Foreclosures & Credit Card Debt

Credit Cards

Paul S. Calem, Julapa Jagtiani and William W. Lang have posted Foreclosure Delay and Consumer Credit Performance to SSRN. Effectively, it argues that long foreclosure delays may have reduced the credit card default rate because homeowners in default were able to pay down their credit card debt while living for free in their homes. The abstract reads,

The deep housing market recession from 2008 through 2010 was characterized by a steep rise in the number of foreclosures and lengthening foreclosure timelines. The average length of time from the onset of delinquency through the end of the foreclosure process also expanded significantly, averaging up to three years in some states. Most individuals undergoing foreclosure were experiencing serious financial stress. However, the extended foreclosure timelines enabled mortgage defaulters to live in their homes without making mortgage payments until the end of the foreclosure process, thus providing temporary income and liquidity benefits from lower housing costs. This paper investigates the impact of extended foreclosure timelines on borrower performance with credit card debt. Our results indicate that a longer period of nonpayment of mortgage expenses results in higher cure rates on delinquent credit cards and reduced credit card balances. Foreclosure process delays may have mitigated the impact of the economic downturn on credit card default.

The authors conclude,

our findings indicate that households do not consume all the benefits from temporary relief from housing expenses; instead, they use that temporary relief to cure delinquent credit card debt and reduce their credit card balances. Interestingly, we find that payment relief from loan modifications has a similar impact to payment relief from longer foreclosure timelines; both are associated with curing card delinquency and reducing card balances.

These households, however, are likely to become delinquent on their credit cards again within six quarters following the end of the foreclosure process. Thus, the results suggest that there may be added risk for nonmortgage lenders when foreclosures are completed and households must incur the transaction costs of moving and incur significant housing expenses once again. This implies an additional dimension of risk to credit card lenders that has not been observed previously. (23)

I am not sure what to make of these findings for borrowers, regulators, credit card lenders or mortgage lenders. Would a utility-maximizing borrower run up their credit card debt while in foreclosure? Should states seek to change foreclosure timelines to change consumer or lender behavior? Should profit-maximizing credit card lenders seek to further limit borrowing upon a mortgage default?  What should profit-maximizing mortgage lenders do? I have lots of questions but no good answers yet.

Abusive Non-Rent Fees for Rent Stabilized Tenants

The Urban Justice Center’s Community Development Project has issued a report, The Burden of Fees: How Affordable Housing is Made Unaffordable. The introduction reads,

Tenants in New York City’s poorest neighborhoods are under attack. Despite the existence of laws such as rent stabilization to protect tenants from high rents, landlords are creating new ways to push rent stabilized tenants out of their homes. One such tactic is the use of non-rent fees, a confusing and often times unwarranted set of charges that are added to a monthly rent statement . . .. These include fees on appliances (air conditioner, washing machine, dryer, and dishwasher), legal fees, damage fees, Major Capital Improvement (MCI) rent increases and other miscellaneous fees. Often these fees appear on a tenant’s rent bill without any explanation. If a tenant fails to pay, even if they are unaware of why the fee was imposed, they are sent letters that make them feel that they are being harassed and are threatened with eviction by the landlord. Most tenants have a right to object to many of these fees, and landlords are legally prohibited from taking tenants to Housing Court solely for non-payment of additional fees. But many tenants don’t know their rights about the fees and often pay them when they shouldn’t. For low-income and working class tenants who struggle each month to pay rent, these fees add up and make their housing costs unaffordable. While some of the fees are legal, many of them are not, and the consistency and pattern of the way the fees are being charged and collected suggests that some landlords are intentionally increasing tenants’ rent burdens to push out long- term, rent stabilized tenants.

This problem is proliferating in the Bronx, where New Settlement’s Community Action for Safe Apartments (CASA) works to improve living conditions and maintain affordable housing. This is particularly apparent in buildings owned by Chestnut Holdings, a company that is fast becoming one of the biggest landlords of rent stabilized buildings in the Bronx.

*     *     *

All survey respondents live in rent stabilized buildings owned by Chestnut Holdings. In total, the coalition collected 172 surveys from 23 buildings, representing 13% of the number of apartments in those buildings. The research sample accounts for 4% of all the apartments that Chestnut Holdings owns, and 28% of the buildings. Researchers also collected rent bills and other supplemental materials (including letters to and from landlords, housing court decisions, and more) from 196 Chestnut Holdings tenants. Coalition members chose to focus on these buildings because they are rent stabilized and located in the neighborhoods where each organization is actively working. Data in this report comes from surveys, recent rent bills collected from Chestnut Holdings’ tenants and interviews with tenants.

Overall, we found that the problem of non-rent fees is serious and widespread in the Bronx. 81% of the tenants we surveyed had been charged some sort of fee. From the rent bills we reviewed for this report, the average tenant had $671.13 in non-rent fees on their most recent rent bill. (1-2)

This document is obviously an advocacy document and not a piece of objective scholarship. Moreover, its methodology may not be rigorous enough to allow us to extrapolate much from its findings. That being said, the survey responses themselves reveal a serious problem: alleged average non-rent fees of nearly $700 for each survey respondent seems very, very high, even if we limit the findings to the respondents themselves.

In the 1970s, predatory landlords hired bruisers with bats and pit bulls to frighten tenants into leaving their homes. In the 2000s, a new generation of predatory landlords used abusive court filings to achieve the same purpose. There is a very real risk that high non-rent fees represent a new tactic for predatory landlords to drive out rent-regulated tenants with under-market rents. To the extent that non-rent fees represent a new tactic to harass tenants, government regulators should actively seek to end it and punish those who employ it.

Housing and Transportation Affordability Index

The Center for Neighborhood Technology has a Housing and Transportation Affordability Index which

provides a more comprehensive way of thinking about the true affordability of place. It presents housing and transportation data as maps, charts and statistics for 917 metropolitan and micropolitan areas—covering 94% of the US population. Costs can be seen from the regional down to the neighborhood level.

The recent focus on combined housing and transportation costs is very useful when planning affordable housing policies as total housing and transportation costs provide a better guide to housing cost burden than housing costs alone.

The Housing and Transportation Affordability Index

shows that transportation costs vary between and within regions depending on neighborhood characteristics:

  • People who live in location-efficient neighborhoods—compact, mixed-use, and with convenient access to jobs, services, transit and amenities—tend to have lower transportation costs.
  • People who live in location-inefficient places—less dense areas that require automobiles for most trips—are more likely to have higher transportation costs.

The traditional measure of affordability recommends that housing cost no more than 30% of household income. Under this view, a little over half (55%) of US neighborhoods are considered “affordable” for the typical household. However, that benchmark fails to take into account transportation costs, which are typically a household’s second-largest expenditure. The H+T Index offers an expanded view of affordability, one that combines housing and transportation costs and sets the benchmark at no more than 45% of household income.

When transportation costs are factored into the equation, the number of affordable neighborhoods drops to 26%, resulting in a net loss of 59,768 neighborhoods that Americans can truly afford. The key finding from the H+T Index is that household transportation costs are highly correlated with urban environment characteristics, when controlling for household characteristics.

A lot of housing policy rests on the definition of affordability, whether it is that housing cost should be no more than 30% of household income or that housing and transportation costs should be no more than 45% of household income. It would be useful for researchers to take a fresh look at those benchmarks to ensure that they make sense in today’s economy.

Thursday’s Advocacy & Think Tank Round-Up

3 Housing Riddles For De Blasio

I wrote an op ed for Law360,com that was posted today. While it is behind a paywall on Law360, it reads in full as follows:

3 Housing Riddles For De Blasio

As Mayor-Elect Bill de Blasio is making the transition from campaigning to governing New York City, it is worth contemplating some of the fundamental riddles that perplex those who spend their time thinking about the city’s housing policy. I address three of the most perplexing below.

The Riddle of Mandatory But Not Sufficient

The housing policy centerpiece of the de Blasio campaign is to require developers to build some affordable housing units when they build on lots that have been upzoned, a policy known as mandatory inclusionary zoning. The campaign website states that this policy will create 50,000 new units of housing.

Let’s put aside the fact that this number appears to be very aggressive given the lack of significant upzonings on the horizon (see second riddle below). Just because the city mandates that affordable housing be part of any new construction, it cannot mandate that developers build any housing at all if the deal does not make economic sense for them.

The de Blasio administration will need to carefully calibrate the mandatory inclusionary zoning rules to ensure that builders are sufficiently incentivized to build in the first place. This may limit the amount of affordable housing that can be mandated as part of that new construction.

One key aspect of this policy is whether the mandatory affordable housing will be required to be on-site or if the developer can build it off-site. If it is the former, it will help achieve the progressive goal of increasing socio-economic diversity in a city that is rapidly losing it.

But each unit of on-site housing would likely be more expensive to construct than off-site affordable units. And the opposite is true if the mandatory affordable units are allowed to be off-site; they will be likely cheaper to construct and thus more housing could be built. But it would not work toward increasing socio-economic diversity in the city.

And thus, the riddle of mandatory but not sufficient poses two challenges to the administration. Can it incentivize the creation of a meaningful number of units? And should it favor socio-economic diversity or the maximum production of affordable units? No easy answers here.

The Riddle of Now Versus Later

Can you increase the supply of housing to address the needs of a growing population while also downzoning large swaths of the city to respond to the preferences of the city’s current residents?

The Michael Bloomberg administration wanted to have this both ways, but that can’t work. The Bloomberg administration had planned on an increase in population of roughly another million people by 2030 while at the same time downzoning a large swath of the city (and, to be fair, upzoning some other portions).

This downzoning made current residents happy as it kept big, modern, out-of-context buildings from popping up near their homes. But it also limited the opportunities for increasing the housing stock, particularly near transit hubs. This is the basis of the second riddle — what is seen as bad by current residents may be good for future residents.

It is a fundamental economic truth that if more and more people are flocking to New York City, housing costs will rise unless supply increases. But for city residents, there is a paradox. New Yorkers see gleaming towers rise in their neighborhoods along with the rents for their nearby apartments. There are two explanations for this paradox.

First, the supply of new housing may be increasing without keeping pace with rising demand. Historically, New York City has not had many new units of housing built each year, maybe 20,000 units or so in a good year. This modest increase in supply has been overwhelmed by the increase in population of a million people in the last 20 or so years. This disparity goes a long way to explain the high rents and the miniscule vacancy rates that are seen throughout the city.

Second, new housing in one community (Williamsburg, for example) may be causing or be part of a wave of local gentrification in the existing housing stock. So, even if the new housing is having a tendency to decrease housing costs in the city overall because it increases the supply, it can also be pushing rents higher in the communities in which it is situated.

Increasing the supply of housing has to be a key component of providing “safe affordable homes for all New Yorkers,” as de Blasio calls for on his campaign website. This has to mean zoning significantly more land for high-rise residential construction as well as incentivizing the construction of affordable housing units in that new construction.

At the same time, de Blasio must attend to the concerns of those negatively impacted by the new construction. Hence, the riddle of now versus later.

The Riddle of the Few Versus the Many

The de Blasio campaign website calls for “tighter standards that ensure subsidies meet the needs of lower-income families and are distributed equitably throughout the five boroughs.” Distributing affordable housing subsidies equitably throughout the city is important, but there is another equity issue — should the city heavily subsidize affordable housing for a small portion of those who are eligible or should it distribute resources more broadly and thinly among everyone who is eligible?

Fewer than 8 percent of low- and middle-income households receive a direct or indirect subsidy for an apartment (excluding public housing) while more than 20 percent live below the poverty line of $23,283 annually for a family of four.

Should the city’s limited resources be used to create a relatively small number of new affordable units or should some of them be used in ways that benefit a broader swath of low- and moderate-income New Yorkers, albeit more modestly?

Certain policies can address the needs of many, many more low- and moderate-income households than does heavily subsidized new construction that houses perhaps a few thousand low- and moderate-income households each year.

Examples of such policies include tax credits for low- and moderate-income households that put money in their pockets and increased enforcement directed against landlords who try to illegally drive their tenants out of rent-regulated units. On the other hand, without an affordable apartment, staying in NYC can just be untenable no matter what additional benefits the government may be able to provide through more broadly available programs.

Thus, the third riddle is — do you give a lot of help to a few or do you give a little help to the many? It’s like choosing between the rock and the hard place for policymakers and New Yorkers alike.

Mayor-Elect de Blasio and his team will have to struggle with these riddles, and more. The only thing that is clear is that there are no right answers and no easy answers when it comes to housing policy in New York City.

—By David Reiss, Brooklyn Law School

David Reiss is a professor of law at Brooklyn Law School. He concentrates on real estate finance and community development and writes about housing policy.