Housing Affordability and GSE Reform

Jim Parrott and Laurie Goodman of the Urban Institute have posted Making Sure the Senate’s Access and Affordability Proposal Works. It opens,

One of the most consequential and possibly promising components of the draft bill being considered in the Senate Banking Committee is the way in which it reduces the cost of a mortgage for those who need it. In the current system, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the government-sponsored enterprises, or GSEs) deliver subsidy primarily through the level pricing of their guarantee fees, overcharging lower-risk borrowers in order to undercharge higher-risk borrowers. While providing support for homeownership through cross-subsidy makes good economic and social sense, there are a number of shortcomings to the way it is done in the current system.

First, it does not effectively target those who need the help. While Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are both pushed to provide secondary market liquidity for the loans of low- and moderate-income (LMI) borrowers in order to comply with their affordable housing goals and duty to serve obligations, almost one in four beneficiaries of the subsidy are not LMI borrowers (Parrott et al. 2018). These borrowers receive the subsidy simply because their credit is poorer than the average GSE borrower and thus more costly than the average guarantee fee pricing covers. And LMI borrowers who pose less than average risk to the GSEs are picking up part of that tab, paying more in the average guarantee fee than their lower-than-average risk warrants.

Second, the subsidy is provided almost exclusively through lower mortgage rates, even though that is not the form of help all LMI borrowers need. For many, the size of their monthly mortgage is not the barrier to homeownership, but the lack of savings needed for a down payment and closing costs or to cover emergency expenses once the purchase is made. For those borrowers, the lower rate provided in the current system simply does not help.

And third, the opacity of the subsidy makes it difficult to determine who is benefiting, by how much, and whether it is actually helping. The GSEs are allocating more than $4 billion a year in subsidy, yet policymakers cannot tell how it has affected the homeownership rate of those who receive it, much less how the means of allocation compares with other means of support. We thus cannot adjust course to better allocate the support so that it provides more help those who need it.

The Senate proposal remedies each of these shortcomings, charging an explicit mortgage access fee to pay for the Housing Trust Fund, the Capital Magnet Fund, and a mortgage access fund that supports LMI borrowers, and only LMI borrowers, with one of five forms of subsidy: a mortgage rate buy-down, assistance with down payment and closing costs, funding for savings for housing-related expenses, housing counseling, and funding to offset the cost of servicing delinquent loans. Unlike the current system, the support is well targeted, helps address the entire range of impediments to homeownership, and is transparent. As a means of delivering subsidy to those who need it, the proposed system is likely to be more effective than what we have today.

If, that is, it can be designed in a way that overcomes two central challenges: determining who qualifies for the support and delivering the subsidy effectively to those who do. (1-2, footnote omitted)

This paper provides a clear framework for determining whether a housing finance reform proposal actually furthers housing affordability for those who need it most. It is unclear where things stand with the Senate housing finance reform bill as of now, but it seems like the current version of the bill is a step in the right direction.

The Long Wait for Home

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The most recent issue of Housing Spotlight from the National Low Income Housing Coalition is titled The Long Wait for a Home. The Executive Summary reads,

The Public Housing and Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) programs provide essential affordable housing to some of the nation’s most financially vulnerable households. Forty percent of new public housing admissions and 75% of new voucher holders each year are required to be extremely low income (ELI) households, who earn no more than 30% of their area’s median income (AMI) or the federal poverty guideline, whichever is higher. Seventy-one percent of the nearly 1.1 million public housing households and 74% of the 2.2 million HCV recipient households are ELI (HUD, 2015).

The housing resources available to ELI renters however are insufficient. The private and subsidized rental markets make available only 3.2 million affordable homes for the nation’s 10.4 million ELI renter households, resulting in a national shortage of 7.2 million rental homes (NLIHC, 2016). ELI households face a long wait for housing assistance. Unable to find affordable housing, 75% of ELI renter households are severely cost burdened, spending more than 50% of their income on housing costs and leaving little money for other necessities (NLIHC, 2016).

The last nationwide survey of Public Housing Agencies (PHAs) regarding their public housing and voucher waiting lists was conducted in 2012. Since then, rental affordability has worsened, squeezing ELI renters even further out of the private market. To document the current state of waiting lists, NLIHC surveyed PHAs in the Fall of 2015 and Winter of 2016. Three hundred twenty PHAs responded with complete surveys, representing a diversity of size, location, and metropolitan status.

Survey data paint a bleak picture of waiting lists closed to new applicants and long waits for housing assistance. Key findings include: „

  • Fifty-three percent of HCV waiting lists were closed to new applicants for housing assistance. Sixty-five percent of HCV waiting lists closed to the general public had been closed for at least one year. „
  • Eleven percent of public housing waiting lists were closed to new applicants. Thirty-seven percent of public housing waiting lists closed to the general public had been closed for at least one year. „
  • The median HCV waiting list had a wait time of 1.5 years. Twenty-five percent of HCV waiting lists had a wait time of 3 years or longer. „
  • The median public housing waiting list had a wait time of 9 months. Twenty-five percent of public housing waiting lists had a wait time of 1.5 years or longer. „
  • ELI households accounted for nearly 74% of households on the average HCV waiting list and more than 67% of households on the typical public housing waiting list.
  • Families with children accounted for 60% of households on the average HCV waiting list and 46% of households on the typical public housing waiting list. „
  • Seniors comprised the most common type of household on 15% of the public housing waiting lists for which these data were provided.

Closed waiting lists and long waits for housing assistance make clear that we must expand housing resources for our nation’s lowest income renters. Legislation introduced in the 114th Congress would increase investments in vouchers, public housing, and other housing programs.

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These policy changes, and others like them, could end housing poverty and homelessness once and for all by providing the resources necessary for every low income family to afford a home.

This report rightly brings attention to the big problems facing extremely low income households and federal affordable housing programs. Whether anything is done for them depends completely on the outcome of the election.

Republicans Ready for GSE Reform?

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Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL)

Senator Shelby (R-AL), the Chair of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, sent a letter to the U.S. Government Accountability Office regarding the future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, sometimes known as the “enterprises.” It provides an interesting roadmap of Republican thinking about the appropriate role of the federal government in the mortgage market:

the FHFA [Federal Housing Finance Agency] has taken steps that appear to encourage a more active, rather than a reduced, role in the mortgage market for the enterprises. These steps include issuing proposed rules regarding the enterprises’ duty to serve, creating principle [sic] write-down requirements, lowering down-payment requirements, allowing allocation of revenues to the national housing trust fund despite the enterprise having no capital, and other actions. Moreover, the development of the common securitization platform, a joint venture established by the enterprises at the FHFA’s direction, raises a number of questions about the FHFA’s stated goal to gradually contract the enterprises’ dominant presence in the marketplace.

Initially, the purpose of the FHFA’s efforts, such as the common securitization platform, was to facilitate greater competition in the secondary mortgage market, but now it appears that the FHFA is no longer taking steps to enable the platform to be used by entities other than the enterprises.  Likewise, lowering the down-payment requirement for mortgages guaranteed by the enterprises will make the enterprises more competitive with others in the mortgage market, not less. Overall, these FHFA actions raise questions about the goals of the conservatorship and whether its ultimate purpose has changed.

To better understand the impact of these changes, I ask that the GAO study and report the extent to which the FHFA’s actions described above could influence:

  • The enterprises’ dominance in residential mortgage markets;
  • A potential increase in the cost of entry for future competitors to the enterprises;
  • Current and future financial demands on the Treasury;
  • Possible options for modifying the enterprises’ structures (1)

As I have stated previously, Congress and the Obama Administration have allowed the FHFA to reform Fannie and Freddie on its own, with very little oversight. Indeed, the only example of oversight one could really point to would be the replacement of Acting Director DeMarco with Director Watt, a former Democratic member of Congress. It is notable that Watt has continued many of the policies started by DeMarco, a Republican favorite. That being said, Shelby is right to point out that Watt has begun taking some modest steps that Democrats have favored, such as funding the housing trust fund and implementing a small principal-forgiveness program.

Housing finance reform is the one component of the post-financial crisis reform agenda that Congress and the Executive have utterly failed to address. It is unlikely that it will be addressed in the near future. But perhaps the FHFA’s independent steps to create a federal housing finance infrastructure for the 21st century will galvanize the political branches to finally act and implement their own vision, instead of ceding all of their power to the unelected leaders of an administrative agency.

 

Bold New Housing Plan?

photo by Cybershot800i

Wanderer Above the Sea of Fog by Caspar David Friedrich

Enterprise Community Partners has released An Investment in Opportunity: A Bold New Vision for Housing Policy in the U.S. I thought it would be useful to highlight its specific proposals to make rental housing affordable for low-income households:

I. ENSURE BROAD ACCESS TO HIGH-OPPORTUNITY NEIGHBORHOODS

  1. Improve the Section 8 program and expand regional mobility programs to help more families with rental assistance vouchers access high-opportunity neighborhoods 
  2. Establish state and local laws banning “source of income” discrimination by landlords and property owners 
  3. Balance the allocation of Low-Income Housing Tax Credits and other federal subsidies to both high-opportunity neighborhoods and low-income communities, while creating more opportunities for mixed-income developments 
  4. Establish inclusionary zoning rules at the state and local levels 
  5. Establish state and local regulations that encourage innovation and promote the cost-effective development of multifamily housing 
  6. Incorporate affordable housing considerations into local and regional transportation planning through equitable transit-oriented development

II. PROMOTE COMPREHENSIVE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INVESTMENTS IN LOW-INCOME NEIGHBORHOODS

  1. Make the public and private investments necessary to preserve existing affordable housing while creating mixed-income communities 
  2. Build capacity of public, private and philanthropic organizations at the local level to pursue cross-sector solutions to the problems facing low-income communities 
  3. Create state and local land banks and other entities to return vacant and abandoned properties to productive use 
  4. Make permanent and significantly expand the New Markets Tax Credit 
  5. Create a new federal tax credit for private investments in community development financial institutions and other community development entities 
  6. Establish federal regulations that encourage “impact investments” in low-income communities by individual and institutional investors

III. RECALIBRATE OUR PRIORITIES IN HOUSING POLICY TO TARGET SCARCE SUBSIDY DOLLARS WHERE THEY’RE NEEDED MOST

  1.  Reform the Mortgage Interest Deduction and other federal homeownership subsidies to ensure that scarce resources are targeted to the families who are most in need of assistance 
  2. Gradually double annual allocations of Low-Income Housing Tax Credits and provide additional gap financing to support the expansion 
  3. Significantly expand funding to Section 8 vouchers to ensure that the most vulnerable households in the U.S. have access to some form of rental assistance 
  4. Expand funding to the Housing Trust Fund and the Capital Magnet Fund as part of any effort to reform America’s mortgage finance system 
  5. Break down funding silos to encourage public investments in healthy and affordable housing for recipients of Medicaid 
  6. Create permanent funding sources at the state and local level to support affordable housing

IV. IMPROVE THE OVERALL FINANCIAL STABILITY OF LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS

  1. Establish minimum wages at the federal, state and local levels that reflect the reasonable cost of living for each community 
  2. Expand the Earned Income Tax Credit, the Child Tax Credit and other essential income supports to America’s low-wage workers 
  3. Create a new federal fund to help test and scale innovative financial products that encourage low-income households to save, with a primary focus on unrestricted emergency savings 
  4. Help more low-income families build strong credit histories 
  5. Establish strong protections against predatory financial products

Not sure if I could really categorize this as “bold.” “Unrealistic” seems more apt in today’s political environment. Indeed, it reads like a wishlist drafted by a committee.

That being said, I think that Enterprise’s vision is helpful in a variety of ways. First, it offers a pretty comprehensive list of policies and programs that that can be used to  make housing more affordable. Second, it recognizes income inequality is a big part of the problem for low-income households. Third, it acknowledges that current federal housing policy favors wealthy households (cf. mortgage interest deduction) over the poor. Finally, it acknowledges that restrictive local land use policies inflate the cost of housing.

I wonder if a bolder plan would be just to fully fund Section 8 so that all low-income households were able to afford a safe and well-maintained home. Probably just as unrealistic as Enterprise’s vision, but it has the virtue of being simple to understand and execute.

Fannie, Freddie & The Affordable Housing Feint

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Robert J. Shapiro

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Elaine C. Kamarck

 

 

 

 

 

Robert J. Shapiro and Elaine C. Kamarck have posted A Strategy to Promote Affordable Housing for All Americans By Recapitalizing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. While it presents as a plan to fund affordable housing, the biggest winners would be speculators who bought up shares of Fannie and Freddie stock and who may end up with nothing if a plan like this is not adopted.  The Executive Summary states that

This study presents a strategy for ending the current conservatorship and majority government ownership of Fannie and Freddie in a way that will enable them, once again, to effectively promote greater homeownership by average Americans and greater access to affordable housing by low-income households. This strategy includes regulation of both enterprises to prevent a recurrence of their effective insolvency in 2008 and the associated bailouts, including 4.0% capital reserves, regular financial monitoring, examinations and risk assessments by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), as dictated by HERA. Notably, an internal Treasury analysis in 2011 recommended capital requirements, consistent with the Basel III accords, of 3.0% to 4.0%. In addition, the President should name a substantial share of the boards of both enterprises, to act as public interest directors. The strategy has four basic elements to ensure that Fannie and Freddie can rebuild the capital required to responsibly carry out their basic missions, absorb losses from future housing downturns, and expand their efforts to support access to affordable housing for all households:

  • In recognition of Fannie and Freddie’s repayments to the Treasury of $239 billion, some $50 billion more than they received in bailout payments, the Treasury would write off any remaining balance owed by the enterprises under the “Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements” (PSPAs).
  • The Treasury also would end its quarterly claim or “sweep” of the profits earned by Fannie and Freddie, so their future retained earnings can be used to build their capital reserves.
  • Fannie and Freddie also should raise roughly $100 billion in additional capital through several rounds of new common stock sales into the market.
  • The Treasury should transfer its warrants for 79.9% of Fannie and Freddie’s current common shares to the HTF [Housing Trust Fund] and the CMF [Capital Magnet Fund], which could sell the shares in a series of secondary stock offerings and use the proceeds, estimated at $100 billion, to endow their efforts to expand access to affordable housing for even very low-income households.

Under this strategy, Fannie and Freddie could once again ensure the liquidity and stability of U.S. housing markets, under prudent financial constraints and less exposure to the risks of mortgage defaults. The strategy would dilute the common shares holdings of current private investors from 20% to 10%, while increasing their value as Fannie and Freddie restore and claim their profitability. Finally, the strategy would establish very substantial support through the HTF and CPM for state programs that increase access to affordable rental housing by very low-income American and affordable home ownership by low-to-moderate income households.

Wow — there is a lot that is very bad about this plan.  Where to begin? First, we would return to the same public/private hybrid model for Fannie and Freddie that got us into so much trouble to begin with.

Second, it would it would reward speculators in Fannie and Freddie stock. That is not terrible in itself, but the question would be — why would you want to? The reason given here would be to put a massive amount of money into affordable housing. That seems like a good rationale, until you realize that that money would just be an accounting move from one federal government account to another. It does not expand the pie, it just makes one slice bigger and one slice smaller. This is a good way to get buy-in from some constituencies in the housing industry, but from a broader public policy perspective, it is just a shuffling around of resources.

There’s more to say, but this blog post has gone on long enough. Fannie and Freddie need to be reformed, but this is not the way to do it.

 

Obama Administration on Frannie

Michael Stegman

Michael Stegman, a White House Senior Policy Advisor, offered up the Obama Administration’s “perspective on critical housing issues” recently. (1) I found the remarks on the future of Fannie and Freddie to be of particular interest:

Before discussing what we would like to see happen in this Congress on GSE reform, you should be aware that last week the Administration made clear its opposition to taking any action in support of what has become known as “recap and release.” We believe that recapitalizing the GSEs with taxpayer funds and administratively- or legislatively-releasing them from conservatorship with a business model that conflicts with their public mission— in essence turning back the clock to the run up to the crisis~ would be both bad policy and poor stewardship of the taxpayers’ interest; willfully recreating the very system that helped do this nation so much harm.
ln remarks I presented two weeks ago at the Mortgage Bankers Association conference, I cautioned that no one should be misled by the increasingly noisy chorus of the advocates of recap and release, many of whom have placed big bets against reform so they can make a‘profit, and are doing everything they can to make sure that those bets pay off.
Nor, I said, should their promise that recap and release would generate a pot of money for affordable housing be taken seriously.
Despite claims to the contrary, recapitalizing the GSEs would not itself provide any resources for affordable housing. Nor can a related — or even unrelated — sale of Treasury’s investment in the GSEs provide any resources for affordable housing. The proceeds of the sale of any GSE obligations acquired by Treasury must by law be “dedicated for the sole purpose of deficit reduction.”
Rather than freeing recapitalized GSEs from conservatorship with their flawed charters intact, we should pursue more comprehensive approaches to reform such as those that members of Congress have introduced over the past two years including mutualizing Fannie and Freddie, or build upon bipartisan agreements on the features of a future secondary market system that were hammered out in the Senate Banking Committee last year:
Preservation of the TBA market; an explicit, paid for government guarantee of catastrophic losses for investors in qualifying MBS; maintaining a clear separation of the primary and secondary markets; ensuring the flow of mortgage credit in both good times and bad; separating the securitization plumbing from private credit risk taking; ensuring that community lenders have the same access to the secondary market as big banks; and making the benefits of government guaranteed MBS available to all households — both those who choose to rent and those with the ability and desire to own.
Members in Congress also reached bipartisan consensus on a transparent way to serve those the private market cannot serve without subsidy, through an annual 10 basis point assessment on the outstanding balance of government-guaranteed MES—which once fully implemented, would generate about 15 times more resources a year for affordable housing than FHFA is expected to raise through the GSEs’ current affordable housing levy–though we were pleased to see the Director begin collections on the affordability fee and look forward to effectively implementing the dollars through the Housing Trust Fund and the Capital Magnet Fund that should become available for the first time in the early months of 2016.
But there is much more work to be done on ensuring a level playing field in the new system, including a robust role for community banks and credit unions who know how best to serve their customers, and ensuring that all communities are served fairly, which can be most effectively achieved through a statutory duty to serve. Regrettably, the Committee could not agree upon such a provision during last year’s negotiations, and we will continue to fight for it. (3-4)
Much of these remarks are eminently reasonable but I have to say that the Obama Administration has not deployed much political capital on reforming the housing finance system. This has left the whole system in limbo and the longer it stays in limbo, the more likely it is that special interests will make inroads into the reform of the system, inroads that will not be in the public interest.
While the likelihood of reform coming out of the current Congress is incredibly small, the Administration should take all of the administrative steps it can to sketch out an outline of a housing finance system that can work for a broad range of borrowers through the credit cycle without putting excessive risk on taxpayers.
The Administration has taken some steps in the right direction, like off-loadling some risk from Fannie and Freddie to private investors. But there is a lot more work to be done if we are to have a system that provides the optimal amount of credit through the 21st century.

Here Comes The Housing Trust Fund

HUD has published an interim rule in the Federal Register to governing the Housing Trust Fund (HTF). The HTF could generate about a half a billion dollars a year for affordable housing initiatives, so this is a big deal. The purpose “of the HTF is to provide grants to State governments to increase and preserve the supply of rental housing for extremely low- and very low-income families, including homeless families, and to increase homeownership for extremely low- and very low-income families.” (80 F.R. 5200) HUD intends to “open this interim rule for public comment to solicit comments once funding is available and the grantees gain experience administering the HTF program.” (80 F.R. 5200)

The HTF’s main focus is rental housing, which often gets short shrift in federal housing policy

States and State-designated entities are eligible grantees for HTF. Annual formula grants will be made, of which at least 80 percent must be used for rental housing; up to 10 percent for homeownership; and up to 10 percent for the grantee’s reasonable administrative and planning costs. HTF funds may be used for the production or preservation of affordable housing through the acquisition, new construction, reconstruction, and/or rehabilitation of nonluxury housing with suitable amenities. (80 F.R. 5200)

Many aspects of federal housing policy are effectively redistributions of income to upper income households. The largest of these redistributions is the mortgage interest deduction.  Households earning over $100,000 per year receive more than three quarters of the benefits of that deduction while those earning less than $50,000 receive close to none of them.

So, the HTF is a double win for a rational federal housing policy because it focuses on (i) rental housing for (ii) extremely low- and very low-income households.

While not wanting to be a downer about such a victory for affordable housing, I will note that Glaeser and Gyourko have demonstrated how local land use policies can run counter to federal affordable housing policy. Might be worth it for federal housing policy makers to pay more attention to that dynamic . . ..