Author Archives: David Reiss

Appraisals in the Coal Mine

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The Federal Housing Finance Agency Office of Inspector General released an Audit Report, FHFA’s Oversight of the Enterprises’ Use of Appraisal Data Before They Buy Single-Family Mortgages. As the IG notes,

Assessing the value of collateral securing mortgage loans is one of the pillars in making sound underwriting decisions. Since September 2008, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) has operated Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae (the Enterprises) in conservatorship, due to poor business decisions and risk management that led to enormous losses. While in conservatorship, the Enterprises have relied on Treasury’s financial support to operate in the secondary mortgage market, buying loans in order to provide needed liquidity to lenders. In 2010, FHFA directed the Enterprises to improve single-family residential loan quality and risk management through, among other things, developing a uniform collateral data portal (portal).

Unfortunately, the IG found that

  • from January 2013 through June 2013, Fannie Mae spent $13 billion buying over 56,000 loans even though the portal’s analysis of the associated appraisals warned the Enterprise that the appraisals were potentially in violation of its underwriting requirements.
  • from June 2013 through September 2013, Freddie Mac spent $6.7 billion buying over 29,000 loans despite the portal warning the Enterprise that either no property value could be provided or the value of the property was in question.

  • the Enterprises bought nearly $88 billion in loans when system logic errors in the portal did not allow them to determine if the appraiser was properly licensed to assess the value of the properties, which served as collateral for the loans.

The IG did not characterize these problems as particularly worrisome, but I wonder if they are somewhat symbolic of the limbo state that the Enterprises find themselves in. Like canaries in a coal mine, they alert us to a serious problem.

Neither private companies nor government instrumentalities, the Enterprises must stagger on until the federal government decides what to do with them. Let’s hope that the Enterprises are not silently building up to another crisis, one not driven by the profit-motive as the last one was, but driven by bureaucratic incompetence. “Bureaucratic” in the sense of the “rule of no one,” as Mary McCarthy defined it.

Fannie and Freddie’s current profitability should not be used as an excuse to delay reform further. They are too important to have been left in limbo for so long.

 

Reiss on Marketplace: Cash Cows to Slaughter

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I was interviewed on Marketplace for its story, Fannie and Freddie: Cash Cows Avoid The Slaughter? (sound file) The text of the story reads

We are making money – the tax payer, that is – on Fannie and Freddie Mac.

When Freddie Mac hands the treasury a $10.4 billion dividend next month, tax payers will have received more money in interest than was put in. (Technically the two institutions still owe the principal on the loan that bailed them out, but the interest they’re paying will shortly exceed that amount).

But.

There always is a but with these things.

Making money for the tax payer isn’t good if you ask those who want reform.

Back during the financial crisis, conservatives and liberals disagreed over whether Freddie and Fannie were a victim of or a cause of the housing collapse, but they agreed that the institutions needed reform. The profits are throwing a wrinkle into this debate.

“As long as Fannie and Freddie continue to pay substantial amounts of money to the government, they are looked at by some people in Congress as a great source of revenue that reduces the deficit,” explains Peter Wallison with the American Enterprise Institute. His concern – shared by reformers on both sides of the political spectrum – is that if Fannie and Freddie become cash cows, congress won’t want to touch them.

David Reiss, professor of law at the Brooklyn Law School, agrees. He says the financial crisis wasn’t a one time problem.

“We should think of it as that we dodged a bullet. There’s fundamental problems with the Fannie and Freddie business model which rests on this notion of privatizing profits and socializing losses.”

Freddie and Fannie buy mortgages from lenders, and then bundle them into “mortgage backed securities” that can be sold to investors. It’s useful because it converted illiquid mortgage loans into liquid securities. In plain English, it means a bank or investor who made a mortgage loan to someone didn’t have to wait around for 30 years to be paid back. They could sell their stake in the mortgage to Fannie or Freddie, move along, and go invest in other things. This helped more people get mortgages.

One concern was that Fannie and Freddie were simply too big and too concentrated. Another concern was that the federal government implicitly guaranteed investments in Freddie and Fannie, and that encouraged people to make home loans that were too risky.

Even without the complication of profits, the debate over how to reform Fannie and Freddie is at a stand still.

House Republicans don’t want the government involved at all, they want an efficient market. The Senate wants the government to be involved a little bit, essentially to promote housing.

“What I see,” says David Reiss, “is nothing really happening, and us being a holding pattern for a long time.”

It’s possible that reform-minded politicians will compromise before they lose their chance. Also possible they won’t.

Subprime Mortgage Conundrums

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Joseph Singer has posted Foreclosure and the Failures of Formality, or Subprime Mortgage Conundrums and How to Fix Them (also on SSRN). Singer writes,

One of the striking features of the subprime era is that banks acted without adequate regard for state property law. They were intent on serving the national and international financial markets with new and more profitable products, and they treated state property law as an obstacle to get around rather than a foundation on which to build. Rather than sell mortgages to families that could afford them, they hoodwinked the vulnerable by picking their pockets. Rather than honestly disclose the high risks associated with subprime loans, they paid rating agencies to give them AAA ratings, inducing investors to take risks they neither were prepared for nor understood. The banks made huge amounts of money marketing mortgages to people who could not afford to pay them back while offloading the risks of such deals onto hapless third parties. And rather than observe longstanding laws and customs designed to clarify property titles, banks evaded requirements of publicity and formality that traditionally governed real estate transactions. In short, the banks misled both borrowers and investors while undermining property titles. This was both a clever and a profitable way to engage in  business, but it was neither honorable nor responsible. (501, footnotes omitted)

Brad Borden and I have made a similar point in our debate with Joshua Stein, but Singer’s article plays it out in far greater depth. The article is a property prof’s cri de coeur over the near death of real property law principles during the early 2000s subprime boom, but it is also a very thorough inquest. The article concludes with a review of tools that are available to respond to failures in the mortgage market. All in all, it provides a nice overview of what led to the crisis as well as potential policy tools that are available to prevent future ones.

 

FIRREA Does the Hustle

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Judge Rakoff has issued another Opinion in U.S. v. Countrywide Fin. Corp. et al., 12 Civ. 1422 (Feb. 17, 2014).  Rakoff reconfirms his broad reading of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), which covers fraudulent behavior that is self-affecting; that is, where the perpetrator and victim of the fraud are one and the same financial institution. This Opinion goes further, however, based on on developments in the litigation since that earlier opinion.

The Opinion notes that the defendants were found liable at trial and finds that

Based on the charge as given to the jury, the jury, by finding liability, necessarily found that the defendants intentionally induced two government-sponsored entities, the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”), to purchase from the Bank Defendants thousands of loans that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would not otherwise have purchased. The defendants did so, the jury necessarily found, by misrepresenting that the loans they were selling were “investment quality” and that they knew of nothing that might cause investors to regard the mortgages as poor investments, when in fact the defendants knew that their underwriting process, known as the “High Speed Swim Lane,” “HSSL,” or “Hustle,” was calculated to produce loans that were not of investment quality. (3)

The Court had previously found that “the fraud here in question, perpetrated by the Countrywide defendants and Ms. Mairone, had a huge effect on Bank of America defendants, which, as a result of Bank of America’s purchase of Countrywide, paid, directly or through affiliates, billions of dollars to settle repurchase claims brought by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.” (4) The opinion concludes that

It is highly improbable that Congress would have intended to place beyond the reach of FIRREA those defendants whose misconduct “affects” federally insured banks that have the great fortune to be fully insured [by their affiliates] for such losses. Even less so can it be imagined that the device of having BAC [the BoA parent holding company] indemnify BANA [the BoA federally insured bank] for losses that otherwise would result from Countrywide’s fraud immunizes Countrywide from liability under FIRREA. Indeed, defendants’ labeling of this theory of liability as the “self-affecting” theory is something of a misnomer; Countrywide’s fraud, which culminated before the merger with BANA, directly affected, not just Countrywide, but its merger partner, BANA, as well. While the effect on Countrywide might be “self-affecting,” the effect on BANA was not. (5)

This Opinion seems to bolster Rakoff’s broad reading of FIRREA.  As of now, FIRREA gives the federal government a powerful tool to pursue alleged wrongdoing affecting federally insured financial institutions.  The caselaw reads FIRREA broadly and the statute’s ten-year statute of limitations means that additional suits may still be coming down the pike.

Long-Term Homeownership Affordability

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Amnon Lehavi has posted Can the Resale Housing Market Be Split to Facilitate Long-Term Affordability? to SSRN.  The paper argues that

a comprehensive affordable housing policy requires the formal splitting of the homeownership market into (at least) two distinct segments: one designated for the general public and following a conventional pricing mechanism through free market supply and demand, and the other designated for eligible households and controlling both initial supply and subsequent resale of housing units through regulated affordability-oriented pricing mechanisms.

While regulation of the pricing of affordable housing units during their initial allocation is a standard feature of housing policy–whether such affordable units are produced by a public authority or a private developer–regulation of pricing upon resale to subsequent buyers has received less attention as a matter of both theory and practice, thus leaving a substantial gap in

design mechanisms aimed at promoting a sustainable affordable housing policy.(1)

This is not really a new argument, but the paper takes the position that existing efforts to regulate resales of affordable housing in the homeownership market can be scaled up significantly. The paper does not take on some of the bigger questions that this position implicates — for instance, should scarce homeownership dollars be spent on rental housing instead — but it does develop a concrete proposal:

This paper seeks to enrich policy design options by introducing two alternative cap-on-resale mechanisms for the affordable housing segment: “Mixed Indexed Cap” (MIC) and “Pure Indexed Cap” (PIC). It explains how such models could be utilized to attain a policy goal of promoting long-term social mobility, allowing multiple low- and modest-income households to engage in capital building by sequentially enjoying increments of appreciation of properties in the affordable housing segment.

In so doing, the paper addresses a series of challenges posed by the design of a cap-on-resale mechanism: Could such a mechanism ensure that the homeowner is granted a fair return upon resale, providing the owner with proper incentives to invest efficiently in the property during the tenure, while setting up a resale rate that would make the unit truly affordable for future homebuyers? (1)

New York Ciy has experimented with affordable homeownership and has not come up with an ideal solution to the problem of affordability upon resale. Given the renewed focus on affordable housing policy in NYC, this attention to affordable homeownership policy is most welcome.

Reiss on Single Family Rental-Backed Bonds

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Law360 Quoted me in Newest Property-Secured Bonds Invite Scrutiny (behind a paywall). It reads in part,

The Blackstone Group LP’s recent groundbreaking move to sell bonds secured by single-family rental homes may have created the next securitization blockbuster, but attorneys say the product could attract the same type of litigation that has plagued the commercial and residential mortgage-backed securities markets.

Blackstone is among a growing group of entities that amassed large numbers of foreclosed homes after the crisis and are turning them into profitable rentals. Now some are hoping to take that profitability one step further, extending loans secured by these single-family homes and securitizing them.

This process offers benefits both to players like Blackstone and to smaller landlords that own groups of single-family rentals and can’t get traditional lenders to lend against their assets. Blackstone’s debut product — sold to a syndicate led by Deutsche Bank AG — has been very well-received, but attorneys caution that many questions remain unanswered, and REO-to-rental-backed bonds could pose litigation risks.

*    *    *

Blackstone’s $480 million deal, in which it pooled 3,200 homes owned by its portfolio company Invitation Homes and used them to secured a single loan that it then securitized, made waves as the first of its kind.

Several other opportunistic real estate investment companies, including American Homes 4 Rent and Colony Capital LLC, are expected to follow suit, but they are treading lightly as the new product is assessed by the market and investors.

*    *    *

The homes themselves may also be subject to condemnation or landlord-tenant litigation that could encumber the overall loan indirectly by affecting the value of the collateral, according to David Reiss, a real estate finance professor at Brooklyn Law School.

Before the recession, single-family homes were considered too expensive to be managed by a large institution like Blackstone or American Homes 4 Rent because of their geographic diversity and because it was hard to control property management on so many different homes, according to Reiss.

The financial crisis made distressed single-family homes cheaper and more attractive to opportunistic investors, and the low price may compensate for the other issues, he said.

“This is a new asset class, and it is not yet clear whether Blackstone has properly evaluated its risks,” Reiss said.  “Time will tell whether these bonds will become a significant new category of asset-backed securities or whether the financial crisis presented a one-time financial opportunity for some firms.”

Reiss on Mortgage Availability

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The Consumer Eagle quoted me in Will Mortgages be Harder to Get in 2014? It reads in part,

David Reiss, Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School, also sees some benefit in more conservative guidelines. “The QM rules and ability-to-repay rules legislate commonsense things like making sure people can repay loans that they take out, which was something that was given up not only in the last boom but in the boom that preceded it. So from the consumer perspective, you now know that when you get a mortgage you’re probably going to be able to pay it back,” Reiss says. “Some consumers and some people in the industry would say let people make their own decisions with minimal consumer protection regulation, but we had a phase of that and it ended poorly for all of us.”

Borrowers who are self-employed or have irregular income may have a harder time qualifying for a loan under the new rules. Reiss notes that those who are ineligible for a QM may still be able to get a non-qualified mortgage. “What we haven’t seen is what this non-QM market is going to look like in 2014 and beyond,” Reiss says. “It’s a new market.”

Members of the banking industry have expressed concerns about the changes. In recent testimony before the House Committee on Financial Services, William Emerson, CEO of Quicken Loans and vice chair of the Mortgage Bankers Association, said the rules “are likely to unduly tighten mortgage credit for a significant number of creditworthy families who seek to buy or refinance a home” and “may impair credit access for many of the very consumers they are designed to protect.”

Reiss notes that consumer protections are always a compromise. “Regulators want to be conservative to protect consumers, but they also don’t want to keep people who would pay back their loans from getting credit,” he says. “There’s always a dance.”