Tag Archives: National Low Income Housing Coalition

Housing Subsidies For Those Who Need Them

Posted on by

The National Low Income Housing Coalition has posted Aligning Federal Low Income Housing Programs with Housing Need. The Executive Summary goes right to the heart of the matter:

The number of renters in the United States has steadily increased since 2006 and will continue to rise as new households form in the post-recession economy. In 2012, one out of four renter households had incomes at or below 30% of the area median income (AMI) for a total of 10.3 million households categorized as extremely low income (ELI). In the same year there were just 3.2 million units affordable and available to ELI households, creating a shortage of 7.1 million rental units affordable to these households.

Despite this evidence of a substantial need for deeply affordable rental housing, the low income housing resources that are provided by the federal government are only able to reach 23% of the eligible population. (iii)
This study looks at the extent to which the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), the HOME program and the Federal Home Loan Banks’ Affordable Housing Program (AHP) serve ELI households. It finds that in general, “these three programs do not serve ELI households on their own. Their ability to serve ELI households depends on the addition of one or more forms of subsidy, usually housing choice vouchers (HCV).” (iii)
The study identifies common themes from its research on this topic:
  • Developers layer multiple funding sources while adapting to rapidly changing political and fiscal environments. Many also rely on non-traditional resources, such as private donations, to fill funding gaps.
  • Reducing or eliminating mortgage debt is critical to be able to serve ELI households.
  • Cultivating strong local partnerships is a key factor affecting developers’ ability to serve ELI households. Often, local jurisdictions that have prioritized affordable housing are willing to donate land or property at a low cost.
  • Cross-subsidization is an important strategy used by many developers committed to inclusive properties that serve ELI households. This strategy incorporates units affordable to ELI households into projects containing other units occupied by households with a broader mix of incomes. The rents paid by higher income households supplement the overall operating expenses of the project, compensating for the lower rents that ELI households can afford.
  • While the case studies highlighted some very effective strategies for serving ELI households without the use of vouchers, there is not one model that can be easily replicated. (iii-iv)

None of this is particularly earth shattering, but it is useful to to look into this topic in a systematic way. The Coalition hopes that this report “will contribute to the broader conversation about simplifying the process of financing affordable housing developments, refining existing programs so that they incentivize developers to serve ELI households, and finding ways to fund the ongoing operating costs of units that do serve ELI renters.” (iv)

As an off-the-cuff response, I wonder if the nation’s affordable housing agenda is benefited from such a complex funding environment for housing for extremely low income households. Can it just be funded more comprehensively, acknowledging the reality that it requires deep subsidies from the get-go? What is the opportunity cost of requiring developers to devote so much time to creating such complicated deal structures? In the current political environment, I doubt that affordable housing advocates have the stomach to raise these questions, lest Congress decides to cut back affordable housing subsidies even further. But in the long term, these are questions worth asking.

The Other GSE Conservatorship Lawsuit

Posted on by

While there has been a lot of attention over Judge Lamberth’s ruling on the shareholders’ cases regarding Fannie and Freddie’s conservatorships, much less has been given to Judge Cooke’s dismissal of Samuels v. FHFA (No. 13-22399 S.D. Fla. ) (Sept. 29, 2014 ). The low-income and organizational plaintiffs in Samuels challenged the FHFA’s decision to suspend Fannie and Freddie’s obligation to fund the Housing Trust Fund after they entered into conservatorship. The Housing Trust Fund was to be funded by contributions by that were based on Fannie and Freddie’s annual purchases. The FHFA took the position that they GSEs need not pay into the fund while they themselves were in such a precarious financial position. Judge Cooke held that “The Individual and Organizational Plaintiffs lack Article III standing because their alleged injuries are too remote from and not fairly traceable to the Defendants’ allegedly unlawful conduct.” (13)

I found the dicta in the case to be the most interesting. The court found that the relevant provision from the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008

provides no meaningful standards for determining when “an enterprise” is financially instable, undercapitalized, or in jeopardy of unsuccessfully completing a capital restoration plan. Considering the history of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; the government’s placing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in conservatorship; the Treasury Department providing liquidity to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac through preferred stock purchase agreements, the mortgage backed securities purchase program, and an emergency credit facility; it is not for this Court to judicially review Defendants’ statutorily mandated suspension of payments into the Housing Trust Fund. (13)

My takeaway from this opinion is that we  now have another federal judge finding that the federal government is to be given great deference in its handling of the financial crisis. And this deference derives not just from the text of the relevant statute but also from the particular historical events that led to its adoption and that followed it. This seems like an important trend, as far as I am concerned.

Whither The Housing Trust Fund?

Posted on by

As part of my review of the litigation surrounding the newly-profitable Fannie And Freddie (here, here, here and here), I turn to the complaint filed by “extremely low income tenants in desperate need of affordable housing” and the National Low Income Housing Coalition and the Right to the City Alliance, Samuels et al. v. FHFA et al., No. 1:13-cv-22399 (Jul. 9, 2009).

As the complaint notes, Congress created the Housing Trust Fund as part of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA).  The Housing Trust Fund was to be funded by contributions by Fannie and Freddie that were based on their annual purchases.   Those contributions could amount to hundreds of millions of dollars a year.

But here was the rub:  the Director of the FHFA could suspend  those contributions if the Director finds that they

(1) are contributing, or would contribute, to the financial instability of [Fannie or Freddie];

(2) are causing, or would cause, the [Fannie or Freddie] to be classified as undercapitalized; or

(3) are preventing, or would prevent, [Fannie or Freddie] from successfully completing a capital restoration plan under section 4622 of this title. (14, quoting 12 U.S.C. section 4567(b))

And that is just what happened in 2008:  the FHFA put them into conservatorship because of fears of their impending insolvency and their mounting losses. With the housing recovery, Fannie and Freddie have returned to profitability — massive profitability. But the federal government has redirected those profits to the Treasury, which had provided many billions of dollars to the two companies during the early years of the crisis without funding the Housing Trust Fund.

The plaintiffs allege that despite “the record profits of the Enterprises and despite the statutory requirement that any suspension of payments be temporary,  the Federal Defendants have failed and refused to review these findings and/or discontinue their suspension of the statutorily required payments by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into the Housing Trust Fund.” (17) The plaintiffs allege that this is “arbitrary and capricious in light of the changed and current financial condition of the Enterprise. The required statutory contribution is a small percentage of the Enterprise’s profits and thus would not contribute to the financial instability” of the two companies or to the other two bases for suspending the contributions pursuant to section 4567(b). (18, citations omitted) In sum, “the level of capitalization is solely a function of the policy decisions of the conservator not the cost of contributions to the Housing Trust Fund.” (22)

The big challenge that the plaintiffs face, as far as I can tell, is how they can convince the Court that the two companies are financially stable when they are still so deeply in debt to the federal government, notwithstanding the billions of dollars of profits that they two companies have remitted so far to the Treasury.