Tag Archives: motion to dismiss

Texas Court Rejects Claims Brought on the Grounds of “Show-me-the-Note” and “Split-the-Note” Theories

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The court in deciding Hunt v. Worldwide Mortg. Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Tex., 2013) dismissed the plaintiff’s action in its entirety and specifically granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Plaintiffs asserted claims for fraud (only against MidFirst and its mortgage servicer), wrongful foreclosure, and violations of the Texas Business and Commerce Code and Finance Code. The plaintiffs also sought to quiet title and declaratory relief.

Specifically, the plaintiffs argued variations of the roundly discounted “show me the note” and “split the note” theories, alleging that the defendants did not have the authority to foreclose on the Property because MERS was not holder of the note and thus was not entitled to enforce the deed of trust.

The plaintiffs also contended MidFirst perpetrated a fraud by misrepresenting that it was the holder or beneficiary of the deed of trust entitled to receive mortgage payments on the note, thus collecting on a debt that it had “no legal, equitable or pecuniary interest in.”

Plaintiffs also alleged violations of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, arguing that the defendant had failed to produce the note and that it is very likely that the defendant was not the holder of the note.

Defendants’ moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, this was granted by the court.

Georgia Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s RESPA, TILA and HOEPA Claims

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The court in deciding Mitchell v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Ga., 2013) found no plain error in the lower court’s conclusion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims.

Plaintiffs Reginald and Jamela Mitchell filed a complaint against Deutsche Bank and MERS, the complaint alleged federal violations of the Truth-in-Lending Act (“TILA”), the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act (“RESPA”), and the Homeownership Equity Protection Act (“HOEPA”).

The Complaint also asserted the following state law claims: (1) fraud; (2) wrongful foreclosure; (3) quiet title; (4) slander of title; (5) infliction of emotional distress and (6) unfair business practices.

The crux of the plaintiffs’ claims under the federal statutes was that the defendants failed to provide them with the required disclosures, thereby allowing plaintiffs to rescind their mortgage transaction and seek damages. The lower court concluded that the Plaintiffs’ claims arising under TILA, HOEPA and RESPA were barred by the statute of limitations. The lower court recommended that the plaintiffs’ complaint be dismissed as the plaintiffs failed to state any federal or state law claim upon which relief could be granted. The plaintiff then appealed.

Upon review of the lower court’s decision, this court found no plain error in the lower court’s findings and recommendation that the defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims be granted.

Vermont Court Rejects Homeowners’ Request to Dismiss Complaint for Lack of Standing

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The court in deciding Deutsche Bank National Trust v. Merritt, 2013 Vt., 225 (Vt. Oct. 1, 2013) ultimately

Defendant homeowners sought to appeal the lower court’s order, which granted substitute plaintiff bank’s motion to dismiss the foreclosure action.

The homeowners raised several arguments regarding the bank’s standing to enforce homeowners’ promissory note, and sought an order dismissing the case. The defendant specified the bank’s lack of standing as the basis for the dismissal request, ordering that any legal charges, assessments and fees assessed by a bank against homeowners in connection with this action be removed from their mortgage debt, and ordering that initial plaintiff OneWest return all mortgage payments received from homeowners with statutory interest.

After considering the defendant’s claim, this court followed the lower court in dismissing the case.

Georgia Court Dismisses Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq Claim

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The court in deciding Morrison v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Ga. Dec. 16, 2013) eventually granted Bank of America, N.A.’s motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff defaulted on her loan obligations after taking a loan from bank of America. Plaintiff asserted that she “suspended” payments because the defendant failed to properly identify the person that was the holder in due course of legal title or the ability to enforce the note under O.C.G.A. § 11-3-309.

Plaintiff asserted that foreclosure would be wrongful because the defendant lacked standing to foreclose on the property, also that the defendant violated the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq (“FDCPA“), and Georgia law by failing to validate the debt and provide an accounting of plaintiff’s mortgage. Lastly, plaintiff asserted that the defendant failed to obtain Secretary of U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development approval to be designated as Foreclosure Commissioner, in violation of 12 U.S.C. § 3754.

Plaintiff also sought to have the security deed and note declared fully satisfied, to enjoin foreclosure of the property, to compel production of the plaintiff’s note and any assignments, and to require the defendant to validate the alleged debt. Bank of America moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim.

The court considered the plaintiff’s assertions, and categorically dismissed them in granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Texas Court Dismisses Claims of Texas Debt Collection Act and Texas Property Code Violations

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The court in deciding Katz v. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist., (S.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2013) granted the motion to dismiss put forth by the defendant.

Plaintiff Katz alleged that defendant JP Morgan: (1) violated the Texas Property Code by failing to give proper notice because all transfers of the lien were not recorded timely; (2) was unjustly enriched because Katz may have been paying the wrong lender or account and that foreclosure would yield value above the amount owed; (3) violated or will violate the Texas Business and Commerce Code because defendants had failed to produce the original note with all transfers and assignments, thus the defendant could not enforce the mortgage without the promissory note; and that the defendant (4) violated the Texas Debt Collection Act by taking actions to collect on the note despite having no authority to collect on the note.

After methodically considering the plaintiff’s assertions, the court categorically dismissed them.

Reiss in Bloomberg Industries Q&A on Frannie Litigation

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Bloomberg Industries Litigation Analyst Emily Hamburger interviewed me about The Government as Defendant: Breaking Down Fannie-Freddie Lawsuits (link to audio of the call). The blurb for the interview is as follows:

As investors engage in jurisdictional discovery and the government pleads for dismissals in several federal cases over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stock, Professor David Reiss of Brooklyn Law School will provide his insights on the dynamics of the lawsuits and possible outcomes for Wall Street, the U.S. government and GSEs. Reiss is the author of a recent article, An Overview of the Fannie and Freddie Conservatorship Litigation.

Emily questioned me for the first half of the one hour call and some of the 200+ participants asked questions in the second half.

Emily’s questions included the following (paraphrased below)

  • You’re tracking several cases that deal with the government’s role in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and I’d like to go through about 3 of the major assertions made by investors – investors that own junior preferred and common stock in the GSEs – against the government and hear your thoughts:
    • The first is the accusation that the Treasury and FHFA’s Conduct in the execution of the Third Amendment was arbitrary and capricious. What do you think of this?
    •  Another claim made by the plaintiffs is that the government’s actions constitute a taking of property without just compensation, which would be seen as a violation of the 5th Amendment – do you think this is a stronger or weaker claim?
    • And finally – what about plaintiffs asserting breach of contract against the government? Plaintiffs have said that the Net Worth Sweep in the Third Amendment to the Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement nullified Fannie and Freddie’s ability to pay dividends, and that the two companies can’t unilaterally change terms of preferred stock, and that the FHFA is guilty of causing this breach.
  • Is the government correct when they say that the section 4617 of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act barred plaintiff’s right to sue over the conservator’s decisions?
  • Former Solicitor General Theodore Olson, an attorney for Perry Capital, has said that the government’s powers with respect to the interventions in Fannie and Freddie “expired” – is he correct?
  • Can you explain what exactly jurisdictional discovery is and why it’s important?
  • Do we know anything about what might happen if one judge rules for the plaintiffs and another judge rules for the government?
  • Is there an estimate that you can provide as to timing?
  • Are there any precedents that you know of from prior crises? Prior interventions by the government that private plaintiffs brought suit against?
  • How do you foresee Congress and policymakers changing outcomes?
  • What do we need to be looking out for now in the litigation?
  • How does this end?

You have to listen to the audiotape to hear my answers, but my bottom line is this — these are factually and legally complex cases and don’t trust anyone who thinks that this is a slam dunk for any of the parties.

 

Connecticut Court Denies Claim Alleging Lack of Standing

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The court in deciding Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Speer, 2013 Conn. Super. 2682 (Conn. Super. Ct., 2013) found that the defendant misstated the law in arguing that the plaintiff must hold the assignment of the mortgage before commencing a foreclosure action.

Defendant, Sheri A. Speer, challenged the standing of the plaintiff to commence the foreclosure action. After hearing from both sides, the court was satisfied with the fact that at the commencement of this action, the plaintiff was the holder of the promissory note that was the foundation of this cause of action.

Although the plaintiff had not been assigned the mortgage at the time of commencement of the suit, it eventually had been assigned the mortgage. Furthermore, the court noted that the defendant misstated Connecticut law in arguing that the plaintiff must hold the assignment of the mortgage prior to the commencement of this foreclosure action.