Tag Archives: mortgage

Cool Mortgage Tool

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The Urban Institute has created a cool interactive tool to map mortgages in the United States. Enterprise describes the tool as follows: it

maps 12 years of data on more than 100 million mortgage originations throughout the U.S. by race and ethnicity, illustrating how the housing boom and bust affected borrowers of different backgrounds by metropolitan area. According to the data, not only were African-American and Hispanic communities particularly damaged by the housing bust, but they have also been the least likely to recover since the recession. The map also shows how geographically uneven the housing recovery has been. For instance, while mortgage originations have only decreased 18 percent in San Francisco and San Jose since 2005, they have fallen by 39 percent in Detroit.

The Urban Institute argues that

For a full mortgage market recovery, we need to expand the credit box again. A number of reforms can be undertaken to encourage lending to creditworthy borrowers who would have qualified before the housing boom. A return to 2005 and 2006 lending practices would be ill-fated, but the pendulum has unquestionably swung too far. Today’s tight standards have locked out many prospective borrowers from homeownership, disproportionately preventing African American and Hispanic families from building wealth and benefiting from the recovery.

There is a growing outcry to loosen credit. It is important that those calling for that loosening also support reforms that ensure that new credit is sustainable credit.  The last thing that people need is a mortgage that has a high likelihood of ending up in default. The Urban Institute acknowledges this point, but it can get lost in the political fight over the future of housing finance.

Policy folk also need to better understand how homeownership helps households build wealth, particularly given the rapid changes in the mortgage market. If households can readily access the equity in their homes through home equity loans, homeownership’s wealth-building function becomes more of a consumption spreading one.  That is, if homeowners access equity in the present in order to supplement current income, they will not be building wealth over the long term.

The robust Consumer Financial Protection Bureau should protect consumers from predatory attempts to get them to refinance, but people may not protect their future selves from their current desires. This may just be the way it goes, but we should not make claims about wealth building until we know more about how homeownership in the 21st century actually promotes it.

Performance-Based Consumer Law

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Lauren Willis has posted Performance-Based Consumer Law to SSRN. This article

makes the case for recognizing performance-based regulation as a distinct tool in the consumer-law regulatory toolbox and for employing this tool broadly. Performance-based consumer law has the potential to incentivize firms to educate rather than obfuscate, develop simple and intuitive product designs that align with rather than defy consumer expectations, and channel consumers to products that are suitable for the consumers’ circumstances. Moreover, the process of establishing performance standards would sharpen our understanding of our goals for consumer law, and the process of testing for compliance with those standards would produce data about how to meet those goals in a continually evolving marketplace. Even if performance-based regulation does not directly lead to dramatic gains in consumer comprehension or marked declines in unsuitable uses of consumer products, the process of establishing and implementing such regulation promises dividends for improving traditional forms of regulation. (1)
This seems like a pretty radical change from our current approaches to the regulation of consumer financial transactions. Willis argues that disclosure does not work (no argument there) and industry can easily circumvent bright line rules (no argument there). She claims that a suitability regime, like ones that exist in the brokerage industry, offer a superior alternatives.  She writes,
Suitability standards would be closer to traditional substantive regulation, but more flexible. Regulation might define suitable (or unsuitable) uses of types or features of products, or firms might define suitable uses of their products, provided that they did so publicly. Although suitability might be required of every transaction, testing every transaction for suitably would often be prohibitively expensive and ad hoc ex post enforcement would create only limited incentives for firm compliance. Better to set performance benchmarks for what proportion of the firm’s customers must use the products or features suitably (or not unsuitably) and use field-based testing of a sample of the firm’s customers to assess whether the benchmarks are met. Enforcement levers could include, e.g., fines, rewards, licensing consequences, regulator scrutiny, or unfair, deceptive, or abusive conduct liability. (4)
This is certainly intriguing. But just as certainly, one can see the consumer finance industry raising concerns about a lack of clear rules to guide their actions and the after-the-fact evaluations that this approach would subject them to. Willis is too quick to reject such concerns, but they are legitimate ones that would need to be addressed if performance-based consumer law was to be widely adopted. Nonetheless, this is an intriguing paper and its implications should be further explored.

Should The Mortgage Follow The Note?

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The financial crisis and the foreclosure crisis have pushed many scholars to take a fresh look at all sorts of aspects of the housing finance system. John Patrick Hunt has added to this growing body of literature with a posting to SSRN, Should The Mortgage Follow The Note?. It is an interesting and important article, taking a a fresh look at the legal platitude, “the mortgage follows the note” and asking — should it?!? The abstract reads,

The law of mortgage assignment has taken center stage amidst foreclosure crisis, robosigning scandal, and controversy over the Mortgage Electronic Registration System. Yet a concept crucially important to mortgage assignment law, the idea that “the mortgage follows the note,” apparently has never been subjected to a critical analysis in a law review.

This Article makes two claims about that proposition, one positive and one normative. The positive claim is that it has been much less clear than typically assumed that the mortgage follows the note, in the sense that note transfer formalities trump mortgage transfer formalities. “The mortgage follows the note” is often described as a well-established principle of law, when in fact considerable doubt has attended the proposition at least since the middle of the last century.

The normative claim is that it is not clear that the mortgage should follow the note. The Article draws on the theoretical literature of filing and recording to show that there is a case that mortgage assignments should be subject to a filing rule and that “the mortgage follows the note,” to the extent it implies that transferee interests should be protected without filing, should be abandoned.

Whether mortgage recording should in fact be abandoned in favor of the principle “the mortgage follows the note” turns on the resolution of a number of empirical questions. This Article identifies key empirical questions that emerge from its application of principles from the theoretical literature on filing and recording to the specific case of mortgages.

The article does not answer the core question that it asks, but it certainly demonstrates that it is worth answering.

California Court Denies Plaintiffs’ Claims for Breach of Express Agreements, Breach of Implied Agreements, Slander of Title, Wrongful Foreclosure, and Violations of California Civil Codes

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The court in deciding Zapata v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Cal. Dec., 2013) dismissed the plaintiff’s action for failure to state a claim.

This action boiled down to an attempt made by the plaintiff to avoid foreclosure by attacking the mortgage securitization process. Plaintiffs Christopher and Elaine Zapata took out a promissory note and deed of trust with Family Lending Services, Inc. The deed of trust named S.P.S. Affiliates as trustee and MERS as nominee for the lender and as beneficiary.

Plaintiffs alleged a host of violations, including the claim that the defendants allegedly violated the terms of the deed of trust by executing an invalid and false notice of default because they were not the true lender or trustee.

Plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants violated the pooling and service agreement for the ARM Trust by failing to record the assignments. Also, Wells Fargo allegedly failed to sign the loan modification agreement or provide plaintiffs with a copy Wells Fargo had signed.

According to plaintiff, defendants also allegedly recorded invalid substitution of trustee, assignment of the deed of trust, and notice of default because of various alleged recording errors and delays. Plaintiffs also allege that defendants intentionally confused them.

Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and claim breach of express agreements, breach of implied agreements, slander of title, wrongful foreclosure, violation of California Civil Code Section 2923.5, violation of California Civil Code Section 2923.55, violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962, and violation of California Business and Professions Code Section 17200 of California’s Unfair Competition Law.

As an initial matter the court noted that, courts in this district as well as the undersigned have rejected plaintiffs’ central underlying theory. Further, the court noted that neither their court of appeals nor the California Supreme Court had ruled on whether plaintiffs may challenge the mortgage securitization process, but the undersigned has held, in agreement with persuasive authority from this district, that there was no standing to challenge foreclosure based on a loan’s having been securitized.

Accordingly, after considering the plaintiff’s litany of claims, the court ultimately granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Georgia Court Dismisses HOEPA, RESPA, and TILA Claims

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The court in deciding Mitchell v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Ga., 2013) ultimately dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.

The plaintiff’s complaint alleged federal violations of the Truth-in-Lending Act (“TILA”), the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act (“RESPA”), and the Homeownership Equity Protection Act (“HOEPA”).

The Complaint also asserted the following Georgia state law claims: (1) fraud; (2) wrongful foreclosure; (3) quiet title; (4) slander of title; (5) infliction of emotional distress and (6) unfair business practices.

In reviewing the plaintiff’s complaint, the court found that the plaintiffs had failed to plead a cognizable claim to support their claims. Thus, after considering the plaintiff’s arguments, the court dismissed all claims with prejudice.

Georgia Court Finds that the Assignment of the Security Deed from MERS to Ocwen Permitted it to Exercise the Power of Sale Under the Security Deed Even Though Ocwen did not Hold the Note

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The court in deciding Thompson v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Ga., 2013) granted defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff filed this complaint challenging the defendants’ right to foreclose on his property and alleged the following: (1) the defendants failed to provide plaintiff with statutory notice of the foreclosure sale thirty days prior to November 6, 2012, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2(a); (2) the defendants violated O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2(a) by failing to identify Freddie Mac as the secured creditor and failing to indicate Ocwen as an agent on Freddie Mac’s behalf; and (3) Ocwen lacked the authority to institute foreclosure proceedings because it only possessed the security deed while Freddie Mac was in possession of the note.

Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

In regards to the failure to record the security deed, the plaintiff further alleges that Ocwen lacked the authority to institute foreclosure proceedings because the security deed was improperly assigned and recorded in its favor. According to the plaintiff, the security deed should have been recorded in favor of Freddie Mac, the note holder and “true secured creditor.”

The court found that the assignment of the security deed from MERS to Ocwen permitted it to exercise the power of sale under the Security Deed even though Ocwen did not also hold the note. Thus the court decided that the plaintiff was unable to state a claim for wrongful foreclosure, and the defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted. The court likewise rejected the plaintiff’s remaining claims.

Georgia Court Finds that MERS Was Within Its Right in Transferring and Assigning Deed, Along with Power of Sale, to Another Party

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The court in deciding Brannigan v. Bank of Am. Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Ga., 2013) found that MERS could transfer and assign the deed, along with the power of sale, to another party.

After Plaintiffs defaulted on their mortgage, U.S. Bank initiated non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiffs Wade and Angelina Brannigan initiated this action and requested that the court set aside a foreclosure sale on the grounds of wrongful foreclosure.

Plaintiff asserted that U.S. Bank, Bank of America, the Albertelli Firm, and MERS conspired to file an alleged ‘Transfer and Assignment,’ whereby MERS purported to transfer, sell, convey and assign to U.S. Bank all of its right, title and interest in and to the security deed. Plaintiffs argued, “MERS retained no interest in their security deed to transfer, and said transfer and assignment were not only fraudulent but a legal nullity” as plaintiffs’ mortgage loan had already been assigned to LaSalle Bank.

In regards to the plaintiff’s claim against MERS, the court found that the plaintiffs executed a security deed listing MERS as grantee and nominee for the lender and its successors and assigns. By the terms of the security deed, MERS could transfer and assign the deed, along with the power of sale, to another party, and did so by transferring it to U.S. Bank. Moreover, the court noted that under Georgia law, the security deed assignee “may exercise any power therein contained,” including the power of sale in accordance with the terms of the deed. O.C.G.A. § 23-2-114.

Therefore, even if Plaintiffs had standing to challenge the assignment, by the terms in the security deed U.S. Bank was within its authority to foreclose after Plaintiffs’ default.