Tag Archives: Federal Housing Finance Agency

CFPB Strategy on Mortgage Data

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The CFPB released its Strategic Plan, Budget, and Performance Plan and Report which provides a good summary of what the Bureau has done to date. I was particularly interested in this summary of its work to build a representative database of mortgages:

In FY 2013, the CFPB began a partnership with the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to build the National Mortgage Database (NMDB). This work continues in FY 2014. For this database, the FHFA and the Bureau have procured (from a credit reporting agency) credit information with respect to a random and representative sample of 5% of mortgages held by consumers. The NMDB is the first dataset that will provide a truly representative sample of mortgages so as to allow analysis of mortgages over the life of the loans, including firsts, seconds, and home equity loans.

In all of the data used for its analyses, the Bureau will work to ensure that strong protections are in place around personally identifiable information. (66)

Such a database (assuming privacy concerns are adequately addressed) will be an invaluable tool for the Bureau (and researchers too, to the extent that they are allowed to access it). One question that the Strategic Plan does not answer is how fresh will the mortgage data be. The mortgage market can innovate at warp speed, as it did in the mid-2000s, so it will be important for the CFPB database to be as current as possible and accessible to researchers as quickly as possible. That being said, even if the data is a bit stale, it will still provide invaluable guidance regarding abusive behaviors in the market. It should also provide guidance regarding a lack of sustainable credit in the market generally as well as within those communities that have historically suffered from such a lack, low- and moderate-income communities as well as communities of color.

On a separate note, I would say that the Strategic Plan makes some assumptions about the efficacy of financial education that should probably be studied carefully. There is a lot of research that challenges the usefulness of financial education. The Bureau should grapple with that research before it invests heavily in financial education implementation.

Reiss on Fannie and Freddie Conservatorship Litigation

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I have posted An Overview of the Fannie and Freddie Conservatorship Litigation to  SSRN (and to BePress as well). The abstract reads:

The fate of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are subject to the vagaries of politics, regulation, public opinion, the economy, and not least of all the numerous cases that have been filed in 2013 against various government entities arising from the placement of the two companies into conservatorship. This short article will provide an overview of the last of these. The litigation surrounding Fannie and Freddie’s conservatorship raises all sorts of issues about the federal government’s involvement in housing finance. These issues are worth setting forth as the proper role of these two companies in the housing finance system is still very much up in the air. The plaintiffs, in the main, argue that the federal government has breached its duties to preferred shareholders, common shareholders, and potential beneficiaries of a housing trust fund authorized by the same statute that authorized their conservatorships. At this early stage, it appears that the plaintiffs have a tough row to hoe.

Reiss on Frannie Reform

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Law360.com quoted me in Capital Rules To Spread Beyond Banks Under Housing Bill (behind a paywall). The story reads in part,

Mortgage servicers, aggregators and other actors in the U.S. housing finance market would for the first time be subject to the same capital requirements that apply to banks under a new bipartisan bill aimed at replacing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, potentially eliminating an advantage nonbank firms currently enjoy.

The elimination of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is the centerpiece of S. 1217, the Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014, introduced by Senate Banking Committee Chairman Tim Johnson, D-S.D., and the committee’s ranking Republican, Sen. Mike Crapo, R-Wyo. The government-sponsored entities would be replaced by a proposed Federal Mortgage Insurance Corp. that would backstop the housing finance market in a manner similar to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.’s backing of the banking system.

Among the details in the 442-page bill released Sunday are provisions that would allow the FMIC to impose capital standards and other “safety and soundness” rules to mortgage servicers, firms that package mortgages into securities and guarantors that provide the private capital backing to mortgage-backed securities. Compliance with these standards would be required for access to a government guarantee.

Previously those types of institutions have not been subject to safety and soundness rules, unless they were part of a bank. If the Johnson-Crapo bill moves forward as currently written, those firms could be in for a big change, said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.

“Historically, nonbanks have had a lot less regulation than banks. So, by giving them a safety and soundness regulator you are taking away a regulatory advantage – that is, less regulation – that they have had as financial institutions,” he said.

*     *      *

“What it effectively does is create safety and soundness standards for guarantors, aggregators and servicers, as if they were banks. There’s been this long debate about what you do about the nondepository institutions, and this would empower FMIC to supervise private-party participants like banks,” said Laurence Platt, a partner with K&L Gates LLP.

Specifically, the potential rules would apply to aggregators, which serve to collect mortgages and pack them into securities, and guarantors, or firms that provide the private capital to back those securities. Mortgage servicers that process payments and provide other services to mortgages inside those securities would also be included under the FMIC’s regulatory umbrella, according to the bill.

The FMIC would also have the power to force the largest guarantors and aggregators to maintain higher capital standards than their smaller competitors as a way to mitigate the risk of any such market player becoming too big to fail, and will be able to limit such firms’ market share if they get too big, according to the bill.

Underwriting standards for mortgages that would be backed by the FMIC would match, as much as possible, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s qualified mortgage standards, which went into effect in January, according to the legislation.

Moreover, the FMIC would be able to write regulations for force-placed insurance that is applied to mortgages where borrowers do not purchase their own private mortgage insurance under the legislation. The CFPB and other regulators have tackled perceived problems in the force-placed insurance market in recent months.

Extending those capital and other safety and soundness requirements to nonbank firms would be akin to extending supervision authority of nonbank mortgage servicers and other firms to the CFPB, a power granted by the Dodd-Frank Act, Reiss said.

“It can be described as part of the effort since the passage of Dodd-Frank to regulate the breadth of the financial services industry instead of one part of it, the banking sector,” he said.

Appraisals in the Coal Mine

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The Federal Housing Finance Agency Office of Inspector General released an Audit Report, FHFA’s Oversight of the Enterprises’ Use of Appraisal Data Before They Buy Single-Family Mortgages. As the IG notes,

Assessing the value of collateral securing mortgage loans is one of the pillars in making sound underwriting decisions. Since September 2008, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) has operated Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae (the Enterprises) in conservatorship, due to poor business decisions and risk management that led to enormous losses. While in conservatorship, the Enterprises have relied on Treasury’s financial support to operate in the secondary mortgage market, buying loans in order to provide needed liquidity to lenders. In 2010, FHFA directed the Enterprises to improve single-family residential loan quality and risk management through, among other things, developing a uniform collateral data portal (portal).

Unfortunately, the IG found that

  • from January 2013 through June 2013, Fannie Mae spent $13 billion buying over 56,000 loans even though the portal’s analysis of the associated appraisals warned the Enterprise that the appraisals were potentially in violation of its underwriting requirements.
  • from June 2013 through September 2013, Freddie Mac spent $6.7 billion buying over 29,000 loans despite the portal warning the Enterprise that either no property value could be provided or the value of the property was in question.

  • the Enterprises bought nearly $88 billion in loans when system logic errors in the portal did not allow them to determine if the appraiser was properly licensed to assess the value of the properties, which served as collateral for the loans.

The IG did not characterize these problems as particularly worrisome, but I wonder if they are somewhat symbolic of the limbo state that the Enterprises find themselves in. Like canaries in a coal mine, they alert us to a serious problem.

Neither private companies nor government instrumentalities, the Enterprises must stagger on until the federal government decides what to do with them. Let’s hope that the Enterprises are not silently building up to another crisis, one not driven by the profit-motive as the last one was, but driven by bureaucratic incompetence. “Bureaucratic” in the sense of the “rule of no one,” as Mary McCarthy defined it.

Fannie and Freddie’s current profitability should not be used as an excuse to delay reform further. They are too important to have been left in limbo for so long.

 

Federalizing Monoline Mortgage Insurance

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The Federal Insurance Office of the Department of Treasury issued a report required pursuant to Dodd-Frank, How To Modernize And Improve The System Of Insurance Regulation In The United States, which addresses among other things the state of the monoline mortgage insurance industry:

Recommendation: Federal standards and oversight for mortgage insurers should be developed and implemented.

Like financial guarantors, private mortgage insurers are monoline companies that experienced devastating losses during the financial crisis. A business predominantly focused on providing credit enhancement to mortgages guaranteed by the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, mortgage insurers migrated from the core business of insuring conventional, well-underwritten mortgage loans to providing insurance on pools of Alt-A and subprime mortgages in the years leading up to the financial crisis. The dramatic decline in housing prices and the impact of the change in underwriting practices required mortgage insurers to draw down capital and reserves to pay claims resulting in the failure of three out of the eight mortgage insurers in the United States. Historically high levels of claim denials, including policy rescissions, helped put taxpayers at risk.

Regulatory oversight of mortgage insurance varies state by state. Though mortgage insurance coverage is provided nationally, only 16 states impose specific requirements on private mortgage insurers. Of these requirements, two govern the solvency regime and, therefore, are of particular significance: (1) a limit on total liability, net of reinsurance, for all policies of 25 times the sum of capital, surplus, and contingency reserves, (known as a 25:1 risk-to-capital ratio); and (2) a requirement of annual contributions to a contingency reserve equal to 50 percent of the mortgage insurer’s earned premium. In addition to the states, the GSEs (and through conservatorship, the Federal Housing Finance Agency) establish uniform standards and eligibility requirements that in some cases are more stringent than those required by state regulators. As the financial crisis unfolded, mortgage insurers no longer met state or contractual capital requirements. State regulators granted waivers in order to allow mortgage insurers to continue to write new business while the GSEs loosened other standards that were applicable to mortgage insurers.

The private mortgage insurance sector is interconnected with other aspects of the federal housing finance system and, therefore, is an issue of significant national interest. As the United States continues to recover from the financial crisis and works to reform aspects of the housing finance system, private mortgage insurance may be an important component of any reform package as an alternative way to place private capital in front of any government or taxpayer risk. Robust national solvency and business practice standards, with uniform implementation, for mortgage insurers would help foster greater confidence in the solvency and performance of housing finance. To achieve this objective, it is necessary to establish federal oversight of federally developed standards applicable to mortgage insurance. (31-32)

This critique of the monoline insurance industry seems accurate to me. The industry has a tendency to fail when it is needed most — during major financial crises. Having multiple states regulate monoline insurers allows this nationally (and globally) significant industry to engage in regulatory arbitrage — that is, finding the most pliable regulatory environment in which to operate. National regulation would solve that problem. As always, a single federal regulator is more prone to capture by the industry it regulates than a bunch of state regulators. We have, however, tried the alternative and it has not worked so well. I think a federal approach is worth a try.

The Road to Securitization

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Miguel Segoviano et al. of the IMF released a helpful Working Paper, Securitization:  Lessons Learned and the Road Ahead (also on SSRN). It opens,

Like most forms of financial innovation, there are cost and benefits associated with the securitization of cash flows. From a conceptual perspective, a sound and efficient market for securitization can be supportive of the financial system and broader economy in various ways such as lowering funding costs and improving the capital utilization of financial institutions—benefits which may be passed onto borrowers; helping issuers and investors diversify risk; and transforming pools of illiquid assets into tradable securities, thus stimulating the flow of credit—an issue of particular relevance for some European countries. However, these features need to be weighed against the potential costs, including the risk that securitization contributes to excessive credit growth in and outside of the formal banking system; principal-agent problems that amplify perverse incentives; the complexity and opaqueness of certain products which make efficient pricing problematic; and the heavy reliance of the industry on credit ratings. (3)

The authors identify lessons learned from the financial crisis as well as impediments to a renewed securitization market. They conclude with a set of policy recommendations.

I recommend this paper as a good overview. I particularly like that it looks beyond the United States market, although it does spend plenty of time looking at the history and structure of the U.S. market. The recommendations tend to be pretty reasonable, but not particularly innovative — implement Dodd-Frank-like requirements in non-U.S. jurisdictions; de-emphasize the role of NRSRO credit ratings; increase transparency and decrease needless complexity throughout the industry; modernize land record regimes, etc.

It is surely hard to get your hands around the global securitization industry, but it is important that we try to. Securitization is here to stay. We should manage its risks the best that we can.

U.S. Dismissive of Frannie Suits

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The Federal Housing Finance Agency filed its motion to dismiss all the claims in Perry Capital v. Lew, D.D.C., No. 13-cv-01025, 1/17/14. I blogged about this case (and similar cases) when they were filed last summer. It is quite interesting to read the government’s side of the story now. Today’s post focuses on the federal government’s alternative narrative. Where the private investors describe an opportunistic and abusive government in their complaints, the FHFA’s brief describes the government as a white knight who rode in to save the day at the depth of the financial crisis:

The national crisis having eased, Plaintiffs now ask the Court to re-write the agreements that FHFA, on behalf of the Enterprises, and Treasury executed to stabilize the Enterprises and the national economy, pursuant to express congressional authority. Plaintiffs want to cherry-pick those aspects of the agreements that they like—namely, the unprecedented financial support from Treasury at a time when the Enterprises required billions of dollars in capital—and discard the parts they do not like—namely, the Third Amended PSPAs—now that over one hundred billion dollars of federal taxpayer capital infusions and commitments have allowed the Enterprises to remain in business and produce positive earnings, rather than being placed into mandatory receivership and then liquidation. Plaintiffs’ attempt to reward themselves, at the expense of federal taxpayers who risked and continue to risk billions of dollars to save the Enterprises from receivership and liquidation, directly contravenes the relevant statutory authorities as implemented by the unambiguous language of the PSPAs.

Plaintiffs’ charges of common law and APA violations have it exactly backwards: FHFA, on behalf of the Enterprises, has acted at all times consistent with the Enterprises’ contractual obligations and FHFA’s powers as Conservator and statutory successor to all rights of the Enterprises and their stockholders. The shareholder-Plaintiffs, on the other hand, are attempting through these cases to convince this Court, during the conservatorships, to give shareholders financial value that they are not owed under the terms of their stock certificates or statutes, and to ignore the rights of the Enterprises’ senior preferred stockholder, the U.S. Treasury. By doing so, Plaintiffs seek not only to undermine the purposes of conservatorship, but also the very statutory mission of the Enterprises in which they chose to invest. (4-5)

While I think that the investors raise some serious legal issues for the court to decide, the federal government’s narrative of the financial crisis jibes a whole lot more with my own than does the investors’. I argued last summer that the side that wins control of the narrative will have an advantage in the battle over the legal issues. I would say that the federal government has won this first round.