Tag Archives: servicing

Mortgage Market Trending in the Right Direction, but . . .

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The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) released its OCC Mortgage Metrics Report, First Quarter 2014. the report is a “Disclosure of National Bank and Federal Savings Association Mortgage Loan Data,” and it “presents data on first-lien residential mortgages serviced by seven national banks and a federal savings association with the largest mortgage-servicing portfolios. The data represent 48 percent of all first-lien residential mortgages outstanding in the country and focus on credit performance, loss mitigation efforts, and foreclosures.” (8, footnote omitted) As a result, this data set is not representative of all mortgages, but it does cover nearly half the market.

The report found that

93.1 percent of mortgages serviced by the reporting servicers were current and performing, compared with 91.8 percent at the end of the previous quarter and 90.2 percent a year earlier. The percentage of mortgages that were 30 to 59 days past due decreased 20.9 percent from the previous quarter to 2.1 percent of the portfolio, a 19.8 percent decrease from a year earlier and the lowest since the OCC began reporting mortgage performance data in the first quarter of 2008. The percentage of mortgages included in this report that were seriously delinquent—60 or more days past due or held by bankrupt borrowers whose payments were 30 or more days past due — decreased to 3.1 percent of the portfolio compared with 3.5 percent at the end of the previous quarter and 4.0 percent a year earlier. The percentage of mortgages that were seriously delinquent has decreased 22.4 percent from a year earlier and is at its lowest level since the end of June 2008.

At the end of the first quarter of 2014, the number of mortgages in the process of foreclosure fell to 432,832, a decrease of 52.3 percent from a year earlier. The percentage of mortgages that were in the process of foreclosure at the end of the first quarter of 2014 was 1.8 percent, the lowest level since September 2008. During the quarter, servicers initiated 90,852 new foreclosures — a decrease of 49.1 percent from a year earlier. Factors contributing to the decline include improved economic conditions, aggressive foreclosure prevention assistance, and the transfer of loans to servicers outside the reporting banks and thrift. The number of completed foreclosures decreased to 56,185, a decrease of 7.5 percent from the previous quarter and 33.9 percent from a year earlier. (4)

These trends are all very good of course, but it is worth remembering how far we have to go to get back to historical averages, particularly for prime mortgages.  Pre-Financial Crisis prime mortgages typically have done much better than these numbers, with delinquency rates in the very low single digits.

Alabama Court Reverses Lower Court’s Decision Granting Summary Judgment to Foreclosing Entity

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The court in deciding Sturdivant v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, 2013 Ala. Civ. App. (Ala. Civ. App., 2013) reversed the lower court’s ruling that granted summary judgment to a foreclosing entity with respect to its complaint in ejectment against a mortgagor under Ala. Code § 6-6-280(b).

The court’s decision was based on the fact that the foreclosing entity presented no evidence that it was either the assignee of the mortgage or the holder of the note at the time it foreclosed, it failed to present a prima facie case that it had the authority to foreclose and, thus, had valid title to or the right to possess the property–one of the elements of its claim in ejectment.

Borrowers Have “Been Through Hell”

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The Maine Supreme Judicial Court issued an opinion, U.S. Bank, N.A. v. David Sawyer et al., 2014 ME 81 (June 24, 2014), that makes you question the sanity of the servicing industry and the efficacy of the rule of law. If you are a reader of this blog, you know this story.

This particular version of the story is taken from the unrebutted testimony of the homeowners, David and Debra Sawyer. They received a loan modification, which was later raised to a level above the predelinquency level; the servicers (which changed from time to time) then demanded various documents which were provided numerous times over the course of four court-ordered mediations; the servicers made numerous promises about modifications that they did not keep; the dysfunction goes on and on.

The trial court ultimately dismissed the foreclosure proceeding with prejudice. Like other jurisdictions, Maine requires that parties to a foreclosure “make a good faith effort to mediate all issues.” (6, quoting 14 M.R.S. section 6321-A(12) (2013); M.R. Civ. P. 93(j)).  Given this factual record, the Supreme Judicial Court found that the trial court “did not abuse its discretion in imposing” that sanction. (6-7) The sanction is obviously severe and creates a windfall for the borrowers. But the Supreme Judicial Court noted that U.S. Bank’s “repeated failures to cooperate and participate meaningfully in the mediation process” meant that the borrowers accrued “significant additional fees, interest, costs, and a reduction in the net value of the borrower’s [sic] equity in the property.” (8)

The Supreme Judicial Court concludes that if “banks and servicers intend to do business in Maine and use our courts to foreclose on delinquent borrowers, they must respect and follow our rules and procedures . . .” (9) So, a state supreme court metes out justice in an individual case and sends a warning that failure to abide by the law exposes “a litigant to significant sanctions, including the prospect of dismissal with prejudice.” (9)

But I am left with a bad taste in my mouth — can the rule of law exist where such behavior by private parties is so prevalent? How can servicers with names like J.P. Morgan Chase and U.S. Bank be this incompetent? What are the incentives within those firms that result in such behavior? Have the recent settlements and regulatory enforcement actions done enough to make such cases anomalies instead of all-too-frequent occurrences? U.S. Bank conceded in court that these borrowers have “been through hell.” (9, n. 5) The question is, have we reached the other side?

 

HT April Charney

Premature End to Foreclosure Review

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Congressman Cummings (D), the ranking minority member of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, has sent a letter to Congressman Issa, the Chairman of the Committee, regarding the Independent Foreclosure Review. It opens,

I am writing to request that the Committee hold a hearing on widespread foreclosure abuses and illegal activities engaged in by mortgage servicing companies.  I request that the hearing also examine why the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) appear to have prematurely ended the Independent Foreclosure Review (IFR) and entered into a major settlement agreement with most of the servicers just as the full extent of their harm was beginning to be revealed. (1)

It goes on to assert that “some mortgage servicing companies engaged in widespread and systemic foreclosure abuses, including charging improper and excessive fees, failing to process loan modifications in accordance with federal guidelines, and violating automatic stays after borrowers filed for bankruptcy.” (2) It concludes that it “remains unclear why the regulators terminated the IFR prematurely, how regulators determined the compensation amounts servicers were required to pay under the settlement, and how regulators could  claim that borrowers who were harmed by these servicers would benefit more from the settlement . . . than by allowing the IFR to be completed.” (2)

The letter raises a number of important concerns, but I will focus on just one — “how did the regulators arrive at the compensation amounts in the settlement?” (9) This particular settlement was for billions of dollars from BoA, PNC, JPMorgan and Citibank. This is an extraordinarily large sum, but the public is left with no sense of whether this sum is proportional to the harm done. I have raised this concern with other billion dollar settlements. As the federal government moves forward with these large settlements, it should carefully consider their expressive function — does the penalty fit the wrongdoing?  And if so, how was that calculated? People want to know.

Servicing Fraud Claim Survives Motion To Dismiss

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Judge Gonzalez Rogers issued an opinion in Ellis v. J.P. Morgan Chase, No. 4:12-cv-03897-YGR (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2013) in which she denied a motion to dismiss a fraud claim in this class action lawsuit arising from Chase’s servicing business. The plaintiffs allege that “Chase engaged in fraudulent practices by charging marked-up or unnecessary fees in connection with Defendants’ home mortgage loan servicing businesses.” (1)

The opinion states that

Plaintiffs have alleged numerous instances where deficient information was provided and could have been revealed—namely, in the mortgage agreements themselves, in the mortgage statements reflecting the marked-up fees, or during communications with Chase where it told Plaintiffs that the fees were in accordance with their mortgage agreements.  Plaintiffs provide specific dates for statements in which they believe they were charged the marked-up fees, and allege they paid the fees without knowing their true nature.  Plaintiffs describe the content of the omission as the failure to inform them that the fees were marked-up and that the majority of the fees ultimately went to Chase, and not third-party vendors performing the services.  As discussed above, Plaintiffs have also sufficiently alleged that they did pay the marked-up fees. (36)

It continues,

Defendants allegedly demanded payment for fees that, in some cases, were never actually incurred. Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that false representations were made to borrowers when Chase told them that the fees were in accordance with their mortgage contracts—this is distinguishable from an omission. As alleged, the fraud is equally about the failure to disclose material information as it is that the amounts demanded on mortgage statements were false because they did not correspond to the actual amounts owed pursuant to the mortgage agreements relied upon by Defendants. Based on the alleged nature of the fraudulent scheme, the lack of an explicit “duty to disclose” is not dispositive in light of affirmative fraud that is also alleged. (37, citations omitted)

Denying the motion to dismiss this claim exposes servicers to great potential liability for their acts and omissions.

Strategies to Improve the Housing Market

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Boston Consulting prepared this Strategies to Improve the Housing Market report on behalf of The Pew Charitable Trusts.  The report focuses “on practical solutions that can readily be implemented by industry, agencies, and regulators working within existing mandates, or by nongovernmental organizations.”  (6)  I highlight three proposals in their report that I find particularly interesting.

1.  Promulgate Consistent Set of Loan Servicing Standards

Mortgage servicing is governed by a number of loan servicing standards—including standards under the DOJ settlement, OCC consent orders, FHFA Servicing Alignment Initiative, CFPB, as well as those of individual states—which vary in scope and individual provisions. A consistent set of loan servicing standards across the servicing life cycle can both ensure a basic standard of service for all homeowners and reduce the operational complexity of complying with multiple, varying standards for servicers.  (8)

This seems to be key to dealing with the misaligned incentives and anticommons problems that have become so apparent during the Subprime Bust.

2.  Streamline The Foreclosure Process in Key States

The long foreclosure process, particularly in judicial states, creates negative impacts on both lenders and communities, particularly when borrowers are “free riding.” While preserving the primacy of states and localities in foreclosure law, experts highlighted the desirability of working with them to develop a “model” foreclosure process based on best practices, to be adopted by states and localities on a voluntary basis. We recommend that an NGO takes the lead on developing such a model, based on best practices across jurisdictions, brings in key states and other relevant stakeholders to build consensus, and advocates for change with state policy makers and legislatures.  (9)

This issue is more complicated than the report (and most other commentators) concedes.  The claim that borrowers are “free riding” is not exactly true.  Lengthy foreclosure periods existed before the mortgages were entered into and were presumably priced into the cost of mortgages.  Indeed, the FHFA is trying to reprice mortgages in jurisdictions with the longest periods.  There are clearly policy choices at issue in the design of a foreclosure process.  For homeowners and lenders alike, the difference between the lengthy judicial process and the relatively rapid non-judicial process is only the most stark example of how process (in this case, length of process) affects substantive rights (that is, post-default occupancy periods).

3.  Rationalize First and Subordinate Lienholder Rights

In the context of continuing demand for home equity loans (second or subordinate liens), there is a need to clarify the rights of first and second lienholders to avoid a repeat of current frictions in the future and to restore investor confidence that first lienholders will have enforceable priority in the event of default. Any new framework put forward should achieve two key objectives:

>  protecting first-lien priority

>  standardizing treatment of seconds in loss mitigation efforts.

Conflicts between first and second lienholders have been a source of controversy and friction since the crisis began. It is unlikely that private investors will want to commit substantial new investment dollars to private securitizations until this issue is resolved. The industry, perhaps through the auspices of one of its trade association, should take the lead on further developing these options, in the first instance, with involvement from the FHFA, Treasury, and FDIC.  (11, emphasis deleted)

This is a very important issue.  I have been struck since the early days of the crisis how non-lawyers in particular (economists are particular offenders!) assume away the legal rights of seconds in their proposals to address the foreclosure epidemic.  Unsurprisingly, the seconds (knowing what happens to those who “ass-u-me”) have successfully asserted their legal rights to protect their financial interests.  Any solution to the problem of misaligned incentives between first and seconds must take the legal rights of these profit-maximizing entities into account.