which some courts conflate with transfers between those with the right to enforce a mortgage.
From a law reform perspective, I wonder what should be done to get courts to apply the law as it is written, instead of just trying to get the gist of it right. Given that the Permanent Editorial Board of the UCC has issued guidance in this area, I don’t think the issue is lack of clarity. Rather, I think it is just straightforward complexity — judges have a hard time going through all of the steps of the analysis. Can this area of law be simplified so that courts can achieve more just and equitable results? I wonder if Dale Whitman has any ideas . . ..
FHFA Wins on “Actual Knowledge”
Judge Cote issued an Opinion and Order in Federal Housing Finance Agency v. HSBC North America Holdings Inc., et al. (11-cv-06189 July 25, 2014). The opinion and order granted the FHFA’s motion for partial summary judgment concerning whether Fannie and Freddie knew of the falsity of various representations contained in offering documents for residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) issued by the remaining defendants in the case.
I found there to be three notable aspects of this lengthy opinion. First, it provides a detailed exposition of the process by which Fannie and Freddie purchased mortgages from the defendants (who included most of the major Wall Street firms, although many of them have settled out of the case by now). it goes into great length about how loans were underwritten and how originators and aggregators reviewed them as they were evaluated as potential collateral for RMBS issuances.
Second, it goes into great detail about the discovery battle in a high, high-stakes dispute with very well funded parties. While not of primary interest to readers of this blog, it is amazing to see just how much of a slog discovery can be in a complex matter like this.
Finally, it demonstrates the importance of litigating with common sense in mind. Judge Cote was clearly put off by the inconsistent arguments of the defendants. She writes, with clear frustration,
It bears emphasis that at this late stage — long after the close of fact discovery and as the parties prepare their Pretrial Orders for three of these four cases — Defendants continue to argue both that their representations were true and that underwriting defects, inflated appraisals and borrower fraud were so endemic as to render their representations obviously false to the GSEs. Using the example just given, Goldman Sachs argues both that Fannie Mae knew that the percentage of loans with an LTV ratio below 80% was not 67%, but also that the true figure was, in fact, 67%. (65)
Open Season on Homeowners
A case coming out of California, Peng v. Chase Home Finance LLC et al., California Courts of Appeal Second App. Dist., Div. 8, April 8th, 2014, has attracted a lot of attention in the blogosphere. This is particularly notable because this case is not to be published in the official reports and thus has no precedential value. Judge Rubin’s dissent has attracted much of the attention. It opens,
The promissory note signed by appellants Jeffry and Grace Peng obligated them to repay their home loan. In August 2007, Freddie Mac acquired the promissory note from Chase. Based on Freddie Mac owning the note, appellants seek to amend their complaint to allege Chase did not have authority to enforce the promissory note or to foreclose on their home, but the majority rejects appellants’ proposed amendment. Relying on case law rebuffing a homeowner’s challenge to a creditor-beneficiary’s authority to foreclose, the majority notes that courts have traditionally reasoned that the homeowner’s challenge is futile because, even if successful, the homeowner “merely substitute[s] one creditor for another, without changing [the homeowner’s] obligations under the note.” (Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 271.) The only party prejudiced by an illegitimate creditor-beneficiary’s enforcement of the homeowner’s debt, courts have reasoned, is the bona fide creditor-beneficiary, not the homeowner.
Such reasoning troubles me. I wonder whether the law would apply the same reasoning if we were dealing with debtors other than homeowners. I wonder how most of us would react if, for example, a third-party purporting to act for one’s credit card company knocked on one’s door, demanding we pay our credit card’s monthly statement to the third party. Could we insist that the third party prove it owned our credit card debt? By the reasoning of Fontenot and similar cases, we could not because, after all, we owe the debt to someone, and the only truly aggrieved party if we paid the wrong party would, according to those cases, be our credit card company. I doubt anyone would stand for such a thing. (Dissent, 1)
The dissent’s concern is justified. As Professor Whitman has recently noted on the Dirt Listserv and elsewhere, it is a “bizarre notion that anyone can foreclose a mortgage without showing that they have the right to enforce the note.” He also notes that the majority (and even the dissent) in Peng confuse ownership of the note with the right to enforce it. Until courts fully understand how the UCC governs the enforcement of notes, one should worry that some state court judges might declare an open season on homeowners as the majority does here in Peng.
