Tag Archives: motion to dismiss

California Court Denies Plaintiffs’ Claims for Breach of Express Agreements, Breach of Implied Agreements, Slander of Title, Wrongful Foreclosure, and Violations of California Civil Codes

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The court in deciding Zapata v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Cal. Dec., 2013) dismissed the plaintiff’s action for failure to state a claim.

This action boiled down to an attempt made by the plaintiff to avoid foreclosure by attacking the mortgage securitization process. Plaintiffs Christopher and Elaine Zapata took out a promissory note and deed of trust with Family Lending Services, Inc. The deed of trust named S.P.S. Affiliates as trustee and MERS as nominee for the lender and as beneficiary.

Plaintiffs alleged a host of violations, including the claim that the defendants allegedly violated the terms of the deed of trust by executing an invalid and false notice of default because they were not the true lender or trustee.

Plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants violated the pooling and service agreement for the ARM Trust by failing to record the assignments. Also, Wells Fargo allegedly failed to sign the loan modification agreement or provide plaintiffs with a copy Wells Fargo had signed.

According to plaintiff, defendants also allegedly recorded invalid substitution of trustee, assignment of the deed of trust, and notice of default because of various alleged recording errors and delays. Plaintiffs also allege that defendants intentionally confused them.

Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and claim breach of express agreements, breach of implied agreements, slander of title, wrongful foreclosure, violation of California Civil Code Section 2923.5, violation of California Civil Code Section 2923.55, violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962, and violation of California Business and Professions Code Section 17200 of California’s Unfair Competition Law.

As an initial matter the court noted that, courts in this district as well as the undersigned have rejected plaintiffs’ central underlying theory. Further, the court noted that neither their court of appeals nor the California Supreme Court had ruled on whether plaintiffs may challenge the mortgage securitization process, but the undersigned has held, in agreement with persuasive authority from this district, that there was no standing to challenge foreclosure based on a loan’s having been securitized.

Accordingly, after considering the plaintiff’s litany of claims, the court ultimately granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Georgia Court Dismisses HOEPA, RESPA, and TILA Claims

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The court in deciding Mitchell v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Ga., 2013) ultimately dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.

The plaintiff’s complaint alleged federal violations of the Truth-in-Lending Act (“TILA”), the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act (“RESPA”), and the Homeownership Equity Protection Act (“HOEPA”).

The Complaint also asserted the following Georgia state law claims: (1) fraud; (2) wrongful foreclosure; (3) quiet title; (4) slander of title; (5) infliction of emotional distress and (6) unfair business practices.

In reviewing the plaintiff’s complaint, the court found that the plaintiffs had failed to plead a cognizable claim to support their claims. Thus, after considering the plaintiff’s arguments, the court dismissed all claims with prejudice.

Georgia Court Finds that the Assignment of the Security Deed from MERS to Ocwen Permitted it to Exercise the Power of Sale Under the Security Deed Even Though Ocwen did not Hold the Note

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The court in deciding Thompson v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Ga., 2013) granted defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff filed this complaint challenging the defendants’ right to foreclose on his property and alleged the following: (1) the defendants failed to provide plaintiff with statutory notice of the foreclosure sale thirty days prior to November 6, 2012, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2(a); (2) the defendants violated O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2(a) by failing to identify Freddie Mac as the secured creditor and failing to indicate Ocwen as an agent on Freddie Mac’s behalf; and (3) Ocwen lacked the authority to institute foreclosure proceedings because it only possessed the security deed while Freddie Mac was in possession of the note.

Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

In regards to the failure to record the security deed, the plaintiff further alleges that Ocwen lacked the authority to institute foreclosure proceedings because the security deed was improperly assigned and recorded in its favor. According to the plaintiff, the security deed should have been recorded in favor of Freddie Mac, the note holder and “true secured creditor.”

The court found that the assignment of the security deed from MERS to Ocwen permitted it to exercise the power of sale under the Security Deed even though Ocwen did not also hold the note. Thus the court decided that the plaintiff was unable to state a claim for wrongful foreclosure, and the defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted. The court likewise rejected the plaintiff’s remaining claims.

Georgia Court Finds that MERS Was Within Its Right in Transferring and Assigning Deed, Along with Power of Sale, to Another Party

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The court in deciding Brannigan v. Bank of Am. Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Ga., 2013) found that MERS could transfer and assign the deed, along with the power of sale, to another party.

After Plaintiffs defaulted on their mortgage, U.S. Bank initiated non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiffs Wade and Angelina Brannigan initiated this action and requested that the court set aside a foreclosure sale on the grounds of wrongful foreclosure.

Plaintiff asserted that U.S. Bank, Bank of America, the Albertelli Firm, and MERS conspired to file an alleged ‘Transfer and Assignment,’ whereby MERS purported to transfer, sell, convey and assign to U.S. Bank all of its right, title and interest in and to the security deed. Plaintiffs argued, “MERS retained no interest in their security deed to transfer, and said transfer and assignment were not only fraudulent but a legal nullity” as plaintiffs’ mortgage loan had already been assigned to LaSalle Bank.

In regards to the plaintiff’s claim against MERS, the court found that the plaintiffs executed a security deed listing MERS as grantee and nominee for the lender and its successors and assigns. By the terms of the security deed, MERS could transfer and assign the deed, along with the power of sale, to another party, and did so by transferring it to U.S. Bank. Moreover, the court noted that under Georgia law, the security deed assignee “may exercise any power therein contained,” including the power of sale in accordance with the terms of the deed. O.C.G.A. § 23-2-114.

Therefore, even if Plaintiffs had standing to challenge the assignment, by the terms in the security deed U.S. Bank was within its authority to foreclose after Plaintiffs’ default.

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The court in deciding Brannigan v. Bank of Am. Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Ga., 2013) agreed with the defendants that the plaintiffs’ complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and was to be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).

Plaintiffs filed an action asserting several state-law claims related to wrongful foreclosure. The claims against the defendants also included: fraud, intentional misrepresentation, and deceit (Count One); negligent misrepresentation (Count Two); negligence (Count Three); wrongful foreclosure (Count Four); and violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (Count Six).

Plaintiffs contended that the defendants wrongfully foreclosed on their property.
Plaintiffs challenged the assignment of the security deed from MERS to U.S. Bank as wholly void, illegal, ineffective and insufficient to transfer any interest to anyone.

Defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the validity of the assignment. The court ultimately agreed. The court noted that the plaintiffs could not challenge the assignment’s validity because they were not parties to the assignment or intended third-party beneficiaries.

Next, the plaintiffs argued that the assignment from MERS to U.S. Bank was invalid because after the mortgage loan was assigned to LaSalle Bank, MERS retained no interest in the plaintiff’s security deed to transfer.

The court noted that the plaintiffs executed a security deed listing MERS as grantee and nominee for the lender and its successors and assigns. By the terms of the security deed, MERS could transfer and assign the deed, along with the power of sale, to another party, and did so by transferring it to U.S. Bank. Therefore, the court reasoned that even if the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the assignment, by the terms in the security deed, U.S. Bank was within its authority to foreclose after the plaintiffs’ default.

Finally, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant Albertelli Firm’s notice of default was inadequate because it “failed to properly identify the secured creditor, note holder and loan servicer.” The court found that the defendants complied with Georgia’s notice requirements. Therefore, the plaintiff could not state a claim for wrongful foreclosure.

GSE Shareholders Taking Discovery

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Judge Sweeney of the Court of Federal Claims issued an Opinion and Order regarding jurisdictional discovery as well as a related Protective Order in the GSE Takings Case brought by Fairholme against the United States.  I had previously discussed the possibility of a protective order here.

By way of background, and as explained in the Opinion and Order,

Defendant [the U.S.] has filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the court lacks jurisdiction to hear this case, that plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe, and that plaintiffs [Fairholme et al.] have failed to state a claim for a regulatory taking. Plaintiffs respond that defendant’s motion relies upon factual assertions that go well beyond, and in many respects, conflict with, their complaint. The court thus entered an order on February 26, 2014, allowing the parties to engage in jurisdictional discovery. (1-2)

Judge Sweeney discussed the likely scope of jurisdictional discovery in a hearing on June 4th. She suggested that the big issue would be the extent to which she was going to defer to the federal government as to its request the discovery be limited in order to allow the government discretion in its operational and policy roles in the housing finance system. The judge indicated that she might be open to a limited protective order that allowed the plaintiffs to examine documents under certain restrictions so that they are not made public.The judge also made clear that she was not going to authorize a fishing expedition.

The Opinion and Order is pretty consistent with what she had suggested in June, but I would characterize it as a tactical win for the plaintiffs. Judge Sweeney signaled that she was not going to be overly deferential to the federal government.  This was clear throughout the Opinion and Order, regarding the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction over matters involving the FHFA, regarding the scope of the deliberative process privilege and regarding the overall scope of jurisdictional discovery that the Court will allow.  The plaintiffs should very happy with this result.

Court Decides that Lower Court Was Correct in Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Bank of America and ReconTrust on FDCPA Claims

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The court in deciding Brown v. Bank of Am., N.A. (In re Brown), 2013 Bankr. (B.A.P. 9th Cir., 2013) affirmed the lower court’s holding.

The plaintiff in this case alleged alleged that BAC and ReconTrust violated the CPA by promulgating, recording, and relying on documents they should have known were false, in particular: the MERS’ assignment, the successor trustee appointment, and the notice of default. Plaintiffs also alleged that ReconTrust’s issuance and use of the notice of default violated the FDCPA and that ReconTrust’s attempts to dispossess the debtor of her property constituted malicious prosecution.

As to the claim for wrongful foreclosure, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the Washington Deed of Trust Act when they designated MERS as a beneficiary in the trust deed and MERS subsequently executed the MERS Assignment.

The plaintiffs contended that BAC’s authority to execute the successor trustee appointment and ReconTrust’s authority to execute the Notice of Default derived solely from the invalid MERS Assignment, invalidating both documents. They alleged that these transactions constituted a deception and, therefore, invalid transactions under the Trust Deed Act.

ReconTrust, Bank of America, N.A., as successor by merger to BAC, and MERS jointly brought a motion to dismiss the SAC pursuant to Civil Rule 12(b)(6). The defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead the identified claims and, in addition, that the plaintiffs should be collaterally estopped from contending that BofA could not initiate foreclosure proceedings, based on the order entered by the bankruptcy court on the uncontested relief from stay motion.